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"It is a truth universally acknowledged, that in all business transactions, tax is a cost like 
any other, and, like any other, it ought to be - if the business is to remain competitive -
no greater than it has to be ... " 
Milton Grundy, The World of International Tax Planning, 1 July 1983, p. 1. 
Abstract: 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the definitional rules of fiscal jurisdiction as 
well as the tax consequences resulting from the application of these rules, as implemented 
in the national tax law of the chosen jurisdictions. In essence, there are two main rules, 
which give content to the chosen theory of fiscal jurisdiction, mainly source and 
residence. It is trite that globalisation of the world ' s economies poses certain problems 
for international tax policy. Companies and individuals are becoming more mobile and 
therefore are able to exploit tax differences between states. 
In consideration of the natural concern of governments that they should get an acceptable 
share of the profits generated by international businesses, this research study analyses the 
bases through which a country could claim the right to tax. The plasticity of these two 
key concepts (source and residence) may well subvert a country's ultimate tax objective 
because of the potential for exploitation of ambiguity in the search for effective 
avoidance. The residence tax system and its implications have been analysed mainly from 
the South African perspective, and where necessary, the analysis has sought reference in 
other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the United States. The source 
principle of taxation and its effects have also been studied from the South African 
context, with a comparative approach from Hong Kong. 
It has been found that the countries considered in this research have, in various ways, 
adopted different combinations of subjective factors for tax liability in their domestic tax 
laws. At the same time, the relentless search of additional tax revenue, has led countries 
to implement in their tax laws, stringent anti-avoidance measures designed to prevent the 
deferral of tax, for instance on foreign source income. Factors such as the increasing 
complexity of modem business and the greater sophistication of tax planning techniques 
have contributed to this state of affairs. 
Thus, this dissertation highlights that competition between governments, in the face of 
international economic integrity, may lead countries to adopt tax rules, which though they 
v 
follow the usual international standards, are nevertheless very complex in application and 
administration. This can maintain the problem of international double taxation and lead to 
excessive or unpredictable compliance burdens. 
It is shown how countries in the exercise of their fiscal jurisdiction can move towards 
harmonisation of rules and common interpretation of the tax base in the application of 
their national tax legislation. 
Eric P. Ketchemin 
7 October 2002 
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Part I: General introduction 
When the Katz Commission came out with its recommendation on certain aspects of tax 
structure of South Africa in its fifth report, it did recognise in the first chapter that we 
were now living in the era of international economic integration, where the tax system 
affecting a country's own citizens or residents activities transacted abroad or within the 
domestic jurisdiction needed to carefully balance domestic and international economic 
objectives. I 
In the global world, countries need to maintain orderly tax regimes to promote 
international trade. Consequently, there is a need for accepted rules and conventions 
limiting anyone country's rights to tax its own citizens or residents operating or 
investing abroad, or the citizens or residents of other countries operating domestically. 
Therefore with trade and investment increasingly becoming transnational, different 
jurisdictions have also started to reinforce or extend the basic principles by which to 
levy tax on income generated by international economic activity, be it in terms of a 
source or residence system. 
In various analyses of the international tax law problems, fiscal jurisdiction is always 
associated with double taxation and the consequent agreements for relief. A great 
amount has been written about double taxation agreements, or the international law 
aspect oftax,2 although the analysis of their application in the South African context in 
view of the fundamental change of the tax jurisdiction still needs to be explored. This 
may be the subject matter of a different research work. 
Very little international tax literature has focused mainly on the analysis of the 
definitional rules of fiscal jurisdiction in income tax law. The challenge of this research 
is therefore to analyse the common factors for tax liability and their application on 
I See the Fifth Interim Report of the Commission of Enquiry into certain aspects of the Tax Structure of 
South Africa (the Katz Commission), Government publication, Department of Finance, March 1997, 
chapter 1, p. 1. 
vanous selected transactions purely from the income tax law context, not really as 
understood in numerous double taxation agreements, but from the national tax laws 
perspective. This is because with or without tax agreements, different countries still 
encounter problems associated with the interpretational rules of fiscal jurisdiction. This 
intellectual venture has become crucial because the main jurisdiction considered (South 
Africa) has gone through the process of reshaping its tax system with a move from what 
is known in the international tax lexicon as a 'source plus' to a 'residence minus' 
system based on a combination of a dominant residence tax system coupled with the 
application of source rules on non-residents' income. 
While the understanding and interpretation of the definitional rules of South African 
fiscal jurisdiction is the centre of this study, I realised in identifying the statutory rules 
and South African case law having an international element, that the principle applied in 
most cases, referred to the practice adopted in other jurisdictions. 
Thus, because of the narrow focus of the South African international income tax law, I 
intend for the purpose of this dissertation to look for guidance and illumination on 
certain selected issues to other jurisdictions which are relevant for this comparative 
study. Even within the South African context, I do not intend to go through every aspect 
of tax jurisdiction. I plan to concentrate on some limited issues of crucial importance, 
following the legislative amendments that took place in 2000 with regard to source and 
residence, and try to compare them with similar positions in the chosen jurisdictions 
such as Hong Kong, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
This thesis is on the examination of the key operational concepts of tax, that is, source 
and residence, as they are employed to implement a theory of fiscal jurisdiction. In 
particular, this thesis has sought to examine and evaluate the changes that have taken 
place in South Africa over the past five years (from 1997) as the tax system has changed 
from source to residence. In short, this thesis is not about theories of fiscal jurisdiction 
2 See for instance, the publication by Jeffery, RJ, The Impact of State Sovereignty on Global Trade and 
International Taxation, 1999. 
2 
but rather the most appropriate connecting factor or operational concept for a tax 
system, in particular within a developing economy like South Mrica. 
Another objective of this research in its comparative view, is to show that globalisation 
of the world's economies calls for integration, and to achieve this, there should be a 
spontaneous movement towards harmonisation of rules, as well as a greater interest on 
the part of local tax practitioners in the tax systems of other countries. 
To make this comparative analysis more useful and consistent, I chose in comparison to 
South Africa which is a typical hybrid system, jurisdictions belonging to the same 
family of income tax laws, and which apply either exclusively one tax system such as 
the source principle (Hong Kong) or mainly residence concept (the United Kingdom or 
the United States). The aim is to analyse the rules of fiscal jurisdiction with South 
Africa, being the centre of focus, while considering comparable similar situations either 
in the dominantly source system such as Hong Kong, or in the main residence tax 
system such as the United Kingdom or to some extent the United States. 
Due to the reform of the tax system in South Africa, culminating in the passing of Act 
59 of 2000, which came into effect for years of assessment commencing on or after 01 
January 2001, most of the deeming source provisions previously applicable in section 9 
of the Income Tax Act have been repealed in the new legislation.3 It is therefore 
important to analyse the effect of the repealed legislation in the South African context, 
as it affects the taxation of non-residents. 
Similarly, on the implementation of a fully-fledged residence based tax system, all types 
of income, including non-investment income (active income) became subject to tax on 
the residence basis. Thus, issues of fiscal jurisdiction for instance, vis-a.-vis controlled 
For example, certain investment income of a foreign investment company in Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland was imputed to South African residents (s 9A); income accruing in respect of any 
business carried on by a South African resident as the owner or charterer of any ship or aircraft [s 
9(l)(c)]; income accruing to a South African resident as lessor of a container [s 9(1)(cB)]; any gain made 
by a South African resident in respect of a banker's acceptance or similar instrument [s 9(5)]. See also ss 
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foreign entities and foreign dividend application rules which are of current international 
practice needs to be analysed and understood mainly from the South African perspective 
with relevant comparative situations in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
To remain within the scope and objectives of this research, I decided not to include a 
discussion of the interpretation of tax rules of double tax agreements. I nevertheless 
relied, particularly in studying the concept of residence, on the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Model Tax Convention interpretation 
of the definitional rules mainly as applicable in the case of legal entities. This is because 
most of the jurisdictions (including South Africa) have now come to adopt this final tie-
breaker (place of effective management) in their domestic tax laws, even if its 
interpretation varies from one country to another. 
Because of the ever-changing nature of tax laws, the scope of this research is to focus 
on the analysis of the legislation and relevant case laws, as they are effective and 
applicable in all chosen jurisdictions up to 7 October 2002, date of submission of this 
thesis. 
In the South African context, this comparative research will furnish an interesting 
laboratory, by helping a better appreciation of the application of source and residence 
rules in view of the new tax legislation, while offering a comprehensive analysis of 
selected issues of the international practice relating to the concept of fiscal jurisdiction. 
1. Structure of the research 
This research study is divided in five parts. 
Part I deals with the academic analysis of the concept of fiscal jurisdiction, in trying to 
find a proper definition, the scope and extent of the concept as well as the importance of 
such study and the problems that it exposes. 
9(l)(cA); 9(l)(d)bis and 9(1)(f). Sections 9(1)(c), 9(l)(d)bis and 9(1)(f) and 9A were repealed by the 
Revenue Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000. 
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Part II concentrates on the policy analysis of the taxation by source and residence and 
the evolution of the South African tax system. This part analyses the rationale from the 
regulatory and academic perspectives for taxing on the basis of source and residence, 
including discussion on the legal theories of fiscal jurisdiction. In addition, this part 
focuses on the process by which South Africa has switched from a dominantly source 
tax system to a dominantly residence based tax system, and discussing the reason for 
this fundamental change. 
Part III deals with a comparative analysis of the concept of residence and its tax 
consequences, mainly from the South African context with particular reference to its 
application in the United Kingdom and the United States. The first section of this part 
reveals that residence tests vary from one jurisdiction to another, through the 
implementation of different subjective factors. The South African tax legislation 
combines the physical presence test with the 'facts and circumstances' approach of 
ordinary residence. While in the United Kingdom for instance, the residence criteria 
(including domicile) are extremely wide and rely heavily in the case of individuals on 
intention and calculation of lengths of stay. On the other hand, the United States rules 
on residence differ from those of both South Mrica and the United Kingdom in some 
crucial and interesting respects. 
With regard to legal persons, South Africa has adopted in addition to the incorporation 
test, the OEeD tie-breaker rule of 'place of effective management' in its test of 
residence. The United Kingdom is focusing in terms of its second criterion to the 
residence rules on the 'place of central management and control' and the United States' 
test of residence is based solely on the formal legal connection of the place of 
incorporation. 
The second section of this part discusses the implications of imposing tax on the 
worldwide basis. This section mainly focuses on the analysis of the statutory anti-
avoidance provisions laid down by the chosen jurisdictions to prevent deferral of tax on 
different kinds of foreign income. This study analyses from a South Mrican perspective, 
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with particular references where relevant to jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom 
and the United States, the factors which determine if, when and how much is payable on 
foreign income received or accrued to resident taxpayers. Basically, this section 
discusses issues revolving around the tax implications of foreign employment income, 
the controlled foreign entity rules, and the foreign dividend application rules . 
Part IV analyses from a comparative approach, the principles and application of source 
system and its tax consequences in both South Africa and Hong Kong. From the South 
African perspective, the discussion of the source concept is still relevant not only to 
non-residents who are subject to tax on their source income, but also in relation to South 
African residents who carry on trade offshore and sustain losses therefrom. 
The first section of this part discusses the source concept from a judicial interpretation 
and shows that the source system is an enigmatic concept on which it is difficult to set a 
statutory definition. An important element in this section from the South African 
perspective, is the adoption of the ' rule ' approach, which provides a better 
understanding of the determination of source of particular income. 
The second section focuses on the analysis of the selected actual and deemed source 
provisions that are still applicable to non-residents in South Africa and compare them 
with similar circumstances in Hong Kong. 
This part reveals that apart from some similarity of approach between the Hong Kong 
courts and the South African courts, a string of ambiguous court decisions has proven 
that Hong Kong courts have not analysed the issue of source with any consistency. 
Thus, it means that irrespective of the jurisdiction considered, the crucial area where 
guidance can be given is on the source concept because its interpretation is mostly 
subject to philosophical problems that may give rise to absurd results. 
Part V contains the general conclusion and recommendations. The first point from the 
various analyses is that any of the tax principles, be it source or residence, has its own 
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disadvantages, and it is preferable for a country to adopt a tax system that is appropriate 
to the circumstances of its economy. 
This part evaluates in summary, whether the most important reasons for the radical 
change to the residence basis of taxation in South Africa are justified. It questions in the 
light of detailed analysis throughout the thesis whether for instance, the new South 
African income tax dispensation is really protecting the tax base from exploitation and 
to overcome the challenge of the open economy. In addition, in consideration of the 
comparative analysis of similar tax systems, this part discusses whether the South 
African tax system in its interpretation and application of rules of fiscal jurisdiction is 
now more in line with international practice. In conclusion, this part provides 
recommendations in order to minimise the complexities arising from the application of 
the South African rules of fiscal jurisdiction. 
2. Theoretical analysis of the concept 
2.1 The meaning of jurisdiction in international law 
The concept of jurisdiction itself has been the subject of controversial arguments and 
has been approached by academics on international law in different ways. The majority 
of writers and institutions who have studied the subject of jurisdiction divide this 
concept into more than one dimension. 
Beale defines jurisdiction as 'the power to create rights such as will be recognised by 
other states as valid: it is a common conception of all nations.' He further noted that a 
broader meaning of the word is more accurately used in connection with the designation 
of a concept that includes proscription, adjudication and execution4 
4 See Beale, J, A treatise on the conflict o/laws, 3 vols, (New York 1935), p. 308-309. 
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Jennings5 considers the term jurisdiction as 'the authority to affect legal interests', and 
contends that there are three aspects of jurisdiction, mainly executive, legislative and 
judicial jurisdiction. 
Thus, while it is generally accepted that jurisdiction refers to the capacity of a state to 
make a rule of law, whether this capacity be exercised by the legislative branch or by 
some other branch of government, it is still a matter of controversy as far as the position 
of international law is concerned in the exercise of a state's jurisdiction. 
Contemporary writers such as Harris see in the term jurisdiction, 'the power of a state 
under international law to govern persons and property by its municipal law. ,6 This 
view is shared by Wallace, who, in recognising that the jurisdiction of a state is to 
prescribe, adjudicate and enforce the law, goes further to state that international law 
does not prescribe rules requiring the exercise of jurisdiction and it is restricted 
principally with the propriety of the exercise of state jurisdiction. Thus the exercise of 
state jurisdiction remains a discretionary matter for the state concerned.7 
It may be agreed that a state's municipal law governs the exercise or the non-exercise of 
jurisdiction. However, it is relevant to mention the distinction noted by Martha to the 
effect that while a state may have jurisdiction to prescribe in certain circumstances, its 
jurisdiction to enforce the prescribed rule may, as a matter of international law be 
restricted by the territoriality principle. 8 Thus, to some extent, international law and 
international economic integration circumscribe a state's freedom and set the limits 
within which a state may be free to act. 
For instance, international economic integration restricts the effective choice available 
to states in the exercise of their jurisdiction if they want to maximise the benefits 
flowing from such integration. As Dunning puts it: 
5 The limits of state jurisdiction, 32 Nordisk Tidssskrift for international ret, 1962, p.202. 
6 Harris, D. J, Cases and materials on international law, 2ed, 1983, p.210. 
7 Wallace, R. M. M, international law, 3ed, 1997, p. III 
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'Unless a country is completely isolated from the rest of the world, any 
sovereignty it enjoys is bound to be constrained, in the sense that whatever 
decisions it chooses to take are, to some extent, influenced by forces beyond its 
jurisdiction. ,9 
It is necessary to give a general definition of the multi-aspect notions of jurisdiction 
because as Danziger noted, the problem of jurisdiction consequently arises when the 
actions of a state purport to affect foreign persons, things or events. 10 A national tax 
system requires a legal justification for imposing tax, not only on residents of the 
particular country but also on non- residents. This legal justification is to be found in the 
principle of fiscal jurisdiction which constitutes the subject of this research. 
Consequently, while the legislative aspect of jurisdiction must be analysed, the state's 
ability and capacity to enforce is particularly relevant in relation to international tax law 
because it determines the efficacy of the system. A proper definition and understanding 
of the attributions of fiscal jurisdiction is the key to any meaningful attempt to solve 
international taxation problems. 
2.2 Fiscal jurisdiction: A definition 
It is a universal principle that the inherent right of the state to tax is limited to its 
jurisdiction. This is due to the fact that taxation usually involves a relation between a 
state and its own subjects. Thus, the jurisdiction to tax may be defined as the legal and 
factual power of a state to levy taxes over either the taxable person or the taxable object. 
As Martha puts it, a state can only have jurisdiction to tax if there is a fiscal attachment, 
that is, if there is a legal relationship between the holder of fiscal jurisdiction and the 
fiscal subj ect by virtue of the presence of fiscal facts. 11 
8 Martha, R. S. J, The jurisdiction to tax in international law, theory and practice of legislative fiscal 
jurisdiction, 1989, p.62. 
9 See Dunning, ill, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 1993, p. 529. 
10 See Danziger, E, International income tax, the South African perspective, July 1991, p.3. 
II Ibid, p. 46. 
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If it is assumed that states have inherent right to claim taxes on income accrued or 
received by the taxpayer within their jurisdiction, the question that may be asked is 
whether the exercise of that jurisdiction would not conflict with the right of other states 
which are entitled under international law to apply their laws to the same facts. 
This raises the issue of the attributes or raison d'etre for a state to levy taxes. In other 
words, what are the crucial tests for determining the extent or legitimacy of state 
jurisdiction in matters of taxation? 
2.3 Extent and scope of fiscal jurisdiction. 
2.3.1 The tax law relationship 
Some writers on international law are of the view that, a state can only levy taxes if 
there is a 'genuine connection' between the state and the taxpayer (by virtue of personal 
attachment) or between the state and the transaction or property in respect with which 
the tax is levied. 12 To this view, Martha suggests that a state can only claim a right to 
exercise fiscal jurisdiction if a legal connection is established between that state and the 
targeted fiscal subject. 13 
As Martha argues further, the first fundamental element of fiscal attachment is the 
personal fiscal attachment, serving to explain the direct relationship between the holder 
of fiscal jurisdiction which might be the state or an international organisation, and the 
fiscal subject or object of taxation, which is determinative for the legality of the exercise 
of fiscal jurisdiction. 14 This notion of attachment when applied to legal subjects such as 
natural or juristic persons, can be said to derive as a result of personal sovereignty 
(nationality) which affords to states the legal title to prescribe conduct, impose 
obligation, and confer rights to their subjects, even where they are outside the sphere of 
validity of the national legal order as it was decided in the American case of Cook v 
12 See Akehurst, M, "Jurisdiction in International Law", 197211973, 46 British Yearbook of International 
Law, p. 145. 
13 Op cit, p.46. 
14 Op cit, p.182. 
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Tail. 15 The direct relationship can also exist as a result of territorial sovereignty (fiscal 
domicile, residence) or through functional sovereignty. 
The relationship between the state and the fiscal subject can also be indirect, known as 
economic fiscal attachment, arising when the object of taxation is located in the taxing 
state (referring to property and source of income within the taxing state) . 
The second element of fiscal attachment called functional fiscal attachment is exercised 
in areas where international law allows states to exercise certain functional powers in 
connection with specific rights such as the cases of continental shelf, exclusive 
economic zone, or in the flight information regions. 
All these elements of fiscal connections depend on the extent to which the taxpayer is 
fiscally liable and therefore subject to the holder of fiscal jurisdiction taxing power. 
Thus the tax liability of a fiscal subject can be either unlimited, for example, when the 
holder of fiscal jurisdiction can assess the taxpayer on his worldwide income (taxation 
on the basis of nationality, domicile or residence) or limited corresponding with the 
economic fiscal attachment (taxation on the basis of source). 16 
As discussed above, there are various types of tax law relationship between the tax 
creditor who claims the tax and the tax debtor who actually pays that tax.17 The core of 
this research is to focus on the main elements of personal and economic attachment 
between the taxpayer and the holder of fiscal jurisdiction. 
As stated in the definition of fiscal jurisdiction, this principle deals with the right and 
power of a state to impose taxes as a result of the exercise of supreme authority of 
sovereignty. For academic purposes, some writers have argued that international law 
has no role to play in matters of taxation. Norr on that issue asserts that : 
15 (1936) 265 U.S 47. 
16 See the well-articulated explanation given by Martha in his summaries and concluding remarks, op cit, 
p. 182. 
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'No rules of international law exist to limit the extent of any country's tax 
jurisdiction ... [and] within its own legal framework a country is free to adopt 
whatever rules of tax jurisdiction it chooses.'18 
While Beale in his argument states that 'the determination of jurisdiction ... is with us a 
question of our own law, and not of a generally accepted doctrine of the law of 
nations.' 19 
If it is agreed that there are no rules of international law which limit the extent of a state 
fiscal jurisdiction, this would raise the question as to whether a state can with regard to 
the totality of powers that it may have under international law pursuant its sovereignty, 
exercise its fiscal jurisdiction in an unwarranted manner. 
Thus, if fiscal jurisdiction is an attribute of sovereignty, it must follow that the 
jurisdiction of state to tax must be confined to events that are subject to this sovereignty. 
This calls for an identification of the limits of state sovereignty for a proper exercise of 
its fiscal jurisdiction. This is because as Martha puts it: 
, .. . [1]f jurisdiction is an attribute of sovereignty, then it is necessarily so that the 
limits of fiscal jurisdiction are similar to those of national sovereignty. 
Consequently, identifying the limits of sovereignty is tantamount to identifying 
the limits of every type of jurisdiction, including tax or fiscal jurisdiction. ,20 
It is therefore important to analyse the extent to which a sovereign nation power to tax is 
impeded by self-imposed statutory limitations and to find out whether there are any 
limitations either spatial, personal or functional deriving from the essence of 
. 21 sovereignty. 
17 Expression used by Swanepoel, E, "The source of income in South African income tax and the inward 
and outward structuring of investments into and out of South Africa", LLM thesis (UCT), 1990, p. 182. 
18 Norr, M, "Jurisdiction to Tax and International Income", 1962,17 Tax Law Review, p. 431; also found 
in Martha, op cit, p. 12. 
19 See Beale, op cit, p. 36. 
20 Martha, op cit, p. 32. 
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2.3.2 Fiscal jurisdiction and sovereignty. 
It is recognised among writers that sovereignty is one of the fundamental concepts in 
international law. It has been a subject of academic interest as to whether fiscal 
jurisdiction could be equated with the concept of sovereignty. Some writers relate fiscal 
jurisdiction as being synonymous to sovereignty and it has the same application in all 
areas of law. 22 This view is supported by Knechtle who states that: 
'Tax (or fiscal) jurisdiction, i.e, sovereignty in the sphere of fiscal law, means 
"the non-derivative sovereignty of a state", which is in principle, internally as 
well as externally unlimited, and which manifests itself vis-a.-vis other states in 
exercising sole (exclusive) authority in respect of acts of legislation, 
administration and justice within its territorial power sphere. Thus, tax 
jurisdiction is a consequence of a state territorial sovereignty, i.e, of territory of 
the body politic. ,23 
On the other hand, writers such as Martha argues that fiscal jurisdiction is only a specie 
of the genus 'sovereignty' and jurisdiction should be distinguished from sovereignty 
because the doctrine of jurisdiction deals with the question of whether and under what 
circumstances a state has the right of regulation, while the sovereignty is the concept by 
virtue of which jurisdiction is exercised24 
This is expressed in the analogy made by Jeffery to the effect that sovereignty refers to 
the bundle of rights and competences which go to make up a nation state, while 
jurisdiction is related to particular rights from that bundle, namely a state's right of 
regulation25 Mann also formulates the relationship by saying that : 'jurisdiction is an 
aspect of sovereignty, it is coexistent with it and indeed, incidental to but limited by the 
state's sovereignty. ,26 
21 See Wurzel, H, "Foreign Investment and Extraterritorial Taxation", 1938, Columbia Law Review, p. 
812. 
22 See Buhler, 0, prinzipen des internationalen steuerrechts, 1964, p.130; also commented by Martha, 
Of cit, p. 13. 
2 See Knechtle, A, Basic problems in international jiscallaw, 1979, p. 34. 
24 See Martha, op cit, p.13. 
25 See Jeffery, RJ, op cit, p. 26. 
26 Mann, M, The doctrine of jurisdiction in international law, III, Rdc, 1964-1, I, p.30. 
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This means that jurisdiction is an essential attribute of sovereignty which is more of a 
conditio sine qua non for the fiscal jurisdiction. 
Because the taxing power of a state derives from sovereignty and sovereignty 1S 
omnipotence and connotes absoluteness, it follows that for the concept of sovereignty to 
have a valid sense, it is essential to circumscribe time, space, people, and matters over 
which sovereign states in the exercise of their fiscal jurisdiction are supreme. That 
delimitation of the supremacy of the state may either be territorial, personal or 
functional. 
2.3.3 The Territorial fiscal sovereignty. 
This type of fiscal sovereignty deals with the issue of the rules and legislation of a state, 
as they apply to all persons and objects within the area subject to its spatial supremacy. 
It refers to geographical boundaries or to what Martha called in his theory of spatial 
sphere of validity, the absolute territorial supremacy27 
According to Wallace, the territorial sovereignty 1S the favoured basis for state 
jurisdiction28 and for that matter, the state has unlimited jurisdiction to regulate conduct 
which occurs in its territory, persons who are present in that territory, things that are 
situated there and acts that take place outside the territory but which have an effect 
within its territory.29 
Thus, because a state has virtual unlimited authority over the affairs of persons and 
things within its territorial sphere, the territorial sovereignty cannot be rendered 
inapplicable by the fact that aliens do not recognise the foreign taxing state as their own 
sovereign. For while they cannot for this reason be compelled to pay taxes to it on the 
ground of political allegiance (imposed by citizenship or nationality), they may 
nevertheless become subject to taxation by virtue of the territorial sovereignty of the 
27 See Martha, op cit, p. 33. 
28 See Wallace, op cit, p.112. 
29 See Danziger, op cit, p. 4. 
14 
foreign power whenever their presence, property or economic activity may be located 
within its jurisdiction, sometimes referred to by writers as economic allegiance?O 
This was well illustrated by Judge Loder in the Lotus case who stated that: 
'The principles of absolute and exclusive jurisdiction within national territory 
apply to foreigners as well as to citizens or inhabitants, and the foreigners can 
claim no exemption from the exercise of such jurisdiction, except so far as he 
may be able to show either: 1) that he is, by reason of some special immunity, 
not subject to the operation of the local law, or 2) that the local law is not in 
conformity with international law. ,31 
As far as international law is concerned on the issue of territiorial sovereignty, it is clear 
as it was stated in the Lotus case by the permanent court of international justice that: 
'[N]ow the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a 
state is that ... it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another 
state. In this sense, jurisdiction is certainly territorial, it cannot be exercised by a 
state outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from 
international custom or from a convention. ,32 
As stated in the judgment of the Lotus case, the territorial fiscal sovereignty deals with 
the situation of economic loyalty to a sovereign state that may result either by reason of 
the quality of the taxpayer (his residence or domicile in the case of individuals) or the 
place of incorporation or the place of effective management when it applies to legal 
persons. The relevant link to territoriality might also result by virtue of the origin of 
income or any economic activity having an effect on that territory (real or deemed 
source) as it might apply because of the situs of the property. 
In terms of fiscal jurisdiction, the territorial connection may be subject to certain 
exceptions: 
The first one deals with the situation where persons, things or economic activity might 
be situated within the territorial limits of the state, but be immune from jurisdiction and 
therefore limiting the power of the state to enforce the tax. In such cases, as recognised 
30 See Albrecht, op cit, p. 149. 
31 See the Lotus case (France v Turkey), PCU reports series A no 10 (1927); Oppenheimer' s 
international law, (1992), ged, vol I, edited by Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts 478; 564. 
32 Jd, p. 18-16; also cited by Barrie, G.N, "The Friendly Posse and the Disregard for Territorial 
Jurisdiction", 1996, vol 113, SALJ, p. 578. 
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by Albrecht, the subject or object of taxation is within the power of the taxing state but 
not within its jurisdiction. As he stated further, the state power to tax might also be 
limited by the nature of jurisdiction. Then, a state might have jurisdiction over an alien's 
property but not over his person and may levy a personal tax that it then proceeds to 
enforce against the property. Or it might have jurisdiction over the alien's person and 
levy a tax upon his property that it attempts to enforce against his person. 33 Such laws 
although enforceable would be considered to be beyond the jurisdiction of the taxing 
state?4 
The second exception to the territorial fiscal sovereignty deals with occasions where the 
state may legitimately claim the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its territory. 
If the contemporary view of international law is correct that a state has exclusive right 
and unlimited power to legislate in relation to its territory without regard to external 
factors, it means that a state applying for example, the residence basis of taxation might 
want to tax the worldwide income of its residents and probably that might result in 
extraterritorial application and effect. The justification for this unlimited fiscal liability 
might be based on the international law concept of objective territoriality by which a 
state can exercise jurisdiction over acts that take place outside its territory but having an 
effect within its territory. 
Theoretically, it may be argued that there is no territorial boundary to national taxation 
and then states are not obliged to take into account the effect of their tax laws on 
international trade nor are they required to consider international comity when framing 
those laws.35 This view is also supported by Knechtle who argues that: 
'Thus, in this case of tax jurisdiction, though emanating from territorial 
sovereignty, breaks the territorial bounds of the state and extends to tax objects 
beyond its national territory. This spatial extension of tax jurisdiction is possible, 
because states can bring to bear the whole pressure of their administrative 
machinery or residents in their state territories . Such comprehensive subjection 
33 See Albrecht, AR, op cit, p. 153. 
34 That is what is referred to by Quereshi, AH,( "The freedom of a State to legislate in fiscal matters 
under general international law", Bulletin of international Fiscal Documentation, 1987, p. 17) as the 
minimum standard for the treatment (fiscal protection) of aliens. This issue deals with the jurisdictional 
immunities and privileges in relation to taxation accorded to governments and their instrumentalities. 
35 See Danziger, op cit, p. 5. 
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of the property and income of a tax subject is regarded by the holders of tax 
jurisdiction as legitimate by virtue of the fact that the owner of the taxable 
property or recipient of the taxable income is resident in their territories 
(residence, universality, totality-principle). ,36 
For instance, under the residence basis of taxation, a resident of a state is liable on all 
income accrued or received by him irrespective of the foreign origin. Indirectly, as 
stated by Albrecht, the effects of taxation may reach aliens who are far beyond the 
jurisdiction of the taxing state, for example, in case of an internal tax on exports which 
is passed on to foreign consumers in the form of higher prices. 37 
Nevertheless, the extent of territorial fiscal sovereignty encounters problems of 
effectiveness when it comes to the enforcement of their tax laws extraterritorially.38 
For the matter of practical necessity, it means that a state might not be able to adopt 
extraterritorial administrative measures to enforce compliance with its tax laws. The 
reasons are twofold: 
First, as a general rule, states do not enforce fiscal legislation of other countries,39 and in 
the practical application of this, the courts of most countries do not entertain a claim by 
a foreign government for its taxes or recognise or enforce a foreign revenue law 
judgment.4o 
The second point that forms a fundamental aspect of international law is known as the 
principle of international comity, that is, the mutual respect which nations have for each 
other gives rise to the recognition which they share as to the field over which each can 
36 See Knechtle, op cit, p. 36. 
37 See Albrecht, op cit, p.153 ; though this deals specifically with indirect tax, which is outside the core 
of this research. 
38 This rule of non-enforcement might also happen sometimes territorially. For example, in theory, a 
non-resident who derives any income from a source-country, even if only in the course of one day is 
subject to tax thereon, but the collection of that short duration income might be a different matter and 
non-compliance in many situations might occur here. 
39 See Spitz, B, International tax planning, 1982, 2nd ed, p.2l. 
40 This rule does not necessarily mean that courts would uphold transactions or agreements conspiring or 
which are knowingly designed to violate the revenue law (such as fundamental tax evasion schemes) of a 
foreign and friendly state; see the case of Emery v Emery (1959) Ch 410; (1959), 1 All E. R 577, where 
an English court refused to recognise a transaction carried out in contravention of the United States 
revenue law. See also Regazzioni v K C Sethia (1959) 2 QB, 490. 
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legislate.41 This means that because of the principles of equality of states and 
sovereignty, a state cannot exercise jurisdiction over persons or property in another state 
even for a legitimate claim without the other state's consent. 
The result of this consideration is that for the effectiveness of the state's tax laws 
(referring to the enforcement and supervision of that law), it is essential that those who 
are within the scope of the legislation must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
sovereign nation which enacts it, for otherwise, the tax would be an empty gesture of 
the sovereign power. 42 
2.3.4 The personal fiscal sovereignty. 
This is another fundamental test by which a state may fiscally impose tax on those facts 
that are subject to its supremacy. This form of supremacy deals with the right of state to 
extend its laws to regulate conduct and attach legal consequences to the conduct of these 
persons (natural and juristic) wherever they may be. 43 
For income tax purposes, the fiscal attachment in this case is based on nationality or 
citizenship, and as Prof Stuyt puts it: 
' ... [A] legal relation exists between that state and individuals (its population) by 
virtue of their "nationality" conferred on them by the state according to its 
domestic law. This legal relation continues even if the "nationals" (citizens or 
subjects) of a given state leave the territory of that state. ,44 
In consideration of the international law principle of political allegiance, nationals of a 
state owe to that state loyalty and therefore the state has the right to demand the 
41 See Pearce-Crump, D, "Commonwealth Citizenship and British Income Tax Law", 1996, vol 1l3, 
SALJ, p. 418. 
42 See Albrecht, op cit, p. 153, (referring to the note in Columbia Law Review, 29, 1929, p. 782) to the 
effect that, 'the power to tax .. .is a mere gesture of sovereign pride and authority when unaccompanied by 
a correlated power to collect. ' 
43 See Martha, op cit, p. 43. 
44 Stuyt, A, General principles of law, as applied by international tribunals to disputes on attributions 
and exercises of state jurisdiction, 1946, p. 96. 
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necessary means from those subject to its laws. This accords Allix' view that: 'there is 
nothing to prevent a state's taxation of its nationals in respect of property abroad. ,45 
Thus a person, possessing the nationality of a taxing state, can be held liable for his full 
worldwide profits from whatever sources they are derived. This was illustrated in the 
American case of Cook v Tait,46 where Cook, a citizen of the United States living in 
Mexico was taxed by the competent American fiscal authority on his income derived 
from sources within Mexico. He brought the matter to court on the point: 
'[W]hether Congress has power to impose a tax upon income received by a 
native citizen of the U.S, who at the time the income was received, was 
permanently resident abroad and domiciled in the city of Mexico, the income 
being from rent and personal property located in Mexico.' 
The court held that the authority to tax is not always incidental to the lex situs. 
Moreover, it is equally independent of the domicile of the subject. 
The plaintiff was fiscally liable on the basis of a formal relationship between the United 
States and the citizen (nationality link) regardless of the fact that the subject's domicile 
and his source of income was outside the United States.47 
However, certain authors contend that the taxation of nationals on the global basis 
through the application of the universality principle by which the state takes into 
consideration the total financial capacity of the nationals, is unacceptable. It is deemed 
undesirable to extract tax from non-resident nationals in the light of international 
economic integration. 
It is correct to argue that while the state of nationality may want to impose taxes on its 
citizens abroad (because of a juristic link), practically, it may be difficult for the 
enforcement and collection of these taxes, if the taxpayer in question does not 
voluntarily comply or does not own assets in the country. For instance, how would a 
45 See AlIix, La condition des etrangers au pOint de vue fiscal, 1937, 61 Rdc, p. 559. 
46 (1924) 265 U.S 20. 
47 Case commented by Martha, op cit, p. 49. 
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state taxing on the basis of nationality, enforce the tax of its nationals permanently 
residing abroad and earning all their income from foreign sources? 
Secondly, the globalisation of the nations' economies has improved the international 
movement of persons and capital. Thus, taxation on the basis of nationality has become 
very anachronistic and sources of conflict of jurisdictions. 48 As Mann writes: 
'[B]etween the national and his home country no problem of international 
jurisdiction can arise, but it is open to question whether the state of the 
national's residence is not itself in certain circumstances so injured as to entitle 
it to complain of the implications of taxation on the basis of nationality. ,49 
Furthermore, Jeffery questions the validity of nationality as a basis for exercising fiscal 
jurisdiction on the ground that it does not have the flexibility to deal with some of the 
issues which arise in the context of international economic integration. As he sees it, 
fiscal jurisdiction must have an economic foundation, so that in order to be entitled to 
tax a person the state should be providing economic benefits to that person in return. 
The problem is that there is no necessary economic link between a person and the state 
of his citizenship. 50 
Consequently, because of the inefficiency of the nationality concept of fiscal 
jurisdiction, Mann favoured the doctrine of 'closeness of connection' or 'genuine link' 
as the basis of taxation which is actually an attribute to the idea of economic allegiance, 
and in that context, he argues that: 
'The conclusion then is, that a state has (legislative) jurisdiction, if its contact 
with a given set of facts is so close, so substantial, so direct, so weighty, that 
legislation in respect of them is in harmony with international law and its various 
aspects including the practice of states, the principle of non-interference and 
reciprocity and demands of interdependence. ,51 
48 See Buhler, 0, Prinzipien des internationa/en Steuerrechts (1964), 130, pp. 165/166; and L.Von Bar, 
Theorie und praxis des inlernaliona/en privatsrechls, 319 (2ed), 1889; cited by Marth~ op cil, p. 67. 
49 See Mann, op cit, p. 117. 
50 Op cil, p. 170. 
51 Jd, p. 49. 
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2.3.5 The functional fiscal sovereignty. 
This conceptual antecedent of fiscal jurisdiction deals with the situation where 
international law allows a state to exercise taxing powers on a functional basis in 
connection with specific rights, such as the cases with the continental shelf, the 
exclusive economic zone, or the flight information regions as developed by Martha on 
his theory of spatial sphere of validity. 52 Professor Riphagen states in his study of this 
concept that: 
'A sovereign state being traditionally considered to be composed of a 
"government", "subjects" and a "territory", one is naturally inclined to look for 
application of a concept of "functional sovereignty" in those cases where there is 
said to be stateless "domain", and in situations where there seems to be some 
form of "government" but no territory, i.e, in the case of international 
organisations enjoying a measure of "independence". Indeed, in both cases, 
there are all sorts of legal phenomena which could be covered by the notion of 
"functional sovereignty".' 5 
Thus, for the purposes of functional fiscal sovereignty as recognised by Vann, the 
question whether the tax jurisdiction of a country extends to all activities on the 
continental shelf must be clarified. If the territorial sea is treated as part of a country 
under international law, the country's jurisdiction should extend to the natural resources 
of the sea and seabed of the continental shelf, and jurisdiction would then be effected to 
the extent of the exercise of the country's sovereignty. 
For instance, as Vann stated further, in a case of a floating hotel owned by a non-
resident and moored on the continental shelf, if the tax jurisdiction of a country is 
limited by reference to its sovereign powers under international law, the country cannot 
tax the profits of the hotel; whereas, it could do so, if its sovereignty covers all activities 
on the continental shelf. 54 
52 See Martha, op cit, p. 182. 
53 See Riphagen, W, "Some reflexions on 'Functional Sovereignty'" 1974, Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, p.227; also Riphagen, W, "The Jurisdiction of the Coastal State", in the Future of the 
Law of the Sea, 1973, 1541162: and cited by Martha, op cit, p. 44. 
54 See explanation by Vann, R. J, "International Aspects of Tax", chapter 18, p. 734, in Victor Thuronyi 
(ed), Tax law Design and Drafting, 1998, 2ed, IMF. 
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3. The relevance of the study fiscal jurisdiction 
As discussed above, the power to impose tax is an attribute of sovereignty by which a 
state can regulate the affairs of persons and things subject to its authority. Theoretically, 
it is argued that there are no limitations on the nation's power to impose taxes. 55 
Every state has tax laws of some kind. Thus as one state's tax law can be shaped into 
particular forms, so the tax laws of all other states tend to differ for individual reasons. 
The expanding role of government in society and increased government expenditures 
have given rise to a relentless search for additional tax revenues. This is complemented 
by the idea that improvements in means of communication and transportation, coupled 
by the fact that in this global world economy, the majority of states have adopted a 
policy of progressively liberalising trade and international investment. 
Consequently, as the barriers of exchange control have been relaxed or removed, so too 
have the fiscal constraints on overseas investments. This facilitates international 
economic and social intercourse and supports the proposition that interests in the effect 
of commercial activities and the resulting need to regulate them can no longer be 
localised within national boundaries. Harold Maier argues that these increasingly 
complex inter-relationships between national, social and economic interests foster a 
recognition by the world community that there are situations where both national and 
community interests are served by permitting a nation to address under its laws, 
activities carried on outside its nationals borders. 56 
Therefore, due to the factors of mobility of persons and capital, many countries have 
been led, as Arnold puts it, to succumb to the temptation to extend their tax 
jurisdiction. 57 Thus fiscal jurisdiction as we will discover in this research can lend itself 
to extra-territorial effect and application. 
55 See comments by Arnold, B, op cit, p. I. 
56 See Maier, H. G, "Jurisdictional Rules in Customary International Law' , chapter 4, p. 65, in 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction in theory and practice, 1996. 
57 See Arnold, op cit, p.l. 
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The ease with which money and other assets can be moved in and out from one country 
to another increases the significance of the study of the concept of fiscal jurisdiction 
because it involves the understanding of how the tax systems of different countries 
interact. This can be manifested for instance, when cross-border investments occur, or 
when there is a flow of funds in some other form between two or more nations. 58 
This study of fiscal jurisdiction is relevant because, far from being exclusively focused 
on the international law aspect of tax,59 it involves a complex study of comparative tax 
law. This research thus includes the study of positive tax laws of South Africa with 
comparative elements derived from other jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, in order to understand the position from a national 
point of view when the taxation of income with a foreign element is concerned. 
4. The problems posed by the concept of fiscal jurisdiction. 
In the global open economy, investors find it difficult to limit the number of steps in a 
transaction. Consequently, at an international level, it will be difficult to limit the 
number of jurisdictions through which a transaction passes. 
It is a universal assumption, as Ogley puts it, that every jurisdiction will want to tax in 
one form or another, any profit arising on a transaction which passes through it. Thus, 
the greater the number of countries through which profits flow, the greater the 
likelihood of their erosion through taxation. 6o Wurzel illustrates this particularity well 
as follows: 
'[T]ypical cases of extra-territorial taxation are found along with a fiction or a 
technical definition by a foreign country which reaches into the home country of 
a taxpayer and claims a share in the profit accruing there on the ground that its 
protection made some contribution real or constructive to such accrual. ,61 
58 See agley, A, The principles o/international tax: A multinational perspective, 1994, p.l. 
59 On which there are extensive writings; see Martha, op cit, note 8 and Jeffery, op cit, note 2 
60 Jd, p. 172. 
61 See Wurzel, op cit, p. 849. 
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The first issue that can be raised is that if the scope of fiscal jurisdiction determined 
solely by the legislative policy of the taxing state can be exercised even 
extraterritorially, then, what is the extent of the right to tax extraterritorial income in 
terms of jurisdiction? In respect of what types of income, property, transaction, or 
arrangement? In other words, when a transaction involves a foreign element, who may 
be taxed and on what may the tax levy? 
Although a state may legitimately want to tax extraterritorial income by virtue of 
jurisdiction, other states may also concurrently claim jurisdiction on the same facts and 
in respect of the same income.62 Then, while one state may extend its fiscal jurisdiction, 
this could lead to other states applying the same retaliatory measures and consequently, 
double or multiple taxation may be imposed on the same income.63 
The concurrence of fiscal jurisdiction may arise when two or more states are legally 
entitled to apply their laws to the same facts . This may happen in practice through a 
combination of many fiscal facts. 
The free circulation of persons, services, goods and capital has led to the confrontation 
of interests of the relevant national borders and caused more complex international 
taxation problems. 
It is argued that if all countries were to tax on a territorial basis, that is, taxing only 
income arising within their geographical boundaries (by restricting their tax net to 
domestic source), international double taxation would not be a problem. However, this 
62 This is subject of course, to the question that may arise as to whether the taxes levied by different 
countries are comparable 
63 The problems posed by double taxation, where the same income or property gets caught within the tax 
jurisdiction of more than one country at the same time, will be considered in the research in an 
international aspect. This must be distinguished from internal or domestic double taxation. For example, 
where one tax jurisdiction imposes tax twice in respect of the same taxable event and person. On the other 
hand, the term ' domestic double taxation' does not refer to the situation where the divisions of federal 
states enjoy parallel taxing powers, i.e, where tax is imposed on the income of a person by both the 
central government and one or more political sub-divisions of the country. In this latter instance, the 
double taxation is technically closer to international rather than domestic double taxation. See comments 
on domestic double taxation, by Spitz, op cit, p. 24; also discussed by Arnold, op cit, p. 75. 
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leads to the question, what if two or more nations claimed the same income as domestic 
source income as a result of different source rules?64 
The tests for source are often vague and ill-defined, thus even in countries that have 
accorded substantially similar treatment to the notion of source and whose judicial 
decisions constitute persuasive authority in other countries (Australia and South Africa 
for instances), the respective tax authorities and even the highest courts may well come 
to different conclusions in a similar case. 65 
As frequently occurs, many countries tax on the basis of both the status of the taxpayer 
and the origin of the income. This is generally effected through a combination of 
residence taxation and source taxation. For instance, where a company is engaged in 
cross-border investment, the country in which it is resident (the home country) may seek 
to tax profits arising from the overseas country (the host country) in which the 
investment has been made. At the same time, the host country will invariably seek to tax 
profits arising within it, and considering the higher level tax rates that prevails in the 
world's economies today, the tax burden can become very onerous.66 
The issue that can be raised here is what are the consequences and the possible solutions 
for lack of international compatibility as to the definition of connecting factors for tax 
liability? 
Furthermore, with the expansion of global electronic communication via the internet for 
example, this has an impact on international trade investment. The classic jurisdictional 
rules applying to taxes are generally based on concepts of physical geography, and as 
electronic commerce is not bound by physical geography, it may become difficult for 
taxpayers and government to determine jurisdiction and revenue rights. Consequently, if 
the basic source concept and the traditional residency notion based on the strong 
64 Arnold, op cit, p. 1. 
65 Spitz, op cit, p. 26. 
66 See Ogley, op cit, p. 1; also found in Arnold, op cit, p. 73. 
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connection between the personal and economic relations (of a taxpayer) and a specific 
location are weaken by technological changes, then what will be the implications? 
In order to avoid consistent distortion of international investment, the necessity for 
relief is clear on the grounds of equity and neutrality. The question that arises is to the 
kinds of relief which would be appropriate in such circumstances? 
Generally, the tax policy of a state should not affect a person's choice to reside or invest 
domestically or abroad 67 Then, there is a need for states to grant different types of 
unilateral tax relief 
This calls for another question as to whether it would be wise to place too great faith in 
those forms of relief As Ogley writes, where the profits benefit from an exemption or 
other privileged treatment in a particular jurisdiction, there is always a danger that the 
legislation will be amended and the favourable treatment withdrawn.68 Furthermore, 
unilateral relief provisions provide by states sometimes reflect considerable differences 
in form as well as in scope. 
Some authors maintain that there is a need for international norms or agreements in the 
resolution of conflicts of fiscal jurisdiction in order to avoid double taxation.69 This 
explains why many jurisdictions enter into double taxation agreements in order to 
promote trade by giving investors the assurance that they will not be subject to double 
taxation. But it is still a controversial question whether these agreements entirely solve 
international double taxation problems, because there is for instance, a need within the 
agreements for a mutual understanding and interpretation of international convention 
and terminology. When more than one state claims fiscal jurisdiction over an income 
arising within their territory, it is often the problem in the absence of proper 
67 See Arnold, op cit, p. 55. 
68 See Ogley, op cit, p. 172. 
69 See Martha, op cit, p. 155, who is of the view that the defmition of connecting factors must be 
regulated by intemationallaw. While Maier, op cit, p. 81 , considered that conflicts of jurisdiction could 
be solved through bilateral agreements. 
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interpretation of the agreements as regards which state has the exclusive right to tax that 
mcome. 
An attempt at the solutions to these issues presented by the concept of fiscal jurisdiction 
will constitute the basis of the research that will focus on the comparative approach of 
the chosen jurisdictions' international income tax law. 
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Part D: Policy analysis of the taxation by source and residence and the evolution 
of the South African tax system 
Introduction: 
The traditional approach to establishing fiscal jurisdiction is founded on the territorial 
and personal bases of jurisdiction as discussed in part I of the research. 
Fiscal jurisdiction depends on the existence of a connecting factor, which is a genuine 
link between the taxing state and the subject or object sought to be taxed. Factors that 
will create an exposure to tax in a particular country may relate either to the quality of 
the taxpayer (such as nationality, residence, or domicile), to the income (real or 
deemed source) or to the situs of the property. 
It has become trite to observe that economic globalisation has reduced the sovereignty 
of nations in respect of taxation. In a world where capital is highly mobile, market 
forces may limit a nation's choices in the taxation of income from capital in a number 
of ways. However, it is the trend in the international arena that, only few states are 
still applying an exclusive system of taxation. This means that most countries have 
implemented a combination of different connecting factors in the search for additional 
revenues. As a result, some countries which tax on the source basis, have also 
extended their tax net to include some forms of income from foreign sources. On the 
other hand, residence-based systems have compromised by the taxation of residents of 
other countries if they derive their income from within the domestic economy. While 
in the nationality system of taxation, aliens are usually taxed if their income is derived 
from that territory. 
Under the traditional doctrine, the fundamental jurisdictional connection IS the 
territorial basis, defined for the purposes of this work to refer to jurisdiction over 
persons, matters and things within the geographic boundaries of a state. Thus, the first 
section of this part of the research will concentrate on the policy discussion based on 
the territorial attachment between the taxing state and the taxpayer. The focus here is 
on the analysis of the justification for taxing on the basis of source and residence. I 
The exclusive taxation on the basis of nationality or citizenship has become anachronistic though 
larger economies like the United States does not see any problem with nationality as a basis for 
exercising jurisdiction to tax. As argued by Jeffery (op cit, p. 49), the key to the question whether 
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The second section of the research will consider from the South African perspective, 
the evolution of its tax system which has undergone some major changes in the 
application of source and residence principles. 
1 Rationale for the taxation on the basis of source 
Different VIews have been advanced by writers In favour of taxation of income 
exclusively on the basis of source. In an attempt to justify the entitlement of the state 
to tax income deriving from its jurisdiction, Stratford CJ explained the rationale for 
source taxation in the case of Kergeulen Sealing and Whaling Co Ltd v CIR by stating 
that : 
' ... [T]he equity of the levy (of tax) rests on the assumption that a country that 
produces wealth by reason of its natural resources or the activities of its 
inhabitants is entitled to a share of that wealth, wherever the recipient may 
live. ,2 
Thus, the right to tax exclusively on the territoriality principle is per se justified on the 
basis of a link between any economic activity and a specific location.3 
In terms of analysis of this principle, it has been argued that the source basis of 
taxation applies when there is an economic attachment of the taxpayer to the taxing 
state. Put differently, the source principle is a system of taxation in which the fiscal 
attachment is based on the link between the income to be taxed and the territory of the 
state imposing the tax. As Plasschaert argues, the source basis of taxation derives 
from the fact that: 
nationality (particularly as it applies to individuals) is a valid fiscal jurisdictional base lies in the 
economic foundation of fiscal jurisdiction and the linking of this with the receipt of economic benefits 
from the state. Thus, nationality based as it is on the idea of political, not economic allegiance, does not 
provide the required link and should therefore be seen as an exceptional basis for the exercise of 
jurisdiction. That is why it will not be considered in this research which will target specifically the 
source and residence fiscal jurisdiction. 
2 (1939) AD 487, 10 SATe 363. 
3 This economic relation or allegiance justifying the application of source of principle is also found 
in the works of prominent scholars such as Harding, (Double taxation of property and income, A study 
in the judicial delimitation of the conflicting claims of taxing jurisdiction advanced by the American 
States, 1933) who in the development of the theory regarding the state's right to tax and the territorial 
limits of this right stated that: 'It appears that the state may tax all property, goods, labor, services and 
the like, which have become identified with the economic structure of the state, by incorporation into 
or integration with the business mechanism so defined .. . the right to tax then depends upon the fact that 
the economic wealth is being used in the coordinated economic task of the social group; that is 
producing utility or wealth or service in connection with, as part of, and because of the economic 
solidarity of the social group.' Also cited by Vogel, op cit, p. 221. 
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'[I]ncome must be subjected to taxation in the country in which it originates, 
irrespective of whether the income accrues to a non-resident or to a resident 
taxpayer. ,4 
He adds that countries applying only the residence basis of taxation would therefore 
forego any tax claim on income which originated within their borders but which 
accrued to non-residents. Due to the fact that the non-resident enjoys the opportunity 
of earning income in the state and thus benefits from the organisation of the state, he 
may accordingly be asked to contribute by way of taxes. Because the source country 
provides facilities which enable income to be earned there or allows non-residents to 
earn income and compete with residen.ts of the taxing state, non-residents should be 
taxed as a result of that economic connection from sources in that state. 5 
An explicit analysis of the source concept is given by Klimowsky who developed the 
idea of qualitative and quantitative aspects of every source of income. 
According to him, the qualitative aspect relates to the activity or property which gives 
rise to the income, irrespective of the personal status of the taxpayer. This constitutes 
some types of activity with qualitative elements of source of income such as trade, 
professions, labour and services. However, there can be no source determination 
unless the income is quantified. Thus, the quantitative aspect relates to the manner in 
which the activity or the property of the taxpayer is applied to earn the income as well 
as his identity.6 
With reference to the same point, Klaus Vogel argues that 'source' is not an a priori 
concept and has to be defined in the context of the legal rules governing a particular 
problem according to the same criteria that led or have led to establish that rule. In 
other words, the source principle in general is not a natural, self-defining concept in 
See Plasschaert, SRF, "The Design of Schedular and Global Systems of Income Taxation: The 
International Dimension", 1981, International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 409. 
5 See Plasschaert (op cit, p. 409/410) who further stated that: ' In the source country, inputs have been 
put to fruition by the non-resident, production is greatly facilitated by intermediate public goods such 
as transport facilities, provided by the host government. A political argument which carries a 
nationalistic taint is that foreigners have been allowed to operate in the national economy and to 
compete with domestic entrepreneurs. Finally, in countries in which foreigners supply a substantial part 
of productivity resources, as is typically the case in the developing world, the adoption of only the 
residence principle would involve a significant loss of revenue.' Also cited and commented by 
Danziger, op cit, p. 87. 
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terms of types of connection that establishes the 'source' of income. On the other 
hand, the source concept could only be referred to the state which in some way or the 
other is connected to the production of income in question or to the state where value 
is added to a good.7 
Following the above analysis, it is clear that the justification for the source principle is 
based on the benefit theory of taxation. Under this theory, the host country is entitled 
to impose tax on non-residents to cover the costs they impose on the public sector, 
including the cost of pollution that their activities impose on residents.8 
In support of the benefits justification for source-based taxation, it might be argued 
that multinationals are sometimes able to earn pure economic profits such as rents by 
taking advantage of some specific feature of a country. A multinational might, for 
instance, engage in business in a developed country to gain access to its large market 
of affluent consumers. In either situation, the multinational enterprise earns a higher 
before tax rate of return on its investment than it could have earned elsewhere. The 
host county should be entitled to tax the multinational enterprise on these location 
specific rents. Furthermore, raising revenue by taxing these rents is efficient because 
the tax will not distort the taxpayer's economic decisions. 9 
Another possible justification for a source-based corporate income taxation is that it 
serves as a means for the source country to regulate the corporate activity that takes 
6 See Klimowsky, "The 'Source of Income' in Municipal and International Taxation", 1960, XIV 
international Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, p. 66. It is also well illustrated by Danziger, Op cit, p. 
84/85. 
7 See Vogel, K, op cit, p. 223. 
8 See Green, R, "The Future of Source-based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises", 
1993, Cornell Law Review, vol 79, p. 29. He argues that the problem with this rationale is that the 
income tax in general and the corporate income tax in particular cannot plausibly be viewed as a form 
of benefit fee or effluent charge. In his view, there is no definite relationship between a corporate's 
taxable income and the costs that the corporation imposes on the public sector. A corporation's taxable 
income depends significantly on the outcomes of the business risks that the corporate undertakes 
whereas the costs the corporation imposes on the host country are generally independent of those 
outcomes. Moreover, foreign direct investment often provides substantial benefits to the host country 
independently of any tax revenue. Consequently, it is likely that these benefits sometimes exceed the 
costs that the corporate taxpayer imposes on the host government. See also Mc Lure, C.E, "Substituting 
Consumption-based Direct Taxation for Income Taxes as the International Norm", (1992), 45 National 
Tax Journal, 145-149. 
9 Green Cop cit, p.30/31) rejects this argument on the basis that the corporation income tax does not 
distinguish between location-specific rents and normal return on equity capital or rents that are specific 
to the multinational rather than the country. As he argues, a multinational might be able to obtain rents 
because of its ownership of unique manufacturing knowledge which it can exploit by building a factory 
anywhere in the world. It is not clear why the country that the multinational happens to choose as the 
location for the factory should have a special entitlement to tax the normal return on the investment in 
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place within its borders. For instance, a country might wish to use taxation as an 
instrument to provide incentives or disincentives for corporate investment or saving, 
to restrict monopoly power or the absolute size of firms, or to constrain profits in 
connection with the imposition of direct controls over wages and prices. Although 
taxation can be a useful device for accomplishing these purposes, the corporate 
income tax generally would not be the most suitable form of taxation to employ if 
these were truly the objectives of the tax. 10 
1.1 The power theory 
One of the best explanations for source-based taxation relates to the power that the 
government has to impose taxes. The core of the concept of fiscal jurisdiction is to be 
found in the power of a state to create interests. II 
According to the power theory, fiscal jurisdiction is the result of the power of the 
taxing state over the tax subject or object. 12 In the equation of fiscal jurisdiction with 
physical power, Stimson argues that: 
'The fundamental principle of jurisdiction is simple enough. Jurisdiction is 
physical power. A sovereign state has no physical power over persons and 
property outside its territory.' 13 
Fiscal jurisdiction depends on the extent to which a tax claim can be enforced. 
Consequently, whenever an entity can or actually exercises its physical power, it has 
fiscal jurisdiction. 
In the context of the source principle, the description of the power theory gives rise to 
some limits. For instance, a state may, in some circumstances, have physical power 
over persons and objects within its territory without having fiscal jurisdiction (cases 
the factory or even the firm-specific rents, the practical effect will be to discourage multinationals from 
investing in the country. 
10 Ibid. 
11 See Wurzel, op cit, p. 825. 
12 See Danziger, op cit, p. 19. 
13 See Stimson, Jurisdiction and power to lax, 1933, III criticised in his theory by Martha, op cil, p. 
19. This theory was relied on in the American case of Burnet v Brooks, where the Supreme Court 
approved of an estate tax on property situated within the United States, when the decedent was a 
British citizen and a resident of Cuba, on the basis that, the property was: 
'[W]ithin the reach of the power which the United States by nature of its sovereignty could 
exercise as against other nations and their subjects without violating any established principle 
of intemationallaw. ,13 
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of jurisdictional immunities of diplomats) or there may be situations where a state has 
no physical power, but can legitimately claim the right to tax. 
However, as correctly pointed out by Green,14 there is one pragmatic justification for 
the source principle that goes beyond force majeure. The country of source IS 
generally in the best position to enforce a tax on transnational income. That IS 
probably why in the international tax context, the benefit principle has been offered as 
a rationale for the permanent establishment test, so that unless a company has a 
permanent establishment, it is not likely to benefit significantly from public 
services. 15 The source country can monitor transnational income by requiring local 
firms and financial intermediaries to report the income payments they make and 
withhold taxes on such payments. The residence country, by contrast, has no 
jurisdiction over such foreign entities and must rely on less effective means to ensure 
compliance. 
1.2 The contractual theory 
This theory justifies the taxation on the basis of source by suggesting that taxation is 
the payment for goods and services received from the taxing state on the basis of a 
presumed contract between the holder of fiscal jurisdiction and the fiscal subject. 16 
This theory has been formulated by Saredo who maintains that the state's right to tax 
is essentially a contractual one, and is a result of a bilateral contract between the state 
and the taxpayer. 17 
If the right to tax is based on a contract, then to what extent is the fundamental aspect 
of contract present in the agreement?18 It may be argued that a person who voluntarily 
goes to a foreign country and buys property or engages in economic activity may be 
said to have impliedly agreed with the foreign state to pay its taxes. However, it might 
14 Op cit, p. 31. 
15 See Mc Lure, C. E, "Globalization, Tax Rules and National Sovereignty", August 2001, Bulletin/or 
International Fiscal Documentation, vol 55, no 8, p. 336, 
16 See Hobbes, T, Leviathan 181 (1651); also found in Martha, op cit, p. 21. 
17 See Saredo, Traite des lois, 1871,779; Griziotti,Recueil descours, 1926, 13, p. 31. 
18 This theory was explicitly rejected by the Appellate Division of the state of New York, in Colorado 
v Harbeck (1921), 189 N Y. AD 865, on the argument that the state of Colorado could not file suit for 
the enforcement of its revenue laws on the basis that a tax was due as a contractual obligation. 
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be difficult to apply the same rules to the situation of inheritance tax when an alien 
non-resident finds himselfliable to foreign tax through no voluntary act of his own.l9 
The question that arises is whether, by accepting the property, the taxpayer 
consequently concludes a contract in which he consents to taxation. Is there any real 
freedom of contract between the state and the taxpayer? 
According to Albrecht, the alien taxpayer must pay his taxes whether he has agreed to 
do so or not, and the contract is not even subj ect to negotiation regarding its terms 
because the state is free to fix the 'price' . Thus the parties do not stand on an equal 
footing, and the terms of the contract are unilaterally imposed by the state which can 
vary them at will, or may alter or abolish existing taxes and introduce new ones, 
spending the proceeds as it likes without any obligation to consult the alien 
taxpayer. 20 
However, as Albrecht contends further, there are some situations in which the right to 
tax aliens for example may be affected by a contract: 
The first situation is when the contract exists between the alien taxpayer and the 
taxing state which sets out the nature and the amount of taxation to be allowed?l 
The second situation may happen when two or more states have concluded a treaty on 
the taxation of aliens . 22 
1.3 The ethical or 'retributive' theory 
This theory found its early analysis in the writings of Griziotti, who considered that, 
the right to tax has an ethical basis rather than a juridical or political one. It derives its 
origins and foundation in the sovereignty of the state?3 It follows that consideration of 
fairness have to some extent influenced the development of rules of international law 
19 See Albrecht, op cit, p. 146; also in Martha, op cit, p. 21. 
20 Id; also discussed by Wurzel, op cit, p. 832. 
21 See the agreement between the Imperial government of Persia and the Anglo-Persian oil Co Ltd of 
29 April 1933, in League of nation officialjoumal (July-December, 1933), annex 1467, p. 1653 . 
22 For example, as Albrecht Cop cit, p. 147) stated, this category deals with treaties designed to prevent 
double taxation, to avoid unfair discrimination, or to establish special privileges. 
23 Griziotti, op cit, p. 5. 
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affecting the right to tax. Thus, from the source tax perspective, taxation in the ethical 
sense is a return for advantages or benefits received from the state.24 
There are limits established by ethical principles and generally recognised in practice 
which restrict the exercise of the sovereignty of states in imposing taxation. 
The determination of the contribution of the individuals to the needs of the society 
depends on two main factors: 
Firstly, anyone who forms part of an economic community must contribute according 
to his earnings to the cost of such community; 
Secondly, anyone who benefits from the social activity ought to pay taxes to that 
community, as well as any person fits or capable to contribute to the collective life of 
the society.25 
The weakness of this theory is that, there is no clear and generally accepted standards 
of fairness in the right to tax for example aliens and thus, no objective parameters of 
what is 'just' can be said to exist. 
1.4 Other principles and policy considerations 
It is also argued that taxation on the basis of source supports the following principles: 
1.4.1 Equity 
The source principle favours the principle of equity. Some writers consider that under 
the worldwide system of taxation, there is discrimination between residents and non-
residents. Non-residents are often taxed at a flat rate on gross income and even when 
they are taxed on a net basis, they are denied some personal allowances and other 
deductions that are allowed to resident taxpayers . While the source country treats all 
24 See Albrecht, op cit, p. 146. 
25 See Martha, op cit, p. 20. Albrecht (op cit, p. 148) has criticised Griziotti on the combination of 
ethical principle of taxation and ability to pay principle. He argues that the rule by which the taxpayer 
should pay according to the advantages which he receives from the state cannot be reconciled with the 
rule that he should pay according to his capacity, unless it is assumed rather unrealistically that 
capacity is a measure of the advantages received. 
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income earned within its jurisdiction equally, whether a resident or a non-resident 
earns the income. 26 
1.4.2 Neutrality 
Taxation on the basis of source may be justified on the ground of capital import 
neutrality; that is to say neutrality as an objective tax system does not affect or 
interfere with personal or investment decision, and consequently, it promotes the most 
efficient allocation of resources. On that basis, since the tax burden on residents and 
non-residents is the same, neither will enjoy any tax advantage in doing business 
within the country. Territoriality as the basis of taxation is then neutral insofar as it 
permits non-residents to compete equally in a particular country with residents of that 
country27 Apart from the question of entitlement, there is an argument for an 
international system of purely source-based corporate income taxation on the ground 
that it would promote global economic efficiency. In particular, such a system would 
be neutral with respect to the international allocation of world savings and ownership 
of capital. 28 
Taxing on the principle of source of income permits the reduction of international 
double taxation to the extent that all the source countries would only claim tax on 
domestic source income under the same applicable tax rules. 
In addition to the motivation emphasising enjoyment of the source country's 
resources as noted in the Kergeulen 's case,29 a source system is also justified by the 
degree to which it ensures fair competition between taxpayers in the particular 
jurisdiction and taxpayers (competitors) from other jurisdictions. It follows that the 
application of the source principle of taxation secures the objective of neutrality and 
equal competition for both inward and outward investment, while protecting a 
country's capital and human skills. 
26 See Arnold op cit, p. 66. 
27 Ibid, p. 69. 
28 See OEeD, Taxing Profits In A Global Economy: Domestic And International Issues 39-42 (1991); 
Horst, T, "A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income", (1980) 94 Q.J Ecan 
793 . 
35 
2. Rationale for taxing on the basis of residence 
Although the justification for a country in imposing a source-based income tax on 
non-residents is universally accepted, some writers have argued that this justification 
is difficult on theoretical grounds. 30 Green has maintained the view that source-based 
taxation is difficult to reconcile with the prevailing theory of the income tax as a 
means of allocating the cost of government among individuals on the basis of ability 
to pay. As he contends, it is an attempt by government to tax income on the basis of 
source that gives rise to income shifting and to tax competition among governments. 
In addition, Avi-Yonah31 argues in the analysis of the US source system that the fact 
that each category of income has its own source rule causes significant transactional 
complexity as taxpayers try to manipulate the source of income so that the resulting 
substantive tax rule will be to their advantage. Moreover, the differentiation between 
the various categories is very difficult and gives rise to much litigation and elaborate 
regulatory exercises. 
Thus, the ultimate solution would be to move to an international tax system that uses 
residence as an exclusive basis for tax jurisdiction. 32 
In the writings of Hugo de Groot, there is a suggestion that the adoption of residence 
as the connecting factor is based on the jurisprudential protection theory of fiscal 
jurisdiction. 
As Grotius contends, if a sovereign state incurs expenses by providing security and 
protection of trade to strangers, it has a right to reimburse itself by the imposition of 
moderate and reasonable duties?3 In other words, the importance of the residence 
concept in taxation, as expressed by Stratford CJ in Kergeulen Sealing & Whaling Co 
Ltd v CIR is based on the fact that: 
([P]resumably, .. . a resident, for the privilege and protection of residence, can 
justly be called upon to contribute towards the cost of good order and 
government of the country that shelters him. ,34 
29 Op cit, note 2. 
30 See Green, op cit, p. 70. See also Plambeck, C.T, "The Taxation Implications of Global Trading", 
(1990),48 Tax Notes 1143. 
31 See Avi-Yonah, RS, "Making Sense of US International Taxation: Six Steps toward 
Simplification", 2001, Bull For International Fiscal Documentation, vol 55, p. 494. 
32 See Green, op cit, p. 70. 
33 See Hugo de Groot, De jure belli ac Pacis, 1625, 2.2.14, 1-2, cited by Danziger, op cit, p. 54. 
34 (1939) AD 487, 10 SATe 363. 
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Because of the economic security which individuals and groups enjoy in a country 
either by benefiting from the laws of the land or relying on its resources (though they 
may be nationals of other countries), it is justifiable to formulate a system in which 
the beneficiaries of national expenditure share in this cost, be it by direct or indirect 
taxation. 35 
2.1 The protection theory 
As mentioned above, this theory as the basis for residence tax jurisdiction derives 
from the proposition that, if a state grants protection to a resident person, his property 
or activities, the state is entitled to tax that person, his property or activities. 36 
Arnold37 reconciles the protection theory with the benefit provided by the state of 
residence. Because government services must be funded from tax revenues, those who 
benefit from the services should pay for them. Protection is the qualitative as well as 
the quantitative prerequisite for extra-territorial taxation. As Arnold puts it, residents 
of a country clearly derive significant benefits from a wide range of government 
expenditures, whether their income is earned from foreign or domestic sources or 
from a combination of the twO?8 This can even justify the taxation of foreign income 
of a resident alien although his foreign assets cannot be protected directly. 
Wurzel argues that a resident is able to make a country of his stay the economic center 
of his activities, directing his business in any part of the world from this centre under 
the protection of the laws of that country. As he continues: 
'[P]rotection is effectively granted not only by political measures in cases of 
conflict with foreign powers but also by the economic center of his activities, 
directing his business in any part of the world from this center under the 
protection of the laws of this country. ,39 
35 See the argument of Plasschaert, SRF, op cit, p. 409, who stated that the benefits enjoy by the 
resident in a state derive from the inflow of factors of production which have been nurtured by 
educational and other outlays of the home country government. 
36 See Danziger, op cit, p. 5. 
37 Op cit, p. 12. 
38 See Arnold, B, J, The Taxation o/Controiled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, 
1986, Canadian Tax Paper, no 78, p. 2. 
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However, the benefit theory may give rise to some problems. The question arises as to 
who benefits from the public expenditures and the extent of the benefit. For instance, 
as a class, residents who earn foreign source income benefit less from public spending 
in their country of residence than residents who earn exclusively domestic source 
income. For the former, the income in question is generated under substantially 
different circumstances in other jurisdictions. 40 On the other hand, non-residents who 
earn income from a country by reason of employment or a business carried on there 
can be said to benefit significantly from the country's public expenditure. 
On the practical application, there appear to be several solid grounds for preferring the 
principle of residence to source, particularly as it applies to individuals. On a 
pragmatic ground, Avi-Yonah argues that individuals can only be resident in one 
place at any given time. Thus residence for individuals is a relatively easy concept to 
establish, and in fact, it is possible to set down bright-line rules for determining the 
fiscal residence of individuals. On the other hand, determining the source of income is 
a highly problematic endeavour, and in most cases, income will have more than one 
source. Consequently, if one jurisdiction is to be given the primary right to tax 
individuals, the residence jurisdiction is an obvious candidate. 41 
With regard to the residence-based taxation of corporate income, Green maintains that 
it would be possible to devise a residence-based system at the corporate level by 
obtaining international agreement on the definition of corporate 'residence' and 
giving the residence country exclusive jurisdiction to impose the corporate income 
tax. It would be difficult to justify such an allocation on theoretical grounds, however, 
39 See Wurzel, op cit, p. 829. 
40 However, this argwnent may be less convincing because it ignores the fact that even for a resident 
who earn exclusively foreign source income, the state of residence of the taxpayer has enabled him to 
accumulate capital, to develop intangible property or to acquire a capital asset, which are invested 
offshore, and that the taxpayer does not actively use the infrastructure of the other state where another 
taxpayer uses the capital or asset. 
41 See Avi-Yonah, R S "The Structure of International Taxation: A proposal for Simplification", 
(1996) 74 Texas Law Review, p. 1311 . The problem with enforcing residence-based taxation of 
individuals is very practical. As many writers argue even developed countries find it hard to effectively 
enforce residence-based taxation on the global income of individuals, especially from tax havens, and 
developing countries find this task impossible. Thus, as portfolio investment grows and becomes 
increasingly more mobile, this problem becomes more and more acute. See Giovannini, A & James 
Hines, Jr "Capital Flight and Tax Competition: AIe There Viable Solutions to Both Problems?", 
(1991) in European Financial Integration 172. Bird, RM "Income Tax Reform in Developing 
Countries: The Administrative Dimension", (1983) 37 Bull. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 
7. 
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except to the extent that the residence of a corporation is a good proxy for the 
residence of its individual shareholders. Moreover, if corporations have flexibility to 
choose their country of residence, as would likely be the case, the result would be tax 
competition among countries to induce corporations to become residents. The end 
result might be the effective elimination of corporate income taxation, at least for 
multinational enterprises. 42 
2.2 Key principles and Policy considerations 
Taxation on a worldwide basis can also be justified by the key principles of equity, 
neutrality and efficiency. 
2.2.1 Equity 
The application of the principle of equity for residence tax purposes is based on the 
idea that taxpayers earning the same amount of income (whether derived from 
domestic or foreign sources) should pay the same amount of tax (horizontal equity) or 
that taxpayers should be taxed in accordance with their capacity or ability to pay 
(vertical equity). Fairness of the tax system is one of the main reasons for taxing 
residents on their worldwide income. 
Vann43 correctly argues that when a country adopts a progressive income tax rate 
scale for individuals, it is usually motivated by the idea that it is fair for higher-
income individuals to pay proportionally more of their income as tax. However, 
unless the individual is taxed on worldwide income, this goal may not be achieved for 
an individual with income from more than one country. If the progressive tax rates are 
the same in each country and each country taxes only on a source basis, an individual 
42 See Green, op cit, p. 70. As recognised further by Green (p. 72), a pure residence-based taxation for 
corporate income does present several potential problems. First, if each country continued to maintain 
its own definition of the corporate income tax base, corporations would have to calculate their taxable 
income under the rules of each country in which any of their ultimate individual shareholders resided. 
Second, enforcement would be difficult, because each country would have to monitor the worldwide 
operations of every multinational enterprise in which any of its residents were shareholders. Another 
substantial obstacle to moving to a residence-based system would be that it would alter the 
international division of the tax base in favour of countries that are net capital exporters (residence 
countries) to the detriment of countries that are net importers of capital (source countries) 
43 Op cit, p. 749. 
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receiving income from each country will pay less tax in total to both countries than an 
individual who receives the same total amount of income from only one of the 
countries. This is doubly unfair because not only are the two like individuals taxed 
differently, but individuals are obviously encouraged to split their income between the 
countries; an avenue that is more likely to be used by a high-income taxpayer. 
On the same point, Avi-Yonah contends that because most individuals can only be 
resident in one place, distributional concerns can be effectively addressed only in the 
country of residence. If the personal income tax is to have a significant redistributive 
function through progressive rates, it is necessary to include all income (including 
foreign source income) in the measurement of the taxpayer's ability to pay. There 
may be no problem of horizontal equity in taxing differently two equivalently situated 
taxpayers, only one of whom invests abroad and earns low-taxed income there, as 
long as the other has the same choice of investments open to him. However, there is a 
significant problem of vertical equity in taxing an investor with a low level of 
domestic earnings and with high foreign earnings that are not taxed abroad in the 
same way that a person with low domestic earnings is taxed. 44 This problem can be 
resolved if the residence jurisdiction is allowed to tax on foreign source income that is 
not taxed abroad (or is taxed at lower effective rates) and allows a credit for foreign 
taxes, but it is much simpler to address the issue if the residence jurisdiction is given 
the exclusive right to tax all income of its residents. 
2.2.2 Neutrality 
Taxation on the basis of residence as supported by economists, promotes capital 
export neutrality. Exempting foreign source income is an inherent incentive for 
residents to invest abroad. The goal of capital export neutrality (CEN) requires that 
the decision to invest in a given location not be affected by tax rates; otherwise, 
investments that yield the highest returns on a pretax basis will not be made because 
the after-tax return will be lower, causing global welfare (based on allocative 
44 See Avi-Yonah, op cit, note 41, p. 1312. For further comments on the concepts and norms of 
horizontal and vertical equity, see Kaplow, L & Repetti, J, "Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The 
Musgrave/ Kaplow Exchange", (1992) 1 FLORIDA . TAX REV. 605. See also Musgrave, R, "Horizontal 
Equity, Once More", (1990) 43 NAT'L TAX. J, p. 113. 
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efficiency) to be diminished. 45 Thus, in a world with many taxing jurisdictions with 
varying rates, capital export neutrality is best achieved by taxing all investors at their 
residence country's rate. 
2.2.3 Efficiency 
Taxation of residents on their global income broadens a country's revenue base, limits 
scope for tax avoidance and non-taxation. If residents of a country have significant 
amounts of foreign investment, the taxation of foreign source income may add 
substantially to tax revenues, even after relief is provided in respect of foreign taxes. 46 
On the political level, the residence of individuals, to some extent overlaps with their 
political allegiance. In democratic countries, it is considered important for individuals 
to have a right to participate (through their representatives) in deciding how much tax 
they have to pay. The converse is even more significant because democratic 
legislatures have a preference for raising taxes on foreigners precisely because they 
cannot vote. Thus, taxation based on residence is a useful, though far from perfect, 
proxy for taxation with representation. 
2.2.4 Cyberspace advantage 
In the era of electronic commerce, where current views of tax principles has become 
extremely vague, it can be argued that the residence-based tax system is more suitable 
to deal with the issue of jurisdiction in cyberspace transactions. It is therefore fair to 
say that in the digital economy, the jurisdictional rules of residence may be more 
dependable and less subject to manipulation than those governing source-based 
taxation. As Swanepoel47 contends, it will often be easier to establish a connecting 
factor with reference to a resident as opposed to the source of particular income and it 
45 CEN is generally considered by economists to be superior to capital import neutrality (CIN) as a 
welfare-enhancing principle. It is argued that CEN is needed to achieve an efficient allocation of the 
world's investments, while CIN is needed for an efficient allocation of savings, which is considered to 
be a less important goal. See Mc Lure, C, "Substituting Consumption-based Direct Taxation for 
Income Taxes as the International Norm", (1992) 45 NAT'L TAX J 145/146. See also Frisch, D, "The 
Economics ofintemational Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches", (1990) 47 TAX NOTES 581. 
46 This policy may be difficult to apply in the jurisdictions which adopt a residence tax system while 
maintaining some form of exchange control regulations. 
47 See Swanepoel, E, "E-Commerce and Tax Questions", 13 Taxgram, July 1999. 
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is thus likely that residence will be the preferred test in respect of the taxation of 
electronic commerce. 
Accordingly, in the case of individuals for example, a country will generally be able 
to enforce its tax claims against residents, probably because the taxpayer or at least 
some of his assets will be within the country's jurisdiction, whereas a single-source 
country is unlikely to know the total income of a non-resident taxpayer and will face 
enforcement problems in relation to income arising outside the country. In addition, 
the tax residence country could minimize the erosion of the tax system by adopting 
alternative legislative factors for tax liability. In application to individuals, the 
physical presence test could be combined with other subjective criteria such as the 
place of vital economic interest. 
In the case of compames, though the ease with which the place of effective 
management and the place of incorporation tests for residence can be manipulated 
without necessarily substantively altering the way the company conducts its business, 
transactions over the internet raises the possibility for tax residence countries to use 
different criteria for tax liability. Thus, in order to avoid the erosion of the national tax 
base and to legitimately claim the right to tax, it is suggested that the determination of 
residence with regard to companies, could be the location of the server that hosts the 
home web of the company, as that would be the place where the day-to-day running 
of the company takes place. 48 On the other hand, Doernberg 49 contends that if it were 
deemed desirable to change the definition of residence for legal entities in light of 
technological advances, one possibility (though not commercially justifiable in some 
instances) would be to extent conventional residence tests to move closely to the 
consideration of residence of the participants, be they shareholders, directors or 
managers, in determining the residence of an entity, without completely forsaking the 
traditional tests. 50 
48 See Buys, C.R, "The Taxation of Electronic Commerce in South Mrica", 1998, LLM thesis (VCT), 
Part IV, p. 13. It could on the other hand be argued that adopting the location of the server as the place 
of residence in an e-commerce environment would be far removed from the management of the 
company which seems to indicate a human activity. 
49 See Doernberg, R & Hinnekens, L, Electronic Commerce and International Taxation, 1999, p. 333. 
50 This approach may be effective in some cases, but it may be unjustifiable to adopt a broad definition 
of residence for legal entities in terms of residence of investors. First, the tax net would be widened to 
include all foreign incorporate companies, even those that conduct legitimate business activities. 
Secondly, there would be practical problems with the enforcement of taxation of foreign companies. It 
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In conclusion, it seems appropriate from a policy viewpoint, for the country taxing on 
the basis of personal allegiance of the taxpayer to be the one that takes account of the 
taxpayer's attributes. 
3. The evolution of the South African tax system 
3.1 Historical background to the South African's fiscal jurisdiction 
The first income tax law in South Africa was based on the principle that income tax 
should be levied on the income originated within the Union (as it then was)51 This 
was incorporated in the Additional Taxation Act 36 of 1904 (Cape), which in its 
section 42 defined 'income' as 'any gains or profits derived or received from any 
source within this colony. ,52 
The source principle was adopted in the first Union income tax legislation called the 
Income Tax Act 28 of 1914, which defined income as 'any gains or profits ... from 
any source within the Union' and taxable income as income received by 'any person 
wheresover residing, from any source whatever in the Union . .. ' 
The source principle was preserved in subsequent tax legislations: the Income Tax 
Consolidation Act 41 of 1917, the Income Tax Act 40 of 1925 and the Income Tax 
Act 31 of 1941 which defined' gross income' as including receipts and accruals' from 
any source within the Union or deemed to be within the Union.' 
The source concept was maintained in the Income Tax Act, no 58 of 1962, in its 
section 1 which then read as follows: 
'In this Act, unless the content otherwise indicates- ... "gross income" in 
relation to any year or period of assessment means, in the case of any person, 
may be difficult to gather information necessary to detennine their tax liability and once determined, 
the collection of tax would be difficult unless the company voluntarily complied or had assets in the 
jurisdiction that imposed the tax. See also Sandler, D, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Companies 
Legis/ation, 1998, 2ed, p. 4. 
51 See the Katz Commission, 5th report, op cit, p. 3. 
52 It should be noted that before 1910, tax on the income of individuals was levied only in the Cape 
Colony and Natal. Thus, the Taxation Act 36 of 1904 was only applicable in the Cape Colony while a 
similar tax was imposed in Natal by Act 33 of 1908. Colonial legislation also made provision for a tax 
to be levied on the taxable income of mines, namely Act 16 of 1907 in the Cape Colony, Act 43 of 
1899 in Natal, and Ordinances 25 of 1903, 8 of 1904, 15 of 1907 and 24 of 1907 in the Orange Free 
State. The Mining Taxation Act 6 of 1910 consolidated the laws relating to the taxation of mines in the 
Union. See Clegg, D & Stretch, R, Income Tax in South Africa, December 2001, vol 1, Service Issue 
20, p. 1-4. 
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the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour 
of such person during such year or period of assessment from a source within 
or deemed to be within the Republic, excluding receipts or accruals of a 
capital nature ... ,5) 
Several investigations concerning the appropriateness of the source concept have been 
made in South Mrica. 
In 1951, the Steyn Commitee54 did not favour the source principle on the argument 
that, the application of the source principle as a connecting factor made it possible for 
persons who derived their income from non-South African sources to reside in the 
Union and enjoy the protection of the state without making any direct contribution by 
way of income tax to the fiscus. 
The Minister of Finance identified the tax avoidance schemes as being linked to a 
source basis in his 1955 budget speech: 
'Under existing legislation income received from foreign sources is not 
taxable. With the purpose of avoiding super tax, certain Union nationals or 
persons resident in the Union, transferred their shares in local companies to 
companies which were specially formed for this purpose outside the 
boundaries of the Union. Profits earned in the Union are then paid to the 
foreign company which in its turn distributes it as dividends to its shareholders 
in the Union. Since such dividends are regarded as income received from 
sources outside the Union, it is not taxable here. This is a clever plan intended 
to rob the state of its legitimate tax revenue - and I use the word rob purposely 
- and this cannot be allowed to continue ... ,55 
However the Commission recommended that the source system should be maintained 
on the grounds of perceived complexity of changing to a residence system where, for 
instance, it would necessitate the granting of double taxation relief which would 
probably entail giving a credit for foreign taxes and that for such credit to be effective 
and equitable, the legislation would have to be complex, and the limited gain benefits 
to the revenue unless a large amount was earned by South African residents in other 
countries and was taxed at lower rates than the rates imposed in South Africa. 
53 See Danziger, op cit, p.13/14; also found in SwanepoeJ, op cit, p. 18. 
54 First Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Income Tax Act (The Steyn Committee Report), 
UG No. 75-1951(Pretoria: The Government Printer); para. 68, p. 19. 
55 See Coetzee, H.A, "Residence and Corporate Taxation", (March 1988) 1 Foreign Tax Review 17. 
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In 1970, the Franszen Commission56 recommended the opposite for the following 
reasons: 
Firstly, more income was beginning to flow into South Africa without being taxed. 
Secondly, the source-basis of South Africa could no longer be reconciled with its 
economic interests due to the fact that South Africa's major trading partners were 
adopting a worldwide system and the residence basis was enhancing the individual's 
ability to pay considering the realities of international tax arrangements. 
The Commission recommended a change from source basis to residence basis of 
taxation, so that the gross income of South African residents would include income 
from both South Africa and foreign sources, while non-residents would be taxed on 
income from South African sources. 
As Danziger57 commented, the justification given for these recommendations was 
based on particular grounds: 
First, the amount of foreign source income earned by South Mrican residents had 
increased consistently since the Steyn Committee report, and in that light, the Income 
Tax Act had already deviated from a pure source basis through the introduction of 
various deeming provisions. 
Secondly, double taxation agreements have been concluded or were being negotiated 
with South African trading partners. The double taxation agreements practice had 
developed equitable principles for the allocation of taxes between source and 
residence states. As a result, South Africa, by taxing on the source basis, unilaterally 
surrendered the benefits of this allocation with a resultant loss to the fiscus . 
The above recommendations were accepted by the government in its subsequent 
white paper subject to the provision that further study would be taken on certain facets 
of the recommendations. The Franszen Commission on the matter of change to 
residence basis was, however, never implemented by way of legislation. 58 
The Margo Commission (1986/87i9 reviewed the whole issue comprehensively. It 
recognised that two reasons would favour a residence basis of taxation. First, with the 
56 Commission of Enquiry into Fiscal and Monetary Policy in South Africa (The Franszen Commission 
Report). Taxation in South Africa: Second Report. RP 86/1970 (pretoria: The Government Printer 
1970), para. 20. 
57 See Danziger, op cit, p. 15. 
58 See the Katz Commission, 5th Report, chap 2, p. 3 . 
.59 Report of the Commission of InqUiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South Africa (The 
Margo Commission Report), RP 3411987 (pretoria: The Government Printer 1987), para. 26-3 . 
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lifting of the exchange control regulations, the residence system might be helpful in 
limiting the consequential tax avoidance. Secondly, the source-basis was exposed to 
schemes of tax avoidance through the other countries in the rand monetary area, and 
thus a worldwide taxation would help to counter this. 
This commission recommended that subject to the possibility of extending some of 
the existing source provisions, the source basis of taxation should be preserved. This 
was based on the consideration that: 
The legislation for and the administration of a worldwide system would be 
considerably more complex than the existing system because it would impose 
considerable burdens on the fisc, especially in relation to companies and trusts 
operating in foreign jurisdictions. 
The second reason was that while income inflow from off-shore was increasing, the 
failure of a source system to tax such income made relatively little difference to the 
yield as in terms of international convention, South Africa would have to grant credit 
for the foreign taxes already paid; and moreover, the fiscal benefits that might be 
derived from a worldwide basis would be reduced as and when the South African tax 
rates were reduced. The Margo Commission recommendations were accepted by the 
government in its White Paper. 60 
The 1997 Katz Commission Report recommended a major move towards a residence-
based tax system in South Africa. It suggested that considering the relaxation of the 
exchange controls and the need to protect the South African capital base, the hybrid 
system of taxation through the implementation of deeming provisions as to source (by 
adopting residence as an important second connecting factor) particularly in the areas 
of investment income (passive income) was the appropriate one, which reconciled 
with the international trend towards a globalised economy.61 
The argument of the Commission was based on the fact that following globalisation, 
no country in the world has sensibly applied any tax system exclusively. 
60 See Katz Conunission, op cit, chap 2, p. 3. 
61 See Jooste, R, "The Imputation ofIncome ofControJled Foreign Entities", 2001, SALJ, vol lI8, part 
3, p.473. 
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The Commission acknowledged the criticism that one problem with the then source 
based system of taxation in South Africa was how to prevent the movement of capital 
and business offshore following the possible relaxation in exchange control 
regulations. Another attack to the source system was that as South Africa became 
more internationally accepted, and in view of the extensive network of double 
taxation agreements being negotiated, a source basis of taxation was putting South 
Africa out of step with its trading partners. Thus, it became easier to manipulate the 
source basis of taxation and the treaty provision to eliminate the tax altogether on 
income received. 62 
Notwithstanding the need to encourage South African businesses to become 
reintegrated with the world economy, the Katz Commission did not find it necessary 
to recommend a change from source to residence, because from the perspective of 
collecting revenue, adopting a residence or source basis would make little, if any, 
difference as regards direct investment (active income). As regards passive 
investment, a residence or worldwide system would bring a revenue advantage. Thus, 
the Commission recommended a partial extension of the current system to counter the 
expected outflow of funds in order to generate foreign income in low tax jurisdictions. 
The Commission proposed the introduction of a permanent establishment concept in 
the South African Income Tax Act. This provision dealing with the treatment of non-
residents carrying on business in South Africa would be similar to the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) model double taxation 
convention concept but with a wider scope akin to the United Nations model 
convention provisions. This implied that with regard to active income, non-residents 
would only be subject to the South African tax if they carried on business in South 
Africa through such a permanent establishment. On the other hand, the Commission 
proposed that active income generated through the equivalent of a permanent 
establishment abroad should be exempt from South African tax, which means that the 
source principle would apply, whereas passive income should be taxed on the 
worldwide basis. 63 
62 See the Katz Commission, op cit, chap 3, p. 6; See also Holland, K.J, "The Viability of a Residence-
Based Tax System in South Africa", (1996), LLM thesis (OCT), p. 53. 
63 See the Katz Commission, op cit, chap 3, p. 11. 
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To counter abuse of the system by routing 'passive income' through an intermediate 
company offshore to change the income to tax exempt dividends, the Commission 
proposed the introduction of controlled foreign corporation rules which would 
function to attribute such passive income received by a controlled foreign corporation 
to the shareholders or controllers in South Africa. 
To prevent the potential avoidance or deferral of tax to South African residents, who 
invested in offshore investment funds and did not repatriate any income until maturity 
or retirement, the Commission consequently recommended the introduction of anti-
avoidance rules similar to the so-called foreign investment fund (FIF) rules in 
Australia. Such rules function to attribute income to the investor on an accrual basis, 
usually applying a formula calculation which takes the capital invested as basis. 
The Commission also identified the problem associated in defining the enigmatic 
source of income, and considered that though a detailed codification of this crucial 
concept was not desirable, it nevertheless suggested a move towards internationally 
intelligible principles to be interpreted according to the circumstances of each case. 
The Commission also recognised the need to combine the two elements of presence 
and activity in determining the source of income. The Report introduced rules to 
determine the source of certain items of income (for instance the source of interest) 
and also provided for apportionment of income to its respective source location as 
opposed to the current' dominant cause' approach. 64 
Most of the recommendations of the Katz Commission were incorporated into the 
South African Income Tax Act, in substance effective from 1 July 199765 
3.2 The fundamental change 
Notwithstanding the recommendations of the Katz Commission, the move to a 
residence-based tax system for South Mrica was perhaps an inevitable development 
considering increased globalisation of South African commerce and also the advent of 
e-commerce. Reliance on a source-based system alone would certainly result in an 
64 See the Katz Commission, op cit, chap 5, p. 15; See also Holland, op cit, p. 55-58. 
65 This was achieved through the insertion of sections 9C and 9D in the Act by the Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act 59 of 2000. 
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ever-increasing amount of tax revenue being lost as transactions were being sourced 
in other countries or concluded over the internet. Without a stronger reliance on 
residence as a basis for taxation, it would have been difficult for the South African 
Revenue Service to exercise jurisdiction effectively over commerce in a global 
context. It was also contended that there were advantages to be gained by South 
Africa through harmonising its tax system with those of its trading partners, many of 
whom applied a residence-based tax system. 
With the support of the view that there were improvements at the Revenue offices in 
terms of administrative facilities, the reservations expressed by the Katz Commission 
were no longer altogether applicable. A step closer to an entirely residence-based 
system was taken in 2000 when foreign dividends also became taxable in the hands of 
South African residents.66 
During the Minister of Finance's speech of23 February 2000, it was announced that a 
residence basis of taxation would replace the source basis of taxation with effect from 
years of assessment beginning on or after 01 January 2001 (and in the case of 
individuals from the year of assessment commencing on or after 01 March 2001)67 
The legislation to give effect to the Minister's announcement received presidential 
assent in November 2000 and is contained in the Revenue Laws Amendment Act.68 
With the passing of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act of 2000, the circle was 
completed with all income, including non-investment income (that is active income) 
becoming subject to a residence-based system. 69 The South African tax authorities 
chose to upgrade our tax system to the level which is applied in first world countries, 
that is, instead of basing liability for tax on income derived from sources within South 
Africa, to tax residents of South Africa on their worldwide income and non-residents 
on their income from sources within South Africa. Accordingly, the change brought 
about by the statutory amendments has made the taxation of residents all-embracing 
66 Foreign dividends were included through the insertion of section 9E in the Act by the Revenue 
Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000, which became operative in respect of any foreign dividend received 
or accrued to a resident on or after 23 February 2000. 
67 See section 76(2) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000 
68 Act of 59 of 2000 as published in the Government Gazette, no 21848, vol 426 dated 06 December 
2000. 
69 See Jooste, op cit, p. 473. 
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without regard to the nature or source of the Income or the source of the funds 
producing the income.7o 
The new residence tax system has nevertheless been subject to certain exemptions or 
exclusions which have their justification in the context of economic considerations 
affecting the operations of residents in countries outside South Africa, as well as 
administrative considerations involving the reduction of the rebates required in order 
to avoid double taxation. Apart from the exemptions and exclusions, South Africa has 
entered into double taxation agreements with a large number of countries. These 
agreements will, in respect of various types of income have an impact on their 
taxation in the hands of residents. But, under the previous regime of taxing on the 
basis of source, the existence of double tax agreements was detrimental to the South 
African Revenue where it was required to yield tax in favour of the other country. 
This was because of the residence of the taxpayer there though the income had its 
source in South Africa, but not the reverse in respect of income having had its source 
in the other country and accruing to South African residents. 
In summary, the most important reasons for the radical change to the residence basis 
of taxation in South Africa7l are: 
• To place the income tax system on a sounder footing thereby protecting the South 
African tax base from exploitation. 
• To bring the South African tax system more In line with international tax 
principles. 
• The relaxation of exchange control and the greater involvement of South African 
companies offshore. 
• To cater more effectively for the taxation of e-commerce. 
70 See "The Revenue Laws Amendments Act", (Editorial note), The Taxpayer, October 2000, vol 49, 
no 10, p. 181. 
71 It would be seen through analysis in this research of the South African fiscal jurisdiction, in 
comparison with selected aspects of the right to tax of some of its trading partners, whether it was 
appropriate in the South African context to undergo such a radical change of tax system. 
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Part III: A comparative study of the concept of residence 
Introduction: 
Various countries have used the connecting factor of residence as a fundamental basis for 
fiscal jurisdiction. This principle derives from the recognition in international law of the 
territorial sovereignty by which states may legitimately exercise jurisdiction over persons 
and property within their geographical boundaries. In other words, a country is entitled to 
the extent of its supreme sovereignty to regulate conduct which occurs in its territory, 
persons who are present in its territory, things that are situated there, and acts which take 
place outside its territory but have effects within its territory. 
The functional term 'fiscal residence' or 'fiscal domicile'] is used to refer to a legal 
relationship that exists between a fiscal subject and the holder of fiscal jurisdiction. 
Expressed differently, the fiscal attachment that justifies the residence concept is the 
close cormection and personal ties to the country. Unlike the source principle where fiscal 
jurisdiction is based on economic attachment, the fiscal nexus between the taxpayer and 
the state that justifies the tax liability on the basis of residence is the personal status of the 
taxpayer. The term 'resident' can comprise both citizens and aliens having the territorial 
link required by the pertinent legal order.2 
The principle of residence has invariably become a central concept in the international tax 
rules of the domestic tax law of many countries in the world . South Africa itself has 
implemented for years of assessment commencing on or after I January 200 1, a radical 
shift from the hybrid source basis to the residence based tax system, which is justified to 
Fiscal domicile is the term used in most continental civi I law countries to refer to residence. For 
instance, in France, it is translated into ' domicile fiscal ' . Thus, in the strict sense, it is distinguished from 
the concept of domicile as understood in the common law system. 
2 It is argued by Martha (op Cil, p. 90) that it is anomalous to speak of residence with respect to citizens, 
because by viltue of personal sovereignty, a state such as the United States of America may impose tax on 
its citizens on the basis of political allegiance, irrespective of their place of residence. Furthermore, in the 
context of the United States, the term 'domiciliary jurisdiction' is the preferred expression used to justify 
the jurisdiction to tax the income based on the personal status of the taxpayer. See American Law Institute, 
Federal Income Tax Project (International aspects of U.S Income Taxation 6,1987). 
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be appropriate to the circums51 tances of its economy and in line with the international 
practice. 
With the emerging idea of globalisation and developments in electronic commerce, many 
fundamental tax concepts currently used in tax jurisdictions around the world will be 
challenged.3 However, although electronic commerce will have the effect of exposing 
serious flaws in the world ' s tax systems for instance by posing the problems of 
identification of the taxpayer or specific transaction information, residence based tax 
systems will be more suited and effective in an e-commerce envirorunent. It has been 
commonly speculated in various jurisdictions that: 
'The growth of new communication technologies and electronic commerce will 
likely require that principJes of residence-based taxation assume even greater 
importance. In the world of cyberspace, it is often difficult, if not impossible to 
apply traditional source concepts to link an item of income with a specific 
geographic location. Therefore, source-based taxation could lose its rationale and 
be rendered obsolete by electronic commerce. By contrast, almost all taxpayers 
are resident somewhere ... , 4 
In consideration of the international practice, it is unlikely today to enter into tax treaties 
without the concept of residence being included in domestic tax law. Moreover, this 
concept forms the main basis for tax liability in the Models of double taxation agreements 
such as the OEeD, which is followed by the most developed trading countries in the 
world. 
The specific characteristic of the residence concept is that fiscal residence is the place 
where a person (whether natural or juristic) is subject to unlimited fiscal liability.s It is 
thus of prime importance to define fiscal residence in order to assess the scope of 
taxation. 
See 'Globalisation and Tax ', The Economist, 29 January 2000. 
4 Cited by Bernard du Plessis and Viljoen , M, "Taxation of E-commerce: Income Tax" 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers document), referring to the arguments on the demise of the source basis of 
taxation advanced by the US Internal Revenue Service and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). 
5 However, most of the jurisdictions nowadays apply the so-called ' residence-minus' system whereby 
residents of a country are taxed on their global income subject to some relief on their foreign income being 
taxed abroad, while non-res idents are only taxed on their income sourced in that territory. 
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The main purpose of the research in this part will be to analyse the criteria of taxation 
based on residence (including domicile) and its specific tax implications in income tax 
law as applied in South Africa and the United Kingdom with reference also made where 
relevant to the application of the residence rules in the Unites States. 
1. The general understanding of the meaning of 'residence' 
In terms of the traditional approach to the interpretation of statutory enactments, known 
as the cardinal rule, the literal meaning of the wording of a provision must be ascertained 
by the use of ordinary grammatical rules. For the purpose of legal interpretation, a word 
must be given its normal everyday meaning, as it is understood by the language of the 
time. Thus, the concept of residence, which is the subject matter of this study can be 
better described by analysing it first , as it is understood in the general sense or would bear 
'in the speech of plain men,.6 
The ordinary person sees in the term 'residence ' as the actual place where one resides. 
Because ' residence' and its allied words are not always specifically defined in the 
legislative provisions, the leading dictionaries are frequently quoted in cases and 
discussions concerning the meaning of the expressions ' resident' and 'residence,.7 
In Levene v CIR,8 the presiding judge quoted the Oxford English dictionary meaning of 
the familiar word 'reside', which means 'to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, 
to have one's settled or usual abode, to live in or at a particular place.' On the other hand, 
the Chambers' Twentieth Century dictionary defines the adjective ' resident' as 'dwelling 
in a place for some time' and in turn, defines the verb ' to dwell ' as 'to abode' or 'to 
remain ' . 
6 See Lysaght v IRe, 1928, 13 TC 511 at 536, per Lord Warrington of Clyffe; Steinberg, W, "An 
examination of the relevance of the concept of residence" June 1991, LLM thesis (UCT), p. 5. 
7 See Piper, GSF and Deadman, W8, Residence and Domicile/or UK tax purposes, 1981, p. I . 
s (1928), AC 217, 13 TC at 505. 
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Although the grammatical meanmg of the term 'residence' could not be used in all 
circumstances, these standard definitions at least have provided some kind of common 
sense starting point. They have therefore been helpful in numerous judicial interpretations 
of the meaning of residence. 
Depending on the facts of the case, residence has been interpreted in the ordinary sense 
by the courts as different from a mere passing by or a casual visit, and thus meant a 
person's home or one of his homes for the time being.9 In giving a general definition of 
the concept of residence, Murray C] in H v COT, stated that: 'it is a man's home, where 
he sleeps at night after his day's work is done.' 10 This view gives rise to the question as to 
whether a person who decides to sleep at different places every night would be said to be 
resident in each of those places. For that matter, Murray C] pointed out in referring to 
numerous cases that, ordinarily, an individual may well at one and the same time have 
more than one residence and may reside in more than one place. 1 I 
On the other hand, in another approach to interpretation of the literal meanmg of 
residence, Viscount Sumner in Lysaght v CIR held that: 
'Grammatically, the word "resident" indicates the quality of the person charged 
and is not descriptive of his property, real or personal. To ask where he has his 
residence is often a convenient form of inquiry but only as leading to the question: 
Then where is he resident himself? I think the distinction, though often points 
doubt, has too often been overlooked in the arguments in the reported cases ... ' 12 
There is no doubt that the concept of residence is well known to tax practitioners. As it 
was stipulated by Murray C] referring to the term' reside': 
'It occurs very frequently in statutes dealing with diverse subjects, is capable of 
more than one meaning, and such meaning has to be ascertained by consideration 
of the object and intention of the particular Act in which it occurs.' 13 
9 See Robinson v COT, 1917, TPD 542, 32 SATC 41. 
10 (\960) 2 SA 695 (SR), 23 SATC 292,1960 Taxpayer ISS. 
II See Murray CJ, ibid, citing the cases of Biro v Minister of Justice, 1957, \ SA 234 (T) at 239; Buck v 
Parker 1908, TS 1 100; Naef v Mutter, 31 LJCP 359; In re Bowie 16 CH 0486. 
12 (1928) AC 234. As Viscount Sumner further pointed out in Levene's case (1928, 13 TC 486 at 502): 
"The words are plain and it is only their application that is haphazard and beyond all forecast." 
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For the purposes of income tax, the term 'residence' is ambiguous. There is considerable 
variation in the detailed rules of the various jurisdictions as to what constitutes the 
residence of persons (natural and juristic). 14 Although a statutory definition of the term 
'residence' can be found in some jurisdictions, residence differs from domicile and 
nationality in that generally, residence for tax purposes is a question of fact that must be 
determined by the circumstances of each particular case. 
1.1 The OEeD tie-breaker rules on 'residence' 
In the prOVISlons of the domestic tax laws and tax treaties defining residence, some 
indication has been given relating to the important factors that are most often used in the 
determination of residence. 15 In the case of individuals, consideration has been based 
either on the permanent home of the taxpayer within the jurisdiction, the maintenance of 
a dwelling for the taxpayer's occupation within the jurisdiction (habitual abode), or the 
centre of the taxpayer's personal and economic interests (such as directorships and other 
business and social connections) or his physical presence. 
With regard to legal entities In general, factors that have created a legal formal 
connection with a country include the place of incorporation, the head office and the 
place of management (be it central management and control or effective management). 
In terms of article 4(2) of the OECD Model Convention, where an individual is a resident 
of both contracting states, then his status shall be determined as follows: 
13 See H v COT, 1960, 2 SA 695 (SR); 23 SA TC 292. This concept is also better analysed in the case of 
ClR v Kuttel, 1992, (3) SA 242 (A); 1992 Taxpayer 150. 
14 See Arnold, op cit, p. 66. It has also been argued that taxation by residence can therefore become 
controversial when the rules by which residence status is determined produce artificial results. See analysis 
by Edge, S, "Taxation - by source or by residence?" in Dyson, J, Recent tax problems: Current legal 
problems, 1985, p. 74. 
15 See the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD on Fiscal Affairs, vol I, 
updated as of 29 April 2000). The OECD tie-breaker provisions specifically set out in article 4 (2) & (3) 
certain tests to be used in determining the status of a person who is resident in more than one jurisdiction at 
the same time. The objectives of the OECD tie-breaker rules is to give one of the contracting states the right 
to tax. Although the OECD Model reflects the interests of its member states (developed countries), its 







• He shall be deemed to be a resident of the state in which he has a permanent home 
available to him. In the order of the tie-breaker rules, the availability of a 
permanent home is the first criterion used to resolve the problem of dual residence 
in the case of a natural person. Generally, it refers to the place where the taxpayer 
has his closest personal bonds or relationships or the place where the taxpayer 
stays for more than a short period oftime. 16 A 'permanent home' as explained in 
the OECD Model Commentary is any suitable accommodation, whether owned or 
not, if it is ready and available at all times continuously (as opposed to 
occasionally) for the taxpayer's use. 17 Thus, unlike the term 'permanent home' 
used in general to ascertain domicile (as in the United Kingdom), 'permanent' 
according to the OECD Commentary means that the individual must have 
arranged and retained the home for his permanent use as opposed to staying at a 
particular place under such conditions that it is evident that the stay is intended to 
be of a short duration. 
• If the individual has a permanent home available to him in both states, he shall be 
deemed to be a resident of the state with which his personal and economic 
relations are closer (so-called 'centre of vital interests'). Thus, if a country 
represents a person's place of vital economic interests, residence may be inferred 
although the taxpayer is absent from the country during the whole tax year in 
question. It is on that basis that in the Italian case concerning the famous opera 
singer Luciano Pavarotti, the Italian government claimed although Pavarotti was 
only present in the country for few days (and therefore not subject to the' 183 
day' rule), he was nevertheless resident in Italy because his companies there 
(located in the city of Modena) represented his vital economic interests, another 
criterion for residency.18 The court held that based on the centre of vital interest 
criterion, Pavarotti was liable to tax in Italy. 
See Lyons, S.M, international Tax GloSSGfY, revised 3ed, 1996, p. 226. 
See Rohatgi, R, Basic international Taxation, 2002, p. n. 
Case analysed in the Economist, 29 January 2000, p. 16. 
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• If the state in which the taxpayer has his centre of vital interests cannot be 
determined, or if he does not have a permanent home available to him in either 
state, he shall be deemed to be a resident of the state in which he has an habitual 
abode. ' Habitual abode ' relates to the state where the taxpayer spends most of his 
time, regardless of purpose. It relies on the frequency or duration of his stay in a 
contracting state over a sufficient period. 19 The consideration of the duration of an 
individual ' s presence as the territorial link for fiscal residence has been 
materialised in various jurisdictions under the 'physical presence' test of 
residence?O 
• If the taxpayer has an habitual abode in both states or in neither of them, he shall 
be deemed to be a resident of the state of which he is a national. Nationals with 
reference to natural persons are defined as individuals possessing the nationality 
of a contracting state. Although nationality is one of the criteria used in the tie-
breaker rule of the OECD Model , the non-discrimination clause of the OECD 
Model provides that foreign taxpayers should not suffer discriminatory taxation 
by reason of their nationality. 
• If the taxpayer is a national of both states or neither of them, the competent 
authorities of the contracting states shall settle the question by mutual agreement. 
Thus, the mutual agreement procedure can only be initiated if the above criteria 
are definitely not satisfied. 
In terms of article 4(3) of the OECD Model, there is only a final tie-breaker applicable to 
persons other than individuals, in determining their residence, namely where the place of 
effective management is situated. The interpretation of effective management for dual 
19 See Rohatgi , op cit, p. 72. 
20 In South Africa, the habitual abode test was recognised in the court decisions of H v COT (1960, 2 SA 
695 SR) and Robinson v COT(1917, TPD 542) long before the general application of the residence basis of 
taxation in that an individual would only be resident for income tax purposes, if it is part of the ordinary 
regular course of life to live in a country for a period of time each year with a degree of permanence 
sufficient to characterise his physical presence there as more than that of a mere bird of passage. 
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resident corporate entities varies widely?l The place could be interpreted as mentioned 
by Vogel22 , as meaning either: 
• Where the factual and effective day-to-day management takes place; or 
• Where the top level or policy making body makes its decision; or 
• Where the shareholder control is situated. 
The OECD Commentary update has now defined the place of effective management as: 
'the place where key management and commercial decisions that are necessary 
for the conduct of the entity's business are in substance made. It is the place 
where senior management (for instance the board of directors) makes business 
decisions and takes corporate actions. An entity may have more than one place of 
management, but it can only have one place of effective management at anyone 
time. ,23 
2. Jurisdictional approaches to the determination of residence 
Introduction 
This section analyses the criteria used for determining fiscal residence in the national tax 
law of South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. The section focuses on 
the analysis of the determination of residence as it applies to individuals, companies and 
other entities in those three jurisdictions. 
With respect to individuals, the South African tax system is restricted to the use of the 
common term 'residence' (although based on the two tests of ordinary residence and 
physical presence) and does not recognise the principle of domicile for income tax 
purposes. The United Kingdom is chosen because the concept of residence is its principal 
determinant of chargeability to tax. The term 'residence' for income tax purposes is not a 
legal concept in the United Kingdom. However, because it is based on a mixture of 
2 1 See Rivier, 1.M, IFA Cahiers, Vol. 72A, General Report, 1987. 
22 See Vogel , K, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions - A Commentary to the OECD, UN and 
US Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Capital with Particular 
Reference to the German Treaty Practice, 1991, 2ed, p. 104-106. 
23 See the OECD Commentary: article 4, para 24; also cited by Rohatgi, op cit, p. 73. 
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statutes, case law and tax practice, there must be reliance on the wide range of judicial 
interpretation in ascertaining the residence oftaxpayers?4 
Unlike South Africa, the United Kingdom adopts a much wider approach in ascertaining 
the taxpayer's liability by the use of different tests for different forms of residence. Under 
the cunent system, liability to tax individuals in the United Kingdom is based on the 
interplay between three concepts connecting taxpayers with the United Kingdom, 
namely, residence, ordinary residence and domicile?5 
To make this comparative study more diverse, the United States rules on 'residence' is 
also analysed in this section because they differ from those of both South Africa and the 
United Kingdom in some crucial and interesting respects. Generally, for United States 
income tax purposes with regard to individuals, all citizens and resident aliens (green 
card holders) are treated as tax residents, regardless of their actual residence. In addition, 
the United States recognises the 'substantial presence' test as a factor for determining the 
individual's residence, which is closer to the time-based rule of physical presence 
applicable in South Africa and the United Kingdom. 
Some connecting factor is also necessary to enable a country to assert jurisdiction to tax 
legal entities effectively. Residence is usually the most important issue in establishing a 
legal entity's tax responsibility. There are considerable variations in the rules of various 
countries as to what constitutes the residence of legal entities in general and companies in 
particular. With regard to companies for instance, this section analyses the formal legal 
connection that attaches a company to a country (place of incorporation), which is the 
sole connecting factor for a company's residence in the United States. In addition, the 
substantial economic tie (be it the place of central management and control or place of 
24 This is adopted in practice and explained in the Inland Revenue publication, Residence and non-
Residents Liability to Tax in the United Kingdom, IR 20 (November 1993); also cited by Crump, DP, 
"Commonwealth Citizenship and British Income Tax Law", 1996, SALJ, vol 113, p. 419. 
25 In principle, for income tax purposes, acquiring or renouncing work and residence permits, and/or 
citizenship does not impact on the taxpayer's United Kingdom residence/domicile status, although the act 
of acquiring or revoking British citizenship may be a contributory factor in the United Kingdom 
determination of an individual's domicile. 
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effective management) which is the additional criterion for a company's residence in the 
United Kingdom and South Africa is also considered in this research. 
The question that anses lO consideration of the particular instances lO the chosen 
jurisdictions is how difficult it is to determine the residence of persons. 
1.1 The case of natural persons 
A) South Africa 
Introduction 
Prior to 1 January 200 1, the South African income tax system was traditionally based on 
the principle of source where income accrued to or received by a person (whether 
resident of the Republic or not) was only taxed in South Africa if it derived from a source 
within the Republic. 
From 1 July 1997, the implementation of certain deeming provisions in the Act resulted 
in South Africa adopting a hybrid system whereby the dominant connecting factor was 
source but with a number of instances in the Act in which the place of residence was 
made the test for the levying of taxation?6 
The concept of residence is not unfamiliar in the South African tax law. The place of 
residence has long assumed importance in relation to the application of provisions of the 
double taxation agreements that the South African government has concluded with its 
d· 27 tra 109 partners. 
26 The most important provisions of the legislation introducing the concept of residence as a connecting 
factor on certain types of income are sections 9C, 9D, and 9E recognising certain types of income to be 
taxable in South Africa although they were derived from foreign sources. 
27 South Africa has adopted the residence concept in most of its tax treaties particularly those with 
developed countries such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany. The tax treaties generally 
take cognisance of the possibility of dual residence of a taxpayer. In such cases, a sequence of tests is 
provided ending with criteria commonly known as 'tie-breakers', aimed at avoiding the situation in which a 
taxpayer could be recognised by the Revenue authorities of both the contracting states as a resident 
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The tests for ascertaining the fiscal residence of individuals has been clearly stated in the 
Act in section 1 through the combination of two different factors, namely, ordinary 
residence and physical presence in the Republic?8 The inclusion of these criteria is 
distinct from the composite term 'ordinary residence' that was previously used III a 
number of references in the legislation to ascertain the taxpayer's residence status. 
Thus, in terms of section 1 of the Act, 'resident' in relation to individuals means a: 
a) natural person who is-
i) ordinarily resident in the Republic; or 
ii) not at any time during the year of assessment ordinarily resident III the 
Republic, if such person was physically present in the Republic-
aa) For a period or periods exceeding 91 days in aggregate during the relevant 
year of assessment, as well as for a period or periods exceeding 91 days in 
aggregate during each of the three years preceding such year of assessment; and 
bb) for a period or periods exceeding 549 days in aggregate during such three 
preceding years of assessment: 
Provided that-
A) for the purposes of items (aa) and (bb) a day shall include a part of a day; and 
B) where a person who is a resident in terms of this subparagraph is outside the 
Republic for a continuous period of at least 330 full days after the day on 
which such person ceases to be physically present in the Republic, such 
person shall be deemed not to have been a resident from the day on which 
such person so ceased to be physically present in the Republic. 
Although one of the tests for residence in section 1 (ordinary residence) has not itself 
been defined, the concept has over the years been examined from time to time by the 
South African courts, and much of the judicial comment in the South African case law 
draws strongly on the United Kingdom cases where residence is the prime connecting 
simultaneously of their respective states. See Broomberg & Kruger, op cit, part II, p.IS3; van Dorsten, JL, 
Horak, JDD, "[nternational tax planning: Legal aspects, Part 2", 1991,4 Juta 's Foreign Tax Review, 911 O. 
28 See para (a) (i)(ii) in section I of the 'resident' definition in relation to individuals. 
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factor giving rise to fiscal responsibilities?9 It has been recognised in some judicial 
decisions in South Africa that the question whether a person is 'resident' or 'ordinarily 
resident' in a country is one of fact, which must be answered with regard to the 
circumstances of each case. 30 
Unlike the United Kingdom, the concept of domicile has not been adopted as a test for 
fiscal purposes in South Africa. Thus, residence is not necessarily determined as being 
where a person is domiciled, as a person can be domiciled in a country without being 
resident there and vice versa. 31 
A-I Background to the judicial analysis of 'residence' and 'ordinary residence' 
The marmer in which the courts have over the years interpreted the word 'residence' IS 
relevant to the understanding of' ordinary residence'. 
In Robinson v COT,32 the taxpayer had resided in South Africa for the previous two-and-a 
half years, but maintained that he was a resident of the United Kingdom where his 
permanent home was. He claimed an exemption from income tax on interest earned on 
the basis that he was not resident in South Africa. 
The court held that the taxpayer was resident in South Africa despite his contention that 
his habitual place of residence was the United Kingdom and that it was always his 
intention to return to the United Kingdom. 
In his findings, Mason J distinguished between the concepts of 'residence' and 
' permanently resident' and stated that residence need not be of a permanent nature, but 
29 See the analysis of the application of the United Kingdom residence tax system, where the law there 
makes use of three different concepts, namely, 'residence', 'ordinary residence' and domicile. 
30 See Cohen v CfR, 1946 AD 174; 13 SATC 362. Soldier v COT, 1943, SR 130. 
3 1 See Ex Parte Minister of Native Affairs, 1941 AD 53. 
32 1917, TPD 542; 32 SA TC 4 I . At the time of the Robinson 's case, the issue was one of residence and not 
whether the taxpayer was 'ordinarily resident' in South Africa and the legislation then granted exemption 
on source interest if the taxpayer was not resident in South Africa. Thus, in determining the meaning of 
'residence ', time was a factor in Robinson's case. 
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where a stay exceeded a casual visit, the intention was more one of permanent residence. 
Thus, the fact of the stay of the taxpayer exceeding what was considered to be a casual 
visit suggested that he was resident in South Africa. 
Bristowe J in a concurring judgment went on to say that: 
'It appears therefore that if a man sets up an establishment in a country and lives 
there at intervals he is resident in that country; however many similar residences 
he may have elsewhere. And the result is the same whether the establishment is 
for a defined period or whether the intention expressed or to be implied from the 
circumstances is to prolong the arrangement for a period exceeding the limit 
(whatever that may be) of a casual visitation. If the case is one of physical 
presence without an establishment a similar test must be applied. When the 
intention is to prolong the presence beyond the possible limits of a casual visit, 
and that intention is not abandoned, it seems to me that that intention would 
constitute residence, the intention of course being gleaned from all the 
circumstances of the case. ,33 
As the above case reveals, when a person visits the Republic year after year, so that his 
visits become in effect part of his habit of life and the annual visits are for a substantial 
period of time, it would be difficult to resist a challenge that that person is resident in the 
Republic. In other words, if it is a part of an individual's regular course of life to live in a 
particular place with a degree of permanence sufficient to characterise his physical 
presence there, he must be regarded as being 'resident' in that place in the ordinary sense 
of the term. On the other hand, a visitor who maintains no place of abode in the Republic, 
whose visits are not habitual but occasional only cannot be regarded as 'resident' or 
'ordinarily resident' in the Republic. 
In the decision whether an individual is merely a casual or temporary visitor to a 
particular area and therefore does not possess the personal quality of a 'resident', the 
nature and cause of his physical presence in that area must be taken into account.34 
A distinction between 'residence' and 'ordinary residence' was first drawn in Soldier v 
COT,35 where ordinary residence was said to be a narrower concept than residence. In 
33 At518. 
34 See H v COT, 1960,2 SA 695 (SR); 23 SATe 292. 
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that case, the issue was whether the taxpayer who was resident in South Africa and was 
serving as a volunteer in the Southern Rhodesian armed forces, was 'ordinarily resident' 
in Southern Rhodesia. 
Tredgold CJ answered the question In the negative and said that the taxpayer was 
ordinarily resident in South Africa. He based this view on the following factors: the 
taxpayer's home was in South Africa; the professional practice which he had carried on 
there for 38 years was still being run by his partner for their joint benefit; his wife was 
resident there; and he intended to return there on his discharge from the armed forces. 
As the learned judge concluded: 'Placed at its lowest it seems to me that the use of the 
word "ordinarily" seems to emphasise that the residence must be settled and certain and 
not temporary and casual. ,36 
In H v COT,37 it was suggested that if there is a difference between ' residence' and 
'ordinary residence' , a taxpayer was ordinarily resident in the place where his permanent 
place of abode was, where his belongings were stored, which he left for temporary 
absences and to which he regularly returned after such absences. 
As analysed above, the two concepts of 'residence' and 'ordinary residence' from the 
judicial point of view are clearly not identical. Although the judicial decisions suggest 
both concepts refer to more than occasional visits to a particular country, the term 
' ordinary residence ' has a somewhat narrower meaning than the word 'resident' .38 
Because the determination of ordinary residence depends on the facts and circumstances 




36 At 133. 
37 Op cit, at 292. 
38 In the British court decision of Thon1son v Minister of National Revenue, (1946 SCR 209) it was 
established that, the expression 'ordinary residence ' carries a restricted signification and though first 
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A-2 Ordinary residence 
a) The 'real home' test 
Physical presence is a requirement in order to establish mere residence, but it is not a 
conclusive test for determining whether an individual is ordinarily resident in the 
Republic. This is because once physical presence is established, a person may be held to 
be ordinarily resident in a country though at any given time or even throughout the whole 
tax year, he is absent from the country. 
This was the basis of the decision of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the 
landmark case of Cohen v CIR. 39 Cohen had been absent from the Republic on business 
in the United States for a period longer than a year. He claimed that as income tax was an 
annual tax and he had not been in the Republic for the entire year of assessment, he had 
not been ordinarily resident for that year and was consequently not subject to super tax on 
dividends he had earned. 
Schreiner JA expressed the view that it was an unquestioned fact that the attribution of 
' residence ' status required actual physical presence in the country at some time, but that 
'it would certainly be giving to residence a special or technical, indeed a highly artificial 
meaning, if one required the physical presence to have existed during the year of 
assessment. ' It was further said that the effect of physical presence in a country persisted 
' so as to prolong that residence after depm1ure from the country ' and that it then became 
a question of fact, unrelated to tax years, whether the taxpayer had retained his 
, 'd' . h 40 reSl ence status ll1 t e country. 
Schreiner JA, after reviewing some of the United Kingdom decisions on the meaning of 
ordinary residence, pointed out that the precise effect to be given to the term 'ordinarily' 
impression seems to be that of preponderance of time, ordinary residence is held to mean residence in the 
course of the customary mode of I ife, and it is contrasted with special or occasional or casual residence. 
39 1946, AD 174; 13 SATe 362. 
40 At 187. 
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is linked with the question whether a person can be 'ordinarily resident' in more than one 
country. He went on to say that: 
'If, though a man may be "resident" in more than one country at a time, he can 
only be "ordinarily resident" in one, it would be natural to interpret "ordinarily" 
by reference to the country of his most fixed or settled residence ... [H]is ordinary 
residence would be the country to which he would naturally and as a matter of 
course return from his wanderings, as contrasted with other lands it might be 
called his usual or principal residence and would be described more aptly than 
other countries as his real home. If this suggested meaning were given to 
"ordinarily" it would not, I think, be logically permissible to hold that a person 
could be "ordinarily resident" in more than one country at the same time. ,41 (my 
emphasis) 
Cohen's case confirmed the interpretation that the term 'ordinary resident' connotes 
residence in a place with some degree of continuity, other than accidental or temporary 
absences. It is the character in which a person is physically present in a country that is the 
determining factor because 'the physical presence in a country must be combined with a 
continuity which would rather exclude any element of chance. ,42 
Thus, physical presence in the country for a temporary visit, for instance, a holiday, 
business trip or for short study purposes, is not sufficient to constitute ordinary residence 
for tax purposes in the Republic. 
Holland43 correctly argues that in deciding the Cohen's case, the court felt that taxation 
based on the concept of where a person was ordinarily resident could not depend on the 
period of time spent in a country as circumstances outside the taxpayer's control could 
affect the true intention of the taxpayer. Unlike the early cases on residence such as the 
Robinson's case, where time was a factor, the length of stay did not have a bearing on the 
decision reached by the court in the Cohen's case, for the purpose of deciding where the 
taxpayer was ordinarily resident. Instead, the court relied on the taxpayer's intention 
41 At SA TC 371. Although the court in Cohen's case confinned that the taxpayer could indeed be mere 
resident in more than one country, Schreiner JA nevertheless rejected the British judicial decisions where it 
has long been held that a person could be ordinarily resident in two places at a time. 
42 See Simon's taxes, 1977, 3ed, E.S 124. 
43 See Holland, K, "To be or not to be ordinarily resident", 1998, 12 Tax Planning 135 at 136. 
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which was always to return in the Republic at some date in the future. 44 And it was 
remarkably pointed out by Davis AJA, the words 'not ordinarily resident in the Union' 
excluded at least any person whose permanent or real home was in South Africa and who 
was temporarily absent therefrom, even if the temporary absence was for a long period. 
For instance, if a person, ordinarily resident in the Republic, decided to travel around the 
world for a year long vacation, although he might be out of the country for an entire year 
of assessment, his ordinary residence would still be in the Republic, and he would 
therefore be resident for tax purposes.45 
The purpose of the visit and the intention of the taxpayer's absence from the Republic 
were highlighted in the following case of fTC 1170,46 where the meaning of 'ordinarily 
resident' was considered for the purposes of section 9(1)(d)bis of the Act (as it then was). 
In that case, the taxpayer, who had been born and educated outside South Africa, and was 
not a South African citizen, had taken up residence in South Africa in 1959. He was 
employed by a South African company, and he owned a house in the country. During the 
1970 tax year, he was sent by his employer to the United States for business purposes for 
14 months. At the time of his departure, he had intended to remain overseas indefinitely, 
if he could find employment there. During his absence from South Africa, his house was 
let and his salary paid by his South African employer. He was unable to find employment 
overseas, and on his return to South Africa, he continued in employment with the same 
employer. It was held that during his absence overseas, the taxpayer had been ordinarily 
resident in South Africa. In arriving at this conclusion, Watermeyer J took into account 
the taxpayer's ownership of a house in South Africa; his employment by a South African 
company; his parents' residence in South Africa; the operation of a local bank account; 
his return to the country at the end of the trip and his residing in the country after that 
time; and his failure to acquire 'ordinary residence' status abroad as shown by the fact 
that the United States tax authorities regarded him as a non-resident alien temporarily 
present in the United States. 
44 Ibid, at 136. 
45 See Schroeder, R, "Not ordinarily resident inside equals ordinarily resident outside", 2000, 14 Ta;\: 
Planning, 68/69. 
46 1973 Taxpayer 33; 34 SATe 76. 
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The Appellate Division revisited the concept of 'ordinary resident' in the case of CIR v 
Kuttel.47 In that case, the taxpayer left South Africa to set up a business in the United 
States and established a permanent home there. His visits to South Africa, following his 
departure, were infrequent and for a short duration. He liquidated as many of his South 
African assets as he was entitled to do under the exchange control regulations and 
remitted as much of his income as possible to the United States. The assets retained in 
South Africa were of an interest and dividend nature, which he claimed as tax free under 
the then sections 10(1 )(h) and 1 O( 1 )(k) of the Act on the basis that he had taken up 
permanent residence in the United States and that he was therefore not ordinarily resident 
in South Africa. The Appellate Division held unanimously that Kuttel was not ordinarily 
resident in the Republic during the relevant years and was thus entitled to those 
exemptions. 
In delivering the judgment, Goldstone JA (with Corbett CJ, Smalberger JA, Kumleben JA 
and Harms AJA concurring) stated that 'ordinarily resident' did not simply mean 
'resident'. It meant something different, and in his opinion, its scope was narrower than 
just 'resident' .48 He went on to adopt the formulation of Schreiner JA in Cohen 's case, as 
well as the dictum of Lord Denning MR in Rv Barnet London Borough Council: Ex Parte 
Shah, by stating that: 
'Ordinary residence would be the country to which he [individual taxpayer] would 
naturally and as a matter of course return from his wanderings; as contrasted with 
other lands it might be called his usual or principal residence and would be 
described more aptly than other countries as his real home. ,49 
Because the policy of the legislature in providing the exemptions m question was to 
'encourage investors from outside the Republic to invest their money in the Republic', 
there was ' no warrant for gi ving an extended meaning to the words (ordinary 
residence) ,.50 
17 1992, 3 SA 242 (A); S4 SA TC 298 . 
48 At 304 
49 See the Cohen 's case, op Cil , note 39. 
50 At 306. 
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Applying that meaning to the words in the exemption provisions, Goldstone JA found 
that at the relevant times, Kuttel was not ordinarily resident in the Republic. He took with 
him to the United States all the assets he was entitled to remove from South Africa. But 
for the exchange control regulations, he would have taken all of them. Since he could not 
do so, he had no choice but to make the most advantageous use of those assets that he 
was forced to leave behind. His visits to South Africa were not what one could describe 
as a 'return home'. The fact that he kept his house in Llanduno and did not let it while 
away was not inconsistent with the point that his usual or principal residence was now in 
the United States. He had sound financial reasons for retaining an interest in immovable 
property, these being to procure a hedge against a fall in the value of the rand against the 
dollar and to provide a place to live in when he visited Cape Town; and those interests 
did not change the character of his residence. 51 
Kuttel's case reiterated the principle that as a principle of law although not conc1usive,52 a 
natural person could only have one 'real home'. Goldstone JA, finding in favour of the 
taxpayer, stated that a person's place where he was ordinarily resident was one of 
habitual abode as opposed to frequent physical presence. 53 
As Clegg54 argues, if a taxpayer cannot be ordinarily resident in more than more than one 
country at the same time, then any absence from that country must surely be temporary. If 
it were not temporary, it would be because he had chosen a new domicile in another 
country or at least moved his 'real home' there. 
Unfortunately, the terms 'real or permanent home' and 'temporary absence' were not 
defined in Kuttel's case. This raises the question, how long must an absence from the 
51 For an extensive analysis of this case, see Cleaver, B, "SA Revisited: Residence Lessons for the 
Emigrant", 1993, 7 Tax Planning 65 at 66. 
52 This is because the issue whether or not an individual could have more than one real home was left open 
by the court and the decision given was obiter. 
53 See also ITC 150 I (1989, 53 SATC 314) where the court held that the legislator intended 'ordinary 
residence' to mean that the taxpayer's permanent or principal home is in South Africa. Thus, the term 
'ordinary residence' implies that a person cannot be ordinarily resident in more than one country. 
54 Clegg, DJM, "Residence - Part I: No ordinary residence", 1990,3 Juta 's Foreign Tax Review, 70 at 73. 
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country be considered 'temporary' for the purposes of ordinary residence In the 
Republic? 
i) Temporary absence and real home 
The issue of 'temporary absence' from the Republic in the determination of an 
individual's residence was considered in CIR v Whitfield55 for the purposes of section 
9(1)( d)bis (as it then was). 56 The taxpayer who was permanently resident and employed 
in the Republic earned his salary mostly through commission on sales concluded by him 
on behalf of his employer in Lesotho, the Ciskei and the Transkei. The issue to be 
decided was whether the taxpayer who spent most of his time outside the country in the 
course of his employment, was only temporarily absent from the Republic for the 
purposes of section 9( 1 )( d) bis of the Act. 
Zietsman JP held for the majority judgment that section 9(1)( d)bis deemed income to be 
derived from a source within the Republic, where a person was inter alia ordinarily 
resident but absent from the Republic during an absence, which was other than 
temporary, but at the same time not permanent by reason of such person's ordinary 
residence. The expression 'temporary absence' in section 9(1)(d)bis meant 'of a limited 
duration' rather than 'not pennanent'. Referring to the case, the commission had been 
earned during absences which were a regular pattern of the taxpayer's employment and 
were not 'temporary' in the sense contemplated in section 9(1)( d)bis. Moreover, as the 
court concluded, the section applied to persons ordinarily resident in the Republic, and it 
would seem to be a contradiction in terms to say that a person ordinarily resident in the 
country was permanently absent from the Republic. 
Accordingly, it was argued, following the above case that in applying the provisions of 
section 9(1)( d)bis, care should be taken not to equate or confuse 'temporary absence' 
55 1993,2 SA 236 (E); 55 SATe 158. 
56 Section 9( I )(d)bis has been repealed in the Act in relation to the determination of the deemed source of 
employees' foreign income. However, the principle analysed in the cases in respect to this provision is still 
relevant for the purposes of ascertaining the ordinary residence status of taxpayers. 
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with 'ordinary residence'. A taxpayer might be ordinarily resident in the Republic, yet his 
absence might not be ' temporary'. The taxpayer may contemplate returning to South 
Africa which is his real home, but an absence from the country cannot be regarded as 
temporary on that account alone. 
ii) Date on which an individual becomes or ceases to be ordinarily resident 
in South Africa 
A practical problem that may arise in the determination of residence status, is that if the 
operation of a provision in the Act is premised on ordinary residence status, whether that 
status must exist for the whole of the tax year, or whether it must only exist at the date to 
which the provision relates. 
In Cohen's case, Schreiner lA declined to rule on the question whether assuming the 
taxpayer's status could change during the course of the tax year, the operative date for 
applying a tax exemption in respect of dividends (which exemption depended on the 
taxpayer not being ordinarily resident in South Africa), was either the date of receipt or 
accrual of the dividends or some other date. In the same case, Davis AlA expressly 
assumed that in order to benefit from the exemption, the taxpayer must not have been 
ordinarily resident in South Africa at any time during the tax year, and 'certainly not at 
the date in respect of which the assessment is made, namely, the close of the tax year. ,57 
Davis AlA, however, left the question open whether it was sufficient for the taxpayer not 
to be ordinarily resident on the date on which the dividends were declared, even if he was 
ordinarily resident at some other time during the tax year. 
Danziger58 argues that whether the taxpayer's 'ordinary residence' must endure during 
the whole of the tax year or not depends on the interpretation of the particular legislative 
provision in issue. In the absence of any statutory indication in the Act, the relevant time 
at which a taxpayer must be ordinarily resident or not in order to qualify for an exemption 
57 A t 189. 
58 Op cit, p. 44. 
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from income tax is at the date of accrual or receipt of the (gross) income concerned. It is 
questionable that the relevant date might be the last day of the tax year as assumed 
(obiter) by Davis AJ A. This is because income tax is levied for the whole of the tax year 
and there seems to be no reason why ordinary residence status should depend on the 
position on the last day of the tax year. 59 
On this issue, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) states in its guideline to the 
interpretation of 'ordinary residence' that a natural person who became ordinarily 
resident, will become a resident as from a specific date. That date will be the date on 
which he became ordinarily resident in the Republic. Thus, immigrants into South Africa 
will be South African residents from the first day of arriving in South Africa. It follows 
that an individual will not be taxable in the Republic on any income earned outside the 
Republic prior to the date on which he became ordinarily resident in South Africa, unless 
it was deemed to be of a South African source and was therefore taxable in terms of 
South African source rules.6o 
On the other hand, SARS also made it clear in its interpretation note that an individual 
who emigrates from South Africa to another country will cease to be a resident as from 
the date he emigrates. Presumably, emigrants will be taxed as ordinarily resident until the 
date of departure. Thus for the rest of the year, they will neither be ordinarily resident nor 
resident. 61 
Meyerowitz62 submits correctly that if the taxpayer's real home is outside the Republic, it 
will not matter that he makes periodic visits to South Africa even on a regular basis. This 
is where an immediate conflict used to arise within the case law. Before the statutory 
inclusion in the Act of the 'physical presence' rule as an additional test of residence in 
South Africa, the element of intention relied on in the 'real home' approach could lead to 
tax planning opportunities in the case of individuals visiting or who were seconded to 
59 See notes on 'Residence and carrying on business' by Emslie, TS, Davis, OM, & Hutton SJ, Income 
Tax Cases and Materials, 1995, 2ed, p. 963. 
60 SARS' Interpretation Note, no 3, 4 February 2002. 
61 Ibid, p. 6. 
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South Africa for periods of up to five years, but who always intended to return to their 
home countries. The question was, at what stage did the length of stay in the Republic 
imply that the taxpayer's intention had changed? Could an individual be considered not 
ordinarily resident in South Africa, if he made it clear that his intention remained to 
eventually return to his home country, notwithstanding the fact that he was physically 
present in the country for say 10 years? 
iii) Situation of taxpayers with 'dual real home' or 'no real home' 
The issue of interpreting the 'real home' test becomes even more crucial as Wilson63 
views it in this era of globalisation dominated by cyberspace transactions where 
individuals can carryon their activities without any fixed place of abode (internet 
gypsies). It is quite feasible for a person to set up a 'real home' in a foreign country and 
to maintain a 'real home' in the Republic. Is this person 'not ordinarily resident' in the 
Republic by virtue of the fact that he has a 'real home' elsewhere? 
On the same line of argument, Meyerowitz64 suggests that on the adopted formulation of 
ordinary residence in which a taxpayer can only have one real home, a person who cannot 
prove that he has a 'real home' anywhere will not have discharged the onus of proving 
that he is not ordinarily resident in the Republic, and thus not subject to tax on his 
worldwide income. 65 For instance, as stated above, formal emigration would be a way of 
demonstrating that South Africa is no longer considered to be the individual's real home 
and of proving any claim that the person is not ordinarily resident in the Republic.66 
This seems to lay down the proposition that if a person is 'not ordinarily resident' in the 
Republic, he must be 'ordinarily resident' outside the country. However, if this principle 
were applied, it would seem to overlook the situation in which a person's peculiar 
62 See Meyerowitz, D, Meyerowitz on Income Tax, 2000/200 I at s 13.10. 
63 See Wilson, S, "Carrying on business: The emigration year", 2000, 14 Tax Planning 6. 
64 Op cit, s 13.10. 
65 Meyerowitz's argument on this aspect was based on the analysis of section 10(1 )(hA) as it appJ ied then. 
In terms of section 82 of the Act, the burden of proof that an amount is not liable to tax under the South 
African tax law rests on the person claiming the non-liability. 
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lifestyle may lead him not to have a real home anywhere in the world. A common feature 
of multinational corporations is that certain staff are virtually permanent wanderers. This 
scenario could also possibly be claimed, for instance, by a performer in a travelling circus 
or an artist who lives aboard a cruise ship. In these situations, it might be argued that such 
an individual would be 'not ordinarily resident in the Republic' but also 'not ordinarily 
resident outside the Republic', that is in any other country. In this case, the individual 
would escape the ordinary residence test and the only test applicable to him in relation to 
his residence status will be whether or not he complies with the physical presence test in 
South Africa. 
Consequently, the 'anomalies' argument put forward by the court in the Cohen's case67 in 
applying the 'real home' test seemed to overlook the need for certainty which could be 
attained by accepting that a particular pattern of physical presence in South Africa would 
give rise to 'ordinary residence' status. The test of ordinary residence does not rely on 
any numerical basis, but refers to intention or state of mind of the individual rather than 
physical presence. Its application is likely to create difficulties. Taxpayers who have 
physically left the country (but have not formally emigrated) and subsequently returned 
after a period of time will argue that there had been a change of intention and that upon 
departure from the country, they ceased to be ordinarily resident in South Africa.68 
It is correctly formulated by Danziger69 that the 'real home' approach in general 
postulates vague criteria and it is a subjective test. It does not assist with the 
determination whether a taxpayer who is a citizen of and domiciled in South Africa, but 
whose mode of life involves extensive absences from the country, loses his 'ordinary 
residence' status. 
66 See Mosupa, F, "Who pays which tax man now?" 2002, vol 9, Part IV, Juta 's Business Law, p. 160. 
67 See the remarks of Davis AJA in that case at 189. 
68 This loophole has been closed by the statutory adoption of the 'physical presence' test in section 
(a)(ii) of the Act as a complementary test of residence for tax purposes. See Badenhorst, M, "Overview of 
Tax Changes", 19 April 2002, Financial Mail, p. 97. See also "Tax Update" (Special Edition), January 
200 I, Deneys Reitz Allorneys PubLication, p. 2. 
~ . 
Up cit, p. 43. 
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In order to clarify the application of 'ordinary residence', SARS70 has suggested in its 
interpretation note that the circumstances of a person must be examined as a whole and 
the personal acts of the individual must receive special attention. This is because the 
cessation of ordinary residence is very much a factual issue, so much that the facts which 
may be conclusive in the case of one taxpayer may not be so in another. Considering the 
judicial decisions on the issue of ordinary residence, the following factors (although not 
intended to be exhaustive) will therefore be relevant in determining where an individual 
is ordinarily resident: 
• The most fixed and settled place of residence; 
• The habitual abode, that is, present habits and mode of life; 
• The place of business and personal interests; 
• The status of the individual in the country, that is whether he is an immigrant, his 
work permit periods and conditions; 
• The location of his personal belongings; 
• His nationality; 
• His family and social relations (schools, church); 
• His political, cultural or other activities; 
• His application for permanent residence; 
• His period of stay abroad; purpose and nature of his visits; 
• His frequency of and reasons of visits . 
iv) Is there any difference between 'real home' and domicile? 
For South African tax purposes, the concept of domicile has not been used as the test for 
income tax liability. In the current South African case law on the meaning of residence, 
the concept of domicile has long been distinguished from residence.71 
70 See Income Tax Interpretation Note, no 3, prepared by the Law Administration Division ofSARS, 4 
February 2002, updated on 22 March 2002. 
71 See Ex Parte Minister of Native Affairs, 1941 AD 53. 
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In Cohen's case, Schreiner JA made it clear that in ascertaining the ordinary residence of 
an individual: 
'This might not be his country of domicile, for it might not be his domicile of 
origin and he might not have formed the fixed and settled intention which 
"excludes all contemplation of any event on the occurrence of which the residence 
would cease" which is necessary to bring into existence a domicile of choice.' 72 
However, the learned judge concluded that a person's ordinary residence would be 'the 
country to which he would naturally and as a matter of course return from his 
d · ,73 wan ermgs. 
This latter formulation of the ' real home ' test has given rise to the argument that if there 
is any distinction between domicile and ordinary residence, it can only be a narrow one. 
However, Cohen' s case supported further by Kuttel 's case seems to clarify the difference 
between domicile and 'real home' by affirming that the subjective intention required for 
the acquisition of a domicile of choice is not required for the acquisition of ordinary 
residence status, and that if objective criteria are sati~fied , then it can be concluded that 
ordinary residence status has been acquired. 74 In addition, SARS 75 reiterated in its 
interpretation note that although it is not possible to lay down hard and fast rules in 
determining 'ordinary residence', the concept should also not be confused with the terms 
'domicile', 'nationality' and the concept of emigrating and immigrating for exchange 
control purposes. 76 
Thus, although the intention of the taxpayer is also a key element in ascertaining his 
ordinary residence, the test is not the same as that for determining a person's domicile 
which requires the fUl1her enquiry as to the permanence of his intent to leave a previous 
place. Generally speaking, ordinary residence and domicile do change simultaneously 
because the facts and intention which establish one are usually sufficient to establish the 
other. However, there is no necessary identity. 
72 24 SATe 557. Schreiner JA was referring to the domicile case of Johnson v Johnson, 1931 , AD 391. 
73 At 557. 
74 See Danziger, op cit, p. 38/39 . 
75 See Interpretation Note n03, op cit, pA. 
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Accordingly, if the taxpayer has adopted a foreign country as his place of 'usual or 
habitual abode or real home', he ceases to be ordinarily resident in the Republic. This is 
different in the case of domicile, where as long as the necessary (permanent and 
indefinite) intention is present, an individual might still be domiciled in a country 
although he has a fixed place of abode elsewhere. 
To this point, Clegg77 correctly comments that one may decide permanently to leave 
South Africa (though one might be obliged to return on occasion to attend to business 
affairs), but this does not necessarily mean that one simultaneously decides to move 
permanently to any other country. If there is no such decision and the individual is to 
become a wanderer, then domicile remains unchanged if the existing domicile is that of 
the person's origin. If the person was born in a different country, then that domicile of 
origin would re-establish itself at the time that he permanently leaves the country of his 
domicile of choice. In both these cases, the individual would no longer be ordinarily 
resident in the country he has just left and it is quite probable that he would establish a 
residence or ordinary residence in some other country depending on his intention and the 
facts of the case.78 
Furthermore, for the purposes of South African income tax, the ' real or permanent home' 
used to describe the ordinary residence status of an individual should be interpreted in the 
same way as the 'permanent home' used in the OECD Model, as one of the tests to 
determine the residence of individuals in the case of dual residency in two contracting 
states. Unlike the term ' permanent home' as used in general to ascertain domicile for 
United Kingdom tax purposes, ' permanent' according to the OECD Commentary means 
that 'the individual must have arranged and retained the home for his permanent use as 
opposed to staying at a particular place under such conditions that it is evident that the 
stay is intended to be of short duration.' 79 
76 The factor of nationality could be used as a test for ordinary residence if other objective criteria are 
non-existent. 
77 Op cit, p. 74 . 
78 See the British position for fUl1her reference as to the application of domicile in general. 
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In conclusion, 'permanent or real' is being used in the South African tax context as the 
opposite of 'temporary or transitory', rather than in the sense of 'for ever more or 
everlasting' . 
A-3 The 'physical presence' test 
As analysed above, the South African case law interpretation of the ' real home' test for 
determining whether an individual is ordinarily resident in the Republic has proven to be 
futile and somewhat unreliable, providing little certainty for the individual and 
practitioner alike. There was therefore a need to introduce in addition to the 'real home' 
test, some quantitative rules for establishing the existence of residence; that is, rules 
which in some instances look solely at the actual actions of the person concerned and not 
at any intent which he might have. 
In his Budget speech in early 1995, the then Minister of Finance admitted that there were 
clearly difficulties in determining where a person is ordinarily resident. He went to say 
that it was felt that many taxpayers were abusing the then section 10(1 )(h) interest 
exemption by claiming to have emigrated from the Republic, though they still spent much 
time in the country.so With the general application of the concept of residence as the 
basis for tax liability, it was therefore logical that a 'physical presence' test limit should 
be implemented to tax all types of income of natural persons present in the Republic for a 
specific period, if they do not qualify as ordinarily resident in the Republic. 
79 See Vogel, op cit, article 4, p. 82. 
80 Section 10(l)(h) of the Act had the effect of exempting from tax interest received or accrued from 
certain qualifying investments by any person not ordinarily resident nor carrying on business in the 
Republic, and section IO(I)(hA) made provision for the exemption of tax on interest received by or accrued 
to a person ' who is ordinarily resident outside the Republic'. Following Kuttel's case, section 1 O( 1 )(hA) 
was amended with the enactment of section 10(1 )(hA)(iv) which introduced the 'bright-line' or the' 183 
day' clause, whereby a natural person who was normally not ordinarily resident in the Republic, would 
only qual ify for the interest exemption if he was physically absent from the Republic for a period of at least 
183 days in aggregate, and provided that he did not carryon business in the Republic during the year of 
assessment in which the interest was accrued or received. The section I O( 1)(hA) exemption has been 
extended to apply to South African source interest distributed to qualified non-residents, be they individuals 
or companies. 
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Consequently, the Act provides the additional test of residence in section 1 (a)(ii), which 
is any natural person who is not at any time during the year of assessment ordinarily 
resident in the Republic is nevertheless resident, if such person was physically present in 
the Republic: 
aa) For a period or periods exceeding 91 days in aggregate during the relevant 
year of assessment, as well as for a period or periods exceeding 91 days in 
aggregate during each of the three years preceding such year of assessment; and 
bb) for a period or periods exceeding 549 days in aggregate during such three 
preceding years of assessment: 
Provided that-
A) for the purposes of items (aa) and (bb) a day shall include a part of a day; and 
B) where a person who is a resident in terms of this subparagraph is outside the 
Republic for a continuous period of at least 330 full days after the day on which 
such person ceases to be physically present in the Republic, such person shall be 
deemed not to have been a resident from the day on which such person so ceased 
to be physically present in the Republic. 
This second test is a time based and more objective rule. A person will therefore only 
become a resident of South Africa in the fourth tax year in which that individual is 
physically present in the Republic for another 91 days or more, provided that during the 
three preceding years, the individual has exceeded the minimum period of 549 days of 
physical presence in the Republic. The purpose of the individual's presence in South 
Africa is irrelevant. Thus, this day test applies irrespective of the purpose or nature of the 
visit or presence in the Republic. 
The effect of the physical presence test is that an individual who is not ordinarily resident 
in South Africa qualifies as a resident by counting days. If the individual meets all the 
requirements for the ' physical presence' test, he then becomes a resident as from the first 
day of the year of assessment during which the criteria are met. 81 With regard to the 
81 A natural person's year of assessment in South Africa starts on 1 March and ends on the last day of 
February in the subsequent year. See SARS' Interpretation Note, no 4, 4 February 2002, p.2. 
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physical presence test, a taxpayer is able to decide whether to be resident or not, provided 
that he avoids being ordinarily resident, in which case physical presence is irrelevant. 
Thus, for instance, the chain will be broken in the case of an individual who, though 
present in the country for at least 91 days per tax year (during three years), does not 
however meet the 549 days requirement in those three years. 
Accordingly, while the inclusion of a proper 'physical presence' test is welcome in the 
South African tax law, the formulation provided in this one would still leave the tax 
system open to manipulation by taxpayers. Taxpayers could take advantage of the 
physical presence test by not meeting the 549 days requirement. It might also be possible 
for individuals to be physically present in the Republic for more than 91 days each of the 
three preceding tax years (while claiming to have their real home elsewhere), but would 
not set foot in the country in the fourth tax year, or be present here in the fourth tax year 
for less than 91 days. It is therefore probable that the definition relating to physical 
presence gives non-residents, particularly those whose business or employment requires 
their presence in South Africa, the possibility of organising themselves in a way which 
would keep their income from non-South African sources outside the net of South 
African Revenue. Thus, for expatriates seconded to South Africa and not deemed to be 
resident in terms of the two tests of residence, they will be taxed on their South African 
earnings only in terms of the source rules, unless a relevant double tax agreement denies 
South Africa the right to impose the tax. 
The physical presence rule has also created a loophole in South African law by the fact 
that unlike legislation in other jurisdictions, the South African legislation does not 
provide that a person will retain his South African residency until a new residency is 
obtained. 
The 91 and 549 day periods should only be in aggregate. Continuous daily presence is not 
required. However, in counting days, a day includes a part of a day. Thus, both the day of 
arrival and departure are included in the count. For instance, if a resident leaves the 
Republic on an aircraft that takes off at 00:01 in the morning, he will be deemed to have 
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been in the Republic for that day. Meanwhile a person who arrives in the Republic at 
23:55 would be regarded to be present in the Republic for a full day.82 In certain 
circumstances, it may be very difficult to ascertain whether a person has been physically 
present in South Africa for the required number of days. This may be the case when 
persons in possession of dual passports use one passpolt to leave the country and the 
other to re-enter the country. Unless the two passports are linked to each other, SARS is 
placed in a difficult position. In any case, what becomes very important for the individual 
taxpayer is to make sure to get the necessary stamps in his passport upon leaving or 
entering the country. 
In the application of the physical presence test, continuous presence is important in one 
aspect. If an individual resident (not a person ordinarily resident) is physically outside the 
Republic for a continuous period of at least 330 full days, that person will be deemed not 
to have been a resident from the day immediately after the day of departure. 83 The 330 
day period can span the end of a tax year. So for instance, if the taxpayer departs South 
Africa on 1 December in year 4 and remains out until after the lapse of 330 days, he will 
be liable for tax as a resident in respect of accruals in year 4 but for no year thereafter 
unless he returns and completes the required three year cycle.84 As correctly argued by 
Stein,85 the 330 days exemption rule will apply to a person only if he has met the physical 
presence test by virtue of being physically present in South Africa for more than 91 days 
in the year of departure. It is therefore clear the period of 330 days may also extend over 
two years of assessment. The first of these years is the one in which the individual was 
last considered to be a resident in terms of physical presence test; that is the year in which 
he spent his last 91 day period in South Africa. The second year of assessment will be the 
immediately succeeding year of assessment. The individual will be deemed to be a non-
resident from the commencement of the 330 day period. The individual ' s tax status will 
82 See SARS ' Interpretation note, no 4, p.2 . 
83 See para (8) of the proviso to the definition of ' resident'. This exemption relies on continuity of the 
absence from the Republic for the periods of 330 days . The taxpayer will not meet this exemption if he 
returns to the Republic even for half a day during that period. 
84 See the "Editorial: Revenue Laws Amendment Act", October 2000, The Taxpayer, p. 182/183. 
85 See Stein . M, "The importance of Residence: And how it ends", 200 I, I 5 Tax Planning 78/79. 
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therefore change from the day on which he became non-resident. Thus, he will have to be 
away for 330 days before he can show that he has qualified as a non-resident. 86 
An individual may be regarded as resident in more than one country, for instance, where 
he is resident in South Africa by virtue of physical presence and ordinarily resident in 
another country, resulting in liability for tax in both countries. This problem is usually 
resolved by either a double tax agreement or by unilateral tax relief provided by one or 
both of the countries. South Africa grants unilateral relief by way of a credit given in 
South Africa for foreign taxes paid.87 
B) The United Kingdom 
Introduction 
In the case of natural persons, the United Kingdom legislation refers to different criteria 
to specify the nature and quality of the association between a person and a place. 
Although residence simpliciter has been recognised in various judicial decisions and 
adopted by parliament as a primary indicator of chargeability to income tax, other 
elements such as ordinary residence and domicile also act as strong connecting factors 
between the taxpayer and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, as was stated by Lord 
Denning MR in R v Barnet London Borough Council, ex parte Nilish Shah88 : 'It is a point 
on a scale which ranges from mere presence in this country, through " resident" ... to 
"domicile" ... ' As articulated by Crump,89 the fm1her one moves along the scale from 
presence to domicile, the more adhesive and less easily broken the association becomes. 
This section explains, as established by case law and applied in the Statement of Practice 
of the Revenue, how an individual's residence, ordinary residence, and domicile can be 
identified for the purposes of the United Kingdom income tax law. 
86 See Silke, J et ai, op cit, p. A.12. 
87 See the app I ication of section 6 quat of the Act. 
88 (1982) QB 688 (CA) at 720; 1982. I ALL ER 698 at 704 . 
89 Up cit. p. 420. 
82 
B-1 Residence 
Although mere residence within the United Kingdom is the pnmary criterion of tax 
liability since the earliest days of income tax, the term has never been fully defined for 
taxation purposes. The legislation on the meaning of residence is much based on the tax 
practice by the Inland Revenue resulting from a mixture of a few statutory 
pronouncements and the interpretation of case law. 
The general principle is that someone is resident where he is living for a time in that tax 
year.90 Residence has to do with physical location and duration, and is not reliant on a 
permanent address or occupation of an accommodation. Presence in the United Kingdom 
alone is sufficient.91 
In the United Kingdom, the determination of residence has in some early cases been 
subject to factual enquiry. It may be helpful at this stage to analyse some relevant extracts 
from the early legal judgments on an individual's residence. 
The leading case dealing with the problem of applying the concept of residence was in Re 
Young.92 In that case, a master mariner was physically in the United Kingdom for 88 
days in the year ended 5 April 1875. He rented a house in Glasgow, which his wife and 
family occupied, and to which he habitually returned when he was not on an overseas 
voyage. Yet he claimed that because he spent only a small part of the year in the United 
Kingdom, he was not resident. The question before the court was whether an individual 
who has his home in the United Kingdom but is at particular times abroad for long or 
short periods, has ceased to be resident or is abroad 'for the purpose only of occasional 
residence'. The presiding judge discussed this question in relation to the facts of the case 
and held that: 
'I have no doubt myself that if a man has an ordinary residence in this country, it 
does not matter much whether he is absent for a greater or a shorter period of each 
year from that residence or from the country itself. That is a thing that depends a 
90 See Williams, DW, Morse, GK, Salter, D, Principles o[tax law, 1996, 3ed, p. 461. 
91 See Reid v IRe, 1926, 10 TC 673. 
92 (J 875) 1 TC 57. 
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good deal on a man's occupation, or it may be on his tastes and habits, especially 
in the latter case, if he is a man not requiring to be engaged in business for his 
maintenance. ' 
The learned judge went on to say that Young clearly had a residence in Glasgow where 
his wife and family lived and it was also clear that he had no residence anywhere else, 
unless a ship could be called a residence, which he thought it never had been: 'A 
residence, according to the ordinary meaning of the word, must be a residence on shore, a 
dwelling in a house. A residence is a dwelling place on land ... ' In considering the 
purpose of the taxpayer's visit abroad, the court concluded that: 'He may live on shore or 
on board the ship according to his mind, but he goes there, not for occasional residence, 
not for residence at all, but for the purposes of his trade. ' 
The judgment established several principles that can be broadly summarised as follows: 
• There does not need to be constant personal presence for the individual to be 
regarded as resident; 
• If a person is usually resident in the United Kingdom, he will be regarded as 
remaining resident throughout any period of temporary absence, except in some 
special cases such as overseas full time employment. 
• Whether a period of absence is temporary will depend upon the reasons for 
absence and the intention of the individual. It will not depend simply upon the 
length of absence, because as articulated by Lord President in the course of his 
judgment, ' temporary absence may be for a very long time, and I think it may be 
temporary because it may be in prosecution of some special purpose.' 
The Young case is therefore of great importance and has the merits of establishing some 
general rules governing the determination of residence for individuals.93 
93 Elaborate rules have evolved since this case based on the practice of the United Kingdom tax authorities. 
The principle as held in the Young case that the length of the period of absence is irrelevant if the absence is 
temporary and is simply for the performance of a specific purpose, was reaffirmed in another case 
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A person may be in the United Kingdom without ever acqumng a 'settled or usual 
abode,94, but that will not necessarily prevent him from being attributed with the status of 
United Kingdom residence. As Viscount Sumner said: 
' Although setting up an establishment in this country available for residence at 
any time throughout the year of charge, even though used but little, may be good 
ground for finding its master to be "resident" here, it does not follow that keeping 
up an establishment abroad and none here is incompatible with being "resident 
here" if there is other sufficient evidence of it'95 
This was clarified two years earlier by the court in Reid v IRC,96 holding that the duration 
of a person' s presence may alone be sufficient to transform mere presence into residence. 
As the judge went on to say: 
'[T]ake the case of a homeless tramp, who shelters tonight under a bridge, 
tomorrow in the greenwood and as the unwelcome occupant of a farm outhouse 
the night after. He wanders in this way all over the United Kingdom. But will 
anyone say he does not live in the United Kingdom? - and will anyone regard it 
as a misuse oflanguage to say he resides in the United Kingdom. In his case there 
may be no relation with family or friends, no business ties, and none of the 
ordinary circumstances which create a link between the life of a British subject 
and the United Kingdom; but even so, I do not think it could be disputed that he 
resides in the United Kingdom. There are no other and very different kinds of 
tramps, who - being possessed of ample means, and having the ordinary ties of 
birth, family, and affairs with the United Kingdom or some part of it - yet prefer 
to enjoy those means without undertaking the domestic responsibility of a home, 
and who move about from one house of public entertainment to another - in 
London today, in the provinces tomorrow, and in the highlands the day after. 
They too are homeless wanderers in the United Kingdom. But surely it is true to 
say they live in the United Kingdom, and reside there? The section of the Act of 
Parliament with which we are dealing speaks of persons "residing", not at a 
particular locality, but in a region so extensive as the United Kingdom. ,97 
The above principle was confirmed by Sargant LJ in Levene v IRe who stated in the 
following words that: 
' [To] determine that when an individual has a home here in the ordinary sense he 
is taxable; but they do not determine that he cannot have a home here unless he 
has an establishment here . It seems to me that an individual may so arrange his 
involving a mariner, Rogers v CIR (1875, 1 TC 225). See also a different judgment in Turnbull v Solicitor 
of Inland Revenue, 42 Scot LR. 
94 This was used by Lord Cave in Levene v I RC 1928, 13 TC 486. 
9S See Lysaght v I RC, 1928, 13 TC 51 1 at 528. 
96 (1926) 10 TC 673 . 
97 At 679 . 
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life as to constitute an hotel his residence in the sense of being his home; and 
although, if he stays at a series of hotels in different places in the United 
Kingdom, he may not be resident in the ordinary lanwuage at anyone of those 
places, he may yet be resident in the United Kingdom. ,9 
The above judicial decisions clarify that under the United Kingdom income tax law, 
residence requires in every case the physical presence of the taxpayer in the United 
Kingdom during some portion of the tax year at least. However, the issue remains as to 
find out at what moment does actual bodily presence becomes legal residence under the 
British tax law. In other words, when does a mere passer-by or a casual visitor acquire the 
quality of residence? 
i) The '183-day' rule 
In terms of section 336 of the United Kingdom Taxes Act99, a person who is in the United 
Kingdom for some temporary purpose only and not with a view or intent of establishing 
his residence there and who has not actually been present in the United Kingdom at one 
time or several times for a period equal in aggregate to six months in the year of 
assessment is not chargeable as a United Kingdom resident, but that a person who has so 
actually resided shall be so chargeable for that year. 
The Inland Revenue emphasises in its practice note that an employee on assignment to 
the United Kingdom for two to three years will be treated as a United Kingdom tax 
resident, provided that he does not purchase accommodation and that certain other 
conditions are met. If the individual does not meet the two years condition, then he will 
be resident for any tax year in which he spends at least 183 days in the United Kingdom. 
Each tax year must be viewed as a whole, and if an individual meets the test of residence, 
he will be chargeable to United Kingdom tax on the basis that he is resident for the entire 
tax year. Therefore, on the strict basis as was established by judicial decisions, it is the 
period in terms of hours which is important. This principle was established in the case of 
98 Op cit, at 499. 
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Wilkie v CIR, 100 where the court held in deciding whether a temporary visitor had actually 
resided in the United Kingdom for a period equal to six months, periods of time in terms 
of hours were relevant for days of less than total residence. 
In that case, Mr Wilkie (who was clearly non-resident for both of the fiscal years 194617 
and 1948/9) had arrived in the United Kingdom at about 2 p.m, on 02 June 1947, and he 
remained in the country continuously until about 10 a.m, on 02 December 1947. The rule 
that states that a person will be regarded as resident for any tax year in which he is 
present for six months or more, was invoked by the Revenue, who claimed that, in their 
method of reckoning, Mr Wilkie had exceeded this period of time. They included the 
whole of the days of arrival and departure as days in the United Kingdom. He was 
therefore present in the United Kingdom for 184 days in the year and had passed 183 
days in the country. 
The court held however that the law was concerned with the exact proportion of the year 
during which he was present, and Mr Wilkie was able to show that he was within the 
United Kingdom for 182 days and approximately 20 hours, out of a total of 366 days in 
the year 1947/8 (1948 was a leap year). 
Donovan J allowing Mr Wilkie's appeal went on to say that: 
'There is nothing in the language of the Rule to prevent hours being taken into 
computation; but that, on the other hand, since what has to be determined is the 
period of actual residence it is legitimate to do so.' I 01 
Following Wilkie's case, the United Kingdom tax authorities, in view of difficulties 
arising in applying the strict rule, by concession for income tax purposes, consider now in 
practice six months as 183 days, ignoring whether it is a leap year or not and normally 
ignoring the days of arrival and departure. The Revenue guidance on the six-month rule is 
that a person: 
99 
'[W]ill always be resident if he is here for six months or more in the year. There 
are no exceptions to this rule. Six months is regarded as equivalent to 183 days, 
whether or not the year is a leap year. For this purpose a count is made of the total 
See the Act of 1988. 
100 (1951) 32 TC 495 at 508. 
101 At511. 
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number of days spent in the United Kingdom during the year whether the stay is 
of one period only or a succession of visits. Under present practice days of arrival 
and days of departure are normally ignored.' '02 
ii) The '91-day' rule 
Section 336 of the Taxes Act l03 infers that a person may be resident in the United 
Kingdom although he has been present there for less than six months, provided that his 
presence has met a 'residential quality' .'04 Thus, for residence purposes, an individual 
who has a permanent residence abroad and who comes to the United Kingdom for a 
period shorter than 183 days may still be a United Kingdom resident if he satisfies an 
alternative test of the British residence, based on a 91-day annual average presence over a 
period of four or more years, even if he does not maintain a home there.' 05 
This test originated from leading judicial decisions where the courts recognised that an 
individual may be resident if his visits to the United Kingdom are sufficiently frequent 
and substantial to form part of his normal way of life. The visits will then be taken to 
indicate an intention to establish or retain residence in the United Kingdom. 
For instance, in Levene v CIR,106 Mr Levene (until March 1918) a British subject, leased 
a home in London. He surrendered the lease and then sold his furniture. He went abroad 
and did not return until July 1920. From July 1920 until January 1925, he spent between 
four to five months each year in the United Kingdom. His visits were to obtain medical 
advice for himself and his wife, to visit relatives and the grave of his parents, to take part 
in certain Jewish religious observances and to deal with his income tax affairs. In January 
1925, he leased a flat abroad. He expected to continue to visit the United Kingdom, but 
not to the same extent as in the past. 
102 See the Inland Revenue booklet IR 20, para 8 . It should be noted that this ' rule of thumb' has been 
criticised (see Piper, op cit, 17) on the basis that it tended to encourage the practice among many foreign 
residents of recording only the nights they spent in the United Kingdom for the purpose of determining 
their residence status. 
103 See the Act of 1988; Financial Act \993, section 208(\)(4). 
104 See Williams et ai, op cit, p. 461. 
105 See the Revenue Pamphlet I R 20, para 2.10 for method of averaging; see also the Revenue Pamph let 
lR 131 , SP 2/91 , 19 March J 99 \. 
106 (1928) 13 TC 486, HL. 
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The House of Lords held that Mr Levene was resident and ordinarily resident in the 
United Kingdom for the years 192011921 to 192411925. 107 
The principle established that a presence of relatively short duration in a succession of tax 
years may be sufficient to acquire a residence status in the United Kingdom was 
confirmed in the House of Lords decision of Shah v Barnet London BorouRh Council,108 
dealing with the entitlement of overseas students to British education grants. 109 
Lord Scarman in giving the judgment noted that: 
'A man's abode in a particular place or country which he has adopted voluntarily 
and for settled purposes as part of the regular order of his life for the time being, 
whether of short or long duration ... ' 110 
In summary, a person is a resident in the United Kingdom if he satisfies one of the 
following requirements: 
• He intends to stay as a temporary visitor (less than two years) and his physical 
presence exceeds an aggregate of 183 days or more in that year. If the stay is 
likely to last for two years or more, the individual is a resident from the date of 
arrival; 
• If the annual visits to the United Kingdom average 91 days or more over four 
consecutive tax years, he is resident from the fifth year. If the visits are planned, 
the individual may be regarded as resident from the start of the visits. 
B-2) Ordinary residence 
As analysed above with residence simpliciter, ordinary residence is also a major factor in 
determining a person's fiscal status for a particular year. 
Under the British income tax law, the term 'ordinary residence' has no technical or 
special meaning, and must therefore be given its natural or ordinary meaning. 
107 See also Kinloch v (,JR, 1929, 14 TC 736 . 
108 (1983) I ALL ER 226. 
109 This case will be extensively analysed under the ' ordinary residence ' section. 
110 At235. 
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The question whether a person possesses this attribute signified by that term is a matter 
not of law but of fact. III 
Over the years, the legislature has tended to use the concept of ordinary residence as a 
second connecting factor for tax liability in the United Kingdom in order to prevent 
individuals from avoiding taxation merely by ceasing to be resident for tax purposes. The 
application of the concept of ordinary residence for example prevents an individual using 
a brief departure from the United Kingdom as a technique for avoiding income tax, and 
therefore it imposes on an individual a much greater burden of proof if he wishes to 
establish ' non-residence ' . 
The general principle as established by judicial authorities is that before a person may be 
attributed with United Kingdom ordinary residence status, he must prove to have 
established there a regular, habitual mode of life which has been voluntarily adopted, 
which serves one or more settled purposes and which possesses a continuity that has 
persisted despite any temporary absences of whatever duration. The term 'ordinary 
residence' is a more elusive and adhesive concept which suggests a greater permanence 
h . I 'd 11 2 t an simp e resl ence. 
However, the courts together with the Revenue authorities have found some difficulties in 
deciding not only the nature of ordinary residence, but also its distinction from mere 
residence. 
i) The nature of ordinary residence 
Although the question whether a person is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom is 
based on the ' facts and circumstances' approach, the meaning of the term 'ordinarily 
resident' is a matter of statutory interpretation. This term was considered by Lord Clyde 
LP in Reid v IRe, where he stated that: 
III See Booth, op cit, p. 53. 
11 2 See R v Barnet London Borour;h, ex p Shah, 1980, 3 ALL ER 679 at 681 . 
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'The argument was that the meaning of the word "ordinarily" is governed -
wholly or mainly - by the test of time or duration. I think it is a test, and an 
important one; but I think it is only one among many. From the point of view of 
time, "ordinarily" would stand in contrast to "casually". But [Miss Reid] is not a 
"casual" visitor to her home country; on the contrary she regularly returns to it, 
and "resides" in it for a part - albeit the smaller part - of every year. I hesitate to 
give the word "ordinarily" any more precise interpretation than "in the customary 
course of events", and anyhow I cannot think that the element of time so 
predominates in its meaning that, unless [Miss Reid] "resided" in the United 
Kingdom for at least 6 months and a day, she could not be said 'ordinarily' to 
reside there in the year in question.,,113 
Rowlatt J reiterated the above point by stating in Levene's case that: 
'''Ordinarily'' may mean either preponderatingly in point of time or time plus 
importance, or it may mean habitually as a matter of course, as one might say in 
the ordinary course of a man's life, although in time it might be insignificant. I 
think that "ordinarily" does not mean preponderatingly, I think it means ordinary 
in the sense that it is habitual in the ordinary course of man's life, and I think a 
man is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom when the ordinary course of his 
life is such that it discloses a residence in the United Kingdom ... ,114 
In illustrating the point that ordinary residence is concerned with the general background 
behind a person's residence, Viscount Sumner said in Lysaght's case that: 
'My Lords, the word "ordinary" may be taken first. The Act on the one hand does 
not say "usually" or "most of the time" or "exclusively" or "principally", nor does 
it say on the other hand "occasionally" or "exceptionally" or "now and then", 
though in various sections it applies to the word "resident", with a full sense of 
choice adverbs like "temporarily" and "actually". I think the converse to 
"ordinarily" is "extraordinarily" and that part of the regular order of a man's life, 
adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes, is not extraordinary. Having regard 
to the times and duration, the objects and the obligations of Mr Lysaght's visits to 
England, there was in my opinion evidence to support and no rule of law to 
prevent a finding that he was ordinarily resident, if he was resident in the United 
Kingdom at all. ' 
The meaning of ordinary residence was again presented as an issue in the case of R v 
Barnet London Borough, ex parte Shah, where Lord Denning said: 
'If there be proved a regular, habitual mode of life in a particular place, the 
continuity of which has persisted despite temporary absences, ordinary residence 
is established provided only it is adopted voluntarily and for a settled purpose.' 115 
113 Op cil, at 673. 
114 Op cil, p. 493. 
115 Op cil, at 236. 
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Thus, the analysis of the above judicial decisions has shown that ordinary residence has 
to do with an individual's regular order of life in a particular place. Ordinary residence 
denotes a place where the taxpayer normally lives or is 'habitually resident'. As the court 
confirms in Shah's case, if by reason of the taxpayer's voluntary presence in the United 
Kingdom in pursuit of one or more settled purposes, he made his presence there part of 
the regular order of his life, and thus attracted to himself the status of ordinary residence, 
his absence from the United Kingdom will not affect that status provided that the 
absences are temporary, occasional or accidental. 
While it is Inland Revenue practice in the United Kingdom not to treat an individual as 
being resident in any year in which he is not physically present in the United Kingdom at 
all,116 physical presence, as decided in case law, is not the conclusive test for the 
determination as to whether an individual is ordinarily resident, because it is the character 
in which a person is physically present in the country that is the determining factor. 
Accordingly, for income tax purposes, a person can remain ordinarily resident though 
physically absent from the country throughout the year. I 17 The concepts of 'residence' 
and 'ordinary residence' are not identical, and while the residence simpliciter status may 
be lost (for instance, if the taxpayer has not been physically present there during the tax 
year, or has come for a short duration), ordinary residence has a broader meaning and it is 
a quality which is less easily acquired and less easily shed than mere residence. I 18 
ii) Intention 
The contention of intention used by the British Revenue authorities is related to the de 
minimis period after which the taxpayer will be considered ordinarily resident. 
The general rule is that: 
116 See IR 20, para 8. 
117 See for example to this effect, section 334 of the Taxes Act 1988, by which Commonwealth and Irish 
citizens who have been ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom and leave for occasional residence 
abroad are regarded as being resident in the United Kingdom. Though the term 'occasional residence' is not 
defined in the Act, its meaning was analysed in the Levene's case and Reid v Clark, 1985, 3 WLR 142, 129 
SOLJo 469,1985 STC 323. 
liS It is therefore possible in this case, for a person to be ordinari Iy resident without being resident. 
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'A person who comes to the United Kingdom, whether to work here or not, will 
be ordinarily resident from the date of his arrival if it is clear that he intends to 
remain here for three years or more.' 119 
Thus, ordinary residence is presumed when an individual comes to the United Kingdom 
with the intention of either living permanently or remaining there for at least three years. 
When such intention exists, it is likely that the individual will be regarded as ordinarily 
resident even if he is absent from the United Kingdom for part of the time, including a 
whole tax year. Furthermore, where a person arrives in the United Kingdom with no 
definite intention as to the length of his stay, but subsequently decides to remain 
permanently, he will normally be regarded as ordinarily resident from the date of arrival 
ifhe made the decision in the tax year of arrival , or he will be ordinarily resident from the 
beginning of the tax year in which he made that decision. Where there is no evident 
change of intention, but the individual stays in the United Kingdom, he will be deemed 
ordinarily resident from the beginning of the year of assessment following the third 
anniversary of physical presence. This would not of course obviate his mere residence 
status in any year in which he was physically present in the United Kingdom for at least 
183 days.120 
Intention may be inferred by reference to particular circumstances. For instance, if an 
individual acquires accommodation for his use in the United Kingdom in circumstances 
that imply that he will stay at least three years (by purchase or in terms of a lease of at 
least three years), he will be treated as ordinarily resident either from the date of arrival or 
from the beginning of the tax year in which the accommodation becomes available, 
whichever is the later. Intention may also be strongly presumed if an individual's arrival 
in the United Kingdom or decision to stay there coincides with their severing of ties with 
elsewhere. In other words, the attribution of ordinary residence to an individual in the 
United Kingdom need not take long if the person has no ordinary residence elsewhere. 121 
11 9 See IR 20, para 26. 
120 See Whitfield, D, " Work Secondments of Individuals - A Multinational Focus on the Tax Implications 
in the Receiving Country: The United Kingdom" 1998, Tax Planning International Review, p. 4 . 
121 See Booth, op cit, p. 77. 
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Thus, in determining which category applies in any particular circumstance, it IS 
necessary to consider all the facts, that is, the individual's intention and what the normal 
living pattern will be. Moreover, in an attempt to close the loopholes as to the difficulty 
to infer intention, the United Kingdom Inland Revenue has also expressly considered that 
residence and ordinary residence may be attributed to an individual from the frequency of 
his visits, even if temporary. 
iii) Continuity of residence 
In the application of its '91 day' rule, the Inland Revenue states that: 
'If it is clear when [ a visitor] first comes he proposes to make such visits [i.e, 
visits for four or more consecutive years which will average three or more months 
per tax year], he may be treated as resident and ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom from the start.' 122 
By analogy, it can be presumed that a person previously resident abroad might decide to 
move to the United Kingdom for a period of at least four years but would nevertheless be 
treated as short term visitor if he intended to stay for less than 91 days per year on 
average. An example of this could be the case of an individual previously resident abroad 
who takes up a post as manager of a group's European operations, which would involve 
work in several countries. If such a person expects that the job will last for at least five 
years and relocates his spouse and family to the United Kingdom with an intention from 
the outset to spend two months of each year in the United Kingdom and the rest of the 
time in some part of Europe, then the visits in each year are for a temporary purpose only 
and the individual will be treated as a short-term visitor and not resident in the United 
Kingdom for each year in which certain limits are not exceeded. 123 
The above rule derives from judicial interpretations to the effect that ordinary residence 
necessitates the establishment of an annually recurrent pattern of residence simpliciter. 
J22 IR 20, para 21. 
123 See Goldsworth, JG, "UK Inland Revenue Review Booklet on UK Residence for Tax Purposes" July 
1994, Tax Notes international, p. 26. 
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In Levene's case, Lord Hanworth MR referred to the interpretation of these terms by 
stating that: 
'I find it difficult to attach any distinction of meaning to the word "ordinarily" as 
affecting the term "resident", unless it be to prevent facts which would amount to 
residence being so estimated, on the ground that they arose from some fortuitous 
cause, such as illness of the so-called resident or of some other person, which 
demanded his continuance at a place for a special purpose otherwise than in 
accordance with his own usual arrangement and the shaping of his movements.' 124 
On appeal, Viscount Cave LC reiterated that: 
'The expression "ordinary residence" ... connotes residence in a place with some 
degree of continuity and apart from temporary absences. So understood, the 
expression differs little in meaning from the word "residence" as used in the Acts; 
and I find it difficult to imagine a case in which a man while not resident here is 
yet ordinarily resident here.' 125 
To confirm the relation of residence with ordinary residence, Lord Denning's 
interpretation of the words 'ordinary resident' expands Viscount's Cave's phrase 'with 
some degree of continuity' into 'habitually and normally' and takes ordinary residence to 
be residence simpliciter which is customary, usual and confirmed by habit. 126 
Accordingly, the above cases are authority for the Inland Revenue proposition that where 
a person visits the United Kingdom, year after year, so that his visits become part of his 
life and habit, and the annual visits are for a substantial period of time, he could be said to 
be resident and ordinarily resident there. However, even if visits of three or more months' 
average duration per tax year are sufficient to establish residence simpliciter status, the 
attribution of ordinary residence status can follow only if the visits were voluntarily and 
in pursuit of a settled (as opposed to a casual or temporary) purpose. 
Thus, in determining whether visits average 91 days or more in the United Kingdom, the 
Statement of Practice 127 allows for the exclusion of any days spent in the United 
Kingdom due to exceptional circumstances, such as illness or because the element of 
124 Op cit, at 496. 
125 At 507. 
126 See the Shah's case, op cit, note I 12. 
127 See SP 2/91. 
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constraint is present, like the case of enforced presence by reason of kidnapping or 
imprisonment or the case of displaced persons (refugees). 128 
Because ordinary residence may be inferred by the continuous visits of an individual in 
the United Kingdom for a specific period, the same individual may also have an ordinary 
residence elsewhere, and is merely making short intermittent visits in the United 
Kingdom. In that case, the problem of dual ordinary residence may arise. 
In British tax law, it has long been established as a principle of law that a person can be 
ordinarily resident in more than one country. Early in A-G v Coote,129 one of the 
questions was whether Sir C. H. Coote could possess the quality of United Kingdom 
residence for a year of assessment during which he undoubtedly possessed the quality of 
Irish residence. 
The court found that his Irish residence was no barrier at all. Baron Wood went to say: 
'It is no uncommon thing for a gentleman to have two permanent residences at the 
same time, in either of which he may establish his abode at any period, and for 
any length oftime. This is just such a case.' 130 
In Reid's case, the judge stated that: 
'I am not sure that there is anything impossible in a person "ordinarily resident" in 
two places, though no doubt he cannot be physically present in more than one 
I h ·,131 P ace at t e same tIme. 
This was subsequently confirmed by Rowlatt J in Levene's case where he held that: 
'I think ... that a man can have two ordinary residences not because he commonly 
is to be found at those places, but because the ordinary cause of his life is such 
that he acquires the attribute of residence at those two places.' 132 
In summary, a person is ordinarily resident if he intends to reside or if he resides 
habitually in the United Kingdom. The ordinary residence depends on the intention when 
128 This exemption does not apply to calculation under the 183-day rule. See also Booth, op cit, p. 57. 
129 (1817)2TC385. 
130 At 386; see also Pittar v Richardson, 1916, 116 L TR 823. 
131 Op cit, at 356/368. 
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entering the country, the type of accommodation (pelmanent or temporary) and the actual 
period of his stay. An individual is ordinarily resident from the date of arrival if he 
intends to stay in the country for three years or more. Otherwise, he is ordinarily resident 
in the tax year after the three year period in the country is over, provided he lives in 
temporary accommodation. A person will also be ordinarily resident if he makes annual 
visits to the United Kingdom averaging three months or more over a four year period. 
B-3) Domicile 133 
Introduction 
As analysed above, the connecting factors for tax liability in the United Kingdom are not 
only based on the physical facts of residence but also on the metaphysical facts of 
intention which form the core of domicile. Domicile for United Kingdom tax purposes is 
the bond that is very difficult to break. The combination of the United Kingdom residence 
and domicile imposes unlimited fiscal liability on the taxpayer. In a number of instances, 
particularly as far as income tax is concerned, the domicile of an individual may be of 
more importance than his residence. 
The concept of domicile itself is primarily a non-tax issue, and therefore has no unique 
meaning in the context of taxation. Domicile has been said to be: 'that legal relationship 
between a person ... and a territory subject to a distinctive legal system which invokes 
the system as [that person's] personal law. , 134 Thus, domicile as a long established 
concept of general law, is a country or location to which each individual is subject by 
virtue of its being his permanent home. 135 Accordingly, Lyons submits correctly that 
domicile is at one and the same time a very general concept concerned with the entirety 
of a legal system, and a highly personal concept having important effects upon specific 
132 Op cit, at 494. 
133 The United Kingdom is one of the exceptional jurisdictions, including other Commonwealth countries 
such as Australia, which is still using the concept of domici Ie in matters of taxation as the most adhesive of 
the territorial connecting fac tors in the case of individuals. 
134 See Henderson v Henderson, 1967, 77 at 79; al so cited by Lyons, T, "The reform of the law of 
domicile", 1993 British Tax Review, vol. 1-6, p. 43. 
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individuals and their families in a large number of areas, such as for purposes of 
marriage, divorce, property ownership or taxation. 136 
Domicile determines the civil status of an individual and is strictly different from 
nationality or citizenship which are concerned with his political status. Thus, holding a 
passport of a country does not necessarily mean that one is domiciled there, although in 
some circumstances (such in the United States, Brazil or the Phillipines), one can be 
subject to tax on that basis. 137 
Because the concept of domicile relates to the general law, an individual cannot 
simultaneously have different domiciles for different purposes. He cannot be domiciled in 
one jurisdiction for taxation purposes but in another for say matrimonial purposes. That is 
the reason why establishing domicile in the United Kingdom context can have more far-
reaching consequences than merely becoming resident there. 138 
An individual's domicile may also be important in the determination of ' residence' for 
the purposes of double taxation treaties or arrangements. 139 
i) Analysis of the concept of domicile. 
Because domicile is a general legal concept, many of the judicial decisions on domicile 
have been concerned with matters outside the field of taxation. However, those cases 
have just as much relevance as those that involve the question of taxation. 
J35 See Piper, op cit, p. 44 . 
136 Op cit, p. 43 . 
137 See Crump, op cit, p. 421 . See also www.lea-white.com/taxation-domicile.html 
138 However, Lyons (op cit at 43) has strongly argued that there is no reason why a person should not have 
different domiciles in different contexts. Whether or not a person should be linked with a legal system is a 
very different question from whether a person should be linked with a tax system. The first is 
fundamentally concerned with relatively stable cultural matters, the second with transitory financial ones. 
Therefore, given that connecting a person with a tax system is a very different matter from connecting a 
person to a legal system generally, there is no reason why different connecting concepts should not be 
employed. 
139 See for instance, article 4 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and some British double tax treaties. In 
an international tax context, domicile is a confusing term because it is the French equivalent of ' domicile 
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Early in Whicker v Hume, Lord Cranworth said that 'by domicile we mean home, the 
permanent home.' 140 A person is domiciled in the country where he has his permanent 
home and intends to settle there permanently and indefinitely. At any given moment in a 
person's life or at the moment of his death, the domicile singles out from among all the 
telTitories in the world, the one territory in which (irrespective of where he happens to be 
or where he happens to reside or ordinarily reside) that person has his real or permanent 
home. 141 
ii) General principles 
Important guidelines have been established dealing with the acquisition of domicile and 
therefore providing different categories of domicile as follows: 
• No person can be without a domicile. 142 The rule derives from the practical 
necessity of connecting every person with some system of law by which a number 
of his legal relationships may be regulated. 143 
As Lord Westbury stated in the leading case of Udny v Udny: 
' It is a settled principle, that no man shall be without a domicile, and to secure this 
result the law attributes to every individual as soon as he is born the domicile of 
his father, if the child is legitimate, and the domicile of the mother if illegitimate. 
This has been called the domicile of origin, and is involuntarily. ' 144 
Since the domicile of the child's father may be the father 's domicile of origin 
which itself may be derived from the father's father, a domicile of origin may be 
transmitted through several generations no member of which has ever lived in the 
fd "1 f .. 145 country 0 omlCl e 0 ongtn. 
fi scal ', which means residence for tax purposes. Thus in contrast to many Civil Law jurisdictions, the 
United Kingdom uses rules to ascertain domicile quite distinct from those governing residence. 
140 (1858) 7 HLC 124 (HL) at 160, II ER 50 at 64. This was confirmed by Barry JP in Mason v Mason , 
(1885) 4 EDC 330 at 337. 
141 See Booth, op cit, p. 180. 
142 See Udny v Udny, 1869, LR 1 SC & DIY 441 at 457, per Lord Westbury. 
14 3 See Me Clean, J.D, Morris: Conflicts o/Laws, 1993,4 ed , p. 14. 
144 (1869) LR & Se & DIY 444 at 457 . 
14 5 See Peal v Peal, 1930,46 TLR 465 ; Grant v Grant, 1931, Se 238. 
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• No person can simultaneously have more than one domicile. 146 This rule also 
springs from the necessity of connecting every person with some one legal system 
by which a number of his legal relationships may be regulated. 
• An existing domicile continues until it is proved that a new domicile has been 
acquired. Hence the burden of proving a change of domicile lies on those who 
assert it. For instance, under the British law, the domicile of origin is difficult to 
change unless it can be shown that the person has moved on, or intends to move 
into a separate legal jurisdiction and intends to reside there indefinitely. 147 At the 
same time, if an individual is domiciled outside the United Kingdom before 
arrival and does not intend to make the United Kingdom his permanent home, 
then generally that individual is unlikely to become a British domiciliary by 
simply taking up United Kingdom residence. 
The burden of provmg a change of domicile is a very heavy one. Taking into 
consideration the number of cases decided by the House of Lords involving the question 
of domicile, there appears to be an almost irrebuttable presumption against a change 
because there are only few cases in which it was held for example that a domicile of 
. . h db I 148 ongm a een ost. 
In summary, case law has revealed three categories of domicile that can be distinguished 
in the United Kingdom: 
• The domicile of origin: acquired by every person at birth, and imposed by 
operation of law. A legitimate child takes the domicile of his father; an 
illegitimate child, the domicile of his mother; and a foundling, the place where he 
is found. 
• The domicile of dependent persons (children under 16, mentally disordered 
persons) is the same as and changes with the domicile of the person on whom the 
dependent person is legally dependent. In the United Kingdom, a wife acquires 
146 IRe v Bullock, 1976, STC 409 at 414, per Buckley LJ. 
147 See Bell v Kennedy, 1868, LR. 1 Sc & DIV 307. 
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the husband's domicile if married before 1 January 1974. If married after that 
date, her domicile status is dependent on her origin or choice. 
• A domicile of choice can be acquired by every independent person through the 
combination of residence and intention of permanent and indefinite residence. 
Although these two elements must be present, they need not necessarily occur at 
one and the same time. The intention may either precede or succeed the 
establishment of the residence. 149 Thus, it was decided in the case of Mrs F & S2 
(personal representatives of F deceased) v CIR I50 that a new domicile of choice 
may be acquired while the individual is continuing to be resident in the domicile 
of origin, but only if the residence in the domicile of choice is the 'chief 
residence' . 
An intention (animus manendi) to reside in the United Kingdom indefinitely with no 
present intention to return to another country will satisfy the test of domicile. In order to 
avoid acquiring a British domicile it will be essential to demonstrate an intention to return 
to another country on a clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated contingency. The 
more specific those intentions are the better. Residence however long in a country will 
not result in the acquisition of a domicile of choice if the necessary intention is lacking. 151 
On the other hand, following the judicial decisions,152 the United Kingdom Revenue now 
considers that if an individual taking up residence intends to reside indefinitely, it is 
assumed that the individual has displaced the domicile of origin by acquiring a domicile 
of choice. J53 Mc Clean correctly argues that the length of the residence is not important in 
itself. It is only important as evidence of intention. A person can acquire a domicile in a 
country if he has the necessary intention, after residence for even part of a day.154 
148 See Mc Clean, op cit, p. 19. 
149 See Piper, op cit, p. 46; Forsyth, CF, Private international law, 2 ed, p. 10311 05; also analysed by 
Steinberg, W, "An examination of the relevance of the concept of residence", June 1991, LLM thesis 
(UCT), p. 13; Ngwafor, E, Family law in Anglophone Cameroon, 1993, p. 27. 
150 (2000) SPC 219, SSCD \; see also Anderson v CrR, (\998) SPC 147, SSCD 43. 
151 See Jopp v Wood, 1865,4 DJ & S. 616; IRC v Bullock, 1976, 1 WLR 1178. 
152 See Udny v Udny, 1869 LR 1 SC & DIY 441. 
153 See Saunders, N, "Benefits of fiscal residence for non-domiciled individuals", March 1996, In[o Tax 
SATR (CD ROM) 
154 Op cit, p. 18. 
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Thus, a domicile of choice can replace the domicile of origin only if both the intent of an 
individual and the factual pattern of life dictate this. 
C) The United States 
Introduction 
With regard to natural persons, the United States imposes income tax on the worldwide 
income of United States citizens and residents as defined in section 7701 (a)(30) of the 
Internal Revenue Code (lRC).155 For a foreign national , the reach of United States income 
taxation depends at the threshold on ' residence ' . For United States immigration and tax 
purposes, an individual who is not a United States citizen is termed an 'alien'. The 
concept of ' residence' for United States tax purposes has become somewhat atomised. It 
differs slightly for foreign nationals and United States citizens. Thus, residence is also a 
factor in the taxation of United States citizens, although to a lesser degree. 156 
The determination of United States residence by inquiry into case specific factors ended 
with the adoption of a statutory definition of a 'resident alien' in 1984, codified as section 
no 1 (b). The most important feature of section 770 1 (b) is that it classifies as resident 
aliens, two categories of individuals, who are therefore subject to federal income tax on 
their worldwide income, irrespective ofsource.J57 In terms of section nOl(b), the United 
States residence is tied first, to the inunigration status of foreign nationals under the 
'permanent residence or green card ' test; secondly, the basis for tax liability depends also 
on the length of time spent in the United States. The latter element is extensively 
elaborated in a test of 'substantial presence ' in the United States. However, both tests 
contain special rules and exceptions, particularly in relation to the substantial presence 
155 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references to the United States Internal Revenue Code are to 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (l RC). 
156 For instance, a United States citizen residing outside the United States may be allowed to exclude 
earned income from taxation under section 911 of the TRe. See Isenbergh, J, " Foundation of US 
International Taxation", 200 I, Tax management: Foreign Income Portfolios, p. A-6 . 
157 See Bissel , T, "US Income Taxation of Non-Res ident Alien Individuals", \999 , Tax Management: 
Foreign Income Portfolios, p. A-3 . 
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test. Thus, an alien will be taxed as a United States resident if he meets one of the above 
tests. 
C-l) Analysis of the tests of residence 
i) The permanent residence (green card) test 
Under this test, an alien is treated as a resident alien if he is a 'lawful permanent resident 
of the United States' at any time during the calendar year. 158 The Internal Revenue Code 
provides that an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States if: 
• The individual has been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently 
in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws. 159 
• And such status has not been revoked, or has not been administratively or 
judicially determined to have been abandoned. 160 In terms of regulatory section 
301 of 770 1 (b), the abandonment of a green card will not terminate the alien's 
resident status for federal income tax purposes unless the abandonment is 
recognised by the United States immigration authorities by means of either and 
administrative or judicial determination. Thus, an alien who wishes to terminate 
his resident alien status for tax purposes should always take affirmative steps to 
abandon his green card. If he simply ceases using it without informing the United 
States immigration authorities and allows it to become invalid with the passage of 
time, under the provision of the United States immigration laws, he will 
nevertheless continue to be classified as a resident alien for tax purposes. 161 
158 See section 7701 (b )(A)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
159 Generally, an alien has this status if the Immigration and Naturalisation Service has issued him with an 
alien registration card which is known as a 'Green Card ' . See Oates, M, " Work Secondments of 
Individuals: A Multinational Focus on the Tax Implications in the Receiving Country- The United States", 
1998, Tax Planning International Review, p. 7. 
160 See section 770J(b)(6). 
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ii) The substantial presence test 
The 'substantial presence' test of section 7701(b)(3) brought a largely arithmetic test of 
United States presence as the core element of United States residence. This test represents 
an attempt by the legislature to provide objective 'mechanical' criteria for non-immigrant 
aliens who spend more than a nominal amount of time in the United States in a calendar 
year. 
a) The actual physical presence 
As a general rule in terms of section 7701 (b )(3) of the Inland Revenue Code, if an alien is 
physically present in the United States for 183 days or more in the calendar year, he is a 
resident alien for the year under the substantial presence test. This is the simpler form of 
substantial presence test based on the actual physical presence of the taxpayer for at least 
183 days in the United States, irrespective of the nature of the visit, the intention of the 
taxpayer or any stronger or more permanent connection that he may have to another 
country. 162 Thus, a foreign tourist falsely arrested for a crime and detained in the United 
States beyond 183 days becomes a United States resident. 163 
The closer analysis of the 'substantial presence' test indicates that it is divided into two 
forms. In addition to the requirement of actual physical presence in the United States, 
another criterion known as the 'look back' rule is based on the combination of physical 
presence and time carried over from earlier years that can classify an alien as a resident 
alien even if he spends less than 183 days in the United States during the calendar year. 
b) Substantial presence by carryover of days or the 'look back' rule 
The second form of the substantial presence takes into account not only time spent in the 
United States during the calendar year, but also days spent in the two preceding calendar 
161 See Sissel, op cit, p. A-S. 
162 See sections 7701(b)(I) (A) (ii) and 7701 (b)(3). 
163 See Isenbergh, op cit, p. A-7. 
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years, which are added to days in the calendar year in measurmg substantial presence. 
Days from the two preceding years are accorded less weight in the total, however, than 
the days of the actual calendar year. The' look back' test is therefore applied as follows: 
If an alien is present in the United States for at least 31 days of the current calendar year, 
he may be classified as a resident alien if the sum of the following equals 183 days or 
more: 
• The actual days in the United States in the current year; plus 
• One third of his days in the United States in the immediately preceding year; plus 
• One sixth of his days in the United States in the second preceding year. 164 
For instance, consider an alien who was physically present in the United States for 120 
days in each of the years 1999,2000 and 2001. To determine whether or not the alien met 
the substantial presence test for 2001, the full 120 days of presence in 2001 should be 
added to 40 days in 2000 (one third of 120) and 20 days in 1999 (one sixth of 120). Since 
the total for the three year period is 180 days, the alien would not be considered a resident 
under the substantial presence test for 2001. 
The effect of the above criterion is to include periods of protracted but less concentrated 
presence in the United States as periods of United States residence. However, United 
States residence does not arise solely by carryover of days from earlier years. A minimum 
physical presence of at least 31 days in the United States is required at all events for 
substantial presence. 165 For example, assume that a citizen of a foreign country was 
physically present in the United States for 360 days in the calendar year 1999, 342 days 
in 2000 and 30 days in 2001. He is a resident alien for the years 1999 and 2000, but not 
for 2001 , although the formula provides for 204 'deemed days ' in the United States in 
2001 (30 + 342/3 + 360/6 = 204) under the three year look back rule. He is a non-resident 
alien for 2001 because he does not satisfy the 31 day threshold test of section 
7701 (b )(3)(A)(i). 
164 Section 770 I (b )(3)(A) of the Inland Revenue Code. 
165 Section 770 I (b )(3)(A)(i) of the Inland Revenue Code. 
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c) The daycount rules 
In applying the substantial presence test, an alien must in principle include any day on 
which he spent any time at all within the United States. Physical presence for any part of 
a day is counted as a full day.166 However, there are special exceptions in determining the 
days of presence in the United States. A stop in the United States for less than 24 hours 
by an alien in transit between two points outside the United States is not counted. 167 
However, the regulations provide that if the alien 'attends a business meeting' while in 
the United States, even if it is 'within the confines of the airport', he will not be 
considered to be in transit. 168 Days are not counted when an alien is unable to leave the 
United States because of a medical condition that developed while he was in the United 
States. 169 Days are also not counted when an alien is considered to be an 'exempt 
individual' .170 
d) Special exceptions in relation to the foreign 'tax home' and 'closer connection' 
If an alien satisfies the substantial presence test, he may still be treated as a non-resident 
alien, provided: 
• He is present in the United States for less than 183 days during the year; and 
• He maintains a tax home in a foreign (non-United States) country during the year; 
and 
• He has a closer connection during the year to that foreign country. 171 
This exception to the substantial presence test does not apply to foreign nationals who 
have applied for lawful permanent residence in the United States or who have pending an 
application for adjustment of their immigration status. I 72 
166 Section 770 I (b )(3)(A)(ii) of the Inland Revenue Code. 
167 Section 7701 (b )(7)(C) of the Inland Revenue Code. 
168 Regs section 301 of7701(b) -3(d) of the IRe. 
169 Secttion 770 1 (b)(3)(O)(ii) of the IRe. 
170 An exempt individual is an alien present in the United States as a foreign government employee 
[section 770 l(b)(S)(8)]; a teacher or trainee [section 7701 (b)(S)(C)]; a student [section 770 I (b)(5)(O)]; or a 
professional athlete [section 7701 (b )(5)(A)(iv)]. 
171 Section 7701 (b)(3)(8) of the IRe. 
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Neither the nature of a 'tax home' nor a 'closer connection' to a foreign country is 
immediately apparent from the statute. The notion of 'tax home' in the Inland Revenue 
Code is derived from section 162(a) which allows deductions to taxpayers away from 
home in pursuit of business. Generally, the Internal Revenue Service considers that any 
individual's 'tax home' is the place where he has the centre of his employment or self-
employment. Thus, if he spends one year of working time away from the place of his 
original work, his tax home is deemed to shift to the new location, although fact patterns 
can arise in which it is unclear whether an individual's work at the new location is 
continuous enough to result in a change of tax home. J73 For practical purposes, resident 
aliens should assume that in determination of residence under section 770 1 (b), their 'tax 
home' is their business or professional centre of gravity rather than where they live. 
Section 7701(b) is even more unclear on the question of a 'closer connection' to a foreign 
country. In determining whether or not an alien has a closer connection to a foreign 
country, the Internal Revenue Service will look to the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the alien's ties to the foreign country, compared to his ties in the United 
States. 174 In practice, the section 7701 (b )(3)(B) exception provides protection from 
resident alien status principally for aliens who are resident in countries that do not have a 
double tax agreement with the United States. Aliens resident in most treaty countries 
would usually be protected from resident alien status without the need for this exception, 
because the 'tie-breaker' rules in the treaty would usually result in their being classified 
as treaty country residents, and thus as non-resident aliens for United States tax 
purposes. 175 
172 Section 7701 (b)(3)(C) of the IRe. 
173 See Bissel, op cit, p. A-8. 
174 Under the regulations section 301.770 I (b )-2( d), the Internal Revenue Service would consider factors 
such as the location of permanent home, family ties, personal belongings, membership in social and 
religious organizations, driver's licences, bank accounts and even voting. 
175 Regs. Section 301.7701 (b)-(7) of the IRe. 
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e) Beginning and end of United States residence 
An important feature of section 7701 (b) is that it does not classify an alien as a resident 
alien or non-resident alien for the entire taxable year. Instead, the rules permit certain 
aliens to qualify as 'dual status' aliens if they satisfy the green card test or the substantial 
presence test for only part of the year. There are special rules for the first and last years of 
residence that limit United States residence to part of the year. The rules differ for United 
States residence based on immigration status or substantial presence. 176 
An individual who becomes a green card holder during the year (and does not meet the 
substantial presence test) becomes a resident on the first day of presence in the United 
States as a lawful permanent resident. l77 Thus, an individual who becomes a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States on September 1 is a United States resident only 
from September 1 to the end of the year, even if he was physically present earlier in the 
United States. 
A foreign national who meets the substantial presence test becomes a United States 
resident on the first day of presence in the United States during the calendar year. l78 
However, there is a provision to exclude up to 10 days of presence in the United States if 
certain conditions are met with regard to a closer connection to a foreign country. 179 If 
both tests (substantial presence and green card) are met in the same year, the earlier of the 
two dates is applied as the starting date.180 An alien may be able to elect (subject to 
certain conditions) to be treated as a resident for the entire first tax year, although he may 
only satisfy the green card or substantial presence tests later in the year. 181 
176 See Isenbergh, op cit, p. A-9. 
177 Section 7701 (b)(2)(A)(ii) of the IRe. 
178 Section 770 I (b)(2)(A)(iii) of the IRe. 
179 Section 770 I (b)(2)(C) of the IRe. 
180 See Oates, op cit , p. 7. 
18 1 Section 770 I (b)(4) of the IRe. 
108 
In the final year of residency, the residency termination date is the last day the person is 
physically present in the United States if he satisfied the substantial presence test. 182 If the 
person met the green card test, the residency termination date is the first day on which he 
is no longer a lawful permanent resident of the United States. 183 The termination date 
may be the later of these dates if both tests are met. 
1.2 The case of legal persons 
A) South Africa 
Introduction 
This section analyses the concept of residence from a South African perspective as it 
applies to legal persons (be it companies, trusts, deceased estates). 
As with the question of residence of individuals, the enquiry into the residence of legal 
persons is not new within the South African tax context. The South African case law has 
long occasionally considered the meaning of residence of artificial persons albeit in a 
different perspective. 184 
Even under the dominant source based tax system, several provisions in the Income Tax 
Act attached tax consequences to the residence of legal entities. 185 Thus, prior to 1 
January 2001, the definition of residence, particularly in relation to legal entities, 
depended on the specific tax consequences provided by the legislation. 186 With the 
182 Section 770 I (b )(2)(8)(iii) of the IRe. 
183 Section 770 I (b)(2)(8)(ii) of the IRe. 
184 For instance, in the judicial deci sions of TW Beckell & Co Ltd v H Kromer Ltd, 191 2 AD 324 at 334; 
Dairy Board v John T Rennie & Co (Pty) Ltd, J 976, 3 SA 768 (W) at 771; Estate Kootcher v CIR, 1941 AD 
256, the residence of companies were considered for jurisdictional purposes, and it was concluded that a 
company resided in law where the registered office was, but it might also reside at the place where its 
principal place of business or central control was situated. 
185 For that matter, section 1 of the Act before the amendment by the Act 59 of 2000 used to state the tax 
implication of companies, by defining domestic company in contradistinction with external company. 
186 For instance, the section I O( I )(hA) exemption in relation to South Africa source interest referred to 
'management and control ' in defining a company's residence . This was different from the application of 
section 31 in relation to the tax consequences of providing financial assistance in international agreements, 
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implementation of the residence-based taxation, there was a need for a more coherent 
approach in terms of the application of the test of residence for legal entities. The new 
legislation is intended to bring a uniform meaning of residence applicable to any legal 
entity. Thus, section 1 (b) of the Act defines residence of legal persons as: 
' Person other than a natural person which is incorporated, established or formed 
in the Republic or which has its place of effective management in the Republic 
(but excluding any international headquarter company). ' 187 
In other words, in the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act, two tests have been 
established to ascertain the residence of legal entities, that is, the place of incorporation or 
the place of effective management of the entity in question. 18S 
While the incorporation test can be easily satisfied as a matter of formality, the place of 
'effective management' has not been defined in the Act. It is clear that in ascertaining 
where a patiicular legal entity will be regarded as being resident for tax purposes under 
the latter test, the facts and circumstances of each case will have to be considered. 189 
which was based (and still applicable in terms of the practice note) on 'management or control'. On the 
other hand, when sections 9C and 90 came into operation on I July 1997 for the taxation of foreign 
investment income, they referred to 'pJace of effective management' for the company 's residence and that 
was maintained in section 9£ (which applies to foreign dividends and which came into operation fi'om 23 
February 2000). 
187 Thus, to qualify as a resident in terms of section I (b) of the Act, the entity must be a person. This 
automatically excludes relationships such as partnerships and similar institutions that lack Jegal personality 
under the South African tax law. 
188 As a consequence therefore, all specific definitions of domestic company, external company, and South 
African company have been deleted by sections 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) of the Amendment Act 59 of 2000. 
A Ithough the section I (b) definition of residence in the Act intends to apply to all situations where a legal 
entity's residence is in question, certain provisions of the Act still apply a specific meaning to company 
residence. For instance, the Practice Note, no 7 (dated 6 august 1999) in relation to financial assistance in 
international agreements provided in section 31 of the Act, still refers to 'management or control' in 
defining a company' s residence. It can be argued that because the practice note only provides the South 
African Revenue Service'S (SARS) guidelines in the application of specific legislation and is not intended 
to be binding, the section 31 reference to 'management or control' should be interpreted in accordance with 
section I (b) of the Act. See SARS Interpretation Note no 6 on 'the place of effective management' , dated 
26 March 2002. 
189 There has not been any uniformity in applying this test even in countries which are members of the 
OECD, which uses this test in its Model Tax Convention [article 4(3)] as the unique tie-breaker in the case 
of dual residency of a legal entity in two contracting states. Malcolm Gammie correctly argues that 
["International tax avoidance: A United Kingdom perspective" in Lindencrona, G, Lodin, S, Wiman, B, 
(ed) International studies in taxation: Law and EconomiCS, 1999, p. 125], although there is significant 
degree of co-operation between countries on income taxes through the OECD, the Jatter work concentrates 
on how taxing rights ought to be allocated between competing jurisdictions, rather than on the agreement of 
a common tax base. That is why OECD measures have accordingly had limited success in resolving the 
more serious problems of international tax avoidance. 
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a) Specific exclusion 
The section 1 (b) definition of residence specifically excludes an ' international 
headquarter company' from being a resident even though it may be incorporated, 
established or formed, or may have its place of effective management in South Africa. 
The international headquarter company is defined in section 1 of the Act as a company: 
a) The entire equity share capital J90 of which is held by persons who are not residents or 
trusts; 
b) Where any indirect interest of residents and of any trust in such equity share capital 
does not exceed 5% in aggregate of the total equity share capital of such company; 
and 
c) Where 90% of the value of the assets of such company represents interests in the 
equity share capital and loan capital of subsidiaries (which are not residents) of such 
company in which such company holds a beneficial interest of at least 50%.191 
In essence, a company is an international headquarter company if at least 90% of its 
assets represent shares and loans to non-resident subsidiaries of such company in which 
such company has a beneficial interest of at least 50% at the fiscal year-end. 192 
The rationale for granting this concession is to encourage multinational companies to 
base their regional headquarters in South Africa and therefore to protect the international 
competitiveness of South Africa. For instance, this exemption may be useful to foreign 
companies setting up regional headquaIiers in South Africa with a view to using the 
country as a base for operations in Africa. 
Consequently, a company that qualifies as an international headquarter company and is 
not a resident of South Africa, is not subject to tax on its worldwide income, but only on 
its receipts and accruals from a source within or deemed to be within South Africa. 193 
190 The term 'equity share capital' is defined in section I of the Act. In essence, it excludes preference 
share capital. 
191 This definition was inserted in the Act by section 2(t) of the Amendment Act 2000. 
192 The first two conditions (a) and (b) also apply for the entire year of assessment. 
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Because the definition of 'resident' excludes any international headquarter company, the 
result of this exclusion is that the provisions of section 9D (relating to income of a 
controlled foreign entities), and of section 9E (relating to the taxation of foreign 
dividends) will not apply to such a company.J94 In addition, as secondary tax on 
companies (STC) is only imposed on South African resident companies, an international 
headquarter company is also not subject to STC on dividends declared. J95 
While the exclusion of the international headquarter company from the definition of 
'resident' has the effect of attracting foreign investment and improving South Africa's 
position as the gateway to Africa, one of the major drawbacks is that the international 
headquarter company is not treated as a South African resident for double tax treaty 
purposes. Thus, the international headquarter company may not qualify for treaty 
benefits, which means for example that any relief on withholding tax paid abroad will not 
apply. J96 In addition, an international headquarter company is subject to the South 
African exchange control regulations, which seems to be contrary to the intention of this 
concession. The reason is that foreign investors need a guarantee that their investment is 
secure and that should they wish to disinvest, they will be allowed to do so with no major 
restrictions. 197 
A.1 The 'place of incorporation' test 
Under section 1 (b) of the Act, a legal person that is incorporated, established or formed in 
South Africa qualifies as a resident for income tax purposes, although it may be 
effectively managed abroad. The inclusion of the incorporation test in the South African 
193 See para (ii) of the gross income definition in section I of the Act. 
194 See Silke, op cit, p. A-13 . 
195 The United Kingdom also introduced the international headquarter company (IHC) regime in its tax 
law in 1994 as a special tax concession in order to attract holding companies to the United Kingdom. The 
IHC enabled foreign income dividends to be paid to shareholders without the provisions of the Advanced 
Corporation Tax (ACT) . Since the ACT provisions were abolished in April 1999, the IHe is no longer 
relevant in the United Kingdom . However, this tax amendment has made the United Kingdom a more 
attractive base for holding companies. 
196 See Casey, A, "The Impact of Residence-based Tax on South African Companies", March 2001, 
Accountancy SA, p. 3. 
197 See Du Toit, C, "Gays, Residence and Headquarter Companies", 3 November 2000, Finance Week, p. 
45. 
112 
tax legislation closes the loophole previously present in the Act in which it was possible 
for a company incorporated in South Africa, to be excluded from a paliicular provision of 
the Act simply by having its place of effective management outside South Africa. 198 
The Act does not define 'incorporated, established or formed ' for the purposes of section 
1 (b). The principle behind this test is that those corporations that are incorporated in, 
established, registered or created under the laws of a particular country are taxable there. 
A company is 'incorporated' when it is formed under the authority given by a legislative 
enactment, or operating under a charter or under articles drafted in accordance with the 
laws of a patiicular country. When properly incorporated, the company is endowed with a 
legal personality separate from that of the persons who own its shares. As a corporate 
entity, it has the right to carryon business, to own property, to assume obligations, and to 
sue and be sued in its own name. It may be liable to tax on its profits and gains according 
to the jurisdiction in which it lies. 199 
It is submitted that a company that is formed and incorporated in South Africa in terms of 
section 32 of the Companies Act,200 is a resident because of its formation and 
incorporation, irrespective of where it is effectively managed or where it carries on its 
business.201 However, the registration of a foreign company as an 'external company' for 
company law purposes does not amount to incorporation, formation or establishment, and 
it will therefore not be a resident, unless it is also effectively managed in South Africa. 
198 See for instance, the reference to a company ' s residence in sections 9C and 9D (as they then were). 
199 See the statement of Buckley LJ, announcing the importance of the place of incorporation test of 
companies for United Kingdom tax residence purposes when he held in American Thread Co Ltd v Joyce 
(1911 / 12, 6 TC I & 163) that: 'A corporation, like an individual, may have more than one place of 
residence. The place of residence which immediately occurs to mind as presumably its place of residence is 
the place of incorporation. That has been spoken of in some of the cases as the place of its birth, it is the 
place of its birth, but it is more than that, it is the place whose laws may determine its status, it is according 
to the law of that place that it is a corporation; and therefore it is not only its birth but its status which 
depends upon the place in which its incorporation takes place, and it would be difficult, [ think, to hold 
under any circumstances the place of its incorporation may not, for some purpose at any rate, as for 
instance with regard to jurisdiction, be always the place of residence.' 
200 61 of 1973. 
201 See Silke, op cit, p. A-12. 
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A.2 The 'place of effective management' 
a) Companies 
The second criterion for determining the residence of legal entities is referred to in 
section 1 (b) of the Act as the place of effective management. The Act has not provided 
any clue as to the meaning of 'place of effective management'. The closest concept, 
which is a subject of a fair body of case law is that of the place of 'central management 
and control' in which a few cases in the South African tax law dealing with this issue, 
have relied on the highly persuasive value of the United Kingdom decisions, where the 
place of management and control has long been established for determining a company 
residence. 
Nevertheless, the use by the legislature of a different terminology (place of effective 
management) must surely indicate a desire to apply a concept different from the place of 
central management and contro1.202 It is argued that the word 'effective' in the phrase 
'effective management' has a subjective content and its interpretation can differ 
depending on the particular circumstances of a case.203 The Little Oxford Dictionar/04 
defines 'effective' inter alia as 'operative; impressive; producing intended results.' The 
term 'effective management' is somehow viewed as being ambiguous, describing either 
the nature of management or the level of management and management decisions. 
However, the reference to the 'place of effective management' as the test for legal 
entities' residence is now widely used in most of the double tax agreements concluded by 
South Africa with other countries. The OECD Model Tax Convention in its Commentary 
now defines the term 'place of effective management' as: 
'The place where key management and commercial decisions that are necessary 
for the conduct of the entity's business are in substance made. Thus, it is the place 
of the top management that makes the policy decisions and takes actions affecting 
202 See Silke, op cil, A-12. 
203 See Van der Merwe, SA, "Residence ofa Company- The Meaning of 'Effective Management"', 2002, 
14 SA Merc LJ, p. 80. 
204 ( 1996), p. 3. 
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the whole entity. An entity may have more than one place of management but it 
can only have one place of effective management at anyone time. ,205 
Due to the lack of statutory definition or proper judicial guidance in South Africa, the 
issue remains as to how the 'place of effective management' test is applied by the South 
African Revenue Services (SARS). 
i) South African Revenue Services (SARS)' interpretation and application 
In the income tax interpretation note no 6,206 SARS provides guidelines as to how it 
interprets the meaning of the term 'place of effective management' of an entity for the 
purposes of the definition of a 'resident' in the Act. According to the interpretation note, 
the concept of effective management is not the same as shareholder-control or control by 
the board of directors, as the concept of management focuses on the company's purpose 
and business and not on the shareholder function. The interpretation note highlights that 
in order to determine the meaning of 'place of effective management', one should keep in 
mind that it is possible to distinguish between: 
• The place where central management and control is carried out by a board of 
directors; 
• The place where executive directors or senior management execute and 
implement the policy and strategic decisions made by the board of directors and 
make and implement day-to-day/ regular! operational management and business 
activities; and 
• The place where the day-to-day business activities are carried out or conducted. 
Accordingly, as a general approach, SARS' vIew IS that the place of effective 
management is ' the place where the company is managed on a regular or day-to-day basis 
by the directors or senior managers of the company, irrespective of where the overriding 
205 See the OECD Commentary, article 4, para 24, updated as of April 29, 2000. Also cited by Rohatgi, 
op cit, p. 146. 
20G Dated 26 March 2002. 
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control is exercised, or where the board of directors meet. Management by these directors 
or senior managers refers to the execution and implementation of policy and strategy 
decisions made by the board of directors. Thus, practically, if these management 
functions are carried out at one location, that location will be the place of effective 
management, which mayor may not be the same as the place where the company's 
business activities are actually conducted. However, if the management functions are not 
carried out at one place, due to the use of distance communication and technology (such 
as telephone, internet or video conferencing), SARS' view is that the place of effective 
management is where the day-to-day operational management and commercial decisions 
taken by the senior managers are actually implemented, that is, where the business 
activities are conducted. If the business activities themselves are conducted at various 
locations, one needs to determine the place with the strongest economic nexus. 
ii) Consideration of facts and circumstances 
Because no hard and fast rules can be laid down in determining the place of effective 
management, the interpretation note (no 6) sets out a non-exhaustive list of relevant 
factors that should be examined on a case-by-case basis in determining the place of 
effective management, which are: 
• Where the centre of top level management is located; 
• Location of functions performed at the headquarters; 
• Where the business operations are actually conducted; 
• Where controlling shareholders make key management and commercial decisions 
in relation to the company; 
• Legal factors such as the place of incorporation, formation and establishment, the 
location of the registered office and public officer; 
• Where the directors or senior managers or the designated manager who are 
responsible for the day-to-day management reside; 
• The frequency of the meetings of the entity's directors or senior managers and 
where they take place; 
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• The expenence and skills of the directors, managers, trustees or designated 
managers who purport to manage the entity; 
• The actual activities and physical location of senior employees; 
• The scale of onshore as opposed to offshore operations; 
• The nature of powers conferred upon the representatives of the entity, the manner 
in which those powers are exercised by the representatives and the purpose of 
conferring the power to the representatives. 
In conclusion, it is likely that the courts will test the term . 'place of effective 
management' in due course. Thus, until there is more consensus regarding the meaning of 
this term, it is better for taxpayers to exercise more conservative tax planning around the 
issue of the place of effective management of their companies. Thus, SARS regards the 
place of effective management to be the place where the highest level of day-to-day 
management of the activities of the business takes place, that being the place where the 
executive directors and management conduct the company's business. This is not 
necessarily the place at which the directors hold their meetings, or the place where 
strategic and policy decisions are made and ultimate control is (which is more closer to 
central management and controlio7, but rather it is the place where the actual operations 
of the company are managed on a day-to-day basis. In this line, Davis suggests that if an 
offshore party must exercise discretion, or can alone implement any decision taken, and 
this is a sine qua non for management decision, then management elsewhere cannot be 
regarded as effective.208 Thus, a distinction must be drawn between executive and non-
executive management. A manager who performs executive duties actively takes part in 
the day-to-day decisions of the business and is effectively charged with the responsibility 
of running it. In contrast, non-executive management serves as consultants to the 
executive management to bring their particular expertise or experience to bear on the 
decisions of the executive management. 
207 This view is held by Meyerowitz, D ("Sections 9C and 9D Revisited", 1998, Taxpayer 81; and in 
" Editorial: The Revenue Laws Amendment Act", October 2000, Taxpayer J 83, vol 49) who relies on the 
United Kingdom case of Wensleydale's Set/Lement Trustees v CIR (1996, SPC 73) where OA Shirley held 
that the place of effective management is where the shots are called, that is where the board of directors 
meets to make the key decisions. 
208 See Davis, OM, Olivier, L, & Uquhart, G, .}uta 's Income Tax, 2000, vol I, para 90-5. 
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b) Other legal persons 
Early in some judicial decisions, it was established that other fictitious persons such as 
estates, trusts, clubs and associations were capable of having a residence and being 
resident. 209 
Section 1 (b) of the Act made it clear that the definition of residence applies to any person 
other than a natural person, therefore implying that any artificial person will be subjected 
to the same test of residence. 210 
Accordingly, trusts and estates are resident in South Africa if they are incorporated, 
established or formed, or if they have their place of effective management in South 
Africa. 
The place of incorporation of these artificial persons is a matter of fact and each case 
must be decided on its own merits.211 It is submitted that the place of effective 
management of trusts and estates will normally be the place where the trustees meet to 
deal with the affairs of the trust, or where the trustees leave the management to a 
particular trustee, the place where he functions on behalf of the trust. 21 2 It is further 
argued by Meyerowitr l3 that if the trustees have delegated their authority to an agent, the 
place of effective management will, until the mandate is withdrawn, be where the agent 
carries out his mandate. 
Thus, the place of where the assets of the trusts or estates are effectively managed IS 
crucial in determining their place of residence. 
209 See Nathan 's estate v CfR, 1948 (3) SA 866 (N), 15 SATC 328; CfR v JagRer & Co (Pty) Ltd, J 945 
CPD 331, 13 SA TC 430 . 
210 Before the amendment to the Act, section 1 used to define 'person' in relation to legal entities as 
including deceased estates and trusts (refer also to section 25B of the Act) for the purposes of income tax, 
unlike in other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom. 
211 See Silke, op cit, p. A-l3. 
212 See Meyerowitz, op cit , October 2000, Taxpayer 183. 
213 Ibid. 
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B) The United Kingdom 
B.1 The incorporation test 
For United Kingdom income tax purposes, the question of the relationship between a 
company's place of incorporation and its place of residence first came before the courts 
in A-G v Alexander,214 concerning the Imperial Ottoman bank which was a company 
incorporated in Constantinople that had taken over and continued to carryon the business 
of a London bank. The court rejected the bank's contention that a company could be 
resident only in the country of its incorporation. 
Further in 1904, in Goerz & Co v Bell,2 15 Channell J held that the company concerned in 
the case was resident in the United Kingdom despite the fact that it had been incorporated 
in South Africa. 
Later in Egyptian Delta Land & Investment Co Ltd v Todd,216 the court considered the 
submission that a company could only exist because of the law that gave it birth, and 
therefore could only reside in that place where its creative law was maintained. In 
delivering the judgment, Viscount Sumner said that: 
'This expression of opinion can only mean that for both British and foreign 
companies alike the test is where on the facts (including among all the others the 
fact of incorporation here or there) the company ' s business is really directed and 
carried on. ,2 17 
However, the common law principle established in judicial decisions that the place of a 
company ' s incorporation was not determinative of its place of residence in the United 
Kingdom, was modified in 1988 by the statutory recognition of the place of incorporation 
2 14 (1874)LR 10 Exch20. 
2 15 (1904) 2 KB J 36. 
216 (1928)14TCl19. 
217 At 151. Early in The Swedish Central Railway Co Ltd v Thompson (1923 /25, 9 TC 342), Viscount 
Cave LC in analysing the place of incorporation test did not make any binding guideline when he held that: 
'I am not at present prepared to say that registration in the United Kingdom would be sufficient proof of 
residence there; that point does not arise in this case, and I express no opinion upon it. But, however that 
may be, [ am satisfied that the fact of registration together with other circumstances which were found by 
the commissioners to exist, were sufficient to enable them to arrive at their finding.' 
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as an additional test of company's residence. From 15 March 1988, any company 
incorporated in the U ni ted Kingdom became resident there for tax purposes.218 
There are circumstances In which residence of a legal entity lS determined without 
reference to the incorporation test. The exception to the principle that all companies 
incorporated in the United Kingdom with effect from 15 March 1988 will be United 
Kingdom resident relate to most companies which prior to 15 March 1988 were carrying 
on business and had ceased to be United Kingdom resident as a result of a Treasury 
consent. These companies will only become United Kingdom resident in relation to the 
incorporation criteria if they cease trading in which case they will be deemed resident 
from that date or 15 March 1993, whichever is later. Companies which have carried on 
business prior to 15 March 1988 and were not resident in the United Kingdom prior to 
this date (for instance, incorporated in the United Kingdom but not resident), will become 
resident companies on 15 March 1988 unless before.2 19 
B.2 The central management and control test 
It is possible for income tax purposes for companies to have a more substantive 
connection with a geographical locality and therefore become part of the law that closely 
reflects reality than a law that turns on the location of a formal act of incorporation which 
may have occurred many years ago. Courts and legislatures have tried other alternative 
corporation rules. In the United Kingdom context, this additional test of residence is 
known as the place of central management and control. 
The application of the 'central management and control' test is difficult in practice 
because of the largely factual nature of the test. The question whether any particular 
company may be regarded as being managed and controlled in the United Kingdom is 
218 Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1988. 
2 19 See Saunders, G, & Antczak, G, Tolley's on Corporation Tax, 2001 /2002, p. 603. 
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one of fact, the answer to which will be dependent upon all the circumstances of a 
. I 220 partlcu ar case. 
It is therefore important for a proper understanding of the development and application of 
this concept of residence to look at and explore the decided cases and the Inland Revenue 
statement of practice. 
i) Application of the test: Case law 
The general principle derived from the landmark case of De Beers Consolidated Mines v 
Howe,221 where residence was found to be where the real business is carried on, and such 
place being where the central management and control actually abides. In this case, De 
Beers was a company registered in South Africa that was involved in diamond mining. 
The company's head office was located in South Africa but it maintained other offices in 
both South Africa and London. The day-to-day decisions were made in South Africa 
where the diamond mines were located. Major decisions were made in London. In 
determining the company's residence, Lord Loreburn held that: 
'In applying the conception of residence to a company, we ought, I think, to 
proceed as nearly as we can upon the analogy of an individual. A company cannot 
eat or sleep, but it can keep house and do business. We ought, therefore, to see 
where it really keeps house and does business ... ,222 
As the learned judge stated further: 
'[1]t is clearly established that the majority of directors and life governors live in 
England, where the directors meet. Meetings in London are meetings where the 
real control is always exercised in practically all the important business of the 
company, except the mining operation. London has always controlled the 
negotiation of the contract with the diamonds and other assets, the working and 
220 The 'facts and circumstances' approach for determining the central management and control of 
companies was made clear by Lord Loreburn in De Beers Consolidated Mines v Howe (1906, 5 TC 198) 
where he said that: "It remains to be considered whether the present case falls within that rule. This is a 
pure question of fact to be determined, not according to the construction of this or that regulation or 
byelaw, but upon a scrutiny of the course of business and trading." The consideration of the facts of a 
particular case in ascertaining the corporate residence for tax purposes was also highlighted by Viscount 
Sumner in Egyptian Delta Land & Investment Co Ltd v Todd (1928, 14 TC 119) and confirmed in Bullock v 
Unit Construction Co Ltd (1959,38 TC 712). 
221 1906, STC 198. 
222 At212/3. 
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development of mines, the application of profits, and the appointment of directors. 
London has always controlled matters that require to be determined by the 
majority of all directors, which include all questions of expenditure, except 
wages, materials . . . at the mines, and a limited sum which may be spent by the 
directors at Kimberley., 223 
The court ruled that since the principal office was in the United Kingdom and the 
majority of directors met there, the company was resident in the United Kingdom.224 
The test propounded by Lord Loreburn above was subsequently applied to the effect that 
in general, a company is managed and controlled at the place or office where the 
directing power of the affairs of the company is exercised. The expression 'management 
and control' is usually interpreted to mean control by directors rather than shareholders. 
Moulton LJ stated in Stanley v Gramaphone & Typewriter Ltd,225 that the control in 
question is that which relates to the highest level of management of a company ' s business 
and must not be confused with the control which vests in a company' s shareholders per 
se . In other words, a company does not attract residence status in the United Kingdom 
simply because its shares, or the bulk of them are owned or held by persons resident in 
the United Kingdom. In expressing that opinion, Phillimore J made it clear in Kodak Ltd 
v Clark,226 that: 
'One must not make the jump from "control" to "carrying on business". A 
company may control another company ... or an individual may control a 
company, but it does not necessarily follow that because the individual controls 
the company or the company controls the company .. . that the business carried on 
by the ... company controlled is necessarily a business carried on by the controller; 
and particularly is that the case where the controller is the company. ,227 
In summary, the test of corporate residence for United Kingdom tax purposes strictly 
involves the identification of the place of central management and control. Although the 
shareholders can with no doubt, by virtue of their votes control the corporation (such as 
223 At 213. 
224 The De Beers case was based on the same principle established in the early cases of A-G v Alexander 
(1874, 10 ex 20); Calcutta Jute Mills Co Ltd v Nicholson (1876, 1 TC 83); and Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd v 
Nicholson (1876, I TC 89). 
225 1908,5 TC 358. 
226 1901 , 4 TC 549. 
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compelling directors to do their will), it does not follow that the corporators are managing 
h . 228 t e corporatIon. 
In applying the De Beers test, the courts in the United Kingdom have identified various 
elements in determining corporate residence, which range from the location of the passive 
management and control, the delegated management and control, policy-making and 
decisions for financing. 
Generally, the central management and control of the company is considered to be where 
the decision making (including the raising and allocation of funds) takes place,229 which 
in some cases, may be the parent company of a subsidiary or a single individual who 
makes all the decisions. It might be found that the central management and control of a 
company is actually being exercised unconstitutionally by a single shareholder or by a 
group of shareholders rather than by those who have the constitutional right to exercise 
management and control. This was already recognised in the Revenue statement of 
practice which stated that: 
'In some cases .. . central management and control is exercised by a single 
individuaJ. This may happen when a chairman or managing director exercises 
power conferred by the company's articles and the other board members are little 
more than cyphers, or by reason of a dominant shareholding or for some other 
reason. In those cases, the residence of the company is where the controlling 
individual exercises his power. ,230 
As far as subsidiary companies are concerned, this principle IS well illustrated by 
Oliver,231 in his so-called ' clockwork residence theory ' . As the theory goes, the 
clockwork subsidiary is one which has been established by the parent company for a 
particular purpose. The parent company at the time of establishment lays down the 
parameters within which the subsidiary is to operate and thus effectively prevents the 
directors of the subsidiary from achieving any independence or flexibility in the decisions 
227 At 582; also extensively analysed by Sheridan, 0, "The Residence of Companies for Tax Purposes", 
1990, British Tax Review, p. 93/94. 
228 See Hamilton J'sjudgment in American Thread Co v Joyce, 191 J, 6 TC I at 32/33 . 
229 See Calculta Juta Mills Co Ltd v Nicholson (1876, J TC 83) ; Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd v Nicholson 
(1876, I TC 88); & San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Co Ltd v Carter (1895, 3 TC 407) 
230 Statement of Practice (SP) 6/83 at para. 6. 
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which they may take. All the major decisions will therefore have been taken at the time 
when the subsidiary was being established; its role and the way in which it will perform it 
are predetermined, and any subsequent discretionary action by the subsidiary directors is 
effectively excluded. Therefore, in a case where the parent company is managed and 
controlled and thus resident in the United Kingdom, then so will the subsidiary company 
be resident in the United Kingdom though it may be carrying on its operation abroad and 
purport to have a board of directors who meet abroad. 
The above principle originated from the speeches of Viscount Simonds and Lord 
Ratcliffe in the landmark case of Bullock v Unit Construction Co Ltd,232 where the 
learned judges made it clear that central management and control is a de Jacto concept 
and that once it has been established that central management and control is being 
exercised by a particular person or group of persons, it will be in·elevant that such 
management and control ought to be exercised by some other person or group of persons. 
In this case, Unit Construction company, a United Kingdom resident subsidiary of Alfred 
Booth company, a United Kingdom parent company, made subvention payments to three 
of its fellow subsidiary companies in East Africa (Kenya) and claimed those payments 
were under Financial Act 1953, section 20, permissible deductions in arriving at its 
profits for tax purposes. This would have been so only if the three Kenyan subsidiaries 
were also resident in the United Kingdom, but the Inland Revenue contended that they 
were not. The three subsidiaries had been incorporated in Kenya and their articles of 
association expressly placed their management and control in the hands of their directors 
and required directors ' meetings to be held outside the United Kingdom. That being so, 
the three Kenyan subsidiaries must, said the Revenue, be resident outside the United 
Kingdom. 
In the House of Lords, Viscount Simonds laid down the principle that: 
'Nothing can be more factual and concrete than the acts of management which 
enable a court to find as a fact that a central management and control are 
exercised in one country or another. It does not in any way alter their character 
23 1 Oliver, J.0.8, "Company Residence: Four Cases", 1996, British Tax Review, no 5, p. 505. 
232 1959, 38TC712. 
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that in greater or lesser degree the irregular or unauthorised or unlawful. The 
business is not less managed in London, because it ought to be managed in 
Kenya. Its residence is determined by the solid facts, not by the terms of its 
constitution, however imperative. If indeed, I must disregard the facts as they are 
because they are irregular, I find a company without any central management at 
all for though I may disregard existing facts, I cannot invest facts which do not 
exist and say the company's business is managed in Kenya and it is the place of 
central management which however much or little weight ought to be given to 
other factors essentially determines its residence. I come therefore to the 
conclusion that truly, no precedent can be found for such a case that it is the actual 
place of management, not the place in which it ought to be managed which fixes 
the residence of a company.' 
The court therefore held that because the subsidiaries' management and control have 
been taken over by the directors of the parent company in London, the former were 
resident in the United Kingdom. The late Mr Frank Heyworth Talbot, QC was recorded 
as arguing that 'the peculiar feature in the present case is that the board of the African 
subsidiaries did not function at all at the material times even as a rubber stamp. ,233 
The Union Construction case therefore confirms the rule that to locate the de Jacto 
policy-making body within a company will thus be to locate that company ' s central 
management and contro1.234 The place where the board of directors meets is important but 
not conclusive. 
Tacit exercise of the right of central management and control through passive oversight 
(such as the delegation of management and control to lower level of managers) is no less 
real than management and control which manifests itself in active intervention in the 
affairs of the business, and is no less de Jacto because of it. 
This was recognised in Calcutta Juta Mills v Nicholson,235 where Baron Huddleston held 
that the central management and control of the Calcutta Juta Mills, though ostensibly 
2JJ 1960, AC 351 at 355 . 
234 This principle was adopted early in the cases of New-Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v Thew (1922, 8 TC 
208), where the court held that though it was a New Zealand company with New Zealand directors, the 
overall management and control lay with a separate London board. See also San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway 
Co Ltd v Carter (1895, 3 TC 407); and American Thread Co v Joyce (1913, 6 TC I). 
235 1876, l TC 83. 
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exercised by a director in India, was actually exercised from the company's office in 
London where the board of directors met. The director in Calcutta was, for all his powers, 
a mere delegate and one had therefore, to look beyond him to the delegators from whom 
his powers had been derived and by whom they were being sustained. 
The expression 'head and brain' has often been used as an alternative to 'central 
management and control' to identify those who are at the centre or higher level of 
decision making in the company.236 
In a case of Re Little Olympian Each Ways Ltd,237 though not a tax case but dealing with 
a summons by which some of the respondents to a petition under section 459 of the 
Company Act 1985, sought security for their costs from the petitioner Supreme Travel's 
Ltd (shareholder in Little Olympian), under the Rules of the Supreme Court. 
One of the issues was whether Supreme Travel Ltd, which was incorporated in Jersey, 
was 'ordinarily resident out of the jurisdiction'. The company argued that though its 
board meets in Jersey, the real central management and control was exercised by one of 
its directors, Mr Lemos, in England. 
As the company asserted, Mr Lemos made the strategic decisions relating to the company 
and' in particular' in relation to the current litigation. 
The court held that a Jersey board might accommodate Mr Lemos but it meets, gives 
instruction from time to time to Withers (the company ' s solicitor), opens a bank account, 
and is kept informed of developments and asks itself whether implementation of any 
particular proposals of Mr Lemos are consistent with the best interests of the company 
and its shareholders who do not include Mr Lemos. 
Lindsay J concluded that he saw a company incorporated in Jersey, with a Jersey 
registered office, with Jersey resident shareholders, with a Jersey board, with a Jersey 
236 See for instance, statements of Halsbury LC in San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Co Ltd v Carter (1895 , 
3 TC 407 at 410); & Hamilton] in American Thread Co Ltd v Joyce (1913,6 TC I at 18). 
237 (1994),4 ALL ER 561 , CHD; case also cited and analysed by Oliver, op cit, p. 506. 
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secretary and with a board that meets as such and which has not surrendered its powers 
nor had them removed but rather which operates them within what it conceives to be the 
law of Jersey. Thus, the central management and control of the company was in Jersey.238 
In Unigate Guernsey Ltd v Mc Gregor,239 subsidiaries of a United Kingdom resident 
parent company were held to be resident where their boards met and their business was 
transacted, as they did function in giving effect to the parent company's wishes, 
notwithstanding that they were complaisant to the parent's will. 
In the Unit Construction and Re Little Olympian decisions, the courts highlighted the 
very fine dividing line between subsidiary companies being complaisant to the will of the 
parent company but actually functioning in giving effect to those wishes, and boards, 
which did not function at all even as rubber stamp.240 Although a board might do what it 
was told to do, it did not follow that the management and control of the company lay with 
another, so long as the board exercised their discretion (through the veto) when coming to 
their decision and would refuse to carry out an improper or unwise transaction.24I 
In the recent case of R v Da Costa, Chipping and Dimsey,242 the issue related to 
Chipping's management and control of the company in the United Kingdom. It was 
alleged that the Jersey companies were all resident in the United Kingdom due to the fact 
that 'their business was really conducted by Mr Chipping and he conducted them in the 
United Kingdom'. The prosecution argued that the companies were liable to corporation 
tax on their profits and that Chipping knew this to be the case and in not disclosing this 
fact, he had attempted to deceive the Revenue into believing that they were centrally 
managed and controlled abroad. Chipping denied this and claimed that the central 
23 8 At 574 d . See also Union Corporation Ltd v CIR, 1952, 34 TC 207. This case could be compared with 
other international approaches in relation to the concept of central management and control, in the specific 
connection between subsidiary and the parent company. See for example, New Zealand Forest Product 
Finance N. V v CIR (1995, 17 N.Z.T.C J2073); Esquire Nominees Ltd v The commissioner of taxation of the 
Commonwealth of Australia (1971173, 129 CLR 177); & Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Minister of National 
Revenue (1977, CTR 2443). 
239 1996, SPC 55, SSCD 1. 
240 See statements by Frank Heyworth Talbot, QC in the Unit Construction case, 1950 AC 351 at 355 . 
241 See Oliver, op cit, p. 520 . 
242 1999, STC 846. 
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management and control was effected from Jersey and that he acted purely as a 
commercial consultant to the numerous companies. It was found that Chipping was 
giving instructions from the United Kingdom. Of interest is the fact the judge, in 
attempting to determine where the central management and control was located, looked 
more to the day-to-day running of the company.243 
Identification of the person or group of persons who exercise de Jacto central 
management and control does not, of course, conclude the question of a company's 
residence. There remains the other step of ascertaining the place from which they 
exercise that central management and control. 
The principle laid down by the De Beers case was that a company is resident for tax 
purposes where the real business is carried on, which is in principle where the directors 
meet and conduct their business and exercise the powers conferred upon them. 
It would be unwise as correctly argued by Oliver244 to take this principle in isolation and 
to conclude that reliance can be placed solely on the place of board meetings. If the 
central management and control of a company can be wherever the directors chose to 
meet to take their decisions, it would be easy for directors who may all be residents in the 
United Kingdom to decide to take the corporate jet together for a trip once a month to a 
tax haven like Bermuda for their board meeting at a small office they maintain there. 
Lord Loreburn in the De Beers case was suggesting that one should look beyond the mere 
fact that, say on one or two occasions per year, certain professional persons in a foreign 
place meet formally to pass and sign agreed minutes. As contended by Booth,245 even if 
central management and control is in the hands of the directors, their place of meeting 
will not determine the company's place of residence if their meetings there are merely a 
matter of form. This was stated in the early Revenue Statement of Practice to the effect 
24 3 This case is also analysed by Saunders, R & Dean, M, "The effects of Dimsey: How Far Reaching Is 
This Case?", October 1999, International Tax Systems and Planning Techniques, p. 9. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Op cit, p. 163. 
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that, the place of directors' meetings is significant only in so far as those meetings 
constitute the medium through which central management and control is exercised.246 
ii) The Inland Revenue Practice 
In an attempt to clarify the implication of the case law on the concept of residence for 
companies, the Revenue has issued a Statement of Practice247 which does not lay down 
rigid guidelines, nor review the whole concept of a company's residence. The Revenue's 
approach is that a foreign company may become tax resident if the central or overriding 
management and control is deemed to be in the United Kingdom. The authorities would 
look at factors such as: 
• Where the highest level of control is exercised; 
• Where the actual management and control is exercised (for instance, the use of 
shadow directors); 
• Where the directors have board meetings; 
• Where the decision-making processes and management meetings take place; or 
• Where the controlling individuals or shareholders exercised their powers.248 
Also of interest in the Statement of Practice is the concept of central management and 
control in contradistinction to the place of effective management. In most cases the two 
places are likely to be the same but the United Kingdom Revenue accepts that effective 
management may, in some cases, be found at a place different from the place of central 
management and control. This could happen, for example, where a company is run by 
executives based abroad but the final directing power rests with non-executive directors 
who meet in the United Kingdom. In such circumstances the company's place of 
effective management might well be abroad but it might be centrally managed and 
controlled (and therefore resident) in the United Kingdom.249 
246 See Statement of Practice (S P) 6/83. 
247 Statement of Practice (SP) 1190 of January 9, 1990, replacing SP 6/83. 
248 Also analysed by Rohatgi, op cit, p. 152. 
249 See Para 22 of SP 1190. 
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This distinction was considered by the court in deciding the question of the place of 
effective management in the case of Trustees of Wens leyda Ie 's Settlement v CIR.250 
The case concerned the residence of a trust under the United Kingdom and Irish treaty. 2S 1 
There were two trustees. One trustee was resident in the United Kingdom and the other 
trustee was resident in the Republic of Ireland. The trustees argued that being a person 
other than an individual, they were to be regarded as a resident of the Republic under 
article 4(3) of the treaty because the place of effective management of the trust was 
situated in the Republic. 
The Special Commissioner DA Shirley noted that there was no reported decision in 
which the phrase 'place of effective management' has been considered. In relation to a 
company, he added that the place of effective management is the place where its business 
is managed and controlled. 
In aniving at his decision, he referred to the German interpretation of the concept, as 
analysed by Vogel,252 to the effect that the 'centre of top level management' was a good 
description of the place of effective management.253 
Thus, the Special Commissioner went on to find that as a question of fact, the place of 
effective management of the trust was in the United Kingdom, and as he added: ' ... it is 
where the shots are called, to adopt a vivid transatlantic colloquialism. ,254 
The judgment found that, the shots were called by the donor in a settlement and not by 
the trustees and consequently the place of effective management was where the donor 
was. 
By adopting the centre of top level management as the test in interpreting the place of 
effective management in the United Kingdom, the Special Commissioner in the 
250 (1996) SPC 73; 1996, STC (SCD) 241. 
251 Double taxation relief (taxes on income) (Republic of Ireland) Order 1976, Sl 1976 no 2151. 
252 Klaus Vogel, op cit, 1991 , p. J 05 ; also cited by Oliver, op cit, p. 528 . 
253 1996, STC (SCD) 241 at 250b. 
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Wensleydale Settlement case seems to reject the approach followed in the Statement of 
Practice of the Revenue to the effect that the place of effective management may be 
dissociated from the central management and control of the company. 
In all cases, the Revenue will seek to determine whether a major objective of the 
existence of any particular factors bearing on residence is the obtaining of tax benefits 
from residence and non-residence, and to establish the reality of the central management 
and control.255 
B.3 The trust residency 
Determining the residence of a trust is important, because residence renders the trust 
liable to tax on foreign source income. However, because many jurisdictions such as the 
United Kingdom do not recognise the separate legal personality of the trust, the 
determination of its residence may be a difficult matter. 
In the United Kingdom, trust residency is assessed by reference to the trustees. Previously 
the Revenue had considered that a trust was resident for income tax purposes in the 
United Kingdom if just one of the trustees was a United Kingdom resident. 
However, in Dawson v JRC,256 the House of Lords held that section 18(l)(a)(i) of the 
Taxes Act 1988 required all persons entitled to the income to reside in the United 
Kingdom. Lord Keith went on to say that the trust's residence was determined by looking 
at whether all the trustees were United Kingdom resident. This case allowed any trust to 
avoid tax on foreign income purely by having a non-resident trustee. 
The Finance Act 1989 in sections 110-111 and section 151 brought the law into line with 
the former Revenue practice. Thus, when a settlement has one trustee who is a British 
resident and one trustee who is a non-resident, the trust is treated as a United Kingdom 
254 At 19; at 250j. 
2:;5 See Saunders, G & Antczak, G , op cit, p. 605. 
256 1988, STC 684. 
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resident unless the settlor was neither resident, ordinarily resident, nor domiciled in the 
United Kingdom when the trust was set up or when funds were provided for it. 257 
As a general rule therefore, the Revenue practice in line with section 110 of the Finance 
Act 1989 in determining the residence of the trust is based on the following factors: 
• Where all the trustees are non-resident, then the trust is not resident for income 
tax purposes; 
• Where all the trustees are resident, then the trust IS resident for lI1come tax 
purposes; 
• Where there is a mixed residence of trustees, but not necessarily a majority, then 
the residence status of the trust will depend on the status of the settlor at the time 
that the funds were provided. The trust will be non-resident only where the settlor 
was not resident, nor ordinarily resident and non-domiciled in the United 
Kingdom when he put funds into the settlement.258 
C) The United States 
Introduction 
Like individuals, legal entities have a legal connection to the United States, often relating 
to their origin or formation. The United States uses the place of incorporation as the 
exclusive test in determining the basic jurisdiction to tax persons other than individuals. 
As defined in section 7701(a)(30) of the Inland Revenue Code (IRC), United States 
persons include individual citizens or residents of the United States, domestic 
partnerships, domestic corporations, trusts that have specific connection to the United 
States and estates that are not 'foreign'. Thus, the distinction that the United States makes 
257 As stated in the Finance Act 1989, the assessment could be made in the name of either of the trustees. 
However, the residence of a trust in the United Kingdom depends on the particular tax consequences. Thus, 
in relation to capital gains tax, a body of trustees is treated as being resident and ordinarily resident in the 
United Kingdom unless, under section 69(1) of the TCGA 1992, the general administration of the trust is 
ordinarily carried on outside the United Kingdom and the trustees, or the majority of them, are not resident, 
or are not ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom. 
258 See WisdelJ , A, "Residence of Trusts in the United Kingdom", June 1999, Tax Planning International 
Review, vol 26, p. 16. 
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is between 'domestic' and 'foreign' entities, and not between resident and non-resident 
entities. Although this status is not exactly assimilable to the 'nationality' or 'citizenship' 
of individuals for the purposes of taxation and regulation of entities, it is somewhat 
analogous. In many instances, the term 'situs' is used to describe the legal status that 
identifies an entity with the United States.259 
The United States tends to impose in their tax treaties, some form of reservation clause 
whereby it only accepts the place of incorporation or organisation as the final tie-breaker 
for ascertaining the residence of companies. If the other party is not prepared to agree 
with this test, dual-resident companies are excluded from the benefits of the treaty.260 
C.l Corporations 
The notion of 'residence' is not significantly associated with corporations in respect of 
United States taxation. The status of a corporation as 'domestic' or 'foreign' is tied to its 
place of incorporation. Corporations 'created or organised' in the United States or 
chartered under the laws of the United States or of any state are 'domestic' 
corporations.261 Thus, corporations not incorporated in the United States are regarded for 
tax purposes as 'foreign' corporations with fiscal residence outside the United States.262 
Because the notion of corporation residence is an element of other tax systems, however, 
there are rules coordinating United States and foreign taxation of United States 
corporations that have foreign 'residence' in another tax system. The problem is not the 
double taxation of income, which is generally minimized by the foreign tax credit, but the 
advantageous double use oflosses in different tax environments.263 
259 See Isenbergh, J, "Foreign Income: Foundation of US International Taxation", 200 I, Tax Management, 
p. A-3. The United States income tax based on the classical system, is imposed at two levels: (i) federal tax 
administered by the Internal Revenue Service, and (ii) state taxes based on the state tax laws, regulations 
and administrative practices. Tn addition, various taxes may be levied at the local level. The federal taxable 
income is usually the basis for the state and local taxes. See Rohatgi, op cit, p. 332. 
260 See for instance, articles 3( I )(g) & 4(1) of the DT A between Austral ia and the United States. See also 
the analysis by Vann, op cit, p. 733; & Oliver, op cit, p. 534 . 
26 1 Section 7701 (a)(4) of the IRe. 
262 Section 770 I (a)(5) of the IRe. 
263 See Isenbergh, op cit, p. A-I O. 
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C.2 Other legal persons 
a) The situs of trusts 
There is a two-part test in section 7701 (a)(30)(E) of the IRe for determining the situs ofa 
trust. A trust is a United States person (that is a domestic trust) if: 
• A court within the United States is able to exercise primary supervision over the 
administration of the trust; and 
• One or more United States persons have the authority to control all substantial 
decisions of the trust. 
The first test is referred to as the 'court test', and the second as the 'control test'. Both 
tests must be met to establish a domestic truSt. 264 
A domestic trust must be subject to the authority of some American court and controlled 
by United States fiduciaries. It is thus sufficient to this end for a trust instrument to 
specify that it is governed by the laws of any state, and for fiduciaries who are United 
States persons to hold a majority of the fiduciary power beyond veto by any foreign 
fiduciary. The twin tests of the situs of a trust are to some degree overlapping because 
who has authority to control a trust itself depends on what courts may exercise the power 
of supervision over the trust. Because the statutory test of the situs of the trusts is 
determined largely by objective elements that are often within the taxpayer's control, it is 
generally accommodating.265 
i) The 'court test' 
It may be difficult to apply this test to a trust that has never appeared before a court, 
especially in a state that has sparsely developed decisional law. The regulation 
established a safe harbour court test, which is satisfied if: 
• The trust instrument does not direct that the trust be administered outside the 
United States; 
264 I n terms of section 7701 (a)(3 1 )(8), a foreign trust is any trustthat is not a domestic trust. 
265 See {sen bergh, op cit, p. A-J2. 
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• The trust is in fact administered exclusively in the United States; and 
• The trust is not subject to any automatic migration provision. 
The term 'primary supervision' means that a court has or would have the authority to 
determine substantially all issues regarding the administration of the entire trust. The 
administration of the trust in turn means the carrying out of the duties imposed by the 
terms of the trust instrument and applicable law, including inter alia, maintaining the 
books and records of the trust. 
ii) The 'control test' 
The regulation defines 'control' by a United States person as 'having the power, by vote 
or otherwise, to make all of the substantial decisions of the trust, with no other person 
having the power to veto any of the substantial decisions' ?66 
The 'substantial decisions' of a trust consist of the authority or obligation to 'make under 
the terms of the trust instrument and applicable law that are not ministeria1.267 The control 
test is not met, however, if certain actions by a government or creditors cause control to 
shift from United States persons.268 The control test must be satisfied independently of 
the safe harbour for the court test. 
b) The situs of estates 
The IRe defines 'foreign estates' in section 7701(a)(3l)(A) as an estate taxed as a foreign 
person. The definition does not indicate to any extent when or how a given status is 
established. Most of the time, the residence of the decedent determines the situs of an 
estate for income tax purposes. However, this is subject to further difficulties. An 
individual's residence may not be the same for income tax and estate tax purposes. 
Therefore, the situs of an estate, in theory at least, may be different for different tax 
266 Reg. S301.7701-7(d)(I)(iii). 
267 Reg. S301.7701-7(d)(I)(ii). 
268 Reg.S301.7701-7(d)(3). 
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purposes. In practice, a decedent's residence for estate tax purposes may determine all 
aspects of its taxation, including income taxation, if only because the shadings of situs 
and residence may be hard for executors and tax authorities to sort out. It is therefore 
desirable to avoid primary administration of a foreign decedent's estate in the United 
States. 
3. The concept of residence and the tax consequences 
Introduction 
The most important characteristic of the residence-based tax system is that residents are, 
in principle, subject to tax on their worldwide income. Thus, foreign source income 
received by the recipient will usually be taxed after it has accrued or been received as 
income in the country of residence of that recipient. If a jurisdiction were to treat non-
resident corporations, including certain other foreign entities, as taxable entities separate 
from their resident shareholders even if those shareholders own all the shares of the 
foreign corporations, it will be possible to defer or avoid the tax on such income at home, 
until it is repatriated. This can be done by receiving the income in an intermediary entity 
located in a tax-free or low tax jurisdiction?69 
Some countries may totally exempt foreign source income by giving priority to the free 
circulation of capital or they may only exempt certain categories of income.27o Thus, for 
countries that exempt foreign source income, deferral is not a concern. However, in order 
for a residence-based tax system to be effective, it is essential that it draws into the tax 
net, income earned from foreign sources.271 If such income is not taxed, it is simply 
269 The deferral of the residence country's tax is beneficial only to the extent that the foreign tax payable 
by the foreign corporation is less than the residence country ' s tax payable by the resident shareholders, and 
the benefit is maximised when the foreign tax imposed on the income of the foreign corporation is 
minimised. 
270 For instance, jurisdictions such as South Africa, in recognising the growing mobility of the workforce 
exempts in its income tax law, income derived by employees during extended periods of absence from the 
country. Other jurisdictions also exempt categories of income such as pensions from foreign sources or 
foreign source business income. 
27 1 See Jooste, op cil , p. 473 . 
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shifted and kept In foreign entities In tax havens and preferential regImes until 
repatriated. 
Many countries USIng the residence basis of taxation, regard this deferral as an 
unjustifiable loss of tax revenue. It violates the fundamental principles of equity and 
capital export neutrality since the residents who invest abroad have a tax advantage over 
those who invest at home.272 Consequently, some countries prevent their residents from 
accumulating funds offshore through for example, exchange control restrictions. But, 
with the global relaxation of exchange control regulations, many countries have 
implemented specific anti-avoidance provisions to ensure that there is no deferral of taxes 
on foreign income. These anti-avoidance provisions include the enactment of controlled 
foreign entity (CFE) or corporation (CFC) rules which require that the tax due on the 
foreign profits, whether distributed or not, be paid in the country of residence. Other 
measures involve taxing the foreign income only when it is finally repatriated to the 
country of residence. For instance, the taxation of dividends arising from foreign sources, 
on the ground that the underlying profits from which the dividends were declared have 
not been subject to tax in the country of source. 
This section analyses, from a South African perspective, with particular references, where 
relevant, to other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the United States, certain 
factors which determine whether tax is payable on foreign income received by or accrued 
to resident taxpayers. For South African tax purposes, this section focuses on those 
provisions of the South African income tax Act which regulate: 
• The amount of the foreign income which must be included in the resident's taxable 
Income; 
• The timing of the inclusion; and 
272 See Rohatgi, op cit, p. 374. South Africa has been implementing strong measures against the deferral of 
foreign source income. The Minister of Finance in his Budget presentation for the 2002/2003 fmancial 
year, has proposed the introduction of a provision which will subject 'deemed' foreign income to income 
tax where a taxpayer has not accounted satisfactorily for assets that are invested abroad. The deemed 
foreign income is to be calculated by applying the official rate of interest to, presumably, the value of the 
offshore asset (or at least, to the asset that SARS deemed the taxpayer to have offshore). Presumably, this 
will mean that where a taxpayer has invested his foreign investment allowance of R 750000 in a non-
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• Whether or not the income qualifies for exemption. 
The categories of income considered for the purposes of this section include foreign 
employment income, foreign pensions, income derived from controlled foreign entities 
and foreign dividends?73 
3.1 South Africa 
3.1.1 Foreign employment income 
South Africa taxes its residents on their worldwide income. With the above in mind, the 
taxation of individuals has a significant impact on the viability of implementing a specific 
structure. In circumstances where the individuals are required to render services abroad 
for either the South African or the foreign employer, there may be situations where the 
employee is subject to tax in South Africa and in the foreign jurisdiction. To counter the 
potential liability to double taxation, relief is provided either in terms of double taxation 
agreements, or through the provisions contained in the South African Income Tax Act. 
In terms of section 1 O( 1)(0 )(ii) of the Act, an exclusion is provided for services rendered 
by South African resident employees outside South Africa so as to enable employers to 
compete in international markets. Section 1 OC 1 )(O)(i) of the Act exempts officers and 
crew members of a ship engaged in international transport from tax on their remuneration 
as officers and crew if they were outside the Republic for a period or periods exceeding 
183 days in aggregate during the year of assessment. The Revenue Laws Amendment Act 
of 2000 extended the scope of section 10(1)(0 )(i) by including within the exemption in 
terms of section 10(1)(0 )(ii), remuneration accruing to a resident taxpayer in respect of 
services rendered outside South Africa for and on behalf of his employer if he was 
outside the Republic -
income producing investment, or has spent such allowance abroad, he will be required to provide proof of 
this to discharge the onus that the amount of 'deemed foreign income ' should not be subject to tax. 
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• For a period or periods exceeding 183 full days in aggregate during any 12 
months period commencing or ending during a year of assessment; and 
• For a continuous period exceeding 60 full days during the period of 12 months.274 
In general, in terms of the above provision, South African resident employees who render 
services outside South Africa may enjoy exemption from South African tax on their 
income (but will remain liable for tax on any other income derived from South Africa or 
abroad) provided that their foreign employment satisfies certain requirements. 
South African resident employees who are assigned to render services outside South 
Africa for long periods may be in a position to take advantage of this exception. This will 
be the case when the employee will be outside South Africa for a total period of more 
than 183 days (that is about six months) provided that if he returns to South Africa during 
this period, at least one of the periods of absence from South Africa is more than 60 
consecutive days. 
While the full period of 183 days need not be continuous, a period exceeding 60 days 
must be continuous. It is the '60 consecutive days' requirement that may prove 
problematic in obtaining this tax exemption.275 If, for any reason, for example, illness or 
other unforeseen circumstances, the employee returns to South Africa and the required 
period of absence has not been achieved, the employee will be subject to tax in South 
Africa. Accordingly, any income that is prima facie linked to the employee's South 
African employment is subject to tax in South Africa. But any portion linked to the 
performance outside South Africa would be covered by section 1 O( 1)( 0 )(ii) of the Act 
having only the difference, if any, to be subject to South African tax. 
273 For the purpose of limiting the scope of the research, I will not cover tax implications in relation to 
other foreign source income such as the income derived from foreign trusts or the tax implications arising 
from foreign exchange gains and losses. 
274 Section 10(1)(0)(ii) was inserted in the Act by section 13(1)(p) of the Act 59 of2000. 
275 See Mitchell, L, " Working Abroad : Careful Planning Required", 200 I Tax Planning 60 . 
139 
Clegg and Smith276 argue in this context that if the employer pays an employee his annual 
bonus and the bonus payment is made while the employee is rendering services outside 
South Africa, such bonus is not attributable in its entirety to services rendered outside 
South Africa. Thus, the portion of the annual bonus as is ascribed to services rendered 
inside South Africa would be subject to tax in South Africa. 
The 183-day period may span more than one year of assessment provided that all days 
fall within the same period of 12 months. At the same time, the 12-month period does not 
have to be measured in the tax year itself but can span two tax years. Section 10(1)(0 )(ii) 
refers to ' full days ' . Thus, the days of departure from and arrival in South Africa will 
count as days of being physically present in South Africa. There may be a concern in 
relation to 'in transit travel ' for South African resident employees, who for example, 
while working abroad, have to stop at one of the South African airports even for half a 
day en route to a foreign destination, like a short holiday in a third country. In practice, 
the view of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) is that if a South African 
employee is in transit at one of the South African airports and does not proceed through 
customs, he will not have breached section 10(1)(0 )(ii) as he is in international territory. 
Although section 10(1)(0 )(ii) is designed primarily to accommodate South African 
employers who engage South African residents on foreign assignments for protracted 
periods of time, the wording of this provision is not however, restricted to employment 
by South African employers.277 
From a pay-as-you-earn (PA YE) perspective, if it is clear that the employee will be 
outside South Africa for the more than 183 days (of which more than 60 will be 
continuous), the employer would not be required to withhold PA YE on the salaries paid 
to the employee for the services rendered abroad. 278 Where the probable period of 
276 See Clegg, D, & Smith, A, "The Travel Component: Offshore Service", 2001, ] 5 Tax Planning 122 at 
124. 
277 However, for South African exchange control purposes, a South African resident may retain his 
foreign-earned income offshore if it is earned as a result of rendering services outside South Africa for a 
non-South African employer. 
278 As provided in paragraph 2( I) of the Fourth Schedule to the Act. 
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absence cannot be determined, the employer should withhold PA YE and issue a tax 
return to the employee. Should the employee have ultimately spent more than 183 days 
outside South Africa and complied with section 1 O( 1)( 0 )(ii), then he would be entitled to 
a refund from SARS. Alternatively, the employer can approach SARS before the 
employees leave South Africa for their work abroad to set out the practical difficulties of 
determining whether or not it is required to withhold PA YEo SARS could be requested to 
issue a directive that the employer need not withhold employees' tax in circumstances 
where the employees are reasonably expected to meet the conditions of section 
lO(l)(o)(ii). However, despite such a directive, the employer may have to pay any 
amount due to SARS, together with penalties and interest, should the employee fail to 
comply with the provisions of section 1 O( 1)( 0 )(ii). 279 
Section 10(1)(0 )(ii) of the Act only applies to employees and not to self-employed 
individuals.28o Similarly, the provision does not apply where the employer is the 
government of South Africa. 28I 
3.1.2 Foreign pensions 
The transition to the taxation of income from foreign sources, in the hands of a resident, 
created some difficulties with regard to pensions. Pensions payable by approved South 
African retirement funds have as income thereto, contributions made by employers and 
employees which have been allowed in terms of sections 11 (k), 11 (I) and 11 (n) of the 
Act. This is not the case with foreign pensions.282 
The recipient of a foreign penSlOn IS therefore at a disadvantage compared to local 
pensions. The Revenue Laws Amendment Act of 2000 recognised the administrative 
279 See paragraphs 5(1) & 6(1) of the Fourth Schedule to the Act. 
280 This exemption does not therefore apply to individuals rendering services as independent contractors, 
agents or in partnership. 
281 See the proviso to section I O( 1)( 0 )(ii) which states that this exemption does not apply in respect of any 
remuneration derived from services rendered outside the country for or on behalf of any employer 
contemplated in section 9( 1)( e) of the Act, which includes employers in the national or provincial spheres 
of government or any public entity if 80 per cent or more of the expenses of such entity is defrayed from 
funds voted by pari iament. 
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burden that would be placed on SARS coupled with the potential negative impact on 
foreigners considering retirement in South Africa if foreign pensions were subject to tax. 
As a result, an interim measure (initially for three years) was made available to exempt 
from tax in South Africa, the following pension receipts and accruals: 
• Any amount received by or accrued to any resident under the social security 
system of any countrl8J; or 
• Any pension received by or accrued to a resident from a source outside the 
Republic, which is not deemed to be from a source in the Republic in terms of 
section 9(1 )(g), in consideration of past employment outside the Republic. 284 
Thus, if a resident receives a non-governmental pension for services rendered partly in 
and partly outside the Republic, the portion of the pension relating to the services outside 
the Republic is not deemed to be from a source in the Republic and will qualify for the 
exemption?85 It is understood that this exemption for foreign pensions is currently under 
review.286 If the foreign pension were finally made subject to tax in South Africa, SARS 
would justify this on the grounds of the policy consideration of equity. Kosie Louw287 has 
previously argued that if high net worth foreigners who retire in South Africa were 
excluded from the provisions of the Act, there would be no parity in terms of the 
legislation. 
3.1.3 The controlled foreign entity rules (CFEs) 
Introduction 
With the advent of the relaxation of its exchange control regulations and as part of its 
overall effort to reduce its tax rates by widening the tax base, South Africa introduced 
282 See Meyerowitz, op cit, Taxpayer, October 2000, p. 185. 
283 See section 10(1)(gC) (i) of the Act inserted by section 13(I)(d) of the Amendment Act of2000. 
284 Section 1 O( I )(gC)(ii) inserted by section 13( 1)( d) of the Amendment Act of 2000. 
285 See Silke, op cit, p. A-33. 
286 See the guideline to the residence basis of taxation for individuals- prepared by the Law Administration 
Division of SARS, 22 March 2002. 
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controlled foreign entity (CFE) legislation with effect from 1 July 1997. As a result, a 
residence-based taxation system was implemented in respect of 'passive' income 
following the Katz Commission recommendation in its 5th Report. 288 The CFE rules in 
the old section 9D289 were specifically designed as an interim anti-avoidance measure 
exempting foreign income from taxation in South Africa if generated by way of active 
foreign trade and foreign capital.29o 
With the introduction of the worldwide taxation system III 2001, one important 
characteristic of the system was how to address all types of income earned by South 
African owned foreign companies and other South African owned foreign entities of a 
similar nature. The concern was that the failure to impose immediate tax on all types of 
foreign income would lead to a deferral by taxpayers shifting their income to foreign 
entities and delaying repatriation for years or never repatriating the funds at all. South 
Africa's attempted solution to this deferral was the expansion of the then section 90 of 
the Act, to include in the gross income of South African qualified shareholders all types 
of income earned by CFEs?91 
The overall effect of the current section 9D is to tax the South African shareholders of 
foreign entities on the income earned by the foreign entities as if those foreign entities 
had immediately repatriated their foreign income as it was earned. Thus, section 9D does 
this by imputing the foreign income to the South African owners as and when it is earned 
by the foreign entity?92 
287 Sunday Times, October 8, 2000. 
288 This was achieved through the insertion of the then sections 9C and 9D in the Act by section 9( 1) of the 
Act 28 of 1997. Section 9A of the Act, repealed by Act 59 of2000, also imputed certain investment income 
of South African owned companies in Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland to their South African 
owners. The term 'passive' income was defined in the old section 9C to comprise annuity income, interest, 
rent, royalty and any income ofa similar nature . 
289 Prior to its amendment by Act 59 of2000. 
290 See Lester, M, "How Wide is Worldwide: Residence-based Tax", June 2002, Accountancy SA , p. 14 . 
29 1 Section 9D(2) of the Act was amended by section 1 O( 1 )(0 of the Amendment Act 59 of 2000 . The 
enactment of section 9D was in line with international law, which does not allow South Africa to directly 
tax foreign entities on their foreign source income, even if those foreign entities are completely owned by 
South African residents . Although the current section 9D still refers in its title to investment income, it is a 
misnomer because the provision deals with all types of income derived by CFEs. 
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The provisions of section 9D can be structured in four analytical parts as follows: 
• Determining which foreign entities fall within section 9D; 
• Determining which South African residents must include a portion of the foreign 
entity's income under section 9D; 
• Determining which forms of a foreign entity's income potentially create an inclusion 
under section 9D; and 
• Analysing a number of exemptions from the operation of section 9D?93 
The study of the operation of the CFE rules in section 9D, particularly from the income 
tax perspective, is therefore critical because this determines whether a resident will be 
taxed in South Africa on income earned offshore by CFEs. 
A) CFEs subject to section 9D 
The determination of the applicability of section 9D depends first on whether the income 
is generated by a 'foreign entity' and secondly whether the entity is 'controlled' by South 
African shareholders. 
Thus, the first test is to consider the definition of 'foreign entity ' in terms of section 9D. 
In terms of section 9D(l) , a 'foreign entity ' is defined as any person (other than a natural 
person or a trust) which is not: 
• a resident, or 
• which is a resident but where such entity is as a result of the application of the 
provision of any agreement entered into by the Republic for the avoidance of double 
taxation is treated as not being resident. 294 
292 See Jooste, op cit, p. 474. 
293 See Engel, K, "National Treasury's Detailed Explanation to Section 9D of the Income Tax Act", June 
2002 in www.Finance.gov.za 
294 This definition was inserted in the Act by section 10(l)(c) of Act 59 of 2000, which changed the 
previous definition of foreign entity included in the Act in 1997. Before the year of assessment 
commencing on or after 1 January 200 J, a foreign entity was defined in the Act as meaning any person, 
other than a natural person, which has its place of effective management in a country other than the 
Republic. 
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In terms of the above definition of foreign entity, it is not clear how the determination as 
to whether or not an entity is a legal person is to be made; that is if it should be in terms 
of the law under which it is formed, or in terms of local law. 
There are a number of entities which are formed in foreign jurisdictions which are not 
recognised or available under the local law, or which could lead to problems if any 
attempt is made to categorise them either as legal persons or not legal persons under local 
law.295 However, it is argued that foreign entities contemplated in section 9D mainly 
include foreign companies or foreign business organisations of a similar nature under 
foreign law. Thus, these foreign entities do not include foreign partnerships and similar 
institutions, which lack legal personality, and accordingly the income earned by them is 
not imputed to the South African patiners in terms of section 9D, but will be deemed to 
have been immediately received by them in any event.296 
On the other hand, a foreign trust is specifically excluded from the definition of foreign 
entity in terms of section 9D(l). Therefore, for a trust that is formed or effectively 
managed outside South Africa, income accruing to it cannot be imputed to beneficiaries 
under section 9D. The result is that foreign trust's income will only be taxable in the 
hands of South African beneficiaries when a distribution of the trust's income takes 
place.297 
The second part of the definition of foreign entity makes it clear that it is possible due to 
the working of a double tax agreement entered into by South Africa, for a resident to 
qualify as a CFE. However, to the extent that the net income of a CFE is subject to tax in 
South Africa in terms of the source rules, it will not be imputed to its related South 
African residents. 298 
295 See Davis et ai , op cit, p. 90-8. 
296 See Jooste, op cil, p. 477; See also Engel, op cil, p. 3. 
297 The avoidance of tax through the use of offshore trusts is dealt with by sections 7(5), 7(8), and 25 B of 
the Act. Prior to the amendment of section 90 by Act 59 of 2000, a trust could have qualified as a CFE but 
this had very little practical effect since very few offshore trusts have beneficiaries with vested rights and 
discretionary trusts would not have constituted CFEs. 
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Before income derived by a foreign entity will be taxable in the hands of a South African 
resident, the foreign entity has to be a CFE as defined. In order for a foreign entity to 
qualify as 'controlled' , South African residents must hold, whether individually or 
jointly, and whether directly or indirectly, more than 50% of the participation rights, or 
must be entitled to exercise more than 50% of the votes or control of such entity?99 In 
order to fully appreciate what constitutes a CFE for South African tax purposes, it is 
important to analyse the wording of the definition as provided in section 9D(1) of the 
Act. 
Subject to the qualifying percentage of more than 50%, there are two important elements 
that must be present to constitute a CFE: The South African resident shareholder must 
either possess the patiicipation rights, or he300 must be entitled to the voting rights or 
control of such foreign entity. 
A-I) Meaning of 'participation rights' 
A participation right is defined as the right to participate directly or indirectly, in the 
capital or profits of, dividends declared by, or any other distribution or allocation made 
by any entity.30) The definition of participation rights is extremely wide and includes 
shares with different classes of rights. Thus, participation rights include shares 
representing equity share capital as well as other forms of shares such as cumulative 
preference shares or redeemable preference shares. 302 It is argued that the term 
'participation rights ' is defined broadly in order to ensure that South African taxpayers 
cannot enter into convoluted share arrangements as a means of controlling foreign entities 
while avoiding tax under section 9D.303 
298 See section 90(9)(e) of the Act. 
299 See section 90(1) of the Act. 
300 Assuming it is an individual. In any case the criteria is the same for the resident shareholder which is a 
company. 
301 See section 90(l) of the Act. 
302 However, convertible debentures, options and similar interests do not quality as participation rights 
because these instruments do not represent a palticipation interest until converted into shares. 
303 See Engel , op cit, p. 3. 
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A right in the definition of 'participation rights' means a legally enforceable right, a 
vested right and not a contingent right. In the case of dividends for instance, shareholders 
do not have a right to dividends until distributed by the company.304 The reference in the 
definition of a CFE to the holding of participation rights 'indirectly' covers holding 
through a nominee or agent. It is argued on the other hand that indirectly holding in the 
definition of a CFE does not cover holding through an entity or an entity which itself 
holds legal title to the participation rights in question. This is because the term 'hold ' in 
the sense of the definition of CFE is considered as commented by Davis305 to mean own 
or hold for one's own benefit as opposed to holding for the benefit of another. 
Thus, where a local resident holds all the shares in an offshore company, which in turn 
holds all the shares in a wholly owned offshore subsidiary, the person holding the 
participation rights in the second company is the first company and not the local resident 
who neither owns nor possess these rights. For example, if a CFE (1) holds 100% of the 
participation rights in a CFE (2), it is difficult to see how a South African shareholder, 
with more than 50% of participation rights in the CFE (1), could have a 'right' (even 
indirectly) to participate in the profits of the CFE (2), because the CFE (1) already holds 
all the rights. However, Jooste306 contends that considering the anti-avoidance nature of 
the CFE rules in section 9D, this interpretation is too narrow and the legislation does not 
appear to limit the participation rights to 100%. 
The term 'participation rights' is a plurality which can be constituted by any right to 
capital, profit, distribution or allocation made by a foreign entity. The words 'capital' and 
'profits' are not defined in the provisions of section 9D(1) and these terms are imprecise 
since different shareholders may have different rights with regard to capital on liquidation 
and to dividends. An absurdity may therefore arise if for example, a South African 
304 Where for instance, an individual is a beneficiary ofa discretionary trust which holds a ll the shares in a 
company, he does not have the right to participate in dividend declaration by that company. The trust has 
that right. As beneficiary, he has a right to any distribution which might be made to him by the trustees. 
This is not the same as a right to the dividends, and cannot even be construed as an indirect right to those 
dividends, since there is in fact no certainty that those dividends will be distributed to him. He does 
however have an indirect right to dividends of this type where the trust is not discretionary and he has a 
vested right to all or part of the annual income. See Davis, op cil, p. 9D-S. 
30, Op cit, p. 9D-7. 
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resident owns 100% of the rights to capital in a foreign entity and a non-resident owns 
100% of the rights to income. Would it be possible in this case to say that the South 
African resident holds more than 50% of the participation rights? It is submitted that the 
definition of participation rights should be interpreted to mean than a resident needs only 
hold more than 50% of the individual types of rights. 307 
The term 'distribution' implies some kind of outflow from the entity, and this is not 
necessarily the case with the term 'allocation' which is much wider and will cover a 
situation where no outflow takes place.308 
A-2) The exercise of the right to vote or control of a CFE 
Another aspect of the definition of a CFE is that South African residents must be entitled 
to exercise directly or indirectly more than 50% of the votes or control of a foreign entity. 
This means for instance that if a foreign company has issued 100 ordinary shares of 
which a South African individual owns 50 and a foreign individual owns 50, and the 
South African resident and foreign individual have a voting agreement in terms of which 
South African individual decides all the tie-votes, the result is that the foreign company 
qualifies as a CFE. This is because the power to decide all tie-votes provides the South 
African individual with control over the foreign company. It appears therefore that votes 
in a foreign company controlled by a South African resident through a voting agreement 
with the holders thereof would qualify as votes that the resident is 'indirectly' entitled to 
exercise, and would be counted in determining whether the foreign entity is a CFE.309 
On the other hand, it is argued that in the South African context, the voting power test 
does not look to indirect control (though the word 'direct or indirectly' are used in the 
definition of a CFE) via an interposed controlled entity or de Jacto control. For example, 
if a South African resident owns 51 % of shares in a CFE (1), and the CFE (1) in turn 
306 Op cit, p. 477. 
307 See Clegg, 0, "Foreign Investment Trusts", 1997, II Tax Planning 106. 
308 See Davis, op cit, p. 90-9 . 
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owns 60% of the shares in another foreign company (CFE 2), it is questionable whether 
the second company (CFE 2) would be a CFE of the South African resident on the basis 
f . 1310 o votmg power or contro . 
The term ' control' in the definition of a CFE may have a wide application. For instance, a 
South African resident who holds the majority of voting shares in a foreign company, 
may automatically exercise control over that company. On the other hand, Jooste311 
argues that it is possible in the case of a company that where the shareholders are widely 
dispersed, the ability to exercise well below 50% of the votes in the company may be 
sufficient to control the company. Thus, if South African residents do not have 50% of 
the votes in a foreign entity, but have the authority to appoint the board of directors, it 
may be argued that they have control over the foreign entity.312 This gives rise to the 
issue whether the ' more than 50%' in the definition of a CFE qualifies the word 'votes' 
or 'control'. As Jooste313 pointed out, if the 'more than 50%' requirement qualifies the 
word 'control', then the wording of the provision of section 9D(1) is vague because it is 
questionable whether we can have degrees of control. In other words, what is meant by 
' more than 50% of control' in the definition of a CFE? 
A-3) What is the meaning of 'jointly' in the definition of a CFE in section 9D(1)? 
While there may be no trouble with the meaning of 'individually ' in the definition of a 
CFE, the 'joint' holding of participation rights or votes or control may raise certain 
difficulties. It is not clear under section 9D(l) whether the word 'jointly' connotes some 
co-operation or relationship between the residents concerned, so that totally independent 
investors who in aggregate hold more than 50% of a foreign entity, would not result in 
that foreign company being a CFE. As correctly pointed out by Jooste,314 if two South 
African residents jointly hold more than 50% of the participation rights in a foreign 
309 In addition , it is contended that the holding of an option to shares in a company does not represent an 
indirect entitlement to the exercise of the votes attaching to those shares . See Jooste, op Cil, p. 476. 
310 See Davis, op cil, p. 90-8. 
311 Op cit, p. 477. 
3 12 See Olivier, L, "Controlled Foreign Entities", May 200 I, Accountancy SA , p. 12. 
31J Op cil, p.477. 
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company, does the word 'jointly' mean that they must have a 'common purpose' or must 
be 'acting in conceIt' in relation to their holdings, though they may be totally 
unconnected and with none of them suspecting that the entity in which they hold an 
interest is CFE? 
Jooste argues that something more than a mere aggregate holding is envisaged by the 
word 'jointly', if not the legislature would have substituted the word 'jointly' with 
'aggregate' as stated in the proviso to section 9D(2). Thus, if 'jointly' does mean with 
'common purpose', presumably the word would cover holdings in a CFE by connected 
persons and holdings by persons who have entered into a 'shareholders' agreement' with 
regard to their votes in the CFE. 
In addition, if 'jointly' means 'with common purpose', it is possible that all the 
participation rights and all the votes in a foreign entity could be held by South African 
residents and yet, because they are all held independently of each other (without a 
common purpose), the foreign entity would not qualify as a CFE and accordingly none of 
its income will be imputed to the South African residents. It is doubtful that this is what 
was intended by the legislature because the aim of section 9D was to prevent one or more 
South African residents from keeping their foreign sourced income out of the South 
African tax net by shifting it to a CFE. 
A-4) Exclusion for de minimis owners of widely held foreign entities in the definition 
ofa CFE 
An exception to the definition of CFE was added by the second Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act in 2001 for listed companies and foreign unit trusts (or collective 
investment schemes), both of which are widely held.315 In terms of this exception, holders 
ofless than 5% of the participation rights in these entities are deemed to be non-residents. 
314 Op Cil, p. 476. 
3 15 The definition of a CFE in section 90(1) was extended by the proviso that in determining whether 
residents jointly hold more than 50% of the participation rights of any foreign entity which is listed on a 
recognised exchange or which is a scheme or arrangement contemplated in paragraph (e)(ii) of the 
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The rationale of this proviso is to avoid ownership tracking problems associated with de 
minimis shareholders in large-scale foreign entities.316 This exception therefore 
recognises the difficulties, in situations where South African residents take up an interest 
in a foreign listed company or collective investment scheme, of knowing the extent to 
which the other shareholders may be South African residents. Thus, for example, if a 
South African resident holds 40% of the shares in a listed foreign company and the 
remaining 60% is held independently by other South African residents who all hold less 
than 5%, the foreign company is not a CFE.317 
The 5% de minimis test does not apply if connected persons own more than 50% of the 
foreign entity. This anti-connected person restriction is aimed at preventing a group of 
economically linked parties from utilising the de minimis test as an artificial means for 
undermining the 'more than 50%' control threshold. 
B) The imputation of the CFE's income to the South African residents 
Once it is established that a foreign entity is a CFE, the proportional amount of net 
income earned by the CFE, based on a resident's participation rights in that CFE, will be 
included in the income of the South African resident for the year of assessment during 
which the CFE's year-end falls. This is in terms of section 9D(2) which provides that: 
' There shall be included in the income for the year of assessment of any resident 
contemplated in the definition of "controlled foreign entity" in subsection (1), an 
amount equal to the proportional amount of the net income of such entity for the 
foreign tax year of such entity which ends during such year of assessment of such 
resident, which bears to the total net income of such entity during such foreign tax 
year, the same ratio as the percentage of the participation rights of such resident in 
relation to such entity bears to the total participation rights in relation to such 
entity . .. ' 
definition of 'company' in section I, except where connected persons hold more than 50% of the 
participation rights of that foreign entity, scheme or arrangement, any person who holds less than 5% of the 
participation rights of that foreign entity shall be deemed not to be a resident. The proviso was added by 
section 22(1) of Act 60 of 200 I, effective trom I January 200 I, for year ends of CFEs which end during the 
year of assessment of a resident, which commences on or after that date. 
3 16 See Engel , op cit, p. 5. 
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Thus, the determination of the proportional amount to be included in the income of a 
resident = Net income of the CFE x resident's participation rights in the CFE 
Total participation rights in the CFE 
However, the application of section 90(2) is extended by the proviso to the effect that in 
tax years commencing in calendar year 2001, any resident holding or entitled (whether 
alone or together with a resident or non-resident connected person) to less than 10% in 
aggregate at all times during the foreign tax year, of the participation rights and voting 
rights in a CFE, must not include the proportionate amount of the net income of that CFE 
in his income? 18 
For example, if a foreign entity is a CFE of South African residents, but one of the 
resident holders holds alone or with connected persons only 9% of the participation 
rights, none of the net income of the CFE will be imputed to that resident. However, 
though the resident is relieved from including any portion of the net income of the CFE in 
his income by virtue of the non-qualification under the 10% rule, he is required to include 
in his income any foreign dividends accrued to him from the CFE. The resident's 
shareholding is nevertheless taken into account in the determination of whether or not the 
foreign entity is a CFE.319 
As correctly pointed out by Jooste,320 it appears that in determining whether the 10% rule 
applies in relation to a particular resident, only direct holdings of participation rights by 
the resident and connected persons in relation to such resident must be taken into 
consideration. It also appears that the 'entitlement' to exercise less than 10% of the voting 
rights covers only direct entitlement. This situation may lead to absurd results probably 
unintended by the legislature.32I Thus, for instance, if only direct individual holdings of 
participation rights are to be taken into account, it is possible that a resident through 
indirect holdings, may in fact control the CFE and yet because his direct individual 
3 17 See Huxham & Haupt, op cit, p. 278/279. 
3 18 See proviso to section 90(2) of the Act. 
3 19 See Kolitz, M, "Tax on Foreign Income II: Foreign Entities", 200 I, 15 Tax Planning 112 . 
:)20 Op cit, p. 478. 
321 The proviso to section 90(2) does not use the word ' indirectly' which is used in the definition ofa CFE 
in section 90( I). 
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holding of participation rights in the CFE is less than 10%, he will avoid section 90 
under the 10% rule. 
The 10% threshold is designed to prevent this defined income rule from applying to 
minority owners who have no practical say over the business of the CFE. 
Section 9D(2) is also subject to the timing rules for the imputation of the CFE's income 
to the South African resident. Thus, the South African shareholder must include the 
CFE's income during his year of assessment in which the CFE 's foreign tax year ends. 
For instance, let us assume that a South African company with a year of assessment 
beginning on 1 March and ending on 28 February owns all the shares of a CFE. The CFE 
has a year of assessment equals to the calendar year and generates R 1 00,000 of net 
income during the year 2002. In terms of the timing rules, the RIOO,OOO of the CFE's 
income must be included in the South African company's year of assessment running 
from 1 March 2002 and ending 28 February 2003 because the RIOO,OOO of the CFE's net 
income arose in the CFE' s tax year which ends on 31 December 2002. 322 
Thus, it is questionable whether the legislation means that a resident who has an interest 
in a CFE and disposes it before the year end of the CFE, will have no proportionate 
inclusion of the CFE's income in his income. Conversely, whether a resident acquiring a 
participation right in a CFE shortly before the CFE's year-end will have to bring to 
account the entire year's income of that CFE in proportion to his holdings. It is contended 
that the equitable interpretation should be that if an interest in a CFE is disposed of 
between the year end of the CFE and the year end of the resident, the attribution of the 
CFE's income will still take place since it ' accrued' when the resident still held an 
interest. 323 
322 See Engel , op Cil , p. 6. 
323 See Jooste, op cil, p. 483. He a lso argues that this interpretation gives rise to difficulties because unless 
the eFE can, and is prepared to disclose to the South African resident what income has accrued to it at the 
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C) Calculation of the net income of the CFE 
The net income of the CFE is computed in accordance with the South African tax 
principles as if the CFE has been a resident.324 This means that the South African Income 
Tax Act must be applied in determining the gross income of the CFE, income, deductions 
and allowances as if the CFE was a South African taxpayer.325 
The calculation of the net income of the CFE is subject to important income tax 
qualifications. First, the deductions and allowances which may be taken into account are 
limited to the income received . Thus, deductions and allowances are ring-fenced and 
limited to the amount of the CFE's income.326 In other words, while the net income of a 
CFE is imputed to the South African resident, the latter cannot deduct net losses of a 
CFE.327 
The justification for this anti-loss rule is to ensure that the residence basis of taxation 
does not result in the erosion of the current South African tax base, and there may be no 
information available relating to the extent of foreign losses. 328 Although the net loss of 
the CFE cannot be set off against a South African resident's taxable income, the net loss 
is not simply eliminated. It is carried forward to the immediately succeeding year and 
treated as an assessed loss of the CFE in that year for the purposes of section 20 of the 
Act.329 
relevant times, it would be factually impossible for either the resident or SARS to determine what income is 
to be imputed to the resident. 
324 See section 9D(2A) of the Act, inserted by section I O( I )(g) of the Amendment Act 59 of 2000. This 
amendment solved the issue that existed whether taxa ble income has to be calculated with reference to 
foreign or South African law. 
325 This determination requires the CFE to maintain two sets of tax books: one for the home country and 
one for South Africa. This administrative practice is essential if the CFE's income is to be kept on par with 
domestic income. 
326 See section 9D(2A)(a). 
327 As pointed out by Casey (op cit, p. 3), a CFE can never realise a loss for South African tax purposes . 
Thus, if a South African resident makes a loan to a CFE, no deduction is allowed for any exchange loss 
resulting from that transaction with a CFE, or with any connected person in relation to the CFE, unless and 
to the extent that the income (interest) attributable to the transaction in question is included in the net 
income of the CFE for the purposes of section 9D(2A) of the Act. 
328 See Jooste, op cit, p. 480. [t is contended that this anti-loss rule is consistent with the anti-Joss rule for 
foreign branch losses, which similarly cannot be used as an offset against South African source income. 
329 See section 9D(2A)(b) of the Act. 
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The net loss of a CFE cannot also be set of against the net income of another CFE. 330 It is 
clear that as far as assessed losses are concerned, CFEs are in a worse position that other 
entities. Although foreign deductions may generally not be offset against local income, 
foreign losses incurred by entities other than CFEs may be offset against income derived 
from another foreign trade. For instance, if a South African resident has a CFE in country 
(1) in respect of which an assessed loss is made, this loss cannot be offset against income 
from another CFE in country (2). However, had the foreign entities not been CFEs, the 
loss could have been offset against the income. In that situation, it can be argued that 
CFEs are penalised . This second anti-loss rule can be justified because South Africa does 
not have group tax rules for losses. 
Another important qualification in the calculation of the net income of the CFE is that no 
deduction is allowed for passive income such as interest, royalties or rentals paid by one 
CFE to another. 331 The circumstances envisaged by this provision are those in which the 
amount of net income of CFE (1) to be imputed to a particular South African resident is 
being calculated, and another CFE (2) is a CFE in relation to the resident. Thus, in such 
circumstances, in calculating the net income of CFE (1), any interest, royalties or rentals 
paid by CFE (1) to CFE (2) are not deductible.332 
The net effect of this provision is that such inter-group transactions are removed from 
inclusion on a consolidation basis, which is to the advantage of taxpayers, given the 
limitation of the set-off of losses. 
33 0 Ibid. 
33 1 See section 9D(2A)( c) of the Act. Conversely, the corresponding amount received by the other CFE is 
not attributable to the South African resident in terms of section 9D(9)(fA) of the Act. However, contrary to 
section 9D2)(c), the exemption from income taxation provided in section 9D(9)(fA) extends in addition to 
interest, royalties and rental , to income of a similar nature and exchange differences, provided that the 
CFEs must be part of the same group of companies. 
332 See Jooste, op cit, p. 471. Section 9D(2A)(c) only applies where the qualified passive income is ' paid ', 
as compared to ' payable ' under section 9D(9)(fA) of the Act. 
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C-l) Net income of the CFE and transfer pricing adjustments 
Under section 9D(2A), the net income of the CFE which is to be included in the South 
African resident's income will be calculated as if the CFE were a South African resident. 
There is therefore an argument that the transfer pricing rules of section 31 of the Act 
apply to the determination of the net income of a CFE. Thus, since the net income must 
be determined as though the CFE was a resident, the relationship between that CFE and a 
foreign connected person must be determined on the basis that the CFE is resident and the 
other entity is a non-resident. 333 
It appears that the perceived transfer prICing problem anses not directly from the 
provision of section 31 (2), but arises 'by proxy' through the provision of section 9D(2A) 
of the Act. Thus, technically SARS is within its right to assess taxpayers on this basis, 
and has indicated its intention to make transfer pricing adjustments to inter-CFE 
transactions if the requirements of section 31 (2) are satisfied and provided that none of 
the exemptions in section 9D apply.334 This means that all inter-CFE transactions should 
be entered into on an arm's length basis. For example, when an interest free loan is 
extended by one CFE to another, the provision of section 9D(2A) would apply separately 
to each in the determination of the respective income that must be imputed to the South 
African resident shareholders. Thus, if CFE (l)'s net income is being determined for 
attribution purposes, it will be deemed to be a resident, but CFE (2) will not be deemed to 
be a resident. In turn when the net income of CFE (2) is being determined, it would be 
deemed to be a resident, but not CFE (1). As a result, when applying section 9D(2A), the 
Joan between CFE (1) and CFE (2) would satisfy the requirements of section 31 (2), that 
is, a non-arm's length loan between a deemed resident and a non-resident connected 
person, and this may result in a transfer pricing adjustment being made to CFE (I)'s 
profits. CFE (I)'s taxable income may then be upwardly adjusted by an amount equal to 
333 Section 31(2) of the Act applies inter alia, to transfer pricing situations deriving from financial 
assistance provided in an international agreement, for example, between a resident and a non-resident. 
334 See Joubert, D, "International Financing Problems: Controlled Foreign Entities and Transfer Pricing", 
2002, 16 Tax Planning 28. 
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the interest that could have been charged on the loan had it been made on arm's length 
basis. 335 
If SARS succeeds in including the interest derived from the transfer pricing adjustment in 
the income of the lending CFE, the question arises as to whether the inter-CFE interest 
exemption in section 9D(9)(fA) would apply to prevent it from being imputed to the 
South African resident shareholder. 
On this issue, the opinions of the tax writers are divergent. It is contended that since 
passive income (including interest in this case) are not taken into account (because they 
are exempted) as between qualified CFEs, in practice therefore, the transfer pricing 
adjustments will be applied primarily to the prices paid or charged for goods and services. 
On the other hand, 10ubert336 correctly argues that the exemption provided under section 
9D(9)(fA) would not be available, mainly because the transfer pricing adjustment is a 
one-sided adjustment to the profits of the lending CFE, in that the imputation for the 
lending CFE does not give rise to an equivalent notional expense in the borrowing CFE. 
Thus, it would be artificial to regard it as being in the nature of interest when it does not 
meet the common law characteristic of interest and because the Act does not specifically 
deem the adjusted amount to be interest.3J7 
It may be argued on the other extreme that it is difficult to accept the validity of the 
analysis that a transfer pricing adjustment is competent between CFEs. In this sense, the 
transfer pricing adjustment for inter-CFE transactions may be seen as an abusive exercise 
of its discretion by SARS, because the intention of section 31 was never to bring within 
its scope transactions between persons who are by definition non-residents. Thus, 
applying the transfer pricing provisions of section 31 for inter-CFE transactions appears 
to run contrary to the intention of the legislature in enacting section 31 of the Act. 
335 See Joubert, op cit, p. 29. 
336 Ibid, p. 30. 
337 See also the analysis on this issue by Clegg, 0 , "Transfer Pricing Adjustments: Finance within Foreign 
Groups", 2002, 16 Tax Planning 58. 
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D) Currency Conversion rule 
In terms of section 9D(2A), the taxable income of the CFt: is determined in a foreign 
currency. The taxable income so determined must be converted to South African cUlTency 
on the last day of the foreign tax year of the CFE.338 The exchange rate to be applied is 
the ruling exchange rate at that date, or any other exchange rate, or rates, as the 
Commissioner may approve, determined with reference to the ruling exchange rate 
during such year. JJ9 
There is relief from immediate imputation of income in terms of section 9D where the 
income may not immediately be remitted to South Africa because of restrictions imposed 
by the source country. In terms of section 9F(3), such income shall be included in the 
resident's gross income in the tax year of remittance. Thus, in this case, it is possible that 
the ruling exchange rate that is required to be used for the conversion calculation may not 
be related to the exchange rate on the date on which the funds are finally remitted to 
South Africa should they be so remitted. 
This gives rise to the further question: what if the amount actually remitted to South 
Africa differs from the amount calculated in terms of the conversion rule? Will the 
provisions of section 241 apply to either include the difference in taxable income of the 
resident or allow it as a deduction from income? 
The answer could be found in the conversion rule of section 6quat( 4). In claiming the 
foreign tax credit, the conversion rule of section 6quat(4) for foreign tax paid requires 
that the amount of the foreign tax paid on the net income of the CFE be converted at the 
ruling exchange rate applicable : 
• Fither on the date that the foreign tax was paid; or 
338 See section 90(6) of the Act. 
339 Section 9D(6) was amended by section J 0(1)(i) of Act 59 of 2000. Under the old section 9D(6), a 
resident could choose a convers ion date prior to the end of the tax year. 
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• At the ruling exchange rate at the end of the year of assessment if the tax is not paid 
by that date.34o 
E) Exemptions from section 91> 
Section 9D(9) of the Act provides various instances in which the net income of the CFE 
will be exempt and therefore will not be attributed to the South African resident. 341 
E-l) The designated country exemption 
In terms of section 9D(9)( a)342 of the Act, the provisions of section 9D(2) do not apply to 
the receipts and accruals of a CFE which is a company343 where: 
• The receipts and accruals have been or will be subject to tax on Income In a 
designated country at a statutory rate of at least 27%;344 or 
• After taking into account the application of the relevant double tax agreement; 
without any right of recovery by any person, other than a right of recovery in terms of 
an entitlement to cany back losses during any year of assessment to any prior year of 
assessment; notwithstanding the fact that the entity may as a result of an assessed loss 
not be liable for tax. 
From the prOVLSlon of section 9D(9)(a), it is clear that the mere fact that a specific 
country is indicated as designated countri45 is not sufficient. In addition, the income of 
340 See Kolitz, M, "Tax on Foreign Income III: Other Influential Factors", 2001, 15 Tax Planning 127 at 
!31. 
341 The exemptions are analysed in this section only with regard to income tax . 
342 Amended by section 22( 1)( d) of Act 60 of 200 1, effective from I October 200 I. 
343 The designated country exemption only applies if the CFE is a company, as expressly stated in section 
90(9)(a) of the Act. Because a foreign entity cannot be a natural person or a trust, it would be assumed that 
it must be a company. It appears that a reference in section 90(9)(a) of the CFE as being a company is 
superfluous because in any case, all CFEs must be companies. See Kolitz, M, "Tax on Foreign Income IT : 
Foreign Entities", 2001,15 Tax Planning 115. 
344 The statutory rate is 13,5% in the case of capital gains. 
345 The term 'designated country' is mentioned in section 90( I) and section 9E( I) and defined in section 
9E(8) of the Act. In terms of the latter provision, the Minister of Finance may designate, by notice in the 
Gazette, countries to be 'designated countries' if they meet all the following requirements: 
• The country has a tax on income that is determined on a basis that is substantially the same as that of 
the Republic; 
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the CFE must be subject to tax346 in that designated country at least at a 27% statutory tax 
rate. The proviso to section 90(9)(a) further stipulates that where a country imposes tax 
on a CFE at a progressive scale of statutory rates, the highest rate must be at least 27%.347 
In applying the minimum statutory rate of 27%, any relevant double tax agreement must 
be taken into account.348 It means that if a taxpayer falls within the tax system of a 
particular country, but the provisions of a double tax agreement take him out of the tax 
net (for example in the case of CFEs), the exemption in section 9D(9)(a) is not 
applicable. Similarly, should a company be subject to a 27% tax rate, but the shareholders 
for instance, have the right to recover the tax paid by the company, the exemption is also 
not applicable. On the other hand, if a company is in principle subject to a minimum of 
27% tax rate, but due to for instance, the existence of an assessed loss, it does not pay any 
tax, the exemption is still applicable.349 
• The country has a statutory rate of tax on companies of at least 27% without any right of recovery by 
any person (other than a right of recovery in terms of an entitlement to can)' back losses arising during 
any year of assessment to any prior year of assessment); 
• The country complies with any other requirement that the Minister may prescribe by regulation. 
The following countries were li sted as 'designated countries' by GN 866 GG 21526 of I September 2000: 
Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, france, 
Germany, Israel, ltaly, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Norway, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States of America, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Contrary to the previous requirement for designation, section 9E(8) does not stipulate that to 
qualify for designation, the foreign country should have a double tax agreement with South Africa. The 
current designated country I ist set above is under consideration by SARS. It is expected that a new I ist wi II 
be announced in the near future and some countries will be removed from the current list of designated 
countries. It is understood that SARS' criteria for determining whether a country should fall on the 
designated list will depend on whether the country has a tax system similar to South Africa ; whether it 
operates a residence based system of taxation ; and whether it has implemented capital gains tax legislation . 
346 The second Revenue Laws Amendment Act of 200 I substituted the term 'generated ' in a designated 
country with 'subject to tax '. This was intended to avoid the complication arising where the income 
accruing to a company in a designated country could be generated in a non-designated country and 
therefore not benefit from the exemption. Thus, in terms of section 9D(9)(a) exemption, the income of the 
CFE does not necessari Iy have to be generated in a designated country, as long as it is subject to tax there, 
irrespective of the origin . Vogel (op Cil , p. 226) considers that the term ' subject to tax' means something 
distinct from that of a liability to pay tax. It is thus argued that ' subject to tax' in a country means that the 
income must be taxable as opposed to such income actually having been taxed in that country. See Davis, 
D, "Taxation of Foreign Dividends : LIFO", January 2002, Taxpayer, p. 14. 
347 However, the legislation does not deal with situations where the jurisdiction may have different rates 
for different types of income. 
348 Section 9D(9)(a) of the Act. 
349 This confirms that the statutory rate of27% does not refer to an effective tax rate. See Olivier, op cit, p. 
12; See also Jooste, op cit, p. 485. 
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E-2) The business establishment exemption 
If a CFE operates a business establishment in a foreign country, the provisions of section 
9D(2) do not apply to the net income that is attributable to the business establishment.35o 
The effect of section 9D(9)(b) is that the net income of the CFE resulting from the 
business establishment is therefore deferred until distributed as dividends to the South 
African resident shareholders, 
A 'business establishment,35I is broadly defined in section 90(1) as a place of business 
with: 
• An office, shop, factory, warehouse, farm or other structure which is used or will 
continue to be used by the controlled foreign entity for a period of not less than one 
3'2 year; ) 
• A mine, oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural 
resources;353 or 
• A site for the construction or installation of buildings, bridges, roads, pipelines, heavy 
machinery or other projects of comparable magnitude which lasts for a period of not 
less than six months,354 
Whereby the business of the entity is carried on, and where -
• The place of business is suitably equipped with on-site operational management, 
employees, equipment and other facilities for the purpose of conducting the primary 
operation of the business;355 and 
350 Section 90(9)(b) of the Act. 
351 The South African income tax law uses the term 'business establishment', which bears some 
relationship to the permanent establishment definition contained in article 5 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and used in most double tax agreements. However, unlike the permanent establishment 
definition in article 5 of the OECD, the business establishment definition in the South African context does 
not for example cover the carrying on of business in a country in the form of a branch. In addition, it 
applies different criteria with regard to the time limit placed on the use of the qualified fixed locations. 
352 The one-year use requirement can be satisfied by direct ownership or by lease. However, the word 'use' 
implies some level of activity with regard to the structure. Thus, the mere possession of ownership or 
leasing rights is insufficient. See Engel, op cit, p. 9. 
353 These places satisfy the fixed location test per se without regard to time. Operation of these places 
demonstrates a clear level of permanence in the foreign location involved because the geographically 
unique nature of the holding makes that holding immobile in practice. 
354 This site meets the location test as long as it lasts for a period of not less than 6 months. The 6-month 
requirement is designed simply to ensure that the CFE is providing an activity that amounts to more than a 
temporary service. See Engel, op cit, p. 9. 
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• The place of business is used outside the Republic for a bona fide business purpose 
(other than the avoidance, postponement or reduction of any liability for payment of 
any tax , duty or levy imposed by the Act or by any other law administered by the 
Commissioner).356 
Even to the extent that a CFE satisfies the business establishment requirements, the 
exemption will not apply to receipts and accruals derived from diversionary transactions 
and mobile passive income. 
i) Diversionary transactions 
This exclusion covers transactions where the possibility of transfer pricing exists between 
a CFE, which is a company and South African connected persons and certain types of 
income. 
In terms of section 9D(9)(b )(i) of the Act, if a CFE engages in a sale or servIce 
transaction with a connected South African resident, transfer pricing inconsistent with 
arm' s length pricing in accordance with section 31 creates deemed income imputed to the 
South African resident shareholder.357 
355 This criterion indicates that not only must the business have a fixed location, but the fixed location must 
also have some economic substance. This substance must be shown in terms of operation. In operational 
terms, the substance element ensures that the business is not only existing on paper or is a disguised form of 
passive income. Thus, it would be impossible for all activities of a business establishment to be outsourced 
to third party suppliers. In addition, it is not sufficient to have employees who cannot take management 
decisions at the foreign business . Persons who take the operational decisions also need to be present. 
Accordingly, as Clegg argues, if the subsidiary relies on timeshare office, occasional foreign board 
meetings and a timeshare administrator who calls at the office twice a week to open and send post which 
originated in the parent's head office, this exemption cannot be met. See Clegg, D, "Residence-Based Tax : 
It is a Wider Horizon through the Offshore Tax Maze", April 19,2002, Financial Mail, p. 96. 
356 In terms of this business purpose, the business must have a bona fide business reason for operating 
abroad rather than in South Africa. [n assessing this business purpose test, the Commissioner need not have 
regard to the requirement of the general anti-avoidance provisions of section I 03( I) of the Act. [t is 
sufficient if on the facts of the case, the reason for having the business outside South Africa is to avoid, 
postpone or reduce tax . 
357 By imputing the income of the CFE to the South African owner, section 90 effectively creates a penalty 
over and above the adjustment imposed by section 31. 
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The section 90(9)(b) exemption does not apply if the CFE's sale of goods to a connected 
South African resident fails to qualify for the higher business activity standard in terms of 
section 9D(9)(b)(ii) (aa), unless the sale falls into one of the following three categories: 
• When the CFE purchases goods that are physically located in the country in which it 
is resident.358 , 
• When the CFE engages in foreign production activities that involve more than minor 
assembly or adjustment, packaging, repackaging and labelling;359 or 
• When the CFE sells a significant quantity of similar goods to unconnected persons at 
bl . 360 compara e pnces. 
The section 90(9)(b) exemption does not apply if a CFE sells goods to foreign residents 
or unconnected South African residents and those goods were initially purchased from 
connected South African residents, unless the sale falls into one of the following three 
categories: 361 
• When the CFE purchases only an insignificant amount of materials, parts or 
ingredients from connected South African residents;362 
• When the CFE engages in foreign production activities that amount to more than 
minor assembly or adjustment, packaging, repackaging and labelling;363 or 
• When the CFE delivers its goods within the CFE's country of residence.364 
The section 90(9)(b) exemption will not apply in the case of services performed by a 
CFE for a connected South African resident, unless the following requirements are 
met:365 
• The services relate directly to the creation, extraction, production, assembly, repair, or 
improvement of goods and the goods at issue are utilised outside South Africa;366 or 
358 See section 90(9)(b )(ii)(aa)(A). 
359 See section 90(9)(b)(ii)(aa)(B). 
360 See section 90(9)(b)(ii)(aa)(C). 
361 See section 90(9)(b)(ii)(bb). 
362 See section 90(9)(b )(ii)(bb )(A). 
363 See section 90(9)(b)(ii)(bb)(B). 
364 See section 90(9)(b )(ii)(bb )(C). 
365 See section 90(9)(b)(ii)(cc). 
366 See section 90(9)(b)(ii)(cc)(A). 
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• These services relate directly to the sale and marketing of goods produced by a 
connected South African resident, and the goods are sold to unconnected persons for 
delivery within the CFE's country ofresidence.367 
ii) Passive income 
The business establishment exemption will also not apply to passive receipts and accruals 
of the CFE in the form of interest, dividends, royalties, rentals, annuities, insurance 
premiums and income of a similar nature, notwithstanding the fact that the CFE may have 
a business establishment as defined. 368 
However, certain exceptions exist for passive income such as: 
• Where the passive income does not exceed 5% of the CFE's total receipts and 
accruals.369 or , 
• Where the passive receipts and accruals arise from the principal trading activities of 
any banking or financial services, insurance or rental business.37o 
The principal trading activity exception is subject to anti-avoidance rules, which excludes 
passive income received or accrued from any: 
• Resident connected person or a resident who holds at least 5% of the participation 
rights in that CFE;371 or 
• Resident where the income received is part of tax avoidance scheme.372 
367 See section 9D(9)(b)(ii)(cc)(8). 
368 See section 9D(9)(b)(iii). Passive receipts and accruals al so consist of capital gains derived from the 
disposal of assets that generate the qualified passive income and all forms of currency gains. 
369 See section 9D(9)(b)( iii)(aa). This de minimis rule isjustified for administrative convenience. 
370 See section 9D(9)(b )(iii)(bb). The purpose of the principal trading activity exception is to ensure that a 
eFE is not merely a finance or a treasury operation with an objective to avoid section 9D. 
371 See section 9D(9)(b )(iii)(bb )(A). 
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E-3) Income already taxable in South Africa 
In terms of section 9D(9)(e),373 the CFE's net income will not be imputed to the South 
African resident to the extent that it is included in the South African taxable income of 
the CFE. This exemption applies where the income of the CFE is derived from an actual 
or deemed South African source and is aimed at avoiding situations of double taxation. 
Thus, if a CFE earns a South African source income and the income is also imputed to 
the CFE's South African owners, an unacceptable double counting would arise. 
However, as correctly argued Jooste,374 if as a result of double tax agreement, the South 
African income of a CFE is not taxed in South Africa, the exemption is not available 
because it is not 'included in the taxable income of the CFE'. 375 Consequently, South 
African residents cannot avoid tax on South African income by operating through CFE's 
located within the South African tax treaty network. This is equitable because the income 
would have been taxed if earned directly by the South African residents. 
E-4) The related and intra-group exemptions 
Section 9D contains provIsions that allow related CFE's to shift income among one 
another without attracting any South African tax implications. These provisions recognise 
that in order to internationally competitive, multinational structures frequently contain 
foreign affiliates acting as a single economic unit. The multilevel nature of these 
structures is for example, aimed at isolating risk in particular countries in which 
economic activities arise, by mainly reducing foreign tax as opposed to South African 
tax.376 
372 See section 9D(9)(b)(iii)(bb)(B). The passive income of such banking, financial services, insurance or 
rental business is subject to the proviso that it is derived mainly from persons who are not connected 
persons in relation to that CFE. 
373 Inserted by section JO(I)(m) of Act 59 of2000. 
174 Op cit, p. 498. 
375 As stated in section 9D(9)(e) . 
376 See Engel , op cit, p. 21 . 
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Thus, in relation to income tax, section 9D provides two exemptions from tax In 
recognition of these concerns. 
E-S) Dividend income from a related CFE 
The provisions of section 9D will not apply to any proportional amount of net income 
attributable to a South African resident, to the extent that this relates to a foreign dividend 
that was declared to a CFE that is a company by another company that is also a CFE in 
relation to the resident.377 
Thus, a CFE can receive dividends from another related CFE without being subject to 
section 9D, provided that both CFEs qualify as a CFE in relation to the same South 
African resident. Section 9D(9)(f) therefore allows a South African multinational group 
to reinvest such dividend income offshore without it falling into the South African tax 
net. It is contended that the rationale for the exemption is that the earnings underlying the 
dividends are either earnings from a CFE business establislunent or are already taxed 
d· I 378 lrect y. 
E-6) Intra-group CFE debts, licences, leases, currency gains or income of a similar 
nature 
The provisions of section 9D would not apply when a CFE receives interest, royalties or 
rental income, income of a similar nature and cunency gains on exchange items from 
another CFE as long as both the payor and payee CFEs are part of the same group of 
companies.379 
377 See section 9D(9)(f) . 
378 See Jooste, op cit, p. 499 . 
379 See section 9D(9)(fA). This provision was expanded to include ' income of a similar nature ' and any 
exchange difference in terms of section 241 with operation from I January 200 J. It is questionable whether 
' income of a similar nature ' may include deemed interest or royalty income arising from transfer pricing 
adjustments . However, insurance premiums and management fees have not been included under section 
9D(9)(fA) and will therefore not be granted exemption under this provision. 
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The group concept involved in this provision has the same meaning as the group concept 
found in section 41 for company restructuring. 38o This exemption allows South African 
multinationals to utilise finance or treasury foreign subsidiaries as a tax-free means of 
channeling collective group loans, licences and leases or transactions of a similar nature. 
This kind of structure allows a group to borrow within a single administrative structure 
and to create opportunities for reduced group rates. 381 
Although section 9D(9)(fA) should be read in conjunction with section 9D(2A)(c) which 
specifically prohibits the deduction of interest, royalties and rentals paid by one CFE to 
another, the provisions of section 9D(9)(fA) state that the qualified income must be 
'payable' and not 'paid,.382 
F) Reporting requirement 
It is essential that South African residents who have a qualified holding in a CFE must be 
aware of their holding in respect of the section 9D imputation of their CFE's income. 
Thus, section 72A is aimed at facilitating the gathering of such information by placing a 
huge administrative burden on certain residents. 
Section 72A requires every resident who at any time during the year of assessment: 
• Directly or indirectly holds not less than 10% of the participation or voting rights in a 
CFE; and 
• Together with connected persons holds more than 50% of the participation rights or 
voting rights to submit a return to the Commissioner.383 
Section 72A itself does not provide any sanction for failure to comply with the provision. 
However, in terms of section 9D( 11), the business establishment exemption,384 the related 
380 That is 75% or more equity share ownership. 
381 See Engel, op cit, p. 22. 
382 The old provision referred to ' paid' as in section 9D (2A)(c). 
383 See section 72A(l). The proviso to this provision states that it is the resident with the largest 
participation right (not voting right or control) who is required to submit the return. 
384 See section 9D(9)(b). 
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CFE dividend exemption385 and the related CFE interest, rent, royalties, currency gains 
and income of a similar nature exemption386 will not be available if the taxpayer fails to 
comply with section 72A. 387 
3.1.4) The taxation of foreign dividends 
Introduction 
Local dividends have long been exempted completely from income tax in South Africa 
by virtue of the amendment of section 10(1 )(k) of the Act in 1991.388 At that stage, it was 
thought that the amendment was unlikely to raise problems because the company 
declaring the dividends was subject to tax. In addition, the system of secondary tax on 
companies (STC) implemented in 1994 was ideal for the collection of corporate tax from 
South African companies that did not receive foreign income. 
However, as South Africa emerged from its isolation and with the relaxation of exchange 
control regulations, tax planning opportunities quickly arose as follows: 
• South African resident companies started to establish branches and subsidiaries in tax 
havens (captives); 
• Agency agreements, commissions, msurance premIUms and transfer pncmg 
procedures were used to channel income from South Africa to captives; 
• Captives received the income, paid no tax and remitted the income to the parent 
company in South Africa by way of the section 10(1 )(k) exemption.389 
Thus, the above procedure generated the idea of taxing dividends from foreign sources 
because the underlying profits from which dividends were declared would not have 
suffered South African tax.390 Section 9E was therefore introduced to deal with the 
385 See section 90(9)(f). 
386 See section 9D(9)(fA). 
387 See Jooste, op cit, p. 50 I. 
388 By section 12( I )(b) of Act 129 of 1991. 
389 See Lester, op cit, p. 14. 
390 See Davis, op cit , Taxpayer, January 2002, p. 11. 
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determination of the amount of foreign dividends to be included in the gross income of 
the South African resident received or accrued on or after 23 February 2000, or which 
accrued before 23 February 2000, but were received on or after that date.391 
Section 10(1 )(k) was then amended to exclude the exemption In respect of foreign 
dividends.392 However, in order to avoid double taxation, two categories of relief 
measures have been introduced in the current section 9E that is: an exemption for certain 
dividends under section 9E(7) and credit relief for foreign tax payable on foreign 
dividends included in the taxable income of residents under section 6quat. 
The complexity of section 9E is compounded by the fact that it is based on two versions 
which apply for two different periods. The first version applies for the period from 23 
February 2000 until 28 February 2001. During this period, section 9E effectively 
operated on the residence basis within a source based tax system.393 In that interim phase, 
foreign dividends were essentially dividends paid by a company out of profits derived 
from a source outside South Africa. 
The second version of section 9E applies to foreign dividends received by or accrued to a 
South African resident after 1 March 2001 onwards (in the case of individuals) and after 
1 January 2001 (in the case of companies). This second version was necessitated by the 
introduction of the residence basis of tax and a fundamental change in the meaning of 
' foreign dividend' was inserted in section 9E. 
This section of the research seeks to deal with the second version and to examine the 
mechanisms of the current section 9E. 
39 1 See SARS' Interpretation Note No 2 of I February 2002. 
392 Section I O( I )(k)(i)(dd) was insel1ed by section 26(1 )(b) of Act 60 of 200 I and deemed to have come 
into operation on 23 February 2000, and provides that the usual dividend exemption is not available for 
foreign dividends. 
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A) Definition of 'foreign dividends' 
The term 'foreign dividend' means any dividend394 received or accrued to any person 
from any company, which is either a 'foreign entity' as defined in section 90 or which is 
a ' resident' to the extent that the dividend is declared from profits derived by the 
company before it became a resident.395 
A-I) Specific inclusion 
The definition of 'foreign dividend' contains an anti-avoidance provlslOn aimed at 
preventing taxpayers from avoiding tax on foreign dividends by making distributions to 
shareholders other than by way of dividends.396 Thus, in terms of section 9E(1 )(a), a 
foreign dividend is extended to : 
• Any amount deemed to have been distributed as contemplated in section 64C(3)(a), 
(b), (c), or (d) of the Act.397 
• By any company which is a CFE; 
• To such person or any resident who is a connected person of such person; 
• To the extent that the company could have distributed a dividend to such person from 
profits which have not been subject to tax in the Republic; 
• If none of the provisions of section 64C(4) apply other than section 64C(4)(g) and 
(h).398 
393 See Davis, op cit, p. 12. 
394 As defined in section 1 of the Act. 
395 See section 9E(I) of the Act. 
396 For instance by providing a loan to shareholders. 
397 Section 64C(3) deems certain distributions to be deemed dividends for STC purposes such as the 
distribution for the benefit of a connected person (a); the release of an obligation (b); the payment of a debt 
(c) ; and any application for the benefit of a connected person (d). It appears that deemed dividends as 
mentioned in section 64C(3)(e), arising as a result of transfer pricing adjustments in section 31 are not 
considered to be foreign dividends for the purposes of section 9E( 1) and are therefore excluded from the 
specific inclusion of the latter provision . 
398 Section 64C (4) deals with the exemption to certain deemed distributions . For instance, a loan which 
bears a market related rate of interest or a rate of interest not less than the ' official rate of interest ' . The 
definition of 'foreign dividend ' was amended from 27 July 2001 to include in foreign dividends certain 
amounts previously excluded by section 64C(4)(g) and (h). These inclusions are loans made by a CFE to its 
holding company and to another company directly or indirectly held by its holding company, and loans 
made by a company to another company where the equity share capital of both companies is held by the 
same shareholders, irrespective of the location in which the borrower uses the funds. 
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The provisions of section 9E(l )(a) do not apply to amounts distributed by a company 
which is being wound up or liquidated out of profits of a capital nature, other than capital 
profits derived from the disposal of another company which had disposable profits which 
would not have been excluded from the provisions of paragraph (b).399 
B) Amount of foreign dividend inclusion 
The amount of the foreign dividend to be included in the gross income of the South 
African resident, in terms of para (k) of the definition of the term 'gross income' in 
section 1, must be determined in accordance with the provisions of section 9E(3) and (4), 
unless the taxpayer makes an election in terms of section 9E(6) of the Act. 
The percentage shareholding of a resident to whom a foreign dividend accrues is decisive 
in determining the amount to be included in his gross income. Thus, section 9E(3) 
distinguishes between shareholders with a substantive investment or qualifying interest 
(that is holding at least a 10% shareholding) and portfolio shareholders (holding less than 
a 10% shareholding). 
In terms of section 9E(3)(a), the amount to be included in the gross income of the South 
African resident is the proportionate amount400 of the profit40' from which the dividend is 
distributed, before taking into account any foreign tax402 on income in respect of such 
399 With the repeal of paragraph (b) of section 9E( 1), which came into operation on I October 200 I, the 
disposal of shares in a non-resident entity is no longer included in the definition of ' foreign dividend ' . Prior 
to I October 200 I, proceeds from a sale of shares in a foreign entity which had undistributed profits which 
had not been subject to South African tax constituted a (deemed) foreign dividend to the extent of those 
undistributed profits. With the introduction of capital gains tax, the proceeds of such sale is now included in 
the resident's income as a capital gain, but is no longer considered revenue income in the form of deemed 
foreign dividends. 
400 The term 'proportionate amount of the profit' in relation to a shareholder is defined in section 9E(l) as 
an amount which bears to the total profit, the same ratio as this shareholding bears to the total shareholding. 
(fthere are different classes of shares, the expression 'total shareholding' refers only to the total of the class 
of shares of which the shareholding is part, and the expression ' total profits ' means the total profits 
attributable to that class of shares. 
401 There is no definition in section 9E of the word ' profit '. It is contended that it would presumably 
include both revenue and capital profits . See Kolitz, op cit, 2001 , 15 Tax Planning 93 . 
402 The term ' foreign tax on income ' is also not defined in section 9E. In terms of the Explanatory 
Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2000 (WP 1- 00 at 6), the word ' income' in the 
express ion' foreign tax on income ' includes profits, income and gains. It also states that forei gn taxes on 
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profit and before taking into account any withholding tax paid in respect of such dividend 
if such resident: 
• For his own benefit; or 
• In the case of a company, together with any other company in a group of 
companies403 of which such company forms a part, hold for their own benefit, 
• At least 10% of the equity share capital404 in the company declaring the dividend. 
Section 9E(3)(a) is subject to two provisos that: 
• The dividend is deemed to be distributed from the most recent profits unless the 
resident proves otherwise;405 and 
• When the company derives its profits by way of dividends and from other sources of 
profits, the dividend is deemed to have been declared on a proportionate basis.406 
Section 9E(3) in these provisos introduces a LIFO (last in, first out) principle which 
means that the dividend is deemed to have been distributed from the profits most recently 
derived, unless the resident taxpayer can prove otherwise in the form prescribed by the 
Commissioner. On the other hand, if profits consist of dividends and other sources of 
income, the 'gross up' of the dividend must be calculated on a deemed proportionate 
basis. 
The issue that arises is the extent of the interaction between the two provisos. It may be 
asked whether section 9E(3) does not create an ambiguity in respect of the interaction 
income will include taxes imposed by national and certain lower tiers ofgovemment in the foreign country 
and capital gains tax. Thus, for the purposes of section 9E(3)(a), the amount of the proportionate share of 
the profit to be included in the gross income of the South African resident would be the amount before the 
deduction of any of these taxes. See de Koker et ai, Silke Tax Yearbook, p. A-l7. 
403 The term' group of companies' is defined in section 9E( I) as a controlling company and one or more 
other companies which are controlled companies, in relation to the controlling company. A ' controlled 
company ' in turn, is defined as a company in relation to which another company is the controlling 
company. And a ' controlling company ' in relation to any other company, is defined as a company which is 
a resident and which holds for its own benefit, whether directly or indirectly, through one or more 
companies, in the group of companies of which all the companies in question form part, shares in the other 
company constituting not less than 75% of the equity share capital of the other company. 
404 As defined in section I of the Act. 
405 Proviso (aa) to section 9E(3)(a) of the Act. 
406 Proviso (bb) to section 9E(3)(a) . 
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between the two provisos in relation to foreign dividend payments. Judge Dennis Davis407 
argues that unlike proviso (aa), there is no election in terms of proviso (bb), because the 
taxpayer does not have an option to prove in a prescribed manner that the proportionate 
system should not operate in the same manner as he may be able to prove that the LIFO 
system should not be applicable. He goes on to correctly contend that the inter-
relationship between the two provisos is that: except where the taxpayer proves 
otherwise, the dividend must be deemed to have been distributed in terms of the LIFO 
principle. In all circumstances, where the source of the dividends is made up of dividends 
received by the declaring company as well as other sources of profits, the dividend which 
falls within the scope of section 9E must be deemed to have been declared on the 
proportionate basis from such dividends and other sources of profits; in both cases subject 
to the LIFO principle. Thus, because both provisos cannot operate simultaneously on the 
same amount of dividends, the LIFO proviso takes precedence over the apportionment 
prOViSO m (bb) which will apply only to the balance after the LIFO basis has been 
exhausted. 
In terms of section 9E(3)(b), in the case of portfolio shareholder who does not hold at 
least 10% (for his own benefit or in the case of a company in a group of companies for its 
own benefit) of the equity share capital of the company declaring the dividend, the 
amount to be included in gross income of the South African resident is the amount of the 
dividend declared before the deduction of the amount of any withholding tax paid m 
respect of the di vidend. 
It is clear in the wording of section 9E(3) that the amount to be included in gross income 
is the 'grossed up' amount of a foreign dividend as opposed to the actual dividend.408 
407 op cit, Taxpayer, January 2002. 
408 See the definition of dividend in para (k) of the gross income definition in section I where the concept 
of ' grossed up' appears. 
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C) The look-through principle of section 9E( 4) 
Section 9E(4) provides that in determining the proportionate amount of the profit to be 
included in the income of a resident shareholder who holds at least 10% of the equity 
share capital of a company that declares a foreign dividend, as required by section 
9E(3)(a), any profits derived by any other company in which the company that distributes 
the dividend has an interest, that have been distributed to that company in the form of 
dividends must be taken into account, if the resident has a qualifying interest409 in the 
other company.410 
Thus, the shareholder who holds at least 10% of the equity share capital has to look 
through the company declaring the dividend and include his proportionate share of the 
profit of that company in his gross income. In determining his proportionate share of the 
operating profit, it may be necessary to look through more than one layer of 
shareholdings.411 Therefore, in terms of section 9E( 4), the look through is not confined to 
the company declaring the dividend, but is applied to companies from which the 
declaring company has received dividends. As Kolitz put it, in the situation of section 
9E( 4), the shareholder must 'drill down' to the profits of the other company in order to 
quantify the amount of the foreign dividend to be included in his gross income.412 
409 In terms of section 9E(l) of the Act, the term 'qualifying interest' of any person means: 
• Any direct interest of at least 10% held by such person in the equity share capital of any company; and 
• Any direct interest of at least 10% held by any company contemplated in paragraph (a) in the equity 
share capital of any other company, which other company shall for the purposes of this definition be 
deemed to be a company contemplated in paragraph (a) in which such person hods a direct interest of 
at least 10%. 
410 As in section 9E(3)(a), LIFO and prop0l1ionate income principles also apply throughout in terms of 
section 9E(4)(a) & (b) of the Act. 
411 De Koker, op cil, p. A-17. 
412 Where the South African resident's shareholding is at least 10%, the aggregate of any withholding tax 
and foreign tax paid on income paid in respect of the foreign dividends included in the gross income of a 
resident, may be deducted from the South African normal tax payable in South Africa by the resident on 
that dividend received. In the case of pOl1folio shareholder (holding less than 10%), only the withholding 
tax paid in respect of the amount of the foreign dividend included in gross income may be deducted from 
the South African normal tax payable. Therefore, no rebate may be claimed by a portfolio shareholder for 
any foreign tax on income imposed in respect of the profit from which the dividend is distributed. The 
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D) Election in respect of gross income inclusion 
A resident may elect that only the net amount of a foreign dividend received (rather than 
the gross up for the taxes paid), after the deduction of foreign taxes, be included in his 
. 413 gross Income. 
In terms of section 9E(6)(a), if a shareholder who holds at least 10% of the equity share 
capital of the company that declares the dividend makes the election, the amount to be 
included in his gross income is the amount of the profits from which the dividend is 
declared, after the deduction of any foreign tax on income and any withholding tax paid 
in respect of the dividends. On the other hand, in terms of section 9E(6)(b), if a portfolio 
shareholder who holds less than 10% of the equity share capital of the company that 
declares the dividend, makes the election, the amount to be included in his gross income 
is the amount of the dividend after the deduction of any withholding tax paid in respect of 
the dividend. 
The rationale of section 9E(6) is to reduce the administrative and compliance burden of 
determining the underlying corporate and withholding tax imposed on the foreign 
dividend.414 
The election must be made on an annual basis and is binding on all foreign dividends 
received by or accrued to the resident during the year of assessment in respect of which it 
is made. If the election is made, a deduction is effectively granted for the foreign taxes 
imposed on the dividend that are included in the gross income of the resident. The foreign 
taxes deducted from the foreign dividend may therefore not be taken into account in 
calculating the amount of the foreign tax credit relief.415 
deduction for foreign tax suffered may not, however, exceed the South African normal tax payable in 
respect of that income. See section 6quat of the Act. 
41 3 See section 9E(6) of the Act. 
414 See de Koker, op cit, p. A-18 . 
415 See section 6quat(IB)(e). 
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It is contended that whether the election will hold any advantages for a resident other than 
administrative benefits, will depend on the particular circumstances of the resident, for 
instance, the rate of South African tax payable on the foreign dividend and the foreign 
rate of tax paid. However, the election is likely to be made where the South African 
resident has an assessed loss, or possibly, where foreign taxes result in unutilisable excess 
credits.416 
E) Dividends distributed to and by unit portfolios 
In terms of section 9E(S)(a)(b),417 where a dividend is declared to any unit portfolio (that 
has a portfolio shareholding in the foreign company), it will be deemed to have been 
declared directly to the unit holders to the extent that such dividend is declared to the 
holders of units by the unit portfolio. The effect of section 9E(S) is that the unit holders, 
will be liable for the tax on the foreign dividends, rather than the unit portfolio itself. 
Unit holders who are natural persons will, however, qualify for the section 10(1 )(i)(xv) 
basic interest and dividend exemption for the foreign dividends included in their gross 
income, if the foreign dividends are not otherwise exempt from tax.4J 8 They will also be 
able to claim section 6quat credits in respect of foreign tax paid on dividends against their 
South African tax liability. 
4 16 A taxable ' foreign dividend ' as defined in section 9E( I) is for STC purposes, excluded from the 
dividends accrued which may be deducted from dividends declared for the purposes of calculating the net 
amount of the company declaring the dividend, in terms of section 648(3). Where a foreign dividend is 
subject to income tax in the hands of a South African resident, the latter will not be able to claim an STC 
credit in respect of the foreign dividend. However, exempt foreign dividends in terms of section 9E(7) are 
deductible at arriving at net dividends declared. 
417 Amended by section 23( 1 )(b) of Act 60 of 200 I, effective retrospectively from 23 February 2000. 
41 8 In terms of section 13( I )(a) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Bi II (B 26-2002), the basic foreign 
dividends and interest from sources outs ide South Africa will only be exempt up to R 1000, effective from 
the commencement of assessment years ending on or after I January 2003, as compared to the previous de 
minimis exemption of R 4000 for individuals below the age of 65 and R 5000 for persons aged above 65 . 
See also SARS Interpretation Note No 2 (second version), 28 August 2002 . 
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F) Deduction of interest incurred in the production of foreign dividends 
Interest incurred in purchasing shares which produce dividends would normally not 
qualify for deduction in terms of the general deduction formula in section 11 (a) and the 
' carrying on of trade' requirement in section 23(g) of the Act. Because taxable foreign 
dividends are ' income' as defined in section 1, expenditure incurred in earning taxable 
foreign dividends meets the requirement of the general deduction formula of being 'in the 
production of income' .419 However, expenditure incurred in earning taxable foreign 
dividends would usually not meet the trade requirement under section 23(g) and would 
therefore not be deductible. 
Section 9E(SA)420 consequently provides a special deduction in order to alleviate the 
problem, notwithstanding the provisions of sections 11 (a) and 23(g). Section 9E(SA) 
overrides the 'trade ' requirement to a certain degree in that it allows a resident to deduct 
interest actually incurred in the production of income derived from both exempt and 
taxable foreign dividends.421 
In terms of section 9E(SA)(a), a deduction is allowed for interest actually incurred in the 
production of foreign dividends against the income of a resident in any year of 
assessment in the form of taxable foreign dividends.422 Thus, interest paid on a loan used 
to purchase the shares in a company that declares a foreign dividend would qualify for the 
deduction. However, in terms of the proviso to section 9E(SA)(a), the amount of interest 
deductible for a particular year of assessment is limited to the amount of income derived 
from foreign dividends during that year of assessment.423 
41 9 See de Koker, op cit, p. A-21. 
420 Amended by section 23( 1)( c) of Act 60 of200 J, effective retrospectively from 23 February 2000 . 
421 See SARS' Income Tax Interpretation Note no 2, I February 2002. 
422 Taxable foreign dividends equal gross foreign dividends less exempt foreign dividends . Exempt foreign 
dividends comprise dividends exempt under section 9E(7) and the de minimis interest and foreign dividend 
exemption available to individuals under section 10(1)(i)(xv) of the Act, which will be limited to R 1000 
from the commencement of assessment years ending on or after I January 2003 . See SARS fncome Tax 
Interpretation Note No 2 (second version) of 28 August 2002. 
423 Previously in the old section 19 of the Act, it was sufficient for such foreign dividends to be included in 
the gross income of the resident. Income for the purpose of section 9E(SA)(a) is defined as gross income 
less exempt income. See section I of the Act. 
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In terms of section 9E(SA)(b), interest incurred over and above the taxable foreign 
dividends is not deductible in that year. Because some of the foreign dividends are 
exempt, a part of the excess interest is deemed to be incurred in the production of that 
exempt income, and is therefore not deductible. The excess interest must first be set off 
against the exempt foreign dividends. The remaining excess interest is carried forward to 
the following tax year and is deductible against taxable foreign dividends in that year. 
SARS has indicated in Interpretation Note no 2424 that if for any year of assessment, the 
amount of exempt foreign dividends is equal to or greater than the amount of excess 
interest, then the balance of excess interest carried forward to the following year of 
assessment is equal to nil. 
The provisions of section 9E(SA) have an inequitable effect in that a full deduction in 
respect of the resident taxpayer's expenses in producing the foreign dividends is not 
granted. As section 9E(SA) only deals with interest incurred in the production of taxable 
foreign dividends, any other expenditure incurred in earning the dividends such as 
commission or professional fees, and any losses arising from outstanding dividends that 
prove to be bad, will be deductible only in the limited circumstances where the holding of 
the shares to earn the dividends constitutes the carrying on of a trade by the resident. 
G) Exempt foreign dividends 
Section 9E(7) exempts in certain circumstances foreign dividends declared or deemed to 
have been declared to South African resident shareholders. It is contended that this is in 
line with international practice, where it is acceptable to completely exempt certain 
foreign dividends in most cases for administrative purposes in circumstances where the 
tax payable on the underlying profits is of such magnitude that a credit of virtually the 
full amount of the domestic tax will have to be granted.425 
424 Dated I February 2002. 
425 See the Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill , 2000 at 3. 
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G-l) The listed company exemption 
Under section 9E(7)( c), foreign dividends declared by a company listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) to a resident and connected person owning less than 
10% of the equity share capital (portfolio investor) will be exempt from tax in South 
Africa. In addition, more than 10% of the shareholding of the company at the time of the 
declaration of the dividend must be held collectively (in aggregate) by residents. If the 
company was not listed on the JSE on 23 February 2000, the exemption will apply upon 
approval by the Commissioner, which he may grant on application by the company, 
having regard to whether or not the profits of the company were generated in a designated 
country and the tax rate at which the profits from which the dividend was declared was, 
or will be taxed. 
The rationale for this exemption is to address the administrative implications of the tax in 
respect of a large number of portfolio shareholders and its potential impact on the South 
African market and economy. In addition, the requirement for approval by the 
Commissioner was introduced to remove the possibility of foreign companies operating 
in low tax rate countries listing on the JSE after 23 February 2000 in order to exploit this 
. 426 exemptIOn. 
G-2) The designated country exemption 
Section 9E(7)( d) exempts any dividend distributed directly or indirectly to the South 
African resident who holds a qualifying interest (at least 10% shareholding) in a foreign 
company to the extent that the profits from which the dividend is declared are or will be 
subject to tax in a designated country at a company income tax statutory rate of at least 
27%.427 
426 See Explanatory Memorandum at 4. 
427 The statutory tax rate is \3,5% for capital gains. See the analysis of the designated country test under 
the CFE exemption of section 9D(9)(a) in note 342. Section 9E(9)(7)(d) was amended from its original 
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G-3) The CFE exemption 
In terms of section 9E(7)(e), any dividend declared by a company will be exempt to the 
extent that the profits from which the dividend is distributed: 
i) Relates to the income which is or will be included In the Income of the 
shareholder of such company in terms of section 9D.428 
ii) Is or will be subject to tax in the Republic in terms of the Act;429 
iii) I-lave otherwise been included in the taxable income of the shareholders in terms 
of paragraph (a) of the definition of ' foreign dividends' ;430 
iv) Arose directly or indirectly from any dividends declared by any company which is 
a resident. 43 I 
G-4) Dividend exemption under section 9E(7)(f) 
Section 9E(7)(f) exempts any dividend declared by a company out of profits derived by 
such company, either: 
• By way of any foreign dividend which is exempt from tax in terms of the provisions 
of section 9E(7); 
• Or any dividend which would have been exempt had it been declared on or after 23 
February 2000. 
introduction so that profits do not need to have been generated in a designated country, but only need to be 
subject to tax in a designated country at the required rates. 
428 Thus, the provision deals with the div idend exemption on income already subject to tax in the South 
African res ident's income as a result of the CFE rules. 
429 This provision deals with the exemption on income already subject to tax in South Africa under the 
source rule. 
430 This provision exempts dividends already subject to ta x in South Africa in the shareholder 's hands as 
deemed foreign dividends in terms of section 64C. 
43 1 This provision deals with the situation where for instance, a foreign company holds shares in a South 
Africa company, and therefore receives dividends on profits distributed by the South African company. 
Section 9E(7)(e)(iv) thus prevents the situation in which the dividends declared by the foreign company to 






G-5) Ministerial exemption 
• The Minister may grant exemption from the application of section 9E in respect of a 
project approved by the Minister;432 
• The Minister may withdraw any exemption granted in terms of section 8A, in the 
event of any condition not being complied with.433 
H) Currency conversion rule 
In terms of section 9E( 1 0), the foreign dividend must be converted into South African 
Rands at the rate of exchange ruling on the date the dividend accrued to the South 
African resident. For the purposes of determining the foreign tax credit of section 6quat, 
the foreign taxes paid are converted to South African Rand at the same rate used for the 
dividend. In this case then, there is consistency between the conversion rates used for the 
conversion of the dividend and for the conversion of the foreign tax paid on it. 
3.1.5 Income from foreign sources 
Foreign income that is required to be included in the South African resident's taxable 
income may also comprise the resident ' s own receipts and accruals.434 However, in terms 
of section 9F, the South African tax consequences in respect of the foreign income 
derived by the South African resident carrying trade outside South Africa (for instance 
through a branch) depend on whether the resident is a natural person or a company.435 
An exemption is provided for in section 9F(2), read together with section 10(1 )(kA), for 
an amount of income 'received by or accrued ... to any company which is a resident from 
a source outside the Republic, which is not deemed to be from a source in the Republic, 
432 See section 9E(8A) of the Act. 
433 See section 9E(8B) of the Act. The effec t of this tax sparing concession is that the taxpayer will be 
able to repatriate the benefits of the tax incentives enjoyed in the foreign country. Previously, such benefits 
would have been lost when the dividends were brought onshore. 
434 In fact because of the worldwide basis of ta xation, the resident's income from anywhere is in principle 
required to be included in his 'gross income' as defined in section 1 of the Act. 
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which has been or will be subject to tax in a designated country at a statutory rate of at 
least 27 per cent. .. without any right of recovery by any person ... ,436 
Thus the section 9F(2) exemption for the South African resident's foreign source income 
is only available to a company. It is not available to a natural person who is therefore 
required to include his foreign receipts and accruals in his South African taxable income 
though they were earned in a designated country. The South African individual in this 
case only has to claim a rebate in telms of section 6quat for the foreign tax paid. The 
effect of this discrimination between natural persons and companies provided in section 
9F(2) is that the South African tax payable by two taxpayers who earn the same amount 
of foreign income differs materially.437 
In terms of section 20 of the Act, losses generated by foreign trade (for instance carrying 
on trade through a foreign branch) are ring-fenced. Thus, if the foreign trade results in an 
assessed loss, such loss may be set off against other foreign trade income but may not be 
set off against any income from carrying on a trade in South Africa.438 
A) Currency conversion rule 
In terms of section 250439 of the Act, the amount of taxable income derived by a resident 
from a source outside South Africa (other than by way of foreign dividend) must be 
determined in the relevant currency of the country from which the income is derived, and 
435 See Kolitz, op cit, 2001,15 Taxplanning 127. 
436 In terms of section 9F(l), the requirements for the qualification as a designated country are the same as 
provided in section 9E(8), and the same provision as regards progressive tax rates has been legislated for in 
section 9F(2). 
437 See Kolitz, op cit, p. 128. In contrast, the designated country exemptions for foreign dividends in 
section 9E(7)(d) and for the net income of a CFE in section 9D(9)(a) are available for both companies and 
individuals. 
438 See Huxham and Haupt, op cit, p. 277. The intention of SARS is to protect the South African tax base 
against the use of losses to shelter South African taxable income and the subsequent conversion of the 
branch to a subsidiary, which may then meet the requirements of the business establishment test. See 
Casey, op cit, p. 4. 
439 Inserted by section 33 of Act 59 of 2000 and operative with effect from years of assessment 






the taxable income must be converted to the South African Rand by applying the ruling 
exchange rate on the' last day of the relevant year of assessment'. 440 
Section 25D has also provided guidelines for calculating foreign exchange gains and 
losses relating to income derived by a South African taxpayer from a foreign branch (that 
is a permanent establishment). If the branch keeps its financial records in the currency of 
the country in which the branch ' s permanent establishment is situated, thus, the net 
income of the branch is converted to Rands at the appropriate rate on the last day of the 
South African's taxpayer financial year.44I However, if the foreign branch does not 
qualify as a permanent establishment, or if it keeps its financial records in a currency 
other than the official currency of the country in which it is located, then the income and 
expenditure of the branch must be calculated in South African Rand on ongoing basis.442 
B) The timing of the income inclusion 
The ruling exchange rates that are required to be used for the conversion calculation of 
section 25D may not be related to the rates ruling on the date that the funds are finally 
remitted to South Africa. This is in terms of section 9F(3), which requires that if the 
foreign amount received by or accrued to any person443 may not be repatriated in South 
Africa because of exchange control restrictions in the country of source, it will not be 
included in the taxable income of the South African resident until the restriction no 
longer applies.444 And as with section 9D, the question may arise that if the amount 
remitted actually differs from the amount calculated in terms of section 25D, will the 
provisions of section 24I apply? The answer to this query lies in section 6quat(4) dealing 
with the conversion rule applicable on the foreign tax payable. 
440 In terms of section 25D(a), the Commissioner may also approve any other averaged rate, taking into 
account the ruling exchange rates during such year of assessment. 
441 See section 250(a) of the Act. 
442 See section 25 O(b) of the Act. 
443 Contrary to section 9F(2), section 9F(3) applies to both companies and natural persons. 
444 Section 9F(3) also applies in terms of source country restriction imposed on the repatriation of CFE's 
net income in terms of section of section 90. 
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Thus, the conversion rules of section 2SD, section 9F(3) and the rules applicable in 
section 90(6) and 9E(10) demonstrate that the net tax payable in South Africa is not only 
influenced by different tax rates, but is also affected by the ruling exchange rates. 
3.2 The United Kingdom 
3.2.1 The controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules 
In trod uction 
CFC legislation was introduced in the United Kingdom by the Finance Act of 1984, as a 
direction-based legislation, that is, it could only operate when the Board of Inland 
Revenue made a direction. The legislation has been subject to a number of changes in the 
most recent budgets. In the Finance Act 1998, changes were made to bring the legislation 
within the Corporation Tax Self-Assessment, as well as certain changes to the exempt 
activities test for holding companies.445 
As a result, the legislation then applied automatically where all the necessary conditions 
are met, rather than only following a board's direction. United Kingdom's companies 
would thus be required to include details of significant interests in CFCs in their tax 
returns and to self-assess any CFC tax due. The Finance Act 2000 brought further 
changes in the exempt activities test, introduced measures to counter the use of designer 
tax rates and widened the definition of control. The rules governing the acceptable 
distribution policy exemption were also changed both in the Finance Act 1999 and the 
Finance Act 2001.446 
445 See Leegaard , T, "CFC JegisJation -· Recent Changes to the Acceptable Distribution Policy Exemption", 
2001, lBFD, p. 293. 
446 The changes made by the finance Act 1999 apply to dividends paid on or after 9 March 1999, and the 
changes made by section 82 of the Finance Act 200 I apply to dividends paid by a CFC on or after 7 March 
2001 for accounting periods ending on or after that date. 
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The analysis of the CFC rules in this section from the United Kingdom perspective will 
focus specifically on the definition of a CFC, the basis of charge and the available 
exemptions from the CFC rules. 
A) Definition of a CFC 
In terms section 747(1 )(2) ofICT A 1988, a company which is resident outside the United 
Kingdom, controlled by persons resident in the United Kingdom, and subject to a 'lower 
level of taxation' in the territory in which it is 'resident' is a CFC.447 
The basic concept of the legislation is that it makes a charge on United Kingdom 
shareholders of companies ' resident in low tax jurisdictions, CFCs on a proportionate 
interest of the company's profits, but not its capital gains.448 
For a foreign company to be controlled, United Kingdom shareholders must have an 
interest of more than 50%.449 The United Kingdom rules, however, follow a wider 
definition of control following the changes in the Finance Act 2000. Thus, with effect 
from 21 March 2000, 'control' of a company is defined for these purposes as the power 
of a person to secure that the affairs of the company are conducted in accordance his 
wishes, either by means of shareholding or voting power in or in relation to the company 
or any other company, or by virtue of any powers conferred by the articles of association 
or other document regulating the company or any other company. Two or more persons 
together having such power are taken as controlling the company. 
In determining whether a person has such control, a wide range of rights and powers is 
attributed to him, in so far as not already so attributed.45o These include future rights and 
44 7 In terms of section 249 of Finance Act 1994, a company that is non-resident as a result of a double tax 
agreement entered into by the United Kingdom, is treated as resident outside the United Kingdom. 
448 See Leegaard, op cit, p. 294. There are provisions in the capital gains tax legislation dealing with the 
attribution of capital gains of closely CFCs to United Kingdom resident shareholders. 
449 See section 756(3) of ICT A 1988. 
450 Section 7550(5)-(1 l)ofiCTA 1988. 
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powers of certain connected and other persons. The ownership requires in the definition 
of control may be direct, indirect or constructi ve.451 
Consequently, if there is less than 50% United Kingdom control, the control test is 
nevertheless satisfied where there are two persons who control the company together. The 
requirements are that the United Kingdom resident person controls at least 40% of the 
company and that the other person controls at least 40%, but not more than 55%.452 
The extended definition of control reflected the fact that it is increasingly common for 
multinational companies to CatTY on business through joint venture companies.453 
A-I) Lower level of tax 
i) Designer rate oftax regimes 
In terms of the United Kingdom CFC legislation, the foreign company must be resident in 
a country where there is a lower rate of tax than in the United Kingdom. Currently, low 
tax is defined as a foreign tax liability (actually paid) in respect of profits (other than 
capital profits) that is less than 75% of the United Kingdom tax payable in the same 
accounting period had the CFC been resident in the United Kingdom.454 
Because some offshore countries have introduced regimes that are specifically designed 
to enable companies to avoid United Kingdom CFC rules, anti-avoidance rules were 
introduced by the Finance Act 2000 in the United Kingdom, aimed at dealing with the 
application of 'designer tax rates'. Thus, in terms of the 'designer tax rates' provisions,455 
451 See Rohatgi , op CiL, p. 390; leTA 1988, section 7550; Finance Act 2000, Sch 3 J para 4(1); see also 
Saunders & Antczak, op cil, p. 160. 
452 See Finance Act 2000, Sch 31 para 2. 
453 See the analysis of the change of the definition of ' control' in the United Kingdom by Medori, e, "U K 
to strengthen eFe legislation", 2000, Tax Planning International Review, p. 11'12. 
454 See Finance Act 1998, Sch 17 para 5. 
455 Effective from October 1999. 
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companies in certain listed jurisdictions, which allow the use of negotiable tax rates, will 
be subject to CFC rules regardless of the level of taxes actually paid.456 
B) Basis of charge 
The United Kingdom CFC rates affect only companies457 resident in the United 
Kingdom. Where a part of a CFC's 'chargeable profits,458 is apportioned459 to the United 
Kingdom resident company, a sum equal to corporate tax at the ' appropriate rate ,460 on 
those profits, less the part of the CFE' s ' creditable tax ,461 (if any) so apportioned, is 
chargeable on the company as if it were corporation tax .462 
456 See Finance Act 2000, Sch 31 para 3; see also Rohatgi, op cit, p. 390. Currently, the countries listed 
under the 'designer tax rates' regimes are Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, Gibraltar and freland. 
457 This is not applicable to individuals as there are special provisions dealing with individuals' use of low 
tax jurisdictions such as powers under section 739 et seq. ICTA 1988 to assess individuals on income and 
benefits derived from the transfer of assets abroad. 
458 The term 'chargeable profits' of a CFC for an accounting period are the total profits (but excluding 
chargeable gains), as defined for corporate tax purposes, on which on the assumption set out in ICTA 1988, 
Sch 24 and after allowing for any available deduction from these profits, it would be chargeable to 
corporate tax for the period. Double tax agreement exemptions which may have applied to income of the 
CFC are of no application in relation to the computation of chargeable profits. See Bricom Holdings Ltd v 
OR, CA 1997, 70 TC 272 . 
459 Prior to the commencement of self-assessment, an apportionment of chargeable profits and creditable 
tax is made according to the respective interests of those with an interest in the CFC at any time during the 
'accounting period ' in question. The Board may attribute to each such person an interest corresponding to 
his interest in the CFC's assets available for distribution in a winding up. If the CFC is not a trading 
company, the Board may treat a loan creditor as having an interest to the extent to which the CFC's income 
has been, or is available to be, applied against his loan capital or debt. Interest held in a fiduciary or 
representative capacity may be apportioned among identifiable beneficiaries. The Board has a general 
power, subject to those specific provisions, to make the necessary apportionment on a just and reasonable 
basis. See section 752 of ICT A 1988; see also Saunders and Antczak, op cit, p. 166. 
460 The 'appropriate rate' is the full corporate tax rate (or average rate) applicable to the accounting period 
in which ends the CFC's 'accounting period' whose 'chargeable profits' are subject to the apportionment . 
See Finance Act 1998, Sch 17, para 1(4)(5). 
461 The ' creditable tax' ofa CFC's accounting period is the aggregate of: 
The double tax relief, in respect of tax on income brought into account in determining chargeable profits of 
the period, which would be available on the assumption set out in ICTA 1988, Sch 24 and assuming the 
company to be liable to corporate tax on those chargeable profits ; 
• The set-off available under ICTA 1988, section 7(2) (sums received under deduction of income 
tax) against those chargeable profits on the assumption, Sch 24 ; 
• The amount of any income or corporate tax actually charged in respect of those chargeable profits , 
less any such tax which has been or fall s to be repaid to the CFe. See Finance Act 1998, Schl7, 
para 6(6). 
462 A credit is allowed for the foreign taxes paid by the CFC on the attributed income. The United 
Kingdom tax paid under the CFC rules is included in the underlying tax credit when the dividends are 
subsequently received from the cre. The CFC trading losses can in certain circumstances be can'ied 
forward indefinitely. See Savory, J, "UK CfCs leave Room for Manoeuvre", June 1999, International Tax 
Review. 
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No charge arises however, unless at least 25% of the CFC's 'chargeable profits' for the 
period in question is apportioned either to the United Kingdom resident company or to 
persons 'connected' or 'associated' with it.463 
C) The exemption from the charge 
There are a number of exemptions from application of the CFC legislation.464 The CFC 
charge may be avoided if the CFC satisfies any of the following tests: 
i) De minimis test 
This exception applies if the total chargeable profits of the CFC attributable to the United 
Kingdom shareholders do not exceed UKP 50,000 in a twelve-month accounting period, 
or less than 25% of the income attributed to them. 
ii) 'Excluded country regulations' test 
The United Kingdom provides a 'white list' of non-low tax countries, and a second list of 
conditionally excluded countries, under its excluded countries regulations. Thus, if a 
company is exempted under that list, the CFC rules do not apply to them, provided not 
more than 10% of its commercially quantified income (pre-tax) is derived from non-local 
sources.465 
The rationale for introducing the 'white list' is probably an assumption that there is no 
involvement in United Kingdom tax avoidance, given the territories listed and the nature 
of such company' s income. 
463 See Finance Act 1998, Sch 17, para 1(3)(4). 
464 See Finance Act 1998, Sch 17, para 3. 
465 See Rohatgi, op cit, p. 390. The non-local source income is also subject to a de minimis threshold of 
UK? 50,000. 
188 
iii) The 'acceptable distribution policy' (ADP) test 
A CFC is excepted from apportionment under this test if it pursues an acceptable 
dividend distribution policy exemption for the accounting period.466 
The basis for the acceptable distribution policy exemption is that there will be no charge 
on the United Kingdom shareholder company, provided that the foreign company remits 
not less than 90% of its net chargeable profits in the form of dividends.467 The 
distributions must be made within 18 months of the ending of the foreign company's 
relevant accounting period. If this test is satisfied, then the accounting period to which the 
dividend is related, is an ADP exemption period. 
A dividend paid by a CFC after 8 March 1999 for an accounting period ending after that 
date is disregarded for these purposes to the extent that the relevant profits in relation to 
the dividend derive from dividends or other distributions paid to the CFC at any time to 
which section 208 of the ICT A 1988 applied, or would have applied had the CFC then 
been United Kingdom resident. A dividend paid by a CFC to a company is also 
disregarded for these purposes unless it is taken into account in computing the recipient's 
company's income for corporate tax and in relation to a dividend paid after 6 March 
2001, for an accounting period ending after that date, it is not so chargeable under Case I 
of Schedule D, or if so chargeable, the payment is not involved in a United Kingdom tax 
avoidance scheme. 
When the CFC's accounts are drawn up in a foreign currency, they do not have to be 
translated into sterling for these purposes. A dividend equaling 90% of the appropriate 
foreign currency profits will meet the test. 468 
466 Accounting periods of trading CFCs beginning after 27 November 1995, and of non-trading CFCs 
ending after 29 November 1993. 
467 For the ADP exemption to apply, the dividends from the CFC must be paid to United Kingdom 
residents. It is not sufficient to make distributions to intermediary holding companies resident outside the 
United Kingdom. However, if such a company makes a distribution to United Kingdom residents out of 
dividends received from a CFC, the test may be satisfied. See Leegaard, op cit, p. 295. 
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iv) Exempt activities test 
The objective of this test is to exempt companIes with no real presence or genuine 
commercial operation (such as a business establishment) in the country of residence. This 
test requires that the foreign company is effectively managed469 abroad and not engaged 
in non-qualifying business activities.47o 
The foreign company should also not receive substantial dividend income from other 
CFCs, unless they are themselves engaged in exempt activities. There are also special 
rules applicable to holding companies (be they holding companies, local holding 
companies or superior holding companies), provided the companies held fall within the 
exempt activities test. 
v) The motive test 
The CFC charge may also be avoided in the United Kingdom if the United Kingdom 
company can demonstrate that the CFC's primary purpose is bona fide commercial 
activities, and not to achieve a reduction of United Kingdom taxes or to divert profits 
from the United Kingdom. 
vi) The public quotation test 
This condition is met by the CFC if it is a publicly listed company in a recognised stock 
exchange in its country of residence and the public beneficially holds at least 35% of its 
468 See Saunders & Antczak, op cil, p. 277. 
469 The requirement that the CFe's business affairs be 'effectively managed' in the territory of residence is 
not regarded as satisfied unless the number of employees in the territory is adequate to deal with the 
volume of the company's business, and unless any services provided for persons resident outside the 
territory (other than through a branch or agency liable to the United Kingdom tax on its profits or gains, or 
for arm's length consideration through any other person so liable) are not in fact performed in the United 
Kingdom (or are merely incidental to services performed outside the United Kingdom). See Saunders, op 
cil, p. 185. 
470 Non-qualifying business income includes income from (i) investment business (passive income); (ii) 
dealing in goods for delivery to or from the United Kingdom or to or from connected or associated persons 
(e.g, re-invoicing companies); and (iii) certain wholesale, distributive and financial businesses. The Finance 
Act 2000 has extended the provisions to include all intra-group services. See Rohatgi, op cil, p. 39 J . 
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voting shares. Moreover, the 'principal members,47l of the company should not hold 
more than 85% of the voting shares. 
3.2.2 The taxation of foreign dividends 
Foreign dividends are fully taxable in the United Kingdom on the gross amount, subject 
to tax credits for foreign taxes paid. Unilateral relief is available in respect of foreign 
taxes suffered on a per-source limitation basis. The United Kingdom also grants direct 
and indirect tax credits on dividends received from a foreign company and its lower-tier 
subsidiaries, provided that the United Kingdom corporate shareholder holds at least 10% 
voting control at each leve1.472 
Thus, individuals and companies with less than 10% participation rights are only entitled 
to a direct tax credit. A United Kingdom company may also elect to claim the foreign tax 
credit as an expense. However, it cannot elect to take part as credit, and part as expense. 
3.3 The United States 
3.3.1 The controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules 
Introduction 
The United States enacted comprehensive anti-avoidance legislation III 1962 
(subsequently expanded under the Tax Reform Act 1986). Subpart F, the familiar name 
for sections 951 through 964 of the code473 consists of a set of special rules for taxing 
certain United States shareholders of CFCs. 
471 A principal member is a person who, together with his associates, own more than 5% of the voting 
power of the company. 
472 See Rohatgi, op cit, p. 330. 
473 The Code refers to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 
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The prOVISIOns of Subpart F were introduced in an effort to prevent United States 
taxpayers from using foreign corporations to defer United States federal income tax on 
. ~. . 474 certam loreign source Income. 
Ordinarily, foreign corporations are subject to United States federal income tax only to 
the extent that they earn: 
• Income from a trade or business within the United States; or 
• United States source income. 
Thus, prior to the adoption of Subpart F, a United States taxpayer could effectively defer 
United States federal income tax on certain foreign source income by ensuring that such 
income was earned through a foreign corporation. The foreign source income earned by 
the foreign subsidiary of the United States taxpayer would generally not be subject to 
United States federal income tax until such income was repatriated. As a result, the 
foreign operations of the United States corporations could avoid United States federal 
income tax indefinitely. 
Subpart F was introduced to prevent such indefinite and potentially infinite deferral. 
Subpart F does not alter the United States federal income tax consequences for 
corporations. Rather, Subpart F alters the United States federal income tax rules for 
certain United States shareholders (US shareholders) of certain foreign corporations 
(CFCs), requiring such shareholders to recognise as income certain earnings of such 
foreign corporations as though such earnings had been distributed as current dividends. 
The methodology for determining if there is a CFC is based on the followings: 
• Define certain United States owned corporations as CFCs; 
• Identify 10% shareholders who are United States persons (US shareholders); 
• Tax US shareholders currently on offending income, known as 'Subpart F income,.475 
474 See Westin, R, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 2000, p. 469. 
475 Ibid, p. 470. 
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The purpose of this section IS to analyse from the United States perspective, what 
constitutes a CFC, the charge to the US shareholders on the earnings of the CFC and the 
available exemption from the CFC rules. 
A) Definition of a CFC 
A CFC for United States tax purposes is a foreign corporation over 50% of whose stock 
is held by US shareholders (either alone or collectively) in terms of vote or value 
(whichever is greater) at any time during its taxable year.476 
A US shareholder is defined as a United States person, who directly or indirectly, owns 
10% or more of the foreign company's voting interest.477 A United States person includes 
a United States citizen or resident individual, a domestic partnership, a domestic 
. d 478 corporatJOn, an an estate or trust. 
The foreign corporation must be controlled for an interrupted period of at least 30 days 
during its fiscal year for the CFC to apply.479 Both the control and ownership tests 
include direct, indirect and constructive ownership rules. The 50% ownership and voting 
requirement of section 957(a), coupled with the 10% voting threshold for United States 
shareholders, determine the patterns of ownership test that create CFCs. If non-US 
shareholders (and this includes United States persons who hold less than 10% of the 
voting power) own at least 50% of the value and voting power of a foreign corporation, 
then it is not a CFC. 
476 See section 957(a) of the Code. It is argued that this definition is disjunctive. A preponderance either of 
voting power or of stock by value constitutes control. Thus, because more than 50% of voting power or 
value is required for control , ownership divided exactly equally (i.e, 50-50) between United States and 
foreign persons leaves a foreign corporation beyond the reach of Subpart F. See Isenbergh, J, " Foreign 
Income: foundation of US lnternational Taxation", 2001 , Tax Management, p. A-66 . 
477 See section 9 51 (b) of the Code. 
478 See section 7701 (a)(30) of the Code. 
479 See Rohatgi , op cit, p. 391 . 
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Thus, if a United States citizen owns 50% of the value and voting power of a foreign 
corporation and another six unrelated United States citizens each own less than 10%, it is 
not a CFc.480 
The smallest number of United States persons that can hold the entire ownership of a 
foreign corporation without creating a CFC is 7. The smallest number of United States 
persons that can hold equal ownership interests in a foreign corporation without creating 
a CFC is 11 (each owning 9,09% of the stoCk).481 
The treasury regulations provide that in determining the voting power, the facts and 
circumstances of each case must be taken into account.482 The regulations add that US 
shareholders will be treated as having control: 
• If they have the power to elect a majority of the board of directors; 
• If they have the power to elect all the members of the board of directors and also have 
the power to directly or through an agent to break a deadlock of the board of 
directors; or 
• If in some other way they can exercise indirectly the powers of a board of directors.483 
B) The income of a CFC subject to the United States federal income taxation 
Current taxation of US shareholders of CFCs arises under section 951 (a). Certain profits 
(Subpart F income) of the CFC are taxable currently on the US shareholders on the last 
day of its fiscal year, even when they are not distributed (ownership test).484 These profits 
are attributed to them pro rata to their shareholding (direct or indirect) to the extent that 
they are entitled to the profit distribution, and included in their tax return. 
480 Thus, in the case of Framatone Connectors USA, Inc et al v Commissioner (case cited in the World 
Trade Adviser, March 2002, p. 12), the Tax Court ruled in favour of the Inland Revenue Service and held 
that a foreign corporation was not a CFC for the year in issue because its sole US shareholder did not own 
more than 50% of the voting power or the value of the foreign corporation . 
48 1 See Isenbergh, p. A-66. 
482 See Regs. S 1.957-I(b). 
483 See decided cases on voting power such as Kraus v Commissioner, 490 F. 2d 898 (2d Cir. 1974); 
C.C.A , Inc v Commissioner, 64 TC, 137 (1976); and Koehring Co v Commissioner, 538 F. 2d 313 (7lh Cir. 
1978), 
484 Section 952 (a) of the Code. 
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Subpart F or 'tainted income' is generally defined to include, among other things, 
'foreign base income'. In turn, foreign base company income includes 'foreign personal 
holding company income', which is made up of seven general categories of income, 
namely: 
• Dividends, interest, rents, royalties and annuities (passive income); 
• Gains from certain property transactions; 
• Gains from commodity transactions; 
• Foreign currency gains; 
• Income equivalent to interest; 
• Certain net income from notional principal contracts and payments In lieu of 
dividends received in certain equity lending transactions.485 
An important exception exists to the general inclusion of dividend and interest income as 
foreign personal holding company income. Section 954(c)(3)(A) of the Code provides 
that foreign personal holding company income will not include dividends and interest 
received by a CFC from a related person (generally referring to ownership of stock 
representing 50% or more of the voting power or value of the related corporation) which: 
• is either a corporation created or organized under the laws of the same foreign 
country as such CFC; and 
• has a substantial part of its assets used in its trade or business located in such same 
fi . 486 orelgn country. 
This so-called same country exception ensures that a US shareholder will not be taxed 
under Subpart F on dividends received by a CFC from a related corporation where the US 
shareholder would not have been taxed on undistributed income had it owned the stock of 
the related corporation directly. Accordingly, the subsidiaries of a United States 
corporation operating within a single country may transfer funds between themselves as 
485 See section 954 of the Code. 
486 Similarly, rents and royalties are excluded from foreign personal holding company income if received 
by a CFC from a related entity for the use of property within the same country in which the CFC is 
organised. See section 954 (c)(3)(A)(ii) of the Code. 
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required by their respective operating needs without adversely affecting such United 
States corporation's federal income tax liability.487 
i) Case law 
In Textron v Commissioner,488 the Tax Court held that a United States corporation that 
required to place the shares it acquired in a United Kingdom corporation into a voting 
trust, must still include in its income currently the Subpart F income earned by the United 
Kingdom corporation, because the trust was a grantor trust. 
In 1989, Textron, a United States corporation, acquired 95% of the shares of Avdel, a 
United Kingdom corporation that had been a competitor. The Federal Trade 
Commissioner sought to enjoin the acquisition as a restraint of trade and, pending 
determination of the case, the US District Court required Textron to place the shares into 
a voting trust. Under the terms of the voting trust, the rights to all voting power of the 
shares were vested in an independent trustee, and Textron had no right to manage the 
operations of A vdel. Any dividends from A vdel, were paid by the trustee to Textron after 
deduction of associated expenses. 
It was decided that A vdel was a CFC because United States persons, that is, the trust held 
by 95% of the shares. However, the Tax Couti held that the Subpart F income would not 
be currently included in Textron's income under the CFC regime, because it did not hold 
the Avdel shares directly or through a foreign entity. Even though the income was not 
includable to Textron under the anti-avoidance rules, the Tax Court went on to hold that 
the voting trust was a ' grantor trust' under United States law, and therefore, the Subpart F 
income included in the income of the trust, as a US shareholder of the CFC, would flow 
through to Textron as grantor of the trust. 
487 Foreign ta x credits are granted to corporate taxpayers for the taxes paid by the CFe. Subsequent 
dividends are excluded from income. Unused CFC losses can be carried forward indefinitely. See Rohatgi, 




The gross foreign base company income (excluding oil-related income) is subject to 
several exclusions. For instance, CFC rules do not apply in cases where either: 
• The effective rate of foreign tax is 90% or more of the maximum United States 
federal corporate tax rate (currently 90% of35% which is equal 31,5%);489 or 
• If the Subpart F income does not exceed the lower of 5% of its total gross income and 
US$ 1 million per year (de minimus rule).49o However, if the Subpart F income total 
exceeds 70% of its gross income, then the entire gross income (including otherwise 
exempt income) is deemed to be tainted (de maxim us rule).491 
3.3.2 The taxation of foreign dividends 
Foreign dividends are generally taxable in the United States. A foreign tax credit is 
available in respect of foreign taxes suffered. If the United States resident owns more 
than 10% of the shares in the foreign company, it will be entitled to a foreign tax credit in 
respect of both the underlying corporate taxes suffered and the withholding taxes suffered 
on its proportionate share of the profits from which the dividend is declared. 
Foreign tax credits in the United States are subject to certain limitations and anti-
avoidance rules. For instance, the credit for foreign taxes paid or deemed paid is limited 
to the United States tax on the foreign source portion of the worldwide income based on 
separate limitation or 'baskets'. Any unused tax credits may be carried back two years 
and forward five years.492 
488 117 TC 67. 
489 See section 954(b)(4) of the Code. 
490 See section 954(b)(3)(A) of the Code. 
491 See section 954(b)(3)(8) of the Code. See also Rohatgi, op cil, p. 392. 
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Concluding remarks 
The analysis of the concept of residence for income tax purposes in this part of the 
research has mainly highlighted the point that many jurisdictions are using or 
emphasising different formal or subjective criteria, no matter how incoherent and 
ineffective they may be, in their definition of residence for tax purposes, and would leave 
the treaty law the task of resolving overlapping taxation which may result from such 
domestic taxation. 
As this study shows in relation to particular countries considered, the South African tax 
system has become more uniform, by adopting a single denomination of residence (based 
on two factors) for individuals. However, the problem remains in relation to the 
application of ordinary residence, in which reliance on the existing case law has not 
eliminated the confusion created by the necessity to infer intent in determining the 'real 
home' in a particular case. 
Furthermore, the physical presence test relies heavily on classification principles of 
mathematics. This is similar to some extent to the 'substantial presence' test adopted in 
the United States as one of the criteria for the determination of the individual's residence. 
On the other hand, the scope of residence in the United Kingdom tax law is extremely 
wide probably because it has been fragmented into different classes and application. In 
many ways, the United Kingdom tax system has become impractical, especially in the 
light of the growth of multinational companies and cross-border movement. Grosvenor 
states that with regard to individuals, taking into consideration the vast range of people 
who work and visit the United Kingdom, a single residency principle may simplify 
calculations.493 
492 See Rohatgi, op cit, p. 333. 
493 See Grosvenor, R, "A Discussion on the Concept and Significance of Residence for Individuals, 
Partnerships, Companies and Trusts for Tax Purposes" in www.jumper.demon.co.uk/rev2htm 
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With regard to the residence of legal entities, the analysis throughout this research has 
shown that it is justifiable for jurisdictions (including South Africa and the United 
Kingdom) to adopt multiple tests for ascertaining their residence for tax purposes. 
Although the exclusive use of the place of incorporation test such as in the United States 
for income tax purposes has the merit of providing certainty and predictability for 
corporate taxpayers, it is however arbitrary, mechanistic and unrelated to economic 
reality.494 This test is subject to abuse and therefore largely within the control and 
manipulation of the taxpayer. Prebble argues that the place of incorporation test is even 
more formalistic than a rule that says that people remain forever resident for fiscal 
49-purposes where they are born. ) 
In South Africa, the understanding of the place of effective management is now better 
understood under the Interpretation Note.496 However, the ease with which the place of 
effective management, the central management and control and the place of incorporation 
tests can be manipulated without necessarily substantially altering the wayan entity 
conducts its business is still a matter of great concern. Thus, an approach to the definition 
of residence for legal entities is dependent on a shared acceptance by the international 
community. 
Doernberg497 argues that if it were deemed desirable to change the definition of residence 
for legal entities for instance in the light of technological advances, one possibility would 
be to extent conventional residence tests to more closely consider the residence of 
participants (be it shareholders, directors or managers) in determining the residence of an 
entity, without completely forsaking the traditional tests. 
While this approach may be effective in some cases, it may be unjustifiable to adopt a 
broad definition of residence of legal entities in terms of residence of investors. 
494 See Arnold , op cit, p. 66; Yann, op cit, p. 733 . 
495 Prebble, J, "Ectopia, Tax Law and International Taxation", J 997, British Tax Review, no 3, p. 389. 
496 See Interpretation Note no 6, dated 26 March 2002. 
497 See Doernberg, R & Hinnekens, L, Electronic Commerce and International Taxation, 1999, p. 333. 
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Sandler498 comments that first, the tax net would be widened to include all foreign 
incorporated corporations including those that conduct legitimate business activities. 
Moreover, there would be practical problems with the enforcement of taxation of foreign 
companies. It may be difficult to gather the information necessary to determine their tax 
liability, and once determined, the collection of tax would be difficult unless the company 
voluntarily complied or had assets in the jurisdiction that imposed the tax. 
This part of the research has also focused on the tax implications derived from the 
application of the residence tax system. In the jurisdictions studied, that are South Africa, 
United Kingdom and the United States, it has been shown that specific anti-avoidance 
measures have been implemented in order to prevent resident taxpayers from deferring 
tax on foreign source income. It is argued that in the absence of international cooperation, 
countries must preserve the integrity of their income tax systems through unilateral 
actions. 
With the increasing mobility of capital comes the increasing ability of residents of a 
country to avoid its income tax provisions. To counter this, the countries considered have 
implemented anti-avoidance measures such as the controlled foreign entity (CFE) rules to 
restrict the use of low tax regimes by residents. Such measure is generally designed to 
preserve equity within a domestic tax regime in much the same manner as transfer pricing 
provIsions. 
As this research has shown, the CFE rules for all countries share one common feature, 
which is the taxing mechanism. Thus, in all CFE rules, celtain income of certain foreign 
corporations is taxable to the resident shareholders of such corporations as the income is 
earned without any need for the income to be distributed. In addition, be it in South 
Africa, United Kingdom or in the United States, the application of the CFE rules is 
limited to foreign corporations that are controlled by residents or in which residents own 
a substantial interest. Accordingly, when the income of the CFE is not taxed because of 
498 See Sandler, D, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Corporation Legislation, J 998, 2ed , p. 4. 
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the application of some kind of relief, it is finally subject to tax in the residence country 
when repatriated in the form of foreign dividends. 
This study shows that the scope of the operation of the CFE rules is limited depending on 
the jurisdiction in question, to various forms of passive, mobile income and perceived 
abuses of certain related-company transactions. On the other hand, there may also be an 
exemption where the CFE is engaged in 'legitimate' location specific business activities 
in the tax haven. 
With the implementation of the CFE rules in South Africa, the tax laws have become too 
complex for companies with foreign affiliates to argue for exemption, because of for 
instance, the complex provisions of the law dealing with the definition of business 
establishment in section 9D. On the other hand, it is argued that the South African CFE 
rules applicable in section 9D follow international norms favouring a balanced approach 
between pure anti-deferral regime and international competitiveness. Thus, section 9D 
achieves this balance by favouring international competitiveness (that is exemption) 
where the income stems from active operation. Anti-deferral (that is immediate taxation) 
applies where the income stems from passive investments or from transactions that meet 
objective criteria with a high tax avoidance risk.499 
499 See Engel, op cit, p. 2. 
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Part IV: A comparative analysis of the application of source rules 
Introduction 
This part of the research intends to examine the application of the source principle of 
taxation as derived from the judicial tests, as well as the effect of source rules on the 
taxation of the taxpayer's income from South African and Hong Kong perspectives. 
Before the introduction of the worldwide basis of taxation in South Africa, the t-
definition of 'gross income' as it then was, did not distinguish between residents and 
non-residents. 1 In most cases, taxpayers resident and non-resident in South Africa 
were liable to tax only on receipts and accruals from within or deemed to be within 
South Africa. With the introduction of the residence based tax system, taxpayers who 
are resident as defined in the amendment to section 1 of the Act, are liable to be taxed 
in South Africa on their worldwide income. Taxpayers who are non-residents are 
liable to be taxed only on their receipts and accruals from sources within or deemed to 
be within South Africa. The amendment was made to the definition of gross income 
by inserting section 2(c) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000, which 
reads as follows in relation to non-residents: 
, .. .. [T]he total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in 
favour of such person from a source within or deemed to be within the 
Republic during the year or period of assessment, excluding receipts and 
accruals of a capital nature ... ,2 
From a South African perspective, the issue of source is no longer relevant in the case 
of residents, because as indicated above, they are now taxable on their worldwide 
income. However, it may still be relevant to South African residents who conduct 
offshore trade and sustain losses therefrom. This is because section 20 of the Act, 
which allows the set-off of losses against income, does not allow the set-off of a loss 
arising from carrying on a trade outside South Africa against the income arising from 
If 
a trade in the Republic. 
I Prior to the introduction of the residence tax system in South Africa, 'gross income' was defined in 
section 1 of the Act in relation to any year of assessment, in the case of any person, as the total amount 
in cash or otherwise, received or accrued to a person from a source within or deemed to be within the 
Republic, excluding amounts of a capital nature. 
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With regard to non-residents who are now subject to tax on a source basis, the 
discussion of the source principle is still of particular importance. The relevance of 
the source principle is also recognised in the context of double tax agreements entered 
into by South Africa with other countries. Thus, in resolving tax conflicts, treaties 
often use the so ~of income as the basis for the provisions contained in the treaty. 
The application of the provisions of a double tax agreement therefore often requires 
the identification of the source of income. 3 
The objective of this part of the research is to study selected actual and deemed source 
provisions that are still applicable to non-residents. In doing so, it is important to 
compare the application of source rules in South African income tax law with 
jurisdictions based exclusively on a source system such as Hong Kong, where the case 
law development in either of the countries generates a great deal of interest in the 
other. 
A) The source principle 
Definition 
The source principle of taxation is an enigmatic concept. There is no universal 
definition or understanding of the meaning of source. This is mostly due to the fact 
that different jurisdictions provide different criteria in their tax laws for determining 
domesti~~Q~urce incom~. It has even been argued in some jurisdictions that the source 
principle is not a legal concept, but something which a practical man would regard as 
a real source of income. 4 
Different court jurisdictions have been approached with the issue of finding a proper 
meaning for source of income. In South Africa, for example, the difficulty in 
ascertaining a clear definition of source was exemplified in the leading case of CIR v 
2 See para (ii) of the gross income definition in section 1 of the Act. 
3 See Huxham, K & Haupt, P, Notes on South African Income Tax, 2002, 21ed, p. 13. 
4 See the judgment of Lord Atkin in Rhodesia Metals Ltd (in liquidation) v COT, (1940) AD 432, 11 
SATe 244, where the learned judge laid down the authority applied in the South African context that 
the source of income is a practical hard matter of fact to be determined according to the circumstances 
of a particular case. 
203 
Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd. 5 In this case, a company was incorporated and 
carried on business in the United Kingdom. As a result of a series of transactions and 
agreements between Lever Brothers, another English company and a Dutch company 
(Mavibel), the latter owed Lever Brothers an amount ofR 22 million. In pursuance of 
another agreement, Overseas Holdings, a subsidiary company which Lever Brothers 
had formed specially for this purpose in South Africa, was substituted for Mavibel as 
the debtor in respect of the debt. 
The Commissioner sought to tax the interest paid to the taxpayer by the South African 
company. The contention on behalf of the Commissioner was that the source of 
interest paid on a loan is the debt, the debt is located where the debtor resides, and 
accordingly, where the debtor is a South African company, the debt is located In 
South Africa and the interest is received from a South African source. 6 
Although in this particular case the court was confronted with determining the source 
of interest, Watermeyer CJ, after analysing some English decisions, recognised in his 
judgment that it is probably an impossible task to formulate a definition that would 
furnish a universal test for determining when an amount is received from a source 
within the Republic. As he went on to say: 
'When the question has to be decided whether or not money received by a 
taxpayer is "gross income" within the meaning of the definition referred to 
above, two problems arise which have not always been differentiated from one 
another in decided cases. The first problem is to determine what is the source 
from which it has been received and when that has been determined the 
second problem is to locate it in order to decide whether it is or is not within 
the Union. 
The word "source" has several possible meanings. In this section, it is used 
figuratively, and when so used in relation to the receipt of money one possible 
meaning is the originating cause of the receipt of money, another possible 
meaning is the quarter from which it is received. A series of decisions of this 
court and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council upon our Income 
Tax Acts and upon similar Acts elsewhere have dealt with meaning of the 
word "source" and the inference, which, I think, should be drawn from those 
decisions is that the source of receipts, received as income, is not the quarter 
from whence they come, but the originating cause of their being received as 
income, and that this originating cause is the work which the taxpayer does to 
earn them, the quid pro quo which he gives in return for which he receives 
them. The work which he does may be a business which he carries on, or an 
enterprise which he undertakes, or an activity in which he engages and it may 
5 (1946) AD 441; 14 SATe 441. 
6 It will be seen in analysing the South African source of interest that the position of the corrunissioner 
was practical and more realistic. 
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take the form of personal exertion, mental or physical, or it may take the form 
of employment of capital either by using it to earn income or bl' letting its use 
to someone else. Often the work is some combination of these. ' 
Schreiner JA, though giving a dissenting judgment in this case, broadly agreed with 
Watermeyer CJ on the meaning of 'source'. He said that, with a few exceptions, a 
taxpayer obtains income from others '(a) because he renders them services, or (b) 
because they have the use of his property, or (c) because he carries on ... profit-
producing activities.8 In regard to (b), he said that 'the property itself, or ... its use, is 
treated as the source of the income. ,9 
He continued: 
'Where we are dealing with income which the taxpayer gets because someone 
is using his property and is prepared to pay him for its use, the taxpayer's 
activities, whether past or present, are in practice disregarded in describing the 
source of his income. We say simply ... that he derives his income from land, 
shares or loans. If perchance we speak of his deriving his income from rent, 
dividends or interest we are obviously speaking loosely, for these things are 
his income itself and not its source. What is important is that no one would 
ordinarily speak of the taxpayer deriving his income from the contract by 
which he leased the land or bought the shares or loaned the money.' 10 
Because the Lever Brothers case was based on a complex set of facts dealing with 
interest payment within a group of companies with an element of source in various 
jurisdictions concerned, it was quite difficult to ascertain the final assertion in this 
court decision. It would be dangerous to extract the general legal principles to be 
applied in determining the source of income from this particular case. In adopting the 
pragmatic approach in the Lever Brothers case, Davis AJ A best illustrated the 
problem of locating the ratio decidendi, when he stated that: 
'I have little doubt that the practical man would say that the source of Lever's 
income was the provision ... of assets in America and the giving of credit in 
England. He might have difficulty in deciding whether the source was located 
in England where, inter alia, the contracts were made, where the trustee was 
situated, where the credit was given and where all payments had to be made, 
or whether it was in America where the assets were situated and where those 
assets earned the money out of which the interest was paid. But the one place 
he would not choose would be South Africa. I cannot conceive of the practical 
man saying that, though the Treasury had only agreed to the transaction going 
through at all on the express condition that not one penny piece of capital or 
7 At 449/450. 
8 At SATC 16. 
9 At SATC 17. 
10 Ibid. 
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interest should be paid from any funds in South Africa, and though that 
condition had been fully carried out and not one penny piece had come from 
South Africa, yet the Treasury was right in now claiming that the whole of the 
interest had come from the source in South Africa, although the Treasury and 
the practical man both knew that as 'a practical hard matter of fact' none of it 
had done so, and that indeed the debtor possessed no assets in South Africa 
from which it possibly could have come.' 11 
In other words, Davis AJ A did not find it necessary to identify one legal test which 
could be applied in all situations involving the source of income. From the Lever 
Brothers case, it is difficult to reasonably conclude that there was a sufficient link 
between the business of the taxpayer and South Africa to allow the conclusion that the 
interest derived from a South African source. 12 
The lesson here is that although the Lever brothers case has authoritatively laid down 
the principle that the 'source of income' means the ' originating cause' of the income, 
conflicting arguments advanced by judges in this case, show that the court has 
struggled with this notion. Therefore, in defining the source of income, each case 
must be considered in the light of its particular facts . 
In other jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, the source concept is still the exclusive 
basis of taxation although controversial decisions result from its application. 
The source principle has also been used in a more formalistic manner in common law 
countries where the place of conclusion of the contract has been considered as an 
important factor in determining the source rules . However, in their application, these 
countries still revert to some combination of activity and presence. For example, 
though not unanimous on the common definition of this concept, jurisdictions such as 
the United States have introduced this concept into their legislation. 13 The United 
Kingdom defines the source concept through the use of the terms 'trading with' and 
'trading in' the United Kingdom, while Canada looks at the place of conclusion of the 
II At 464/465 . 
12 See Meyerowitz, D "Source or Residence As The Basis For Taxation" The Taxpayer, January 1999, 
Pc' 5. 
3 In the US for example, the production and selling profits may be split on cross-border transactions 
involving manufactured goods. The passage of title rule in the US applies to traded inventory and 
certain depreciable personal property. In otller cases, the sales income is deemed to arise in the seller's 
country of residence, unless either: (i) substantial sales activity is carried out in the country where the 
sale is made; or (ii) the goods are sold for the use, consumption or disposition in the other country and 
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I 
contract as an important indicator of source. On the other hand, continental European 
systems such as France or Switzerland have explicitly adopted the concept of source 
into their legislation to refer to an activity linked with some form of permanent 
establishment when it comes to the taxation of their business profits. 14 
1. The South African position 
1.1 Judicial analysis for determining the source of income 
Introduction 
Notwithstanding the fundamental change in the South African tax legislation, the 
source of income is still the primary connecting factor used to justify the imposition 
of income tax on non-residents. Even so, the concept of source is still an elusive one. 
Generally, the South Mrican income tax system still faces several problems in the 
determination of the source of income. 
As recommended by the Katz Commission, a detailed codification of general source 
rules is not desirable. Instead, consideration must be given to the introduction of 
international principles that can be interpreted according to the circumstances of a 
particular case. IS Consequently, not only that there is no statutory definition of the 
words 'source within the Republic' as included in section 1 of the Act l6, but also the 
courts have experienced considerable difficulty in formulating a clear definition for 
determining when an amount is received by or accrued from a source within the 
Republic. 
at least a significant amount of activity is carried out through a fixed place of business in that country. 
See Rohatgi , R, Basic International Taxation, 2002, p. ISS. 
14 France specifically applies the source concept in the taxation of its resident companies. See The 
Fifth Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects of the Tax Structure of South 
Africa (The Katz Commission), Department of Finance, March 1997, chapter 5, p. 14. The source rules 
regarding the business profits of various jurisdictions over the world were also analysed by Vogel, K, 
("Worldwide vs Source taxation of income - A review and re-evaluation of arguments", 1988, Part I, 
Intertax, vol 9, p. 226) who submitted that, there was a fundamental distinction between the countries 
allocating business profits according to a single and comprehensive rule (without distinguishing 
between different types of business profits) and those splitting business profits and allocating them 
according to their character (for example profits deriving from manufacturing, sales or loans). 
15 See The Katz Commission, op cit, p. 14. 
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As mentioned above, though the legislature has left it to the courts to determine the 
source of specific income where necessary, the courts have been reluctant in some 
decisions to attempt to define 'source' . Thus, in Rhodesia Metals ltd v corl7, Atkin 
LJ held that, the Privy Council members did not find it necessary to formulate a 
definition which would afford a universal test of when an amount is 'received from a 
source within the Republic'. In CIR v Epstein,18 Schreiner JA stated that the 
legislature 'was probably aware of the difficulty of defining the phrase "source within 
the Union", and therefore did not define the concept.' 
Many court decisions have presented different arguments regarding the determination 
of the source of income. The locus classicus of the test of source was given by 
Watermeyer CJ, in the case of Lever Brothers and another v CIR,19 who pointed out 
that, the determination of source involves two problems. As the learned judge stated: 
'When the question has to be decided whether or not money received by a 
taxpayer is gross income . .. two problems arise which have not always been 
differentiated from one another in decided cases. The first problem is to 
determine what is source from which it has been received and when that has 
been determined, the second problem is to locate it in order to decide whether 
it is or is not within the Union. ' 
The Lever Brothers case thus formulated the approach to be followed in determining 
the 'source of income' by the application of a two-tier test. 
First, it is necessary to establish the source qua originating cause (the reason why the 
income accrued to the taxpayer) and thereafter the location of the originating cause 
must be determined. 
Another argument may be the one supported by Danziger, who stated in the analysis 
of the Rhodesia Metals case that the determination of the source of income depended 
firstly on the choice of an appropriate test for locating the source of income, and 
secondly, on the selection of one dominant factor out of several factors related to the 
earning of the income and which would enable the source to be determined. 20 
16 See The Income Tax Act no 52 of 1962. 
17 (1940) AD 432, at 436. 
18 (1954) 3 SA (AD) 689, at 698; (1954) Taxpayer 147; 19 SATe 22l. 
19 Op cit, p. 449. 
20 See Danziger, E, International Income Tax, The South African Perspective, July 1999, p. 17/18. 
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In the South African context, there are no hard and fast rules as far as the 
ascertainment of the actual source of a given income is concerned. Because the 
determination of the source is a practical matter of facts, the surrounding 
circumstances of each case are therefore vitally important. Each case ought to be 
decided on its merits, though broad guidelines have been laid down in the cases. 21 
The question that arises is how have the courts applied the dual inquiry test (of origin 
and location of income) in determining the source? In other words, what are the kinds 
of tests, considerations, and factors that should be used according to the circumstances 
when ascertaining the source of income? 
Two approaches have been developed. This research considers both of them. Firstly, 
the courts have laid down some guidelines or 'tests' to ascertain the source of income. 
Secondly, a 'rule' approach is followed, in terms of which income is categorised and 
rules for the formulation of various categories of income have been set out. 
1.2 Judicial tests 
1.2.1 The place where the capital is employed 
This test derives from the principle that the source of income is located where the 
taxpayer's capital was employed. As Murray CJ stated in M ltd v COT,22 every profit 
making scheme involves two factors: firstly, the decision of the taxpayer to embark on 
the scheme; and secondly, the employment of capital in pursuance of the scheme, 
which embraces the carrying into effect of the decision implicit in the first factor. 23 
This test has been given considerable support in many cases. In COT v William Dunn 
and Co Ltd, 24 the taxpayer acted as the London agent of certain South African traders. 
The issue before the court was to determine the source of the commission and the 
interest earned by the agent. Seale J held that, the income was 'earned directly by an 
21 See Nathan v FeT, (1918) 25 CLR 183 at 189; also found in Williams, R. C, Income Tax in South 
Arica: Law and Practice, 1994, p. 28. 
2 (1958),3 SA 18 (FC). 
23 Also found in Danziger, op cit, p. 90. 
24 (1918) AD 607. 
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employment of English capital in an English business', 25 and that 'the source of the 
gain rests entirely on the fact that English capital is employed or credit obtained in 
England. ,26 
In the appellate division, Innes CJ formulated the test as follows: 
'In order to ascertain where the capital was employed to earn the profits 
sought to be taxed, we must have regard to the source from which they were 
derived. And that source, in the present case, was the company's English 
business. It employed its own capital in carrying on its own business in 
England, and by doing so it earned the interest ... ,27 
This principle was followed in Overseas Trust Corporation Ltd v CIR,28 where Innes J 
held that dividends paid on and the proceeds of the sale of shares of companies 
incorporated outside South Africa were from a South African source, because the 
taxpayer who received these amounts had employed its capital in South Africa in 
acquiring the shares. 
These views were confirmed in other cases. In CIR v Black,29 the court held that the 
income earned by a South African stockbroker on share transaction effected in the 
United Kingdom were from a United Kingdom source, on the basis that the broker's 
capital (cash and credit) had been used in the United Kingdom in purchasing the 
shares there. Moreover, in Rhodesia Metals Ltd (in liquidation) v COT,30 it was held 
that the source of the proceeds of the disposal of Zimbabwean mineral rights was 
Zimbabwe where the rights were situated, based on the reasoning that the 
employment of the seller's capital in acquiring the rights was in Zimbabwe. 
However, because it is often a difficult matter to determine where the capital was 
employed in a particular situation, the' employment of capital' test has been subject to 
criticism. In the Rhodesia Metals case, Lord Atkin expressed doubt whether 'the 
productive use of capital' is a useful test in an inquiry as to source. He asked whether 
in this case, capital is productively employed in the place where it is used to purchase 
25 Ibid, at 609. 
26 Ibid, at 610. 
27 At 615. 
28 (1926) AD 446. 
29 (1957) 3 SA 536 (A). 
30 (1938) AD 282. 
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stock, or in the place where the company directors take their decisions as to how to 
employ the capital. 3l 
These remarks seem to suggest that, because capital might be productively employed 
in more than one place, the test may mean no more than carrying on business in a 
particular place. Thus, the 'employment of capital' test may be of little practical 
assistance in determining the source of income. Williams puts it in the following way: 
'It seems that the place where the taxpayer's capital was employed is arguably just 
another way of saying the place where the taxpayer carried on business. ,32 
Another critical aspect of the 'employment of capital' test lies in the fact that, as 
Danziger33 argues, courts have failed in their decisions where they have applied this 
test to define the term 'capital'. 'Capital' in these two cases has taken the form of 
value of mineral rights (Rhodesian Metals case), the use of cash and credit (Black's 
case) or the place where the work is done or the service rendered (ITC 43234) . Thus, 
the attribution of different meanings to 'capital' gives rise to different results in the 
application of this test. 
1.2.2 The place where the business is carried on 
The locality of the business was used together with the 'employment of capital' test in 
Williams Dunn case. Innes CJ found in that case that the employment of capital test 
was dependent on the location of the business in which the capital was employed.35 
This test was rejected in Rhodesia Metals case, where Atkin LJ held that 'income can 
quite plainly be derived from more than one source even where the source is 
b · ,36 usmess. 
The locality of the business test was considered in three judgments. 
In Lever Brothers case, this test was equated with the location of activity test, where 
the court held that: 
31 At 436. 
32 Op cit, p. 28. 
33 Op cit, p. 92/93 . 
34 (1939) 10 SATe 537. 
35 At 615. 
211 
'Generally it may be said that a source of income is either (a) some personal 
activity of the taxpayer, or (b) the property over which he has rights, or ( c) a 
combination of both. ,37 
Schreiner noted in this case that in situation where this test was applied through a 
combination of purchase and sale of movables with the conclusion of numerous 
contracts over a period of time, the taxpayer was said to carry on business. Therefore, 
the frequency of this type of activity as well as references by the courts to the United 
Kingdom tax statutes in which the term 'business' frequently appeared had resulted in 
a tendency on the part of the courts to seek the taxpayer's business and to treat it as 
the source of any income earned by him in connection with it.38 
In CIR v Epstein,39 the locality of the business test was recognised in the dissenting 
judgment of Schreiner J A, who softened his opposition to this test by stating that: 
'[W]hat is very relevant and may be crucial is where he [the taxpayer] carries on the 
business from which the income in question is derived. ,40 
The same judge in Black's case, maintained the decision of the Special Court that the 
United Kingdom was the source of income earned by a stockbroker on sharedealing 
transaction carried out in the United Kingdom through a United Kingdom agent, on 
the grounds that the United Kingdom transaction constituted a sharedealing business 
in that country, though the taxpayer exercised control of the transaction in South 
Africa. As Schreiner ACJ stated,41 the situation in this particular case was different 
from one in which assets bought in one country were sold in another, nor was it a case 
in which the place where contracts were concluded different from the place where the 
parties perform their contractual obligation. In this case, there was a distinct business 
carried on in the United Kingdom, and everything connected with the transaction 
except authorisation or confirmation had been effected in the United Kingdom. 
36 At 789. 
37 At 17. 
38 At 18. 
39 (1954) 51 SA (AD) 689 (A). 
40 At 700. 
41 At 536. 
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The locality of the business test was followed by several Zimbabwean court decisions 
where the tendency was to look to the business of the taxpayer as the source of his 
income. 42 
In CW v COT, for instance, the court held that the share dealing activities of the 
taxpayer on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was located in Zimbabwe, where he 
carried on his investment-dealing activities.43 
Thus, as articulated by Williams, if a taxpayer carries on business in the Republic, 
then any income which he derives from transaction in the course of that business is 
from a source within the Republic, irrespective of whether the work was actually done 
within or outside the Republic. This means that the source of such income is the 
business itself, and the source is located where the business is carried on. In the same 
context, if two separate businesses are carried on, one within the Republic and the 
other outside the Republic, then, as decided in the Black' s case, the source of income 
from the latter business is outside the Republic. 44 
1.2.3 The location of activities test 
This test was formulated in Lever Brothers' case, where Watermeyer stated in the 
definition of source that it could also mean an activity in which the taxpayer engages. 
This test was criticised by Schreiner JA in the dissenting judgment of the above case, 
where he held that : 
'Since in ordinary speech we ignore the taxpayer's activities in describing the 
source of. .. income, there is, in my view, no good reason for treating such 
activities as the source of such income in contemplation of law. ' 
The location of activities test was applied in CIR v Epstein,45 in relation to the source 
of income earned by a South Mrican resident member of an international partnership 
from the sale of movables outside South Africa. 
The same principle was also applied in Millin v CIR,46 concerning the source of an 
author's royalties. 
42 See M Ltd v COT, 19583 SA 18 (FC); 'T' Co Ltd v COT, 1966,2 SA 16 SR; fTC 1395, 1984, 47 
SATe 123; CWv COT, 1990,2 SA 245 (ZH). 
43 Op cit at 245. 
44 See Williams, op cit , p. 28. 
45 (1954) 2 SA 689, (A). 
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The principle followed by this test is that, if income is produced through activities 
performed in the Republic, the source of that income is the activities, and that source 
is located where the activities were carried out, namely in the Republic. 
However, as argued by Williams following the Epstein's case, if income is produced 
through activities of the taxpayer which were performed outside the Republic, the 
source of the income will nevertheless be located within the Republic if those 
activities were performed in the course of a business carried on by the taxpayer in the 
Republic.47 Thus, the location of activities test is subordinate to the place where the 
business is carried on. 
1.2.4 The practical man test 
This test originated in the High Court decision in Australia in Nathan v COT,48 where 
Isaacs J, in interpreting a statutory provision levying tax on income 'derived directly 
or indirectly by every taxpayer from sources within Australia', held that: 
'The legislature in using the word "source" meant not a legal concept, but 
something which a practical man would regard as a real source of income. 
Legal concepts must, of course, enter into the question when we have to 
consider to whom a given source belongs. But the ascertainment of the actual 
source of a given income is a practical, hard matter of fact. The Act, on 
examination, so treats it. ' 
In South Africa, the Privy Council in Rhodesia Metals ltd (in liqUidation) v cor9 
approved this test, where Atkin LJ held that: 
'Their Lordships incline to the view quoted with approval from Mr Ingram's 
work on South African Income Tax Law by De Villiers J in his dissenting 
judgment: "Source means not a legal concept, but something which a practical 
man would regard as a real source of income. The ascertaining of the actual 
source is a practical hard matter of fact." , 
This test was considered in Lever Brothers' case where Watermeyer said that he had 
'some difficulty in differentiating the reasoning of a practical man from that of 
theoretical lawyer'. 50 While Schreiner JA in his dissenting judgment found that, the 
effect of the transaction in the instant case 'does not appear to me to be a matter on 
46 (1928) AD 207. 
47 See Williams, op cit, p. 28129. 
48 Op cit at 189. 
49 Op cit p. 774. 
50 At 457 . 
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which the OpInIOn of the ordinary practical business man would provide much 
assistance. ' 51 
1.2.5 The place of contracting test 
This test is related to the place at which the taxpayer concludes the contract which 
gives rise to the income in issue in order to establish the source of that income. This 
test was formulated by Wilson J in Lovell and Christmas Ltd v COT,52 where he stated 
that: 
'One rule is easily deductible from the decided cases. The trade or business in 
question in such cases ordinarily consists in making certain classes of contract 
and in carrying those contracts into operation with a view to profit; and the 
rule seems to be that where such contracts, forming as they do the essence of 
the business or trade, are habitually made, there a trade or business is carried 
on within the meaning of the Income Tax Acts, so as to render the profits 
liable to income tax ... But the decisions do not seem to furnish authority for 
going further back, for the purpose of taxation, than the business from which 
profits are directly derived, and the contracts which form the essence of that 
business. ' 
This test was recognised by Watermeyer CJ in Lever Brothers ' case,53 where he held 
that the obligation which gave rise to the income had been assumed pursuant to 
contract made outside South Africa, and because the taxpayer had concluded no 
contract in South Africa, it was the contract entered into by the taxpayer and its 
performance under that contract that gave rise to its right to receive the income. 
Searle J relied on the place of contracting test in COT v Williams Dunn and Co Ltd,54 
where interest and commission earned by a United Kingdom agent were held to 
derive from sources outside South Mrica, by reason of the United Kingdom contract. 
This test was also followed by De Villiers J A in Rhodesia Metals' case, who in his 
dissenting judgment favoured the place of contracting test over the place of 
employment of capital test. 
Murray CJ in 'M' Ltd v COr5 also held that the United Kingdom sharedealing profits 
made by a Zimbabwean company was sourced in the United Kingdom, in support of 
51 At 464. 
52 (1908) AC 46. 
53 Op cit, at 441. 
54 Op cit, p. 607. 
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the idea that the company had effected the actual contracts of purchase and resale in 
London. 
1.2.6 The place of exercise of control test 
This test regards the place from which the taxpayer exercises control over transactions 
or activities that give rise to the income as the source of the income. 
In Overseas Trust Corporation Ltd v CIR,56 the court held that South Africa was the 
source of the pr?ceeds of share sales effected in Germany by a South African 
company, on the ground that the place of exercise of the control of the share 
transaction was in South Africa. 
Schreiner ACJ rejected the above argument in CIR v Black,57 on the basis that the 
source was in the United Kingdom because the taxpayer had a separate sharedealing 
business in that country, though the authorisation and confirmation of transaction 
were from South Africa. 
This test was also rejected In 'M' Ltd case,58 where Murray CJ in the argument 
refused to accept that the investigation and deliberation were the source of income, 
because various contributory factors were involved in the earning of the income. 
Thus, it may be submitted that, the place of the exercise of control test is important, 
depending on the facts of a particular case and the extent to which the taxpayer 
personally controlled the transaction or operation that gives rise to the income. 
1.2.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it may be said through the evaluation of judicial decisions concerning 
the determination of source of income in South Africa, that it is still difficult to give 
the concept of source, a simple, logically ascertainable meaning. 
The meaning of 'source' remains unclear, and it is questionable whether the tests 
adopted by the courts are of practical value. As Danziger argues, this is due to judicial 
guidelines being vague, contradictory and difficult to apply to specific sets of factual 
55 (1958) 3 SA 18 (FC) at 23. 
56 (1926) AD 444. 
57 At 536. 
58 At 23 . 
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situations. 59 For instance, the selection of tests to determine the source of income 
varies from case to case, and without sufficient indication why a particular test has 
been chosen. 
Moreover, the application of these judicial tests is not always harmonious, and most 
of them are subordinated to others. For example, the employment of capital test is 
confused with the place of business test. In the same light, the activity test was 
questioned by Schreiner J A who demonstrated its inapplicability in relation to 
investment income, while the 'practical man' approach totally negated other criteria, 
and suggested the adoption of an ad hoc policy based approach to be determined on a 
b b · 60 case- y-case aSlS. 
Therefore, it may be argued that while considering the facts and circumstances of a 
particular case in applying these tests, they must be approached with great 
circumspection. A small difference in the facts and circumstances of two almost 
identical cases can result in different judgments when determining the source of 
Income. 
Due to the fact that there is no statutory definition of the source of income, the 
determination of source is even more complicated, when the taxpayer's activities that 
produce income are performed partly in the Republic and partly outside it. This is 
because as stated in fTC 1491,61 even for a single business, there may be different 
sources for different categories of income. This calls on the issue of multiple sources 
of income. 
1.3 The problem of multiple sources. 
Introduction 
This issue brings into light, the considerable difficulty in determining the originating 
cause of the income as well as the location of the source of that income. 
59 Op cit, p. 87. 
60 Jbid, p. 21. 
61 (1991) 53 SATe 115 at 127. 
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In fact, it is common that a number of factors could contribute to the acquisition of 
income. Therefore, it is possible that income has more than one originating cause or 
the originating cause is located in more than one country, some of which are within 
and others outside the Republic. 
In this particular situation of composite or multiple sources, the determination of the 
source of income can be extremely difficult. This problem is still unresolved because 
the South African Income Tax Act gave no clear guidance as to how to address the 
issue. 62 As Watermeyer CJ pointed out in Lever Brothers case,63 he was not aware of 
any decision that clearly lays down what principle is applied in such a situation. 
Therefore, the surrounding circumstances of a particular case must be given 
consideration. 
The question to be asked is, what is the position adopted in different court judgments? 
Is it possible to apportion the income in case of multiple locations of the source? 
1.3.1 Identification of the dominant cause. 
In situations where various contributory factors and a number of originating causes 
were operative, possibly in different places before the income is earned, the courts 
have in many instances circumvented this problem, by considering it unnecessary to 
assign a separate source to 'incidental ' or 'subsidiary' items of income as decided in 
COT v Shein.64 
Consequently, where there is more than one originating cause; for example, when 
income is generated partly by an identifiable trade conducted in the Republic and 
partly by another identifiable business conducted outside the Republic (like in 
Epstein's case), then it is the duty of the court to ascertain which of the causes is the 
main or dominant one, and recognition must be given only to that main or dominant 
cause. 
62 See Williams, op cit, p. 29. 
63 (1946) AD 441. 
64 (1958) (3) SA 14 (FC). 
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Many court decisions support this principle. In CIR v Black,65 the Special court held 
that Black, a broker who bought and sold shares in Johannesburg, had a similar 
independent business in London and that the profits from the latter business did not 
originate from a source within the Republic though the business in London was 
controlled from Johannesburg by Black. The Appellate Division held here that the 
main, dominant, substantial source of the income was the employment of capital in 
London. 
The same argument was followed M Co Ltd v COT 66 where Murray CJ after 
analysing the facts of the case, found the dominant factor and stated that: 
'The essential facts in the present case are that, the company had an idle 
capital in London, employed it to purchase securities with the object of profit 
on resale, effected actual contracts of purchase and resale in London and 
received its profit on resale there. Thus, the cardinal facts lead to the 
conclusion that, the causa causans of the earning of the profits was located in 
London, where the activities there conducted were properly characterised as 
the source qua originating cause. ' 
The term 'main or substantial or real and basic cause of the accrual of income' was 
also used in the case of Transvaal Associated Hide and Skin Merchants (Ply) Ltd v 
COT, where the company which was registered in the Republic purchased hides in 
Lobatsi where they were prepared for sale in the Republic and elsewhere. The 
contracts were concluded in the Republic and payment took place here. The court held 
that the source of income was in Botswana because the dominant factor was the 
purchase and curing of the hides and not the sale. In this case, Schreiner JA made the 
distinction in the determination of source of income between the factual causation 
(causa causans) and the legal causation (causa sine qua non) in his application of the 
dominant causa or higher degree of essentiality in the following remarks: 
'No doubt selling the cured hides is necessary to bring an income to hand, so 
that it might be said of the sales, as much as of the curing, that they are a 
causa sine qua non of the accrual of the income. But the place where a causa 
sine qua non exists cannot be decisive of the place of origin of the income, for 
there may be a number of causa sine qua non. One must look for something 
more - something like the dominance or the basicality used in the above 
mentioned list of expressions; or like what I venture to call the highest, or 
higher, degree of essentiality. ,67 
65 At 536. 
66 (1958) 3 SA 18 (FC). 
67 Op cit, at 219; see also the case of Essential Sterolin Products (Pty) Ltd v CIR, (1993) (4) SA 859 
(A), 55 SATe 357 where the principle of identification of the dominant cause of income was given 
preference. 
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Some academic writers such as Meyerowitz68 also support the view that the source of 
incidental income may be ignored for the purpose of determining the source of 
income, and it is only when it is impossible to ascertain the main, basic, dominant, 
substantial or real source of the income that the profits from each source must be 
treated independently. 
The above view is also expressed by Danziger, who in following the de minimis rule 
applied in Shein's case, noted that income should not be apportioned where that part 
of it which is derived from a source in one country is insignificant in relation to the 
balance of the income allocable to a source in another country.69 
In fact in Shein's case, the courts held that, the 'related, trivial and incidental source 
of income' must be ignored on ascertaining the source and the application of the de 
minimis rule was phrased in the following terms: 
'[W]hen a man is engaged to perform a certain work in a given country but 
has minor duties, which are purely subsidiary and incidental, that fall to be 
performed in another country, then, I do not think it is a practical approach to 
suggest that portion of his income has its source in that other country. When 
he is not paid separately for these extraneous duties, it becomes particularly 
artificial to try to allot portion of his earnings to them. ' 
It must be taken into consideration that the cases discussed above do not lay down a 
conclusive and universal test for the determination of the main source of income. This 
is because those cases do not specify clear criteria to differentiate the 'main' source 
from other possible sources. This raises another problem because once the dominant 
or main originating cause has been identified, it is necessary to locate that cause 
geographically70 
Then it may be found that the originating cause IS located in more than one 
jurisdiction. In other words, it is common that the sole originating cause or the main 
or dominant originating cause is located both within and outside South Africa. 
F or instance, the main originating cause can be found to be the services rendered by 
the taxpayer, and those services were rendered partly in South Africa and partly 
outside the country. 
In those situations, what should be the approach to be adopted by the courts? 
68 See Meyerowitz, D, Meyerowitz on Income Tax, 2001/2002 edition, para. 7-5/7-6. 
69 Op cit, note 21 , p. 112. 
70 See Broomberg, EB, & Kruger, D, Tax strategy, 1998, 3rd Ed, Butterworths (Durban), p. 164. 
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1.3.2 The apportionment issue 
This issue deals with the situation where a single amount has a multiplicity of sources 
both within and outside the Republic. This leads to the question whether it is possible 
for an amount to be split up so that part of it is to be regarded as arising from a 
Republic source and the other part not. In other words, as stated by Emslie and 
Jooste,71 the issue is whether an apportionment is competent under the South African 
income tax law. 
The courts have discussed the application of the principle of apportionment of source 
of income. In the judgment of the Lever Brothers' case, Waterrneyer CJ left open the 
question of apportionment in these following comments: 
'Turning now to the problem of locating a source of income, it is obvious that 
the taxpayer's activities, which are the originating cause of a particular receipt, 
need not all occur in the same place and may even occur in different countries, 
and consequently, after the activities which are the source of the particular 
"gross income" have been identified the problem of locating them may present 
considerable difficulties, and it may be necessary to come to the conclusion 
that the "source" of a particular receipt is located partly in one country and 
partly in another.. .. Such a state of affairs may lead to the conclusion that the 
whole of a receipt, or part of it, or none of it, is taxable as income from a 
source within the Union, according to the particular circumstances of the case, 
but I am not aware of any decision which has laid down clearly what would be 
the governing consideration in such a case. ,72 
In CIR v Epstein, Schreiner JA recognised that, theoretically, apportionment could be 
possible in certain circumstances as he held: 'Where work has been done in producing 
or improving raw material which is sold elsewhere by the same person, it might be 
possible to apportion ... ,73 
However, it was categorically held in CIR v Blace4 that, the apportionment of 
amounts as between different sources is not possible in South African income tax law 
and preference must be given to the dominant factor. 
71 See Emslie TS, and Jooste R, "Causation and the Concomitant Issue of Apportionment with 
Reference to Gross Income in South African Income Tax Law", 1989, SALJ, p. 302. 
72 Op cit, at 451. 
73 Op cit, at 689. 
74 Op cit, at 536. 
221 
The principle of apportionment of income was favourably considered in the case of 
SIR v Kirsch,75 where the meaning of 'right to acquire' in terms of section 8A of the 
Act was in issue. A South African company taxpayer having wholly-owned 
subsidiaries in Israel resolved in pursuance to a recommendation contained in a 
resolution of the company's board of directors, that 5000 shares be offered to the 
respondent. The respondent was the executive service director of the company and he 
was authorised to allot the said shares to the extent that the offer was accepted. 
The said shares of the company were allotted to the respondent and during the 1972 
tax year, he made a gain thereon of R 12400 which the Secretary for Inland Revenue 
included in his taxable income for that year. 
The Special Court found that as 95% of the work motivating such authorisation was 
done in Israel, only 5% of the gain in issue was taxable in the Republic. 
On appeal, Coetzee J found that on the facts of the case, the respondent had 
established that he received the shares, not qua director, but for his work as a 'Service 
Director' in Israel; and consequently, that the gain in issue was (save for the 5% 
thereof found by the Special Court to be taxable) not income 'from a source within or 
deemed to be within the Republic' as used in the definition of 'gross income' in 
section 1 of the Act. 
The judicial consideration of the apportionment principle in South Africa was again 
highlighted in the case of CIR v Tuck,76 though based on different grounds (this case 
was dealing with income from capital or revenue nature). In the case under 
consideration, the appellant was the managing director of a pharmaceutical company 
who had received certain shares in terms of a management-incentive plan. 
Corbett JA applied the quid pro quo test formulated in the Lever Brothers case, and 
approved the principle of apportionment where a receipt of an amount, having regard 
to its quid pro quo contained both an income element and an element of a capital 
nature. 
The learned judge in expressing doubt concerning the appropriateness of applying, in 
cases dealing with receipt for income tax purposes, the principles of causation (that is, 
the distinction between factual causation or conditio sine qua non and legal 
75 (1978),3 SA 93; 40 SATe 95. 
76 (1988)(3) SA 819 (A). 
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causation), as developed in the law of delict and in criminal law, held that the receipt 
of the shares was attributed partly to a restraint-on-trade condition and partly to his 
services rendered, and that as the restraint element was of a capital nature, an 
apportionment was appropriate. 
In delivering the unanimous decision of the court, Corbett JA held that: 
'There is, so far as I am aware, no authority for this proposition in our case 
law. Nevertheless, ... , it seems to me that in a proper case apportionment 
provides a sensible and practical solution to the problem which arises when a 
taxpayer receives a single receipt and the quid pro quo contains two or more 
separate elements, one or more of which would characterise it as capital. It 
could hardly have been the intention of the legislature that in such 
circumstances the receipt be regarded wholly as an income receipt to the 
disadvantage of the taxpayer, or wholly as a capital receipt, to the detriment of 
the fiscus. ,77 
As decided by the court, the warmng sent by the Tuck's judgment is that the 
application of the apportionment principle in the context of capital or revenue income 
is in conflict with the income tax law recognition that all receipts or accruals to the 
taxpayer must fall into one category and be classified as being either exclusively of a 
capital nature or totally of a revenue nature. The point is that the concept of 
apportionment (and this could be as a matter of principle also extended to the area of 
source) will only take place where there are two or more distinct legal causae which 
give rise to a receipt or accrual or in the language of the Lever Brothers case, where 
there are two or more originating causes or when the originating cause is located in 
more than one country. 
It is surprising to notice that specifically in the area of source, the judicial decision 
concerning the application of apportionment is still very rigid. In the case of Essential 
Sterolin Products (Pty) v CIR,78 the taxpayer manufactured a product in South Mrica 
and patented this by entering into an agreement in West Germany for the sale of rights 
for which consideration was received. He argued in court that the patent had no value 
in South Africa as it could only be sold for medicinal properties which were only 
available in Germany. The court held that the income earned was from a non-South 
African source because the business operations were all non-South African being 
77 At 834 G-J. 
78 (1993) (4) SA 859, 55 SATe 357,1994 Taxpayer 15. 
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carried out and entered into in West Germany together with the fact that the patent 
itself had no value in South Mrica. 
As Corbett CJ found in applying the factual connection between the work carried out 
and the income arising therefrom in order to determine the source: 
'[O]ne must have regard to the factual matrix underlying and giving rise to 
the agreement in terms of which the income became payable and then apply 
the basic principles. ,79 
As the court observed in the above case in locating the originating cause, there might 
be in individual cases, a number of causal factors relevant to the ascertainment of 
source. And in those instances, it will be appropriate to weigh these factors in order to 
determine the dominant or main or substantial or real and basic cause of the receipt. 8o 
The consideration of the total matrix of facts in a case was confirmed in the recent 
Supreme Court of Appeal decision of First National Bank of South Africa v C: 
SARS, 81 where Smalberger ADP held in his judgment in applying the principles 
enunciated in the Essential Sterolin case to the determination of the source of interest 
that all the important factors which cause the interest income to arise and constituting 
the dominant cause of the receipt of the interest should be considered. Thus, in 
determining the source of income and the location of that source, there is a need to 
have regard to the essence of the whole transaction that generates the income. 
Consequently, it can be stated through that the logic for refusing to apply the principle 
of apportionment to the source cases as indicated in other aspects of tax law is 
difficult to discern. It appears that the Essential Sterolin and the First National Bank 
cases confirmed that the approach adopted by the courts to this problem seems to be 
as follows: where there is more than one originating cause, then it is the duty of the 
court to establish in which is the main or dominant cause, and recognition must be 
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1.3.3 Academic view 
The issue of apportionment under the South Mrican income tax law has given rise to 
academic analysis. In that light, writers have adopted different approaches. 
Silke82 for example, is of the view that with reference to the Transvaal Associated 
case, there is no provision in the South African tax law for the apportionment of 
income, and considering the statements of Schreiner JA in Epstein's case, it might 
therefore as he sees it, be practically difficult for the application of apportionment in 
the absence of statutory guidelines. 83 Silke however goes further to recognise that the 
courts have in some instances authorised the apportionment of lumpsum income in the 
cases of services rendered 84 
This is actually the logic followed by Broomberg and Kruger who are of the view that 
if the main originating cause is located in different countries, then an apportionment 
must be made.85 Their argument is supported by cases where apportionment received 
for services rendered partly within and partly outside the country was made.86 In those 
specific situations, Tredgold J justified the correctness of apportionment in Shein's 
case,87 when he observed that: 'It is not questioned that it is legally correct to 
apportion income if it is in fact clear that it is derived from more than one source ... ' 
To substantiate this view, Danziger pointed out with reference to ITC 9'18 that, 
apportionment has most frequently been applied by the courts in relation to income 
from the rendering of dependent services, where the employment contract requires the 
employee to render services in more than one country. 89 
In another approach to this matter, it is submitted that the question of apportionment 
of income for the determination of source is still unresolved because in most of the 
82 See Silke on Income Tax, (1995 Service 7), para 5-4. 
83 This view is also supported by Williams (op cit, p. 29) who believes that the Income Tax Act does 
not authorise the apportionment between different sources of income, except in cases of specific 
provisions, such as income in relation to shipping, air transport, submarine cables, films and insurance, 
or income in relation to business that extends beyond the republic, as it was stated in section 30 before 
its repeal. 
84 Op cit, para 5-5. 
85 Op cit, p. 164. 
86 SeeITC 1104, 29 SATe 46; ITC 837,21 SATe 413; ITC 396,10 SATe 87. 
87 22 SATe 12. 
88 (1927),3 SATe 245. 
89 Op cit, p. 108. 
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cases before the courts, the apportionment is not raised by either of the parties to the 
issue. This view is supported by Emslie and Jooste90 who through the analysis of the 
particular cases (Transvaal Hide, Epstein and Lever Brothers cases) argued that, 
though the courts are still looking for the dominant or substantial cause in determining 
the source, the use of these terms does not amount to a rejection of the principle of 
apportionment. They went further to point out that a taxpayer who wants an amount to 
be apportioned as between different sources would simply have to raise this 
contention as a ground of objection in an objection to an income tax assessment. 91 
Therefore, as remarked by the same authors in their conclusion, because there is 
nothing in the Act or in the case law to prevent a court from applying the principle of 
apportionment as to source when dealing with the issue, the apportionment of income 
as between different sources must not only be competent but mandatory. 92 
The above view is actually in line with the criticism laid down by the Katz 
Commission Report, which stipulated that the adherence to an uncodified system of 
dominant source has contributed to an all-or-nothing approach that is subject to 
abuse. 93 
The necessity to find a dominant cause offers considerable tax planning opportunities. 
For instance, as noted by Holland, it is enough to prove that the dominant cause of a 
particular income is not South Africa, and then the taxpayer can easily avoid tax in 
South Africa. Consequently, this opens up avenues for creative tax planning to avoid 
sourCing Income in South Africa, and instead sourcing it in a more tax efficient 
jurisdiction.94 
As the Katz Commission viewed it, the current all-or-nothing system of dominant 
source favoured by the South African courts should be replaced by a greater capacity 
in the system to apportion source.95 
90 Op cit, p. 305/306. 
91 Ibid, at 307. Danziger (op cit, p.107/113), also raises the argument that the courts will grant 
apportionment when it is claimed by the taxpayer. As he puts it, the taxpayer then bears the onus of 
showing that the apportionment is justified in a particular case. 
92 Ibid, at 308. 
93 Op cit, at 15. 
94 See Holland, KJ, "The Viability of a Residence Based Tax System in South Africa", 1996, LLM 
thesis (UCT), p. 13/14. 
95 0pcitatll. 
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Furthermore, as it was stated in the Tuck case, difficulties may arise in ascertaining an 
acceptable basis of apportionment. However, as Corbett JA pointed out in that case in 
considering a fair and reasonable apportionment on a 50:50 basis, this problem was 
not insurmountable, and not confined to source. 
The learned judge went on to conclude that: 
'Having regard to the inherent nature of the receipt and its origin in the plan, it 
is not possible to find an arithmetical basis for apportionment ... , but I do not 
think that this should constitute an insuperable obstacle. ,96 
Foreign courts have also been confronted with the issue of determining the proper 
method of apportioning income from different sources. In the interesting Zimbabwean 
case of ITC 1104,97 the issue before the court was to decide whether section 9(1)( d) 
(as it then was in the South African context) which provided that amount received or 
accrued to a taxpayer by virtue of any service rendered or work done by him in 
carrying on in the country of any trade, irrespective of the status of the payer or the 
place of payment could apply, where a skindiver, as the facts revealed, had spent 323 
hours and 34 minutes diving under the water on the Zambian side of the Kariba dam, 
and 310 hours and 6 minutes blowing bubbles on the Zimbabwean side of the dam 
wall. 
The Commissioner argued that the whole of the remuneration that was paid to the 
diver was taxable in Zimbabwe, because, apparently, the diver kept his snorkel and 
flippers in a shack at the back of his girlfriend's house in Bulawayo. The 
Commissioner stipulated that the diver's trade was thus located in Zimbabwe. 
The court rejected the Commissioner's submission on the point that the diving on the 
Zambian side of the Kariba dam-wall was not linked to any Zimbabwean trade carried 
on by the taxpayer, and therefore the deeming provision of section 9(1)( d) was not 
applicable. However, the court considered the solomonic decision to split the income, 
insofar as the source was concerned, and it apportioned 48% as the element taxable in 
Zimbabwe. 
Consequently, as applied in other aspects of tax, it is enough to say that once the 
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between different sources, he may suggest his own apportionment and leave it to the 
court to make the apportionment that it deems fair and reasonable. 
1.4 The source rules and the tax consequences 
Introduction 
Due to the complexity of the interpretation and application of judicial tests, another 
approach has been formulated as being more reliable for the determination of source 
of income. This approach which is known as the ' rule' approach, permits to determine 
the source of income through the nature of transaction that generates the income in 
question. 98 This rule is exercised by the formulation of the source of various 
categories of income. 
The aim of the research here will be to analyse the tax consequences of different kinds 
of specific incomes that have their actual or deemed source within South Africa. 
In that light, this section will first deal with the study of actual source of different 
kinds of income including among others the analysis of the selected source of active 
and passive income. 
Judicial selections of appropriate tests to determine the actual source of income varies 
form case to case, and have proven at times to be contradictory and of limited 
practical value. Court principles for determining the true originating cause of income 
has in some cases tended to be vague and difficult to apply to specific factual 
situations. 
In order to limit the scope for tax avoidance and to obviate uncertainty as to the 
source of income in borderline cases, the Income Tax Act, prior to the fundamental 
change of the tax system, included provisions mainly in section 9 which artificially in 
a number of instances, deemed certain amounts to be from a source within the 
Republic, irrespective of where the actual source was located.99 
98 See Danziger, op cit, p. 87. 
99 With the introduction of the residence tax system in South Africa, most of the deeming source 
provisions have been repealed on the justification that they have become obsolete. The important sub-
sections of section 9 dealing with the deeming source of income that have been repealed by section 7(a) 
of the Amendment Act 59 of 2000 are: section (l)(a) - contracts for the sale of goods concluded in 
228 
As previously mentioned, non-residents were taxed on South African source income 
in the past and would continue to be taxed on South African source income in the new 
tax system. Thus, this section will also focus on the analysis of specific deeming 
provisions that are relevant in the South African context as well as other crucial non-
resident tax implications applicable in South Africa. 100 
The study in this section will focus on the analysis of the above deeming provisions 
and their effect in particular kinds of income. 
1.4.1 The actual source of income 
1.4.1.1 The sale of goods 
The analysis of the actual source of the sale of goods in the South Mrican context will 
only cover the sale of movable property. 
The analysis of the actual source of the sale of goods in the South African context will 
only cover the sale of movable property. 
In this particular situation, the courts have never authoritatively laid down a general 
principle as to the source of income. 101 However, important criteria can be considered 
including the place where the taxpayer's capital is employed and the carrying out of 
his trading activities . When these elements have occurred in the Republic, it has been 
held in many cases that the source of income was within the Republic. 
For example, in Transvaal Associated Hide and Skin Merchants v COT,102 the 
taxpayer company had its head office in Johannesburg, where management and 
South Africa; section (l)(b) - right to use in South Africa a patent, trademark, copyright, model 
pattern, plan, formula or process or property of s similar nature; section (l)(bA) - imparting of 
scientific, tedmical, industrial or commercial knowledge or information for use in South Africa; -
section (l)(d) - services connected to a South African trade; section (l)(d)bis - services rendered 
during temporary absence of a South African ordinary resident on behalf of a South African employer. 
100 To limit the scope of this research, I will focus only on selected provisions dealing with the non-
resident tax implications, though the Income Tax Act provides in some other instances that certain 
amounts are deemed to be from a source within the Republic, irrespective of whether such amounts are 
in fact received or accrued in the Republic. For example, recoupments of expenditure previously 
allowed as a deduction must be included in gross income, irrespective of the actual source, in terms of 
section I, para (n) of the gross income definition. Other deeming source provisions that will not be 
analysed in this section includes sections 9(1)(cA), 9(1)(e), 9(1)(fA), and 9(1)(g). 
101 See Williams, op cit, p. 37. Also analysed by Silke (op cit, 1997 service 12, para 5-15) referring to 
the remarks of Lord Atkin in Rhodesia Metals Ltd (in Liquidation) v COT, 1940 AD 432, II SATC 
244. 
102 29 SATC 97. 
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control were exercised. It bought hides at abattoirs in Botswana, where the hides were 
salted and bound into bales, then dispatched from Botswana directly to customers in 
South Africa and overseas. It was found by Maisels J A that the dominant or main 
cause of the taxpayer's income in question was its activities (the curing process) in 
Botswana, and it was accordingly there that, the source of the income was located. 
The elements of employment of capital and activity tests were considered in Overseas 
Trust Corporation Ltd v CIR,103 where the taxpayer who carried on business in the 
Republic, made a profit on the sale of shares in Germany. Watermeyer J held that the 
source of income was the employment of the taxpayer's capital in the Republic 
because the shares were bought here (where the business was carried on) and the 
instruction to the taxpayer's agent in Germany to effect the sale had been sent from 
South Africa. 
The' activities' element was also found decisive in CIR v Epstein, 104 where Centlivres 
CJ held in the majority judgment that, in referring to the partnership existence 
between the taxpayer and the dealers in Argentina, it was nevertheless the taxpayer's 
activities in South Africa that gave rise to his share of the profits. And as all the 
activities of the taxpayer took place in South Africa, the profits were derived then 
from a source within South Africa. 
It is also important to note that in determining the actual source of the sale of movable 
property, the other criteria of place of production, manufacture, or processing have 
also been taken into account in some cases. It is submitted that the source of such 
income will be located where the processes are carried on. 105 
1.4.1.2 Sale of immovable property 
The determination of source of income deriving from the sale of immovable property 
. I b· 106 IS a so su Ject to controversy. 
103 Op cit, at 444. 
104 Op cit, p. 689. The facts of the case will be stated in the analysis ofthe actual source of partnership 
income. 
lOS See Williams, op cit, p. 39. 
106 As analysed by Williams (op cit, p. 39), the decision in this context turns on the particular facts 
and it provides little illumination by way of general principles. 
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The source of income in this case is actually perceived to be the place where the 
capital that produces the income is employed. In other words, the source of such sale 
is the place where the property is situated. 107 Thus, by analogy, the source of income 
deriving from mining or farming is situated at the mine or farm respectively where the 
taxpayer's activities are exercised, including the productive employment of his 
capital. 
The leading authority here is the Rhodesia Metals case,108 where a company 
registered and resident in England had as its major asset certain immovable property 
situated in Rhodesia, namely certain registered tungsten mining claims. The sole 
business of the company was the purchase of these claims with a view to developing 
them and selling them at a profit. The company then profitably sold the whole of its 
undertaking, including these claims to another company also registered in England. 
The issue here was to decide whether the value of the claims in Rhodesia or the 
control of business in London was the source of income. In his judgment, Tindall J A 
held that, the dominant factor in the making of the profit was not the transaction in 
London but the value of the claims. Concurrently, Stratford CJ confirmed that: 
'On the facts, the profit was made not by the company's organisation and 
connection in London but by the productive employment of its capital In 
Southern Rhodesia in acquiring and developing the claims situated there.' 
1.4.1.3 The cross-border derivative transactions 
In consideration of the significant number of derivative transactions such as interest 
rate swap or other interest rate options concluded between South African taxpayers 
and other foreign counterparties, it is of particular importance to determine the actual 
source of income of these transactions. 
Though there is no decisive authority on the determination of source of income in this 
context, a number of court decisions have been held on the source of income derived 
from other cross-border transactions which are indicative of the approach likely to be 
\01 See Danziger , op cit, p. 127. 
108 Op cit, at 282; see also Davis v COT, 1938, AD 301. 
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followed by the South African courts in dealing with the location of the source of 
payment of these transactions under consideration. 109 
Thus, it emerges from the general principle that when a taxpayer enters into cross-
border contracts in the course of his business, different factors may be considered in 
locating the source of income. 
It is argued that the source of income may then either be the place where these cross-
border derivative transactions were concluded,llo or it might also be the place where 
the taxpayer's activities in relation to those contracts are carried out, that is, the place 
where the contracts are negotiated, concluded and performed by the taxpayer. In other 
words, as Meyerowitzlll put it: 
'Where profits are derived from contracts, or the combination of contracts, 
which form the essence of the taxpayer's business, it may indeed be a 
workable test to look to the place where such contracts are "habitually" 
negotiated, namely to the ordinary place of business.' 
The place of 'activity' test has been adopted in case law. So, in ITC 36,112 the 
taxpayer company which carried on business in South Africa, received a payment 
from a Rhodesian mining company in consideration of the latter's use in Rhodesia of 
a patented process owned by the taxpayer. In determination of the source of income of 
the fee received by the taxpayer, the court held that it was from a South African 
source because it was derived from a contract entered into by the taxpayer in South 
Africa in connection with its South African business. The court based its judgment on 
the following point: 
'It must be accepted as a principle clearly within the four corners of the 
Income Tax Act that the place where a company carried on its business and 
where it entered into contracts in connection within that business, where also it 
received the income resulting from those contracts, was the source of its 
income. ,113 
This decision was confirmed in the case of ITC 313,114 where the taxpayer in 
anticipation of the United Kingdom's departure from the gold standard, converted 
109 See Hutton, S, "The Taxation of Derivatives in South Mrica", The Taxpayer, October 1998, vol 
47, no 12, p. 188. 
110 Ibid, p. 189. 
III Op cit, para 7-15, referring to the dictum of the court in Mount Morgan G M Co Ltd v C of I T, 33 
Commonwealth LR 76. 
112 2 SATC 64. 
Il3 At 65. 
114 8 SATC 157; see also The Taxpayer, op cit, p. 188. 
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some of his capital into gold coin. After the United Kingdom abandoned the gold 
standard, the taxpayer entered into forty-three transactions in terms of which he 
dispatched gold to England, sold it for sterling, transmitted the sterling to South 
Africa, reconverted it into gold and reshipped the gold to England, and made a 
substantial profit on these transactions due to profitable foreign exchange fluctuations. 
The court held that, as the taxpayer was resident in South Africa, the transactions 
were originated in each case in South Africa and the ultimate profit was derived by 
the taxpayer in South Africa, and therefore the taxpayer's profits were sourced in 
South Africa. 
It appears from the above case law that the approach of the courts in determining the 
source of income derived from cross-border derivative transactions that form part of 
the taxpayer's business will ordinarily be the place where the taxpayer carries on its 
business. It thus follows that from these particular transactions, the place of 
conclusion of contract will not normally be the decisive factor . Consequently, it can 
be said that, if income is derived by a foreign counterparty from derivative 
transactions entered into with a South African taxpayer, the source of income from 
this transaction will not be South Africa. In the same light, income derived by a South 
African taxpayer from derivative transactions with foreign counterparties will 
invariably be sourced in South Africa. 
1.4.1.4 Insurance transactions 
In general, the important factor in determining the source of income derived by a 
taxpayer from an indemnity received under an insurance policy is the place where the 
contract of insurance was concluded, irrespective of the place of destruction or the 
loss of goodS. 115 
This principle derived from the decision given in the leading cases. Thus, in fTC 3,116 
the taxpayers were general merchants who had in the course of their business in South 
Africa insured certain goods in transit from Europe to Delagoa Bay. The goods were 
115 See Meyerowitz, op cit, para 7-80; also analysed in The Taxpayer, op cit, p. 189. 
116 1 SATe 50. 
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destroyed by fire outside South Africa, and one of the issues to be decided by the 
court was the source of the insurance proceeds. 
The court held that as the money was earned from a contract of insurance concluded 
in South Africa, and that money received by the taxpayer in South Africa, it was thus 
from a South African source. However, the courts also recognised in this case that the 
place where the taxpayer carries on his business might also be an important factor, 
though not decisive. The court actually noted that the taxpayer's insurance of the 
goods formed a necessary part of their business in South Africa and this could well 
have influenced it in locating the source of the proceeds.117 
The place of 'conclusion of contract' test was followed in fTC 81,118 where the 
taxpayer which conducted its business operation offshore had insured certain of its 
produce in transit from its place of production outside South Africa to Europe in terms 
of a contract of insurance concluded in South Africa. The cargo was lost at sea and 
the issue was to determine the source of the proceeds from the insurance policy. The 
court held that the insurance of trading stock constituted a necessary part of the 
taxpayer's business and that, as the contract was concluded in the Union, the 
insurance proceeds then were from a South African source. 
The reliance by the courts on the place of conclusion of an insurance contract as the 
source of the income has been subject to criticism. Thus, referring to the above case, it 
was argued that, the source of insurance proceeds might not necessarily be in South 
Africa where the contract was concluded, because it was entered into in the course of 
the taxpayer's business offshore, and thus, it would have been logical that, the 
insurance proceeds should have been sourced in the place where the taxpayer's 
business is conducted.119 
In the same context, Meyerowitz argued that, the place of conclusion of the insurance 
contract is not a satisfactory test. And the better test would appear to be either the 
11 7 At 5l. 
118 3 SATe 136. 
119 See The Taxpayer, op cit, p. 189. 
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place where the business of the insured is carried on or the supply of the money 
buying the policy. 120 
1.4.1.5 Sale of securities 
The rule applies in determining the real source of the sale of goods transaction also 
applies mutatis mutandis to the sale of securities (shares) transaction. 
It is submitted that the determination of the source of income from the sale of shares 
is a question of facts to be decided according to the circumstances of a particular case. 
However, the general principle in this case is that where the taxpayer carries a distinct 
and separate business of dealing in shares outside the Republic, the source of such 
income is located outside the Republic, though the taxpayer may be carrying on a 
similar business in the Republic. This rule is subject to the proviso that the transaction 
carried out in the foreign country must not be so linked up with similar transaction in 
the Republic as to be an inherent part of it thereof 
The general rule is derived from different case judgments. In Overseas Trust 
Corporation Ltd v CIR,121 the taxpayer, a financial and investment company carrying 
on business in the Republic by purchasing and selling shares and other securities, sold 
certain shares through brokers in Germany. The brokers were instructed from Cape 
Town to find buyers at a certain price and the scrip being forwarded from Cape Town 
in fulfilment of the sales effected. The court held that the taxpayer had acquired the 
shares in the Republic where its capital was employed, that it did not carry on 
business in Germany, and that the transaction was controlled throughout from the 
Republic. So, the broker employed in Germany was merely its agent executing its 
instruction and the source of the profit was therefore in the Republic. 
Solomon JA in giving his judgment held that: 
'Here again applying the test of where the capital was employed which earned 
the profit, it is clear that none was employed in Germany. The capital 
employed was that which the shares were bought which were afterwards sold 
in Germany. Had the company carried on part of its business in Germany by 
buying and selling shares there, the position would have been different. But it 
120 Op cit, para 7-80. 
121 Op cit, p. 444. 
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carried on no business in Germany; it merely sent shares there to brokers to 
realize in accordance with instruction ... ,122 
By contrast, in CIR v Black,123 the taxpayer, a Johannesburg stockbroker, was 
associated in an arbitrage business with a London firm, which in addition, by 
arrangement, dealt in shares on the taxpayer's behalf in London. Though the 
transaction in London in many cases were effected only after discussion with the 
taxpayer, the London firm was however by arrangement entitled to deal in shares on 
the taxpayer's account without his authorization. The issue to be decided by the court 
was whether the profit derived by the taxpayer from the sharedealings in London was 
from a South African source. The court held that since 'the main, real dominant, 
substantial source of income' was the use of the taxpayer's capital in London and the 
making and executing of the contract there, the source of the profit was not in South 
Africa. The court based its judgment on the fact that since there was a distinct 
business of buying and selling shares in London, it was impossible to hold that the 
cause of the accrual of the profit was the control exercised by the taxpayer in 
Johannesburg. 
In conclusion, it can be submitted through the analysis of the above cases that the 
source of profit on a particular transaction of a sharedealing business is the business 
carried on, provided that the transaction is part and parcel of that business. Where a 
taxpayer has idle capital in a foreign country which he employs there to purchase 
shares with a view to making a profit, the ultimate profit should be from a source 
outside the Republic if the activities constitute a separate business there. 124 
1.4.1.6 Dividends 
Although most of the South African source dividends are no longer subject to normal 
tax, the analysis of the source of dividends is still material. The significance of the 
source of dividends is related first, to the determination of the source of this form of 
income in terms of the taxation of foreign dividends; that is, dividends deriving from 
122 At 458. 
123 Op cit, at 536; see also M Ltd v COT, 1958 (SR) (3) SA 18 (SA), 22 SATe 27. 
124 See 'T' Co Ltd v COT (1966) (2) SA 16,28 SATe 67; and most recent cases of ITC 1395 (1984) 
47 SATe 123; CWv COT (1990) (2) SA (ZH), 50 SATe 137 at 144. 
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distributions to South African resident shareholders by non-resident companies. 125 
Secondly, the source of dividends is also of consequence in respect of secondary tax 
on companies (STC).126 
With regard to the determination of source, the general principle as originated from 
cases in Boyd v CIR 127 and Lamb v CIR,128 is that, the actual source of income from 
dividends is the share giving rise to the dividends and the shares are situated where 
they are registered, which means where they can be effectively dealt with, irrespective 
of the source from which the company derives its profits. 
As analysed by Williams, 129 the rationale for the adoption of this principle is twofold: 
Firstly, dividends are income that derives from property in the form of shares, and 
because the share register is evidence of title to shares, the property is located where 
the register is located. 
Secondly, once the dividends are declared, they become a debt owed by a company 
resident in the Republic. 
The leading case in this connection is Boyd v CIR,130 where the taxpayer received 
dividends on shares in the Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa Ltd, 
which was a public company within the meaning of the Income Tax Act. The 
company was incorporated in South Africa and had its registered office and Head 
Office in Kimberley where its kept its share register, the central management and 
control of company was exercised and all the dividends were declared by the directors 
of the company. The company derived its income mainly from its diamond mining 
operation in South West Africa, but a portion of its income was derived from 
125 Dividends fall into gross income definition in terms of para (k) of section 1 of the Income Tax 
Act, as amended by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 30 of 2000, effective from 23 February 2000, 
and by section 2(e) of the Act 59 of 2000. While section 10(1)(1<) (i) generally exempts (except in the 
case of certain unit trust arrangements) domestic source dividends, foreign dividends are still taxed in 
South Africa in terms of section 9E of the Act. Previously, foreign dividends were essentially dividends 
paid by a company out of profits derived from a source outside South Africa. However, in respect of 
dividends declared on or after 1 January 2001, the definition of foreign dividends changed to refer to 
dividends received by or accrued to a South African resident from a company which is a foreign entity. 
See the analysis of foreign dividends tax implications in Part Ill, p .... 
126 See sections 64B and 64C read together with section 9E of the Act. 
127 (1951) (3) SA 525 (A), 17 SATC 366. 
128 (1955) (1) SA 270 (A), 20 SATC 1. 
129 0 6 P cit, p. 3 . 
130 Op cit, p. 525. 
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investments m South Africa. The court held that the source of the whole of the 
dividend income was South Africa. 
Thus, it follows from this judgment that the source of dividend accrumg to a 
shareholder is not necessarily the same as the source of the income of the company 
out of which the dividend was declared. By virtue of the South African Company law 
legislation, 131 all companies are compelled to keep their register of shareholders in the 
Republic, and consequently, the shares of all such companies would be regarded 
legally as being registered in the Republic. 
Another issue is to determine the source of dividend received from a company whose 
principal register is kept in the Republic, but the shares in question are registered in a 
branch register in a foreign country. 
This matter was considered in the Lamb's case, where it was held that, a dividend 
received from Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd, a company incorporated in 
England, with its central management and control in Northern Rhodesia, was from a 
source in England, notwithstanding the registration of the taxpayer's shares on which 
the dividend was received in the Johannesburg branch register of the company and not 
in the principal register in England . 
The principle laid down from this case is that the location of the source of dividend is 
not where the shares of the company are registered at any particular date, but where 
the shares of the company are generally registrable. In other words, where there is 
more than one share register, the location of the principal share register of the 
'II '1 132 company WI preval . 
Thus, in South Africa, section 108(1) of the Companies Act provides that a branch 
register is deemed to be part of the principal register. 
131 Act 61 of 1973 
132 See notes by Emslie, TS, Davis, D, and Hutton, SJ, income Tax, cases and materials, 1995, 2 ed, 
p. 147. 
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1.4.1. 7 Partnership activities 
In South Africa, a partnership does not possess a legal personality and therefore is not 
taxable as such in its own right. This means that the partnership income is taxed in the 
hands of the partners in accordance with their respective share in such income 
determined by the terms of the partnership agreement. I33 Yet, the question remains as 
to how to determine the source of that share. 
As a general rule, the partner share of income may derive from the employment of 
capital, as in the case of a dormant partner, or the profit may be the result of work 
done or service rendered. 134 
The source of the partner's income was considered in the landmark case of CIR v 
Epstein,135 where the taxpayer resident and carrying on business in South Africa, 
entered into a partnership agreement with an Argentinian company in terms of which 
the former would purchase asbestos from a supplier in South Africa and ship it to the 
latter, who would sell it in Argentina. Any profit then so derived, was divided equally 
between the partners. The issue before the court was to decide about the location the 
source of income of the South African partner. 
Centlivres CJ in giving the majority judgment laid down the principle that income 
derived from carrying on of a partnership business has its source in the respective 
business activities of the partners. In other words, where the partnership members 
carry on their business activities in different countries, the income of the partnership 
is derived from different sources and the partner carrying on his business activities in 
the Republic has the source of his income from partnership within the Republic, 
received or accrued as the quid pro quo for the services rendered to the partnership in 
the Republic. At the mean time, the other partners carrying out their activities outside 
the Republic have the source of their income in their foreign countries. Thus, the court 
in this case disregarded entirely the whole trading operation and looked only into 
Epstein's share of profits of the partnership and held that, the source of Epstein's 
income was in South Africa. 
133 See Williams, op cit, p. 42. 
134 See Meyerowitz, op cit, para 7-62. 
135 Op cit, p. 689. 
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The logic of the above principle is dubious. It offers the taxpayers scope for tax 
planning with regard to the question of source and it is difficult to reconcile with the 
fundamental principles of the partnership law. 
The above proposition ignores, as Williams puts it,136 the fact that in the partnership, 
partners carry on business for their joint benefit and each partner has the right to a 
share in all partnership profits. Then, the partnership income that has its source 
outside the Republic retains its character as such when it is distributed to the 
individual partners. If Epstein's half-share of the profits were to be considered as 
being derived directly from the entire trading operation, or if the court has approached 
the source in this case by looking at the taxpayer's overall business rather than at a 
particular profit producing transaction, it would have been possible that different 
result might have occurred. 137 The source of this income would have been found to be 
either in South Africa or in Argentina, depending on the argument about the 
identification of the dominant originating cause. 
The better view in order to determine the source of the partnership income is the one 
considered by Schreiner JA who held in the minority judgement that: 
'Since a business may be carried on through partners or other agents, the place 
where the taxpayer's income originates is not where he personally exerts 
himself, assuming that he does so, but where the business profits are realised.' 
Income accrues to all partners jointly, based on the concept that partners are one 
another's agents and that they take responsibility or risk in all territories where the 
partnership does business. Therefore, each partner shares in multiple source income of 
the partnership in the ratio of his or her profit shares to one another. 
This approach has been given legal approval in view of section 24H(2) of the Income 
Tax Act I38 which states that: 
'Where any trade or business is carried on in a partnership, each member of 
such partnership shall ... be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be carrying 
on such trade or business. ' 
136 Op cit, p. 43. 
137 See Broomberg and Kruger, op cit, p. 20; see also The Taxpayer, op cit, p. 7. 
138 Inserted by section 21 of the Act 90 of 1988. 
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This provision has in some way given legal personality recognition to the partnership 
for income tax purposes by stipulating as noted by Emslie139 that the business 
activities of a partnership must be viewed as if the partnership was a separate entity, 
and each partner will be then considered to be carrying on the business that is carried 
on by the partnership. 
This unorthodox legal recognition accorded to the partnership by section 24H(2) tends 
to reject the argument that the choice of the parties to the contract can substantially 
affect the source of income to be derived from the contract. In other words, the 
implementation of section 24H(2) tends to confirm that it would indeed be anomalous 
for the source of business projects to vary according to whether that business was 
carried on by a partnership or by for instance a company. 
If it is assumed however that these trading activities (in Epstein's case) had been 
conducted through the medium of a company, it is most likely that the company 
(taking into account its entire trading operation) would not have been taxed on its 
profits in the Republic, because the source of the trading income would almost 
certainly have been in Argentina. 140 
1.4.1.8 Employment and services rendered 
The general principle in the South African context with regard to the actual source of 
income from employment and other services rendered 141 is that the service rendered 
itself constitutes the source of the income, irrespective of the place where the contract 
is concluded or the remuneration paid, and regardless of whether such service is 
mental or physical, or whether it is rendered or performed in person or through the 
agency of another. Thus, the source of income of these services is located at the place 
where the services are rendered. 
139 See Emslie, Davis, and Hutton, op cit, p. 137. 
140 Considering the principles set out in the Transvaal Hide and Skin Merchants case, as regards 
income from buying and selling of commodities, it is clear that by the application of section 24H(2) on 
the facts of the Epstein's case, there was only one source of income in any event, that is, the sale of 
asbestos in Argentina. Thus, the services rendered by Epstein were irrelevant. 
141 It is understood that these terms deal with labour and services as they include the exercise and 
exploitation of a person's skill, wit, intellect, personality, and connection as well as manual labour. 
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This general rule for the determination of source of income of this nature was given 
consideration in the correct summary of Herbstein J in fTC 837,142 when he stated 
that: 
, " . in the case of personal services the originating cause, i. e the source of the 
income resulting therefrom is the work which the taxpayer does to earn 
it ... and the location of the source is the place where the services are rendered.' 
However, the application of the above rule depends on the circumstances of a 
particular case and mostly on the type of service or work done. 
a) The director's fees 
A director of company acting in his capacity as such is deemed to render the services 
at the head office of the company where the board of directors ordinarily meets to 
transact the business of the company. Thus, if the head office is situated in the 
Republic, the fees are derived from a South African source irrespective of the place 
where the director resides or where he performs the services. 143 
So, a director who is resident outside the Republic would therefore be liable to South 
African tax on his fees if the board of directors meets in the Republic. If he shares his 
fees with an alternate director in the Republic, he will be subject to tax only on that 
portion accruing to him. Similarly, if a director is resident in the Republic and 
receives a fee from a company with its head office, where the board ordinarily 
transacts its business outside the Republic, the income is from a non-South African 
source. 144 
However, it is sometimes common that the same person may hold different positions 
resulting in him acting as the director and employee of the same company at the same 
timel45 In this case, a clear distinction must be made between the director's fees and 
the income for services rendered in a capacity other than that of a director. For 
142 21 SATC 413 . 
143 See ITC 77 (1927) 3 SATC 72; ITC 106 (1927) 3 SATC 336; ITC 235 (1932) 6 SATC 262; ITC 
250 (1932) 7 SATC 46. 
144 See Silke, op cit, para 5-8. 
145 Amendments to the Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax Act with the inclusion of the new 
paragraph II C have been enacted in order to cast the pay-as-you-earn (P AYE) net over private 
companies' directors. Thus, with effect from I March 2002, the definition of employees now includes 
directors of a private company. They are currently subject to PAYE on their 'deemed remuneration' 
calculated in terms of formula as well as any actual remuneration paid or payable to them. 
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example, besides sitting on the board, a director may also be appointed to manage the 
day-to-day affairs of a company or involved in specific duties on a full-time basis 
(like assisting in buying or selling operations of the company). In the latter capacity, 
where the director holds a salaried appointment, the source of such income is located 
in the Republic if those services were rendered in the Republic. 
This rule was considered in ITC 235,146 where a managing director of a company 
located in the Republic performed his duties outside the Republic and was held liable 
to tax on both his director's fees and salary. It was held by the court with regard to the 
fees that the director's fees were derived as a result of being a director, and therefore 
had to be presumed to have been earned at the head office of the company located 
within the Republic. As regards his salary, the court decided that the director did not 
discharge the onus resting on him to prove that he was permanently transferred from 
the Republic and that the work done by him outside the Republic was independent of 
the operation of the company in the Republic. 
Consequently, where a director establishes as a fact that he is employed not merely as 
director, but by virtue of his special skills or knowledge of the conditions prevailing 
in an overseas country, and he earns a fee specifically for such services rendered 
outside the Republic, such fee will thus be sourced outside the country. 147 
b) Employees 
As a general rule, the actual source of remuneration from employment is located at 
the place where the services are rendered. 148 It follows that the salary of an employee 
who is stationed outside the Republic to render services there on behalf of a South 
African employer is not taxable in the Republic, being from a source outside the 
146 Op cit, p. 262. 
147 See fTC 266 (1932) 7 SATC 151. This rule also applies subject to the source of gains under 
section 8A of the Income Tax Act, which includes in a taxpayer's income the amount of any 'gain' 
made by him on the exercise, cession or release of a right to acquire a marketable security obtained by 
him as a director or ex-director of a company or in respect of services rendered or to be rendered by 
him as an employee to an employer. 
148 See fTC 1104 (1967) 29 SATC 46. 
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Republic even if the contract of employment was concluded or the sale was payable in 
the Republic. 149 
On the other hand, if a foreign employer sends his employee to the Republic to buy 
trading goods and the employee is stationed here for that purpose, the salary he 
receives is from a South African source by virtue of the services being rendered in 
South Africa, irrespective of the fact that, the employee is abroad or to whether or not 
the employee's salary is remitted to the Republic. 150 
The principles in respect of actual source of income from employment were well 
illustrated by GJ Maritz in ITC 77151 by way of the following examples: 
• An attorney whom practised in the Free State employed a clerk at a salary of £ 
500. The source of that clerk's income will be the Union (South Africa), for his 
services were located there. 
• An attorney who practised both in the Free State and in Basutoland employed a 
clerk to work in both businesses at a salary of £ 500; the locality of the services 
which earned the £ 500 would be partly in the Free State and partly in Basutoland. 
An allocation would have to be made probably on a time basis, of the £ 500, partly 
to a Union source and partly to a Basutoland source ... 
• An attorney who practised in the Free State near the Basutoland border employed 
a clerk at £ 500 per annum to serve him in his Free State business. The clerk, 
however, occasionally crossed the border to perform casual work for his 
employer in Basutoland. The locality of the services which earned the £ 500 
would be Free State. The acts of service performed by the clerk in Basutoland 
were casual and accidental in their nature, and were not remunerated as such. If, 
however, the attorney remunerated him especially for the acts of service he 
performed in Basutoland, then the locality of the service which produced that 
149 See fTC 182 (1930) 5 SATC 260. With the application of the residence tax system in South 
Africa, this is subject to whether or not the employee is a South African resident. See the analysis of 
the tax implications of South African residents ' foreign employment income. 
ISO See Silke, op cit, para 5-11. TItis rule is subject where applicable, to the double taxation 
agreements between South Africa and its trading partners, which may, provided that certain 
requirements are met, render income that has its source in the Republic in terms of this rule, exempt 
from tax. 
lSI (1927) 3 SATC 72. 
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special remuneration would be Basutoland, and the source of special 
remuneration would be Basutoland. 
The conditions of the agreement in terms of which the employee performs his services 
is the most important factor in determining the place where the service was rendered 
or labour done. Thus, in COT v Shein,152 the taxpayer assumed the management of a 
store in the territory then known as Bechuanaland Protectorate. At first, the taxpayer 
resided at the store, but long before the year of assessment in issue, he moved to and 
lived permanently in Bulawayo, and employed a full-time storekeeper at his own 
expense to mange the shop in Bechuanaland. 
The court held in considering the nature of the employment that a man may render 
services by accepting responsibility just as much as by manual or other work, and 
when he does so, he accepts responsibility at the place at which the business for which 
he accepts responsibility is being carried on, i.e, Bechuanaland. Therefore, as the 
court found it, the taxpayer was not liable for tax in Rhodesia. 
In conclusion, in determining the actual source of income from employment, an 
apportionment is permissible where services are rendered partly within and partly 
outside the Republic, unless it can be proved that, the work done in a country other 
than that where the work is ordinarily done, or the services are ordinarily rendered, 
are merely subsidiary, incidental, casual or trivial and are not paid separately. 153 
c) Professions 
The determination of the actual source of professional services deals with independent 
personal services; that is, services that are rendered otherwise than in an employer-
employee relationship . In this case particularly, the 'activity' test also applies in 
identifying the source of this kind of remuneration, which is submitted to be the place 
where the services are rendered. This was decided in ITC 432,154 where the income 
earned by a United Kingdom company from the sale and installation of a lift in 
Zimbabwe was held not to be from a South African source, though the company had a 
152 22 SATe 12; see also ITC 929 (1961) 24 SATe 331. 
153 See ITC 266 (1932) 7 SATe 151. 
154 (1939) 10 SATe 437. 
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place of business in South Africa, was represented in South Africa by an agent for the 
sale of its products and had tendered for the installation in issue in South Africa. 155 
In fTC 134,156 a South African resident quantity surveyor contracted to prepare bills 
of quantities for a building in Kenya. He worked in Kenya for approximately six 
months investigating the requirements of the proposed building and thereafter, 
returned to South Africa to prepare the final bills of quantities. It was held that the 
source of the fees was South Africa where the taxpayer carried on his profession and 
drafted the final bills of quantities, and the investigation in Kenya held to be merely 
preparatory work. The fact that the fees earned were paid in Kenya was immaterial. 157 
The above case can be compared with CfR v Nell,158 where a South African 
consulting engineer who practised his profession in Johannesburg, went to Southern 
Rhodesia on different occasions to render certain services pertaining to his profession. 
He spent considerable time there in order to ascertain the requirements of the clients 
and to be able to advise them. Thereafter, he returned to the Republic and caused the 
draft plans to be prepared in his office at Johannesburg from the notes made in 
Rhodesia. It was found by the Appellate Division that it was impossible to interfere 
with the finding of the court aqua that the work of establishing the clients' 
requirements was an essential and basic part of the work which requires skill and 
experience and was usually attended to by the engineer himself, whereas the 
formulation of the draft plans from the engineer's notes was routine work entrusted to 
a relatively junior assistant. 
Thus the income attributed to the servIces rendered outside South Africa was 
accordingly held to be a non-South African source. 159 
155 See also ITC 1102 (1967) 29 SATC 28. 
156 (1928) 4 SA TC 200 
157 See also ITC 1104 (1967) 29 SATC 46. 
158 Op cit, at 774. 
159 The decision of the court was based on the absence of close link between the work done in 
Southern Rhodesia and the carrying on of trade by the engineer in South Africa in terms of the repealed 
section 9(1)( d) of the Act. 
246 
1.4.1.9 Interest 
n determining the source of interest, the type of transaction that gives rise to the 
":1 
~' interest should be considered, 
The 'employment of capital ' test is used as a decisive factor in determining the 
originating cause of interest. This principle was followed in the early case of COT v 
William Dunn & CO,160 where the taxpayer, a United Kingdom company, had 
purchased goods in the United Kingdom on behalf of South African companies. The 
taxpayer, which purchased the goods in its own name and paid for them itself and was 
reimbursed later by the South African companies, charged the companies interest on 
the balances owing by them from time to time. The court held that the interest resulted 
from 'an employment of English capital in an English business' because the funds 
used to purchase and shipped the goods to South Africa had neither been employed 
nor invested in South Africa. 161 Consequently, the source of interest in this case was 
outside South Africa. 162 
The determination of the source of interest was further considered in the landmark 
case of CIR v Lever Brothers and another,163 A majority judgment of the Appellate 
Division held that, the interest paid by Overseas Holdings to Lever Brothers was not 
derived from a source within South Africa. Watermeyer CJ in his judgment laid down 
the principle that the originating cause of interest payable on a loan of money was not 
the debt but the services that the lender performs to the borrower, that is, the supply of 
credit in return for which the borrower pays him interest. He proposed the rule as 
follows : 
'In the case of a loan of money the lender gives the money to the borrower, 
who in return incurs an obligation to repay the same amount of money at some 
future time and if the loan is one which bears interest, he also incurs an 
obligation to pay that interest. Though I use the words 'gives the money' this 
must not be taken literally as the usual way of making a loan. As a rule the 
lender either gives credit to the borrower or transfers to him certain rights of 
obtaining credit which had previously belonged to the lender, and this supply 
160 Op cit, at 607. 
161 At 609. 
162 This rule was also followed in ITC 82 (1927 3 SATe 141) where it was held in accordance with 
Dunn 's case that, if capital were employed in the Republic by South African merchants for the 
payment of the purchase price of goods ordered by foreign principals, any interest so received would be 
from a South African source, 
163 (1946), Op cit, at 441; the facts of the case have been extensively analysed above (note 5). 
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of credit is the service which the lender performs to the borrower, in return for 
which the borrower pays him interest. Consequently, this provision of credit is 
the originating cause or source of the interest received by the lender. 
Although, colloquially, one speaks of a debt carrying interest, or interest on a 
debt, as though interest were a sort of growth sprouting from the debt, the 
language used means no more than that the borrower pays interest, if that is 
the agreement between borrower and lender, as consideration for the benefits 
allowed to him by the lender. ,164 
Consequently, the Lever Brothers case laid down the judicial authority that the source 
of interest on a loan of money is located neither where the agreement of loan is 
concluded, the borrower productively employs the funds, the interest is payable nor 
the debt is payable. Instead, the true source of interest is to be found where the funds 
are 'physically' made available to the debtor. 
The Lever Brothers principle was again highlighted in the recent case of First 
National Bank of South Africa Ltd v C: SARS,165 where the Supreme Court of Appeal 
found the issue to be a case of a 'source' of income within South Africa, as 
contemplated in the ACt. 166 
The issue revolved around the appellant's (taxpayer) international financing 
transaction, and the interest income it derived from it, by providing credit to its South 
African client who required the facility to finance its exports, imports and its working 
capital. In terms of its offshore business, the taxpayer had a facility to borrow funds 
from foreign banks interested in lending money to a South African bank. The 
international financing transactions in this case were triggered by a client's request for 
a foreign facility, after which the taxpayer would raise the facility by way of a loan 
from a foreign bank. The taxpayer would then make the facility available to the client 
by paying the amount into a foreign banking account operated by the client, or, if the 
amount was to be paid to the client in South Africa, by crediting the amount to its 
treasury account in the United States, which it frequently used for transactions of this 
kind. The Taxpayer would debit the client's account in South Africa in local currency. 
The client was debited with the interest the taxpayer was charged by the foreign bank, 
plus an added margin on the interest comprising the taxpayer's remuneration, plus a 
164 At 451. 
165 Reportable case no 34312000, delivered on 7 March 2002. 
166 This refers to the Income Tax Act as it then before the amendment by Act 59 of 2000. 
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premium for the forward exchange rate to protect the client from adverse currency 
fluctuations. 
The taxpayer's transactions were affected when the South African government 
declared a debt standstill in 1985, which prohibited banks from repaying obligations 
to foreign creditors. The taxpayer chose the option of continuing to use the foreign 
currency received pursuant to repayment by its clients of their debts and continue to 
lend such funds on the established basis. 
The taxpayer's argument (upheld by the Special Court and disallowed by the 
Transvaal Provincial Division) on appeal by the Commissioner, was that the funds 
were always advanced and made payable offshore, usually in New York. All loans 
were repayable offshore both with regard to the principal and interest. The proceeds 
of such loan transactions were maintained offshore and utilised by the taxpayer for 
future transactions on the same basis as outlined. 
On appeal by the First National Bank, the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the 
Transvaal Provincial Division's decision that apart from the fact that contractually the 
foreign currency was made available to the borrowing client in New York and had to 
be repaid there, all the other important factors which caused the interest income to 
arise (and which constituted the dominant cause of the receipt of the interest) had their 
origin in South Africa and flowed from the appellant's business activities and 
operations in the Republic. The narrow view taken by the appellant focuses only on 
where the funds were made available and had to be repaid . Thus, it overlooks the need 
to have regard to the essence of the whole transaction which generated the interest 
with a view to determining the location of its source. It was conceded on behalf of the 
appellant that had it borrowed foreign currency in New York, transferred it to South 
Africa and lent out the rand equivalent here, the source of the interest income 
generated by the loan would have been South Africa. There is no logical reason why 
the position should be any different because of the expedient of making the foreign 
currency available in New York to the client before transferring it to South Africa 
(and later back to New York) essentially using the same method. The substance of the 
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underlying income-generating transaction remains the same, even though the means 
used to achieve the same result may differ. 167 
Thus, Smalberger ADP (with Harms, Streicher, Farlam and Brand JJA concurring) 
went on to conclude that in consideration of the totality of facts of the case, the 
appellant's reliance on the Lever Brothers decision was misplaced. The latter case did 
not provide authority for the narrow proposition advanced by the appellant. 
Accordingly, the facts of the Lever Brothers case differed materially from the First 
National Bank case. In any event, Smalberger's decision has the result of overriding 
the view that the Lever Brothers rule was the absolute authority for the proposition 
that the source of interest in the sense of originating cause is the loan or credit given 
and that its location is determined as being the place where the loan or credit is made 
available. 
1.4.1.10 Rent 
The determination of the source of rental income depends on the surrounding 
circumstances of a particular case. Some factors, though not conclusive have to be 
considered such as the place where the taxpayer's capital was employed in purchasing 
the leased property, the place where the taxpayer's business is carried on, the nature 
of the leased property whether movable or immovable and the duration of the lease. 
These factors were laid down in the landmark case of COT v British United Shoe 
Machinery (SA) (Pty) Ltd. 168 The taxpayer was a company registered, managed and 
controlled in South Africa. It carried on business as a manufacturer and dealer in all 
kinds of machinery, appliances and tools used in the footwear industry. A large part of 
its business consisted in leasing machines in South Africa and Rhodesia. Once signed 
by the prospective lessees, the leases were all completed by the signature of the 
company in South Africa. The company had no branch office in Rhodesia and no 
canvassing for lease business was carried on in that territory. The issue to be decided 
was the location of the source of the Rhodesians rentals . The court held that it was the 
167 See the comments on the case in the April 2002, The Taxpayer, p. 72. 
168 Opcit,at193. 
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use of the machines that produced the income and not the capital which was used to 
buy them. 
The application of the above principle depends on the nature of the property let, the 
nature of the lessor's business and the duration of the lease. As the court stated in its 
obiter, different results as to the determination of the source of rental income may 
arise in the case of letting of smaller items of a relatively insignificant value for a 
more limited period, such as motor vehicles, typewriters and dictating machines. In 
this case, the source of rent would probably be the business of the lessor, rather the 
property let and the occasional use of property in another country would be ignored. 
1.4.1.11 Royalties 
Under South Mrican income tax law, the true source of income derived from the 
exploitation of intangible property (in the form of patent rights, formulae, secret 
processes or similar items accruing to investors excluding the registration of patent 
rights) is in South Africa if the intangible property was created or developed in South 
Africa, irrespective of where the asset is used to generate royalties. 
This principle was laid down in Millin v CIR,169 where the author, Gertrude Millin, 
had derived royalties from a book which she had written in South Mrica but which 
was published in England. The court held that she had exercised her wits, labour and 
intellect in South Africa in writing the book and in dealing with the publishers and 
consequently, the source of the royalties was located in South Mrica. 
However, the above principle does not apply when the royalties are derived by a 
person who is not the original author or inventor, but who had acquired the relevant 
rights from the author. The source of such income would then be derived not from the 
creative talent of the author, but depending on the circumstances of a particular case, 
either from the contract whereby such rights were acquired, or the business used to 
exploit such rights, or the capital employed in doing so, or the use of such rights, 
169 (1928) AD 207, 3 SATe 170. 
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following the analogy of the decision in British United Shoe Machinery (SA) (Fty) Ltd 
case. 170 
As matter of principle, there is no difference between the letting of movable assets 
and the granting of right to use a trade mark and secret processes as decided in ITC 
1491,171 where it was held that the exploitation in the United Kingdom of a patented 
process and know-how for resurfacing bathtubs gave rise to non-South African source 
income. The development of the process in South Africa was irrelevant because the 
property and the activities constituting the dominant cause that earned the income 
were situated in the United Kingdom. 
1.4.1.12 Annuities 
Conflicting court decisions lead to some uncertainty regarding the determination of 
the actual source of annuities. The general rule is that a contractual annuity, where a 
person agrees to pay another an annuity will be sourced in South Africa if the 
contract, which is the originating cause, is made in the Republic. 
This principle was laid down in obiter by Centlivres CJ in Boyd v CIR,172 to the effect 
that: 
'If a resident of the Union whose sole source of income is South West Africa 
pays in terms of a contract made in the Union an annuity to another person, it 
seems to me that the source of that other person's income is in the Union . .. .It 
might be said that the ultimate source of the annuity is in South West Africa 
but I do not think that on a proper interpretation of the word "source" in the 
definition of "gross income" one is required to go back to the remote 
source ... ' 
The leading authority in this case is ITC 826.173 A widow taxpayer was entitled to an 
annuity payable out of the income of a trust created under the will of her late husband, 
or if the income of the trust proved insufficient, out of the capital of the trust. The 
assets of the trust comprised South African, Swaziland and Rhodesian assets, and 
during the year of assessment, income was derived from all three countries. The 
taxpayer was resident in the Republic, as also was her late husband during his 
170 (1964) (3) SA 193 (Fe), 26 SATe 141;. See alsoiTC 1491 (1990) 53 SATe 115 at 1231124. 
171 (1990) 53 SATe 115. 
172 Op cit, at 377. 
173 (1956) 21 SATe 189. 
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lifetime. The last will of the deceased was executed in the Republic, the 
administrators of his estate and trustees of the trust were resident in the Republic and 
the general administration of the trust was carried out in the Republic. The issue was 
to decide whether the full amount of annuity included by the commissioner in the 
taxpayer's taxable income was from a source within the Republic. The court held that, 
the source of an annuity flowing from the terms of a contract is the place where the 
contract is made.174 
Another consideration is to ascertain the source of a purchased annuity, i.e, an annuity 
bought for instance, from an insurance company. In practice, as submitted by Silke,175 
The Inland Revenue regards the location of the source of purchased annuity to be the 
place where the contract in terms of which the company undertook to pay the annuity 
was entered into. This therefore means, the place where the capital is employed is 
irrelevant, but consideration must be given to the place where the insurance company 
accepts the proposal. 
Then, by further implications, all annuities payable under a contract taken out with the 
South African branch of a foreign company are not taxable in the Republic if it is a 
requirement that the proposal be accepted at the foreign head office. 
1.4.2 The deemed source application 
1.4.2.1 Deemed source of interest: section 9(6) 
It is argued that the unclear ratio of the Lever Brothers case fails to provide an 
acceptable definition of source of interest. The reason being that, that case was based 
on a complex set of facts and the majority judgment was able to dispose of the matter 
without showing a critical distinction between the submission that the source of 
interest is the provision of credit as opposed to the location of the debt. 176 
174 This rule was reaffinned by the Appeal Court in fTC 1069 (27 SATC 145) to the point that, an 
annuity paid out of the income of the trust created by a will has its real and immediate source in the 
debt imposed upon the trustees by the former testamentary Act. The originating cause of the annuity 
was the trust. 
175 Op cit, para 5-8. 
176 See The Taxpayer, op cit, p. 5. 
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Consequently, it is correctly submitted that the simplification of the source rule of 
interest has led to a damaging formalism, and in practice, this artificial test allows the 
source of interest to be changed through legal subtleties . 177 
In order to avoid the distorted results that could happen in application of the 
'provision of credit' test in determining the actual source of interest, the Katz 
Commission l78 proposed that the arguments stated by Schreiner JA in his minority 
judgment in Lever Brothers case were more relevant in the practical and theoretical 
sense. The learned judge was of the view that the source of interest on a loan should 
be considered to be where the capital is used and therefore where the debtor is 
located. 179 
In line with Schreiner JA's view and to bring some certainty as to the source of 
interest, some statutory amendment was brought to the Act by the implementation of 
section 9(6),180 which deems interest (as defined for the purposes of section 24J) to be 
from a source within South Africa where it is derived from the utilisation or 
application of funds or credit in the Republic. 
The funds or credit are deemed to be utilised (unless proven otherwise) where the 
debtor is resident as it applies to individuals (through the ordinary residence test) and 
legal entities (through the place of effective management test) by virtue of section 
9(7) of the Act. 
Consequently, the place of residence of the debtor is the determining factor for the 
application of sections 9(6) and 9(7) . Factors such as the place where the agreement 
between the parties is concluded and the performance by the creditor of his obligation 
under the agreement are of no relevance in determining the deemed source of interest. 
For instance, if a debtor resident of the Republic borrows money or acquires an asset 
outside the country from a creditor, the interest payable to the creditor will be deemed 
to have a South African source, unless it is proved that the debtor utilised the funds or 
the asset outside the country. At the same time, the interest received by the creditor 
177 See Katz Commission, op cit, chapter 6, p. 22. 
178 Ibid, at 23 . 
179 See 14 SATC 1 at 17. 
180 See The Taxation Laws Amendment Act no 30, 1998, Government Gazette, 29 June 1998, 
effective from 1 July 1998; also cited in Silke, op cit, p. 5/49. 
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will be exempt from tax, if he is not resident and does not spend more than 183 days 
in the Republic or a company resident outside the Republic provided that the interest 
is not effectively connected with the business carried on in the Republic by virtue of 
section 1 O( 1 )(hA) of the Act. 
In the same manner, if the debtor happens to be a non-resident and borrows funds or 
acquires assets in South Africa and uses the funds or the assets outside the Republic, 
then the source of the interest is not deemed to be in South Africa. But if the creditor 
was a resident of the country, he would be taxable on the interest accrued or received 
by him in the country, subject to the de minimis exemption. 181 
It can be said that the onus of proof rests on the taxpayer who wants to escape the 
provision of sections 9(6) and 9(7) to prove that the funds or credit obtained or 
borrowed were used outside the Republic, though he is resident in South Africa. 
The decision of the Lever Brothers case has now been overturned by the First 
national Bank'82 case on the determination of the natural source of income, which 
emphasise the consideration of the relevant factual matrix of each case. However the 
provisions of sections 9(6) and 9(7) do not override the normal or actual source of 
interest rule, but complement it by deeming interest to be from a South African 
source. The commissioner can thus address the determination of the source of interest 
from two perspectives: 
• He can either apply the normal source rules as laid down in the First National 
Bank case, by considering the essence of the whole transaction which generated 
the interest with the view to determining the location of its source ('totality of 
facts ' test) or; 
• If the normal source rule fails, he can recourse to the deeming source provision 
of sections 9(6) and (7) . 183 
181 The application of sections 9(6) and 9(7) of the Act is subject to the statutory rule (applying in this 
instance to the South African source interest) that the first R6000 and RlOOOO for persons aged 65 and 
over, of not otherwise exempt interest derived by a taxpayer who is a natural person is free from tax. 
See section 10(1)(i)(xv) of the Act as amended in clause 13(l)(a) of the Taxation Laws Amendment 
Bill (B 26-2002) following the Republic of South Africa Budget Review of 20 February 2002. 
182 Case discussed under the actual source of interest. 
183 See Huxham, K & Haupt., P, op cit, p. 20. 
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1.4.2.2 Other statutory non-resident tax implications 
a) Non-resident tax on interest: section lO(l)(hA) 
Although interest earned from a South African source is taxed in the Republic, the 
legislation has provided some kind of relief in the form of exemption available to non-
residents meeting certain requirements. 184 
For the general application of section 10(1)(hA), South African source interest 1S 
exempt if received or accrued to any person who is not a resident. 
In the case of natural persons,185 the exemption will only apply In the following 
circumstances: 
• The individual must be a non-resident; 
• He must be physically absent from the Republic for at least 183 days (in 
aggregate) during the year of assessment in which the interest is received or 
accrued; 
• The interest must not be derived from a business carried on by him in the 
Republic during the year of assessment. 
With regard to a company, the South African source interest is exempt in terms of 
section lO(l)(hA)(v) 186 of the Act if: 
• The company is a non-resident; 
• And the interest is not effectively connected with the business carried on by 
that company in the Republic. 
For the purposes of section 10(1 )(hA), the term 'Republic' includes countries forming 
part of the common monetary area (CMA).187 It follows that a person who is a 
184 In this section, I will focus only on interest exemption applicable to non-residents in general, 
without specifically analysing the tax provision in terms of section 1 O( 1 )(h) dealing with exemption on 
interest paid to non-residents on government stocks and similar investment. 
185 See para (iv) of the proviso to section lO( 1 )(hA) of the Act applying to interest received or accrued 
on or after 1 April 1995. It is considered that only a full day can be counted as a day of absence from 
the Republic in accordance with the 'physical presence' test in terms of the meaning of residence for 
individuals in section 1 definition of gross income. See also Silke, service 2001, para 9. 19A-20. 
186 This provision applies to interest accrues on or after 1 April 1996 and was substituted by section 
13(l)(i) of the Act 59 of 2000. The term 'carrying on business' in the Republic refers for instance to 
transactions carried on through a branch of a foreign company in South Africa. 
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resident, let say of Lesotho is deemed to be a resident of South Africa for the purposes 
of section lO(l)(hA). It is also provided in the application of section lO(l)(hA) that 
the interest portion of a dividend distributed by a unit portfolio in equities other than 
property shares to a resident outside the Republic is deemed to be interest, therefore 
falls within the ambit of the exemption. 188 
b) South African branches of foreign companies 
Foreign compames may decide to carry on business in the Republic through a 
minimum presence in the form of a branch. The term 'branch' is used in double tax 
agreements to confer a taxable presence in a source jurisdiction to a foreign resident 
company carrying on activities partly or wholly through a fixed place of business. 
Thus, the word 'branch' is included in the permanent establishment definition 
provided in article 5 of the DE CD Model Tax Convention. 189 
From the South African tax perspective, a branch of a foreign company is treated as a 
separate company. The term 'external company'\90 is used to designate a company 
incorporated outside the Republic which establishes a place of business in the 
Republic and is required to register its memorandum with the registrar of 
companies. 191 It follows that the registration of the memorandum of an 'external 
company' does not result in the incorporation of the company in the Republic and it 
will therefore not consider to be resident, unless it is effectively managed in the 
Republic. l92 Thus, an external company that carries on business in South Africa 
through a branch will be liable on its source or deemed source income, but not on its 
non-Republic source income. 193 Because a branch is not a resident company, there is 
no secondary tax on companies (STC) consequences when a foreign company 
declares dividends out of its South African branch profits. 194 However, the rate of tax 
187 See section 9 of the Currency & Exchange Act, 9 of 1933. The CMA includes South Africa, 
Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. 
188 See para (iii) of section lO(l)(hA) effective from 23 February 2000. 
189 See the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital as it is read on 29 April 2000. 
190 As defined in section 1 of the Companies' Act 61 of 1973. 
191 See section 322 of the Companies Act 1973. 
192 See De Koker, A et ai, Silke Tax Yearbook, 2001-2002, p. A12. 
193 See para (ii) of the gross income definition in section 1 of the Act. 
194 See section 64B(5) of the Act. 
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for branches IS at 35% and IS currently higher than the normal company rate of 
30%.195 
The analysis of the tax consequences of South African branches is relevant in the 
context for instance, of exemption provided to non-residents, not carrying on business 
in the Republic in terms of sections 10(1)(h) and (hA).196 
The meaning of 'carrying on business' in the Republic must therefore be ascertained 
. . f h b . 197 In view 0 tea ove tax exemptIOns. 
c) Meaning of 'carrying on business' in South Africa 
The Act has not specifically defined the term 'carrying on business' .198 However, in 
section 1, the Act does give a definition of 'trade' which includes: profession, trade, 
business, employment, calling, occupation, venture, letting of property, use or 
granting of permission to use certain assets. In the South African context, 'carrying on 
195 However, from an exchange control perspective, both a branch and a subsidiary are considered to 
be South African residents. Branch profits tax are freely remittable to the head office, subject to 
obtaining an auditor's certificate in respect of the profits being distributed. In South Africa, a branch 
has the advantage of not being subject to thin capitalisation legislation in terms of section 31 (3) of the 
Act, enabling it to borrow as mush as it needs from its head office. However, unless the head office has 
borrowed the funds itself, the branch will be denied a tax deduction for any interest on the head office 
loan. A branch has also the advantage that South Africa's transfer pricing does not apply to head 
office-branch transactions. Such legislation would however apply to transactions between the branch 
and other foreign group companies. Further, such legislation might also be used to restrict a tax 
deduction for interest paid by the branch to a foreign related party (not its head office) if such interest is 
considered excessive. 
196 The Katz Commission (5th Report, op cil, chap 7, p. 30) suggested (found also in its Second 
Interim Report) that the provision of section lO(l)(hA) of the Act should be amended to deny the tax 
exemption on interest received by non-residents where the non-resident carried on business in South 
Africa through a branch. The intention of the recommendation was to prevent foreign banks carrying 
on normal lending operations in South Africa through a branch and thus obtaining an unfair advantage 
over the domestic competition. When this recommendation was legislated however, the exemption was 
denied in all cases where the interest was effectively connected with the business carried on by that 
non-resident in South Africa. 
197 The establishment of a branch in South Africa does not automatically mean that the foreign 
company is carrying on business in the Republic. In some cases, the branch might be merely serving as 
a marketing and representative presence for the non-resident company within South Africa. The onus is 
therefore on the taxpayer to prove that it is not carrying on business in South Africa to benefit from the 
exemptions provided in section lO(l)(hA). 
198 The Katz Commission (op cit, p. 30) contended that the concept of 'carrying on business ' in South 
Africa was much wider than the concept of doing so through a local branch, and this has created some 
uncertainty in situations not intended to have been affected. It recommended that the restriction should 
refer rather to more specifically to a non-resident carrying on business through a permanent place of 
business suitably equipped for carrying on such a business. Thus, in terms of section lO(l)(hA) 
application, interest which is attributable to such a business should then not qualify for the exemption. 
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business' is not the same as carrying on trade. Business has a narrower meaning than 
trade and it is only one of its components. 199 
In fTC 1179,200 the court held that the term 'carrying on business' must be given their 
ordinary meaning in the commercial sense. In Platt v CfR,201 Juta JA referred to the 
English case of Smith v Anderson202 in which business was defined as anything which 
occupies the time, attention and labour of a man for the purpose of profit. 
In Estate G v COT,203 Beadle CJ gave a list of activities which in commercial life 
could be regarded as carrying on business. In order to determine whether a business is 
being carried on, the nature, scope and magnitude of the taxpayer's activities, the 
object (whether to make a profit or not) and the continuity of the activities concerned 
would have to be taken into account. The list of these activities are regarded as 
elements determining the carrying on of business in the Republic and do not purport 
to be exhaustive, nor are they decisive, but each case must depend on its own 
particular circumstances. 
i) The profit element in carrying on business 
The general definition of business was provided in the Smith 'i04 case where the court 
held that business is related to anything which occupies the time, attention and labour 
of a man for a profit. A different view was expressed in Modderfontein Deep Level 
Ltd v Feinstein,205 in which a mining company bought clothing articles and re-sold 
them to its employees without making a profit. The court held that though the factor 
of profit was absent, the transaction could still be regarded as business. There is an 
argument that by selling at cost to its employees, the company could still benefit 
through for instance, greater staff retention and loyalty. That was the basis of the 
decision in De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CfR,206 where the court held that: 
199 See Williams, R.C, "The Distinction for Income Tax Purposes between 'Trading' and 'Carrying on 
Business"', 1999, 11 SA Merc U, p. 574. The distinction between 'trade' and 'business' has played a 
crucial role in the court decision governing the tax deductibility of losses arising from irrecoverable 
loans and from standing surety for loans. See the judgment of CIR v Hilewitz (1998, 60 SATC 86 T). 
200 35 SATC 38; 1974 Taxpayer 33. 
201 1922 AD 42; 32 SATC 142. 
202 1880, 15 CH D 247. 
203 1964, SR, 26 SATC 168. 
204 (1888), op cit, at 247. 
205 1920 TPD 288. 
206 1986, 1 SA 8 (A); 47 SATC 229; 1986 Taxpayer 8. 
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'Where a trader normally carries on business by buying its goods and selling 
them at a profit as a general rule, a transaction entered into with the purpose of 
not making a profit, or in fact registering a loss, must in order to satisfy s 
23(g), be shown to have been so connected with the pursuit of the taxpayer's 
trade, e.g., on ground of commercial expediency or indirect facilitation of 
trade, as to justify the conclusion that, despite the lack of profit motive, the 
moneys paid out under the transaction were wholly and exclusively expanded 
for the purposes of trade. ,207 
In the case of Platt v CIR,208 the court stated that while accepting the objective of 
profit as a test, remarked that in certain circumstances there may be a carrying on of a 
business without the contemplation of procuring a gain. For instance, allowing 
business premises to be used as an outpatient branch of a hospital. The objective of 
making a profit is therefore not an essential feature in every instance where the 
carrying on of business is in issue. 
ii) The continuity factor in 'carrying on business' 
The continuity element seems to be one of the important factors for the carrying on of 
a business. As a general rule, the expression 'carrying on business' usually involves a 
series of actions on the part of the person. Accordingly, one or two isolated 
transactions cannot be regarded, particularly in the case of individuals, as the carrying 
on of a business. 209 However, a single undertaking may be of such a nature that it can 
be correctly described as a business. Thus, in Stephan v CIR,21O the salvaging of a 
single ship's cargo was considered a business because it involves a number of 
ordinary business acts. In CIR v Lynderburg Platinum Ltd, 2 I I Stratford JA made the 
point that continuity is a necessary element in the carrying on of a business in the case 
of an individual but not ofa company.212 
In the Platt's case, the taxpayer guaranteed certain advances made by a bank to a 
company in the profits of which he was interested and was called on to make payment 
in terms of his guarantee. He sought to deduct the payment from his income as a sugar 
207 It could be argued that the court's ruling applicable to trade may equally apply to business 
transactions. The words 'trade' and 'business' seem to be used interchangeably by the court. 
208 1922 AD 42; 32 SATe 142 at 147. 
209 See Stott v CIR, 1928 AD 252 at 262. 
210 1919 WLD 1; 32 SATe 54. 
211 1929 AD 137 at 147. 
212 See also SIR v The Trust Bank of Africa Ltd, 1975 (3) SA 652 (A); 37 SATe 87. 
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manufacturer. His right to do so depended on whether in the making of such advances 
he was carrying on trade. Juta JA held that: 
'In the case of a company formed for certain purposes, the question of the 
continuity of the acts, which is another factor to be considered in deciding 
whether a business is being carried on, is not of the same importance as in the 
case of an individual. As was stated by J essel N1R in Smith v Anderson .. . , in 
the case of a company formed for a certain purpose, it would be said at once 
that it was carrying on business, because it was formed for that purpose, and 
for nothing else, and from the very nature of the association the idea of 
continuity is inferred. ,213 
iii) Examples of carrying on business 
• Shares, investments, directorships 
It could be argued that the investment of surplus fund in shares in companies, as long 
as it does not form part of a general scheme of profit-making, cannot be regarded as 
the carrying on of a business.214 It was held in fTC 425215 that the investment of 
money on mortgage loans, loans on fixed deposits, as long as it is not part of a general 
financial on financier's business, does not amount to carrying on of a business. 
In Overseas Trust Corp ltd v CfR,216 where the taxpayer made certain shares and other 
investments in South West Africa, the court held that the mere possession of shares 
and investments in a country does not amount to the carrying on of a business in that 
country. In fTC 1501,217 the taxpayer was an 85% shareholder and director of a 
private company. He lived in the USA but returned to South Africa to attend 
directors' meetings. The issue before the court was whether in his capacity as director, 
he was carrying on business in South Africa. The court held that the mere fact that a 
taxpayer was a director and majority shareholder of a company conducting an 
extensive business did not make the company's business his. Nor was he required to 
be regarded as carrying on his own business simply because he was involved in the 
carrying on of the company's business. His investment in the company's shares as a 
shareholder did not amount to him carrying on business, neither did his directorship. 
213 At SATC 148. 
214 See Silke, op cit, 1997 Service 11, p. 14-38. 
215 1938, 10 SATC 340. 
216 1926 AD 444; 2 SATC 7l. 
217 1989,53SATC314. 
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Nor did he earn his living by being a director of several companies. It could not be 
said that by carrying on the company's business, he himself was carrying on business. 
The above view was confirmed in the recent case of Tiger Oats Ltd v CIR 218 The 
appellant, a listed investment holding company held long term equity investments in 
subsidiaries and associated companies, and it made loans to them. It derived its 
income from dividends, interest on loans and management fees . It paid a monthly 
amount as regional service council (RSC) levies. It maintained that it was not liable to 
the council for the payment of levy on income derived from dividends, and 
accordingly claimed the refund of these levies back on the ground that it was not 
carrying on an enterprise as defined in section 1 of the Act 109 of 1985. 
Judge Speolstra J (with Van der Westhuizen J and De Vos J concurring) held that the 
mere purchasing and holding of an asset does not constitute the carrying on of a 
business. It is the activities of the person in relation to that asset which determine 
whether or not the person is carrying on a business. Whether or not the activities of 
the person take that person from the category of simply holding an investment into the 
category of carrying on a business is obviously a matter of degree. The mere holding 
of share investments does not constitute an activity of a continuing nature within the 
ordinary meaning of that phrase and it also clearly cannot constitute the carrying on of 
business as money investor. Accordingly, the court found that the appellant's 
investments in the shares did not constitute the carrying on of a business as an 
investor of money within the meaning of the definition of financial enterprise in the 
regulations. 
• The Letting of property 
It is not possible to define with any degree of precision when the activities of a person 
in letting property will constitute 'carrying on of business'. The general principle is 
that a mere investment in fixed property must be distinguished from an intention to 
carry on business as a lessor of property. Each case must depend on its own 
circumstances, and it is important to consider the extent of the taxpayer's letting 
218 8 August 2001, 63 SATe 473. 
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activities III order to determine whether they show that degree of continuity or 
regularity one would expect if the taxpayer were 'carrying on business' as a 
professional landlord. 219 
Current Revenue practice treats the letting of a single property as not carrying on 
business, since there is no regular or systematic letting of property in the course of a 
business of letting of a single property. The temporary letting of a property in the 
Republic by a non-resident while waiting for an opportunity to sell cannot, it is 
argued, be regarded as the carrying on of a business, provided that the intention to sell 
can be clearly established. 
In ITC 883,220 the taxpayer, a non-resident, inherited a property in South Africa. He 
gave his brother a power of attorney to enable the latter to let the property and to 
effect repairs and renovations as become necessary. It was held that the taxpayer was 
carrying on business but was merely receiving the benefit of his inheritance. In ITC 
1529,221 a non-resident taxpayer owned two stands in South Africa. His income 
consisted of rentals from the stands, interest on investments and dividends on shares. 
He made no decision in regard to the administration of the property as all his affairs 
were being handled by a firm of accountants. In finding that the circumstances and 
activities did not fall within the parameters of the considerations propounded for 
carrying on business, Melamet J referred to the following dicta of Beadle CJ in Estate 
G v COT,222 as setting out the approach to be adopted: 
'The sensible approach, I think, is to look at the activities concerned as a whole, 
and then to ask the question: Are these the sort of activities which, in commercial 
life, would be regarded as "carrying on business"? The principal feature of the 
activities which might be examined in order to determine this are their nature, 
their scope and magnitude, their object (whether to make a profit or not), the 
continuity of the activities concerned, if the acquisition of property is involved, 
the intention with which the property was acquired. This list of features does not 
purport to be exhaustive, nor are anyone of these features necessarily decisive, 
nor is it possible to generalise and state which feature should carry most weight in 
determining the problem. Each case must depend on its own particular 
circumstances. ' 
219 See Silke, op cit, service 11, p. 14-39. 
220 1959,23 SATe 328. 
221 54 SATe 252; 1992 Taxpayer 213. 
222 1964 SR, 26 SATe 168. 
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• The Place where the business is carried on 
The place where the taxpayer carries on business may be important for income tax 
purposes. As a general rule, a business is carried on where the business activities are 
performed, though it may happen that a business is carried on in more than one 
country. In Joel & Joel v CIR,223 the issue was whether the taxpayers, members of a 
partnership and South African non-residents were not carrying on business in the 
Republic as financiers, floaters of companies in which they controlled by becoming 
directors thereof and shareholders. The court stated that about the taxpayers in 
London that: 
*They were represented in South Africa by servants and not agents; 
*They had an office under their business name; 
*They took the fees of some of their servants who served on the boards for them; 
*They entered into contracts to float companies in which they described themselves 
as carrying on business in Johannesburg and; 
*They dealt in shares through the local office. 
In its decision, the court held that the taxpayers were carrying on business in two 
places at the same time being at their head office in London and their South African 
office in Johannesburg. 
The place where the taxpayer resides is not generally conclusive as to where he 
carries on business. For instance, a person may be resident in one country and carries 
on business in another. A person may also carry on business through an agent, though 
in many instances, something more may be required to establish that he is carrying on 
b ·· 224 USIness In a country. 
223 1922 WLD 29; 33 SATC 106. 
224 See Lovell & Christmas Ltd v COT, 1908, AC 46. Refer also to article 5 of the OECD in terms of 
permanent establishment deftnition in relation to carrying on business in a country through an agent. In 
terms of this provision, a person can be said to be carrying on business in a country through an agent, if 
the latter is dependent and normally enters into contract on behalf of the principal. 
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d) Non-resident tax on royalty income and similar payments: section 35 
Certain amounts received by or accrued to non-residents from the use225 or right to 
use of patents, designs, trademarks, copyright, models, plans, motion picture films, 
video tapes and discs, know-how and similar property in the Republic and services 
connected therewith, whether payable as a lump sum or periodically, are referred in 
terms of section 35(1) of the Act as royalties . 
In terms of the above provision, these amounts are subject to a final withholding tax 
of 12%?26 The introduction of the residence tax system in South Africa has offered 
the opportunity to vary the application of the withholding tax and its relationship with 
the normal corporate tax due by the non-resident recipient of the royalties. Thus, 
previously, section 35 provided for a 12% withholding tax on certain royalty 
payments to non-residents. In the case of corporate taxpayers, the withholding tax 
exceeds the actual tax payable, as the section provided that 30% of the royalty income 
is taxable. This means that the rate was 9% (30% of the royalty income taxable at a 
30% of the company tax rate). Non-residents were entitled to submit a tax return and 
claim the excess back. 227 
Accordingly, royalties accruing to a recipient in a year of assessment commencing in 
2001, is subject to a withholding tax and there is no liability for normal corporate 
tax.228 It is expressly provided that a person having an address outside the Republic 
will, until the contrary is proved, be deemed not to be a resident of the Republic?29 
The payer of the amount or the recipient of the amount on behalf of the non-resident 
225 The Commentary of the DECD Model Convention (updated as of 29 April 2000) clarifies in article 
12 definition of royalties that the word 'use' implies that the rights must not amount to an outright 
assignment or sale of the intellectual property itself. 
226 See section 35(1) of the Act, as substituted by section 39(a) of the Act no 59 of 2000. The rate of 
12% is in most cases reduced in terms of double tax agreements entered into by South Africa with its 
trading partners. As the treaty definition is comprehensive, the use of the royalty definition under the 
South African domestic law may not be appropriate in its double tax agreements adopting the DECD 
Model. Unlike the South African provisions in section 35 (l)(b), The DECD Model was amended in 
1992 to exclude technical service and assistance fees (show-how payments) from the royalty provision. 
They are treated under the DECD Model as active business income. See Article 12, para 11 of the 
DE CD Commentary. 
227 The imposition of the withholding tax on royalties in terms of section 35 of the Act constitutes an 
exception to the source rules because the royalty in this case is received from a non-South African 
source (with the deletion of the deeming source provisions of sections 9(1)(b) & (bA) of the Act) by a 
non-resident, but it is still taxed in South Africa. 
228 In practice, the year of assessment referred to would be the financial year of the payer of royalties. 
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is obliged to declare the amount to the commissioner within the 14 days period and to 
pay the tax due calculated at the rate of 12% of the gross amount of the royalty.230 
The non-resident remams obliged to render a return of income for the year of 
assessment and to pay any tax for which he is liable and the tax deducted from the 
amount concerned will be set off against the total tax payable for the year; any 
underpayment being recoverable from him and any overpayment being refunded to 
him. In particular, he can claim any tax overpaid in terms of section 102 of the ACt.231 
i) Exemptions 
• Any amount accrumg to a non-resident company is exempt from the 
withholding tax if it is earned by that company in a trade carried on through a 
branch or agency in the Republic and is subject to normal corporate tax. 232 In 
other words, because section 35 subj ects royalty income to tax, it is necessary 
to remove such royalty income from the non-resident normal tax. 233 
• Section 35 does not also apply to any amount accrued to a person (be it 
individual or company) other than one resident in a neighbouring country in 
respect of any copyright in a printed publication. This exemption does not 
however apply to copyright in advertising material for motion picture films 
(whether advertising or not) or for any printed publication relating to 
television.234 
229 Proviso (ii) of section 35(2). 
230 Section 35(2)(a). 
23) See section 35(2)(t). For exchange control purposes, approval is required for the payment of 
royalties. Manufacturing agreements are referred to the Department of Trade and Industry. This 
Department together with the South Mrican Reserve Bank have jointly issued guidelines with regard to 
the maximum level of royalty that will be approved, namely 4% in respect of retail products and 6% in 
respect of intermediate and capital goods. The basis on which the royalties may be calculated would be 
restricted to 'net ex-factory sales' excluding the in-factory landed cost of imported components and 
raw materials directly or indirectly from the licensor, as well as VAT. License agreements relating to 
the use of intellectual property and agreements not involving local manufacture or production require 
the consent of the South Mrican Reserve Bank. 
232 See section 35(l)(i). 
233 This is achieved by means of section 10(1)(1) inserted by section 13(1)(0) of the Amendment Act 
59 of 2000. 
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2. The concept of source in Hong Kong tax system 
Introduction: 
After the return of the region of Hong Kong to Mainland China235, it was decided that 
Hong Kong was to retain its own legal system, where the Judiciary would remain 
independent from the Executive, and therefore existing tax decisions by the Judiciary 
would remain binding. In that sense, the legal dimension of the Hong Kong tax 
system was to be maintained. 236 
Hong Kong is one of the jurisdictions where the principle of source is a critical aspect 
of the tax system.237 Taxation on income in Hong Kong is imposed by the Inland 
Revenue Ordinance (IRO, promulgated in 1947).238 
Hong Kong has adopted a schedular system of tax in which only specified types of 
income, namely profits, salaries and property rental incomes are taxable. There is no 
'general or total income' concept in Hong Kong. The income-type taxes that operate 
are separate. They operate without regard to other income that may be subject to tax 
under separate headings. For instance, a taxpayer operating a business will (subject to 
some exceptions) pay profits tax on any profits made in that business that are taxable 
in Hong Kong, and if he is also working in a salaried job, he will pay salaries tax on 
that salary according to Hong Kong tax law, but the two calculations operate 
234 See section 35(l)(ii). 
235 In July 1997 where Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC). 
236 See :WWW)!@.,l!hhJ¥i!!!~Wjl!t~L~.t!}1~f.9.~J.LQH.Q,h!m.\. As it was decided as such in the agreement 
between Britain and the People's Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong was to maintain its legal and 
tax systems separate from those of the PRC for at least 50 years. 
In the Basic Law (effective new constitution passed by the PRC in 1990) of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR), it is provided in article 108 that the HKSAR 'shall, taking the low 
tax policy previously pursued in Hong Kong as a reference, enact laws on its own concerning the types 
of taxes, tax rates, tax reductions, allowances and exemptions and other matters of taxation'. See 
VanderWolk, JP, & Brook, P, "Hong Kong Source Rules: Another Twist in a Long-running Tale" , Info 
Tax, SA Tax Review, September 1997. 
237 See "Hong Kong Source of Profits - Again: Inland Revenue issues Statement of Practice" (Official 
Release by CrR, HK), 1993,6 SA Tax Review 54. 
238 Originally Cap. 20, 1947 (Cap. ll2, 1950) Laws of Hong Kong. The IRO is based on the United 
Kingdom's tax legislation, particularly as it was exported to other Commonwealth countries. Because 
of these linkages, the tax law, of not only the United Kingdom but also Australia and New Zealand, 
continue to have a significant impact on the interpretation of the IRO. See Tax Notes International, 
November 1, 1993, p. 1122. 
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separately. The Hong Kong tax system is territorial in nature; tax is only levied on 
income arising in or derived from a source in Hong Kong.239 
While the territorial principle itself appears to be clear, its application in particular 
cases has been proven at times to be a contentious issue between the Inland Revenue 
Department (IRD) and practitioners, with numerous disputes being referred to the 
Board of Review and the courts240 
The aim of the research in this section is to analyse in comparison with the South 
African position, the judicial tests and the specific statutory rules for determining the 
source of particular incomes in Hong Kong. 
2.1 Taxation of profits 
2.1.1 Determination of the source of profits 
Profits tax is the major tax in Hong Kong.241 In line with its territorial concept of 
taxation, the charge to profits tax in Hong Kong is only extended to persons 
(including inter alia corporations, partnerships, trustees and other legal entities) 
carrying on trade, profession or business there. Profits tax is charged on all profits 
(excluding profits arising from the sale of capital assets) arising in or derived from 
Hong Kong from such trade, profession or business. 
239 Because of the pure territorial system of taxation applied in Hong Kong, the concept of residence is 
of little importance there, and there is little difference in the taxation of Hong Kong and foreign 
entities. In the simple example, a resident of Hong Kong may derive income from abroad without 
suffering tax, even if that earning is remitted to Hong Kong, and conversely, a non-resident may suffer 
tax on profits arising in Hong Kong. 
240 The court system after July 1997 has also undergone some amendments in Hong Kong. Thus, the 
Court of Final Appeal has since then replaced the Privy Council as the most senior Court, and is 
composed of 5 members being the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal, together with 3 
permanent judges and 1 non-permanent Hong Kong judge or 1 judge invited from another Common 
Law jurisdiction. Underneath the Court of Final Appeal is the High Court consisting of the Court of 
Appeal of the High Court and the Court of First Instance of the High Court. Then follows the District 
Court jurisdiction and the Magistrate Court. In addition, the Hong Kong court system also includes the 
Small Claims tribunal, Labour tribunal, Lands tribunal, Obscene Articles tribunal and the Coroners 
Court, each with its own responsibilities and functions . See www.hg.orglguide-hk.html. 
241 The present rates for profits tax are 16% for companies and 15% for unincorporated companies 
such as partnerships and sole traders. In the case of corporations, no distinction is made between public 
and private companies or between distributed and undistributed profits. In the same context, branches 
of overseas companies are taxed at the same rate. See www.chinazone.nUnewslbusiness/asia/hong 
kong/tax.htrnI. See also Rohatgi, op cit, p. 261. 
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The main applicable provision to profits tax is contained in section 14(1) of the Inland 
Revenue Ordinance (IRO) which provides as follows: 
'Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, profits tax shall be charged for 
each year of assessment at the standard rate on every person carrying on a 
trade, profession or business in Hong Kong in respect of his assessable profits 
arising in or derived from Hong Kong for that year from such trade, profession 
or business (excluding profits arising from the sale of capital assets) as 
ascertained in accordance with this Part ... ,242 
As stated in section 14, pre-conditions must be satisfied before liability to profits tax 
may arise. A person is only chargeable to profits tax in Hong Kong if: 
• He carries on a trade, profession or business in Hong Kong; 
• The trade, profession or business derives profits; and 
• The profits arise in or are derived from Hong Kong. 
It remains a contentious issue what constitutes the carrying on of a trade, profession, 
or business for Hong Kong tax purposes. Although the concepts of 'trade' and 
'business' are fairly well defined, in general 'business' has been seen to have a very 
broad meaning whereas 'trade' is probably narrower.243 
Vanderwolk contends that the term 'business' has been defined to cover virtually any 
activity, no matter how insubstantial or infrequent that is done with a view toward 
profit making. Contrary to the layman's understanding of the terms, the concepts of 
trade and business are much wider in the context of taxation. Thus the element of 
repetition or 'habit' (used in the form of 'habitual trading') is not essential for tax 
liability to exist, with the result that profits or gains derived from a single transaction 
having a profit making purpose can be assessable profits of trade or business. 244 
242 See Toh, D, "Source of Profits: Hong Kong Revisits Legal Tests", 1992, 5 S4 Tax Review 102; 
also indicated in www.hg.org/guide-hongkong.html. The legislative provision to tax profits in Hong 
Kong clearly makes a distinction between capital and revenue income by excluding gains or earning 
derived from the realisation or disposal of capital assets which gives rise in the South African context 
for instance to capital gains implication effective from 1 October 2001. See www.info.gov.hkIird/brief-
pf.htm. 
243 See Willoughby, P. G, Hong Kong Revenue Law: Vol 2 and Vol 3, 1981, section 1.04. It is said 
that much of the discussions on the issue of business refer to the broader definition as contained in the 
Business Registration Ordinance. 
244 See Vanderwolk, JP, "Hong Kong Inland Revenue Board of Review Offers new view of 'Carrying 
on Business' in Hong Kong"', Tax Notes international, May 9, 1994, p. 1241. Also discussed by 
Willoughby, ibid. While in the Hong Kong tax law, the definition of business is extremely broad as 
including any activity in a form of trade, a different position is adopted in the South African context, 
where a transaction which falls within the broad category of a 'trade' may not fall within the narrower 
category of a 'business' . 
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Whether a taxpayer is carrying on a business is largely a matter of fact and will 
depend upon the circumstances of a particular case. Thus as was decided by the 
Inland Revenue Board of Review in D 27/93245 on the meaning of 'carrying on 
business' in Hong Kong, it is necessary to find a significant degree of organised 
activity by the taxpayer in order to hold that a business is being carried on for Hong 
Kong tax purposes. Corporate taxpayers that have infrequent transactions in Hong 
Kong or that are engaged only in investment-type activity in Hong Kong that requires 
little active management will be able to argue that they are not carrying on a business 
in Hong Kong for tax purposes. 
In general, a continuous commercial activity being carried on or performed in Hong 
Kong will be regarded as the carrying on of a business in Hong Kong. 246 While the 
term 'trade' is defined as including 'every trade and manufacture and every adventure 
and nature in the concern of a trade' and is designed to bring into charge for profits 
tax purposes a single transaction which may have the characteristics of a trade or 
business. 247 
As the third condition provides, liability to profits tax will only arise if a person's 
profits arise in or are derived from Hong Kong. 
Section 2(1) of the IRO provides that: 
'(P]rofits arising in or derived from Hong Kong for the purposes of Part IV 
shall, without in any way limiting the meaning of the term, include all profits 
from business transacted in Hong Kong whether directly or through an 
agent. .. ' 
245 (1993) 1 HKRC, para. 80-260. 
246 See the Bartica Investment Ltd case (cited in the Departmental Interpretation & Pratice Notes No. 
13: The Taxation of interest received and the deductibility of interest paid) dealing with the issue of 
'carrying on business' by an investment company that habitually places deposits and furnishing 
securities. 
247 According to the Departmental Interpretation and Practice Notes No. 30, where a non-resident 
carried on business with a resident and the business is so arranged that it produces to the resident either 
no profits or less than the ordinary profits that might be expected to arise to an independent concern, 
the business may be treated as carried on in Hong Kong by the non-resident through the resident as his 
agent. This follows the Board of Review decision in D 17/93 (1993, 1 HKRC, para. 80-250), involving 
a tax-avoidance structure designed to shift income to a tax-haven company that allegedly did not carry 
on business in Hong Kong. The Board of Review held in that matter that the fact that a company has 
not appointed an agent in Hong Kong will not necessarily ensure that the company is not carrying on 
business in Hong Kong. Thus, if an individual or company in Hong Kong negotiates and informally 
concludes agreements in Hong Kong on the offshore company, the offshore company may be held to 
be carrying on business in Hong Kong despite disclaimers to the contrary. See" Hong Kong Board of 
Review Decision Highlights Risks Involved in using Offshore Companies" (News Digest) Tax notes 
International, January 31, 1994, p. 278. 
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This element of territorial limitation (whether profits arise or derive from Hong Kong) 
is more difficult to analyse. As VanderWolk argues, at first glance, the provision 
appears susceptible to an extremely broad reading. As he sees it, section 2(1) does not 
assist in finding the answer to the question of how one determines whether a 
particular profit is 'from' one part of an overall business transaction as opposed to 
another part. For instance, if a contract of sale is made in Hong Kong but the property 
to which the contract relates is manufactured and delivered by the seller outside Hong 
Kong, is the seller's profit from business transacted in Hong Kong?248 Section 2(1) 
raises, but leaves open the question of the economic source of a given profit. 
Because the IRO contains very few source rules, the ascertainment of the locality of 
profits for profits tax purposes has been subject to arguments. 
It has been left to the commissioner and the courts to articulate guidelines for 
determining the source of such controversial profits. 
2.1.2 Judicial tests 
The courts in Hong Kong have over the years considered the subject of the source of 
profits . Because the law surrounding the source of profits in this jurisdiction is still 
unclear, it has been difficult in many court decisions to employ a simple legal test by 
which the locality of profits for profits tax purposes could be determined. 
No universal rule will cover every case. Predictably, the guidelines that have been 
articulated in particular cases are difficult to apply in other cases?49 
Certain tests have been devised through case law to ascertain the source of profits as 
analysed below. 
a) 'Matter of fact or practical man' test 
The general principle is that the source of profits or the question of locality of profits 
is a hard, practical matter of fact. Consequently, whether profits arise in or are derived 
from Hong Kong depends on the nature of the profits and of the transaction which 
gives rise to such profits. 
248 See VanderWolk, JP, The source o/income: Tax Law and Practice in Hong Kong, 1998,2 ed, p. 8. 
249 See VanderWolk and Brook, op cit, note 233 . 
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This test originated from the case of CIR v The Hong Kong & Whampoa Dock Co 
Ltd,250 where Reece J in applying the 'practical man' test did not agree with Gregg J 
that the hypothetical 'practical man' would regard Hong Kong as the real source of 
the Dock company's fee for salvaging the ship in the paracels due to the location of 
the Dock company's entire organisation in Hong Kong. In considering various dicta 
from Australian tax cases251 involving the question of source of income, Reece J went 
on to conclude that: 
'These cases all confirm that the source of income is a question of fact 
depending entirely upon the facts of each particular case and that no principle 
can be formulated which is universally applicable to every taxation system for 
the reason that each system differs from country to country. Furthermore, they 
indicate that the place where the business is carried on need not necessarily be 
the source of the profit, for profits may arise from more than one source, and 
finally, they demonstrate the importance of the contract element, that it is not 
to be treated as "as having no significance". ,252 
The guiding principle was confirmed by Lord Bridge delivering the decision of the 
Privy Council (as it then was) in CIR v Hang Seng Bank Ltd,253 where he stated that: 
'But the question whether the gross profit resulting from a particular 
transaction arose in or derived from one place or another is always in the last 
analysis a question of fact depending on the nature of the transaction. It is 
impossible to lay down precise rules of law by which the answer to that 
question is to be determined . . . ,254 
However, the 'hard, practical matter of fact' test is not very helpful in deciding cases, 
and therefore not of practical value because they deal with legal and accounting 
concepts that do not exist in nature?55 As analysed by VanderWolk, at face value, the 
notion that the source of profits is purely a factual matter seems absurd, for 'profits' 
are not observable natural phenomena like rivers, beams of light, odorous fumes, or 
anything else that is perceived to have emanated from some source. 256 
250 (1960) 1 HKTC 85. 
251 The cases referred to include Federal Commissioner of Taxation v United Aircraft Corporation 
(1944) 68 CLR 525; and Tariff Reinsurances Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes (1938) 59 CLR 205. 
252 At 109. 
253 (1991) (1) AC 306 (FC), at 322/323. 
254 It should be pointed out the Hong Kong Department of Inland Revenue through Interpretation and 
Practice Notes (for example, the note 21, revised 1998 on the locality of profits) has stated that, the 
Hang Seng Bank case has clarified the general principles to be followed in determining the locality of 
profits. Therefore, the Department intends to look closely at any particular circumstances where there 
is an apparent artificial attempt to tum profits which arise in or derived from Hong Kong (Hong Kong 
profits) into profits which arise in or derived from outside Hong Kong (offshore profits). 
255 See Vanderwolk and Brook, op cit, note 233 . 
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b) The 'operations' test 
Accordingly, a more appropriate test favoured by the IRO is the 'operations' test of 
source whereby an examination of the operations or activity of the business giving 
rise to the profits is conducted. The broad guiding principle here is that, one looks to 
see what the taxpayer has done to earn the profits in question and where he has done 
it. This means that the proper approach will be to identify the operations which 
produced the relevant profits and then ascertain where those operations took place. 257 
The place where the activities are carried out is the important indicator of the source 
of profits. If the main business is carried on outside Hong Kong, basic administrative 
activities in Hong Kong such as the preparation of invoices, the negotiation of letters 
of credit through Hong Kong banks and the preparation of accounts would be 
regarded as being of an ancillary nature and therefore not resulting in a tax liability in 
Hong Kong.258 
The judicial principles in determining the source of profits by the application of the 
'operations' test have emerged from authoritative court decisions . 
i) Case law 
In Sinolink Overseas Ltd v CIR,259 the taxpayer was a Hong Kong company that 
bought plywood and paper from manufacturers in Hong Kong and overseas for sale to 
customers in Hong Kong and China. Sinolink acknowledged that the income from 
sales to Hong Kong customers was subject to Hong Kong tax but said that the 
majority (75%) of the sales were made to Chinese customers, and claimed an 
exemption on the income from those Chinese sales. Sinolink's sales personnel 
256 Ibid, p. 46. 
257 This principle originated from the Dock case, op cit, note 247. It involved service fees received by 
a Hong Kong-based taxpayer for services rendered on the high seas, namely, salvaging a ship and 
towing it back to Hong Kong. The Court held that, the services were substantially performed outside 
Hong Kong and so the service fees had their source outside Hong Kong. Thus, the court considered that 
income would be sourced where 'the operations take place from which the profits in substance arise.' 
The principle was also highlighted in FL Smith & Co v F Greenwood (1921, 3 KB 583 at 593). 
258 See Horak, W, & Davis, D.M, "United Kingdom: Non-resident Companies," 1988, 1 Juta's 
Foreign Tax Review 57. In consideration of the guidelines now adopted by the Department of Inland 
Revenue in ascertaining the locality of profits, the distinction between Hong Kong profits and offshore 
profits is made by reference to the gross profits arising from individual transactions. Thus, only those 
business activities which directly produced the gross profits are taken into account in determining the 
source of profits. Activities such as general administration are normally not relevant. See 
www.info.gov.hklirdlbrief-sg. htrn. 
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travelled to China to solicit orders, and contracts for the sale of plywood were 
negotiated and concluded in China. While the orders from China were fulfilled by the 
purchase of plywood from manufacturers in Hong Kong or more frequently, from 
suppliers in Singapore and Europe. 
The court found that as the taxpayer's administrative office which controlled the 
Chinese sales was located in Hong Kong, the source of the proceeds of the sale was in 
Hong Kong. In rejection of the principle adopted in the Dock case (which focused on 
the particular profits from particular transaction), Hunter J expanded the 'operations' 
test to include all of Sinolink's operations, not just the operations relating to the 
particular transactions under which the profits in question arose. 
As the learned judge stated, Sinolink's profits from China sales 'could never have 
been earned unless some mechanisms for the pre-contract management of the terms 
discussed with both buyers and sellers existed' and that 'this vital function could only 
be controlled and conducted from and through the company's administrative centre in 
Hong Kong. ,260 
In contrast, in Hong Kong Board of Review case no D 15/82,261 a Hong Kong 
purchasing company was not subjected to tax on its income from sales, since the 
source of the income was regarded as being located outside Hong Kong, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Hong Kong company had an administrative centre in 
Hong Kong and the sales contracts were concluded in Hong Kong. 
The agent of the Hong Kong company negotiated the contracts with manufacturers 
outside Hong Kong. The order would then be placed by the United States customer 
with the Hong Kong company, which would place the order with the manufacturer 
through the agent. The agent would inspect the goods on completion and ensure that 
they were delivered on time to the customer. The Hong Kong company invoiced the 
United States customer, and payment was made to the company by the letter of credit 
negotiated through Hong Kong bankers. 
259 (1985) (2) HKTC 127. 
260 At 133. 
261 (1982) 2 HKTC 27; also cited by Horak and Davis, op cit, p. 57, and analysed by Edwards, P "The 
Locality of Profits for Hong Kong Profits Tax Purposes", International Tax Strategy 224. 
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The Board of Review held that the source of the income was the operation of the 
agent outside Hong Kong in the country in which the manufacturer was located . This 
decision was in line with the Dock case in that it placed more weight on the operations 
required to carry out the relevant contracts than on the making of the contracts 
themselves. 
The confusion relating to the application of the 'operations' test was highlighted in 
the landmark case of CIR v Hang Seng Bank Ltd,262 where the taxpayer was a bank 
based in Hong Kong. Its internal investment department bought and sold securities in 
overseas markets such as Singapore and London through independent brokers. The 
decision-making as well as the provision of instructions occurred in Hong Kong and 
funds which were located in Hong Kong were utilised for the relevant purchases. 
The Commissioner determined that the bank's profits from buying and selling 
securities in these overseas markets arose in Hong Kong. The Commissioner 
supported his argument by advancing two submissions: 
• The business of the bank was indivisible since all the profit earning operations 
were conducted from Hong Kong by staff employed there, no overseas branch 
of the bank was involved and the funds employed in the purchase of the 
certificates of deposits arose from the carrying on of the business in Hong 
Kong. 
• In any event, even if the sale and purchase of certificates of deposit failed to 
be treated as separate operations, the profits from these operations arose in 
Hong Kong. Investment decisions were taken in Hong Kong and the funds 
used in the purchase would have been derived from Hong Kong depositors. 
In delivering the judgment on behalf of the Privy Council, Lord Bridge of Harwich 
rejected the Commissioner's submission on the basis that in line with section 14 of the 
IRO, the carrying on of the business element should be separated from the source of 
profits requirement. As the learned judge argued in illustrating the possibility of 
apportionment in ascertaining the location of profits, the structure of section 14 
262 (1991) (1) AC 306 (PC), 3HKTC 351; also extensively analysed in The Taxpayer, note 12, January 
1999, p. 6. Prior to the Hang Seng Bank case, the Hong Kong courts have to settle the dispute between 
the Bank of India v CIR (1988) 2 HKTC 503, where the source of profits was in issue. Nazareth J in 
applying the 'overall business framework' approach concluded that ' the operations test as applying to 
Hong Kong in the light of the Dock case is that conveniently set out by Hunter J in the Sinolink case. ' 
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presupposes that the profits of a business carried on in Hong Kong may accrue from 
different sources, some located within Hong Kong and others overseas. The former 
are taxable, and the latter are not. Therefore to accept the construction which 
underlies the Commissioner's primary submission would reduce the effect of the third 
condition of section 14 to negligible significance.263 
Lord Bridge also rejected the Commissioner's second submission on the ground that 
the source of the profits from individual transactions must be located only by 
reference to the gross profit accruing from those transactions. The court held that the 
place where the funds were obtained was not an important factor as well as the place 
where the investment decisions were made. Thus, as Lord Bridge went on to state in 
this guiding principle: 
, . .. One looks to see what the taxpayer has done to earn the profit in question. 
If he has rendered a service or engaged in an activity such as the manufacture 
of goods, the profit will have arisen or derived from the place where the 
service was rendered or the profit making activity carried on. But if the profit 
was earned by the exploitation of property assets as by letting property, 
lending money or dealing in commodities or securities by buying and reselling 
at a profit, the profit will have arisen in or derived from the place where the 
property was let, the money was lent or the contracts of purchase and sale 
were effected. ,264 
The court consequently found that, in this case, the taxpayer's activities were located 
outside Hong Kong. The decision was based on the point that the dominant cause 
giving rise to the taxpayer's income, which was the buying and selling of certificates 
of deposit was outside Hong Kong. The Privy Council therefore rejected the analysis 
adopted by the Board of Review, which looked at both property and activity as 
sources of the bank's profits. In the same manner, the Council indicated that the 
operations involved in performing a contract are generally the operations that, in 
substance, produce the profits receivable under the contract. 
By doing so, the Privy Council reaffirmed the specific-operations approach taken by 
Reece J in the Dock case, and it rejected the compelling all-operations or business-
framework approach reflected in the decisions of Gregg J in the Dock case and Hunter 






The pragmatism of the judgment in the above issue is of relevance in the South 
African context because of its similarity to the decision in CIR v Black. 265 
In the reinvoicing related case of Exxon Chemical v CIR,266 the uncertainty regarding 
the issue of the source of profits in Hong Kong was again highlighted in the confusing 
High Court decision, 
Exxon Chemical, the Hong Kong branch of a company organised in Panama, bought 
Petroleum Products from offshore affiliates and sold them to other offshore affiliates, 
Upon receiving a purchase order from an overseas affiliate, Exxon Chemical's Hong 
Kong office would transmit the order to a United States affiliate, which would 
identify a source of supply, purchase the goods on Exxon Chemical's behalf and 
arrange for direct shipment to the buyer. The United States affiliate received a fee 
from Exxon Chemical for these services, Exxon Chemical conceded that it was 
carrying on business in Hong Kong by accepting orders and placing orders from its 
Hong Kong office, It argued that it was not taxable because its profits had their source 
outside Hong Kong, Virtually, all operations relating to the performance of the 
contracts of sale took place outside Hong Kong; thus, it was argued that the profits 
must be treated as arising from offshore operations. 
The court decided that Exxon Chemical's profits had their source in Hong Kong and 
were subject to Hong Kong profits tax. In Godfrey J's view, Exxon Chemical's profits 
arose from a sales mark-up that was effected by Exxon Chemical's acceptance of 
purchase orders and placing of corresponding orders with suppliers at a lower price, 
Both of these activities technically took place in Hong Kong. The activities of Exxon 
Chemical's United States affiliate and other contractors were not viewed as giving 
rise to Exxon Chemical's profits , Rather, the offshore activities were seen as giving 
rise only to the profits earned by the contractors from their fees , 
The court's decision was probably influenced by a wrong interpretation of the 
statutory provision that states that profits 'from the business transacted in Hong Kong' 
have their source in Hong Kong for tax purposes. 
265 
266 
(1957),3 SA 536 (A), 1957 Taxpayer 172, 
(1989) 3 HKTC 57 (High Court), 
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In considering the fact that the sales contracts producing all of Exxon Chemical's 
income were entered into by Exxon Chemical in Hong Kong, the court had no 
difficulty in concluding that all of Exxon Chemical's business was transacted in Hong 
Kong and that its business profits had their source in Hong Kong. 
The decision of the court in this case was very much criticised for overlooking the 
real substance of the action that gives rise to the profits. As it was argued, the court 
here defies the common sense approach that looks at where 'the real action took 
place, where the money was put at work. ,267 
Just one year after the Hang Seng Bank case, the Privy Council confirmed the 
application of the guiding principle stated in that case in CIR v HK- TVB International 
Ltd,268 by illustrating the appropriateness of the 'operations' test. 
In this case, the taxpayer was based in Hong Kong but sent employees overseas to 
negotiate, and in some instances to conclude licensing agreements with independent 
film distributors and television station regarding the showing of films in which the 
taxpayer owned the copyright. The taxpayer acquired the copyright in the films in 
terms of an agreement made in Hong Kong with the parent company which had 
produced the films in Hong Kong. 
The commissioner appealed against the decision of the Court of Appeal which had 
held that, as copyright royalties received from overseas licensees were from outside 
Hong Kong, they were not taxable. 
In the Privy Council, it was decided in favour of the Commissioner. Lord Jauncey of 
Tullichettle, in considering what was done to earn the sub-licence fees, rejected the 
argument presented by the taxpayer that the sub-licencing services provided by TVBI 
generated the fees. The learned judge held that: 
'Where a resident in country A grants in that country the right in country B to 
exercise intellectual property rights which he has therein acquired by 
registration or application, he does not render a service in country B by the 
grant. Nor does he render a service in country B or anywhere else by 
refraining in consequence of the grant from taking preventive action against 
267 See VanderWolk, JP, " Hong Kong: Taxation of profits from international business: Recent cases," 
July 1990, International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, p. 340. Following the Exxon Chemical case, 
an identical decision was adopted by the court in CIR v Euro Tech (Far East) Ltd (1995, 1 HKRC, para 
90-074) involving the facts similar to Exxon Chemical. 
268 (1992), STC 723,3 HKTC 468; also cited by The Taxpayer, January 1999, p. 7. 
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the grantee. Rendering a service connotes some positive action on the part of 
the renderer and not a state of passivity. ,269 
The court further carried on in giving the proper approach by stating: 
'The profit-making activity of the sub-licensees was carried on outside Hong 
Kong but the grant of the sub-licences took place in Hong Kong where the 
taxpayer company operated. Furthermore, the court's alternative conclusion 
that the profit arose in or derived from the places where these assets were 
licensed erroneously presupposes that the rights in question had a fixed situs 
outside Hong Kong whence profits accrued no to the sub-licenses but to the 
taxpayer company. ,270 
A detailed analysis of this case suggests that although the decision reaffirmed the 
fundamental principle in determining the source of profits, the HB-TVB International 
case appears to have departed from the approach followed in the Hang Seng Bank 
case, in examining the taxpayer's overall business rather than the particular profit-
producing transaction.271 
Thus, the TVBI decision had the effect of reviving the business-framework approach 
exemplified in the Sinolink case. 
This was confirmed in the Wardley case,272 where the three~udge panel held, by a 
two-to-one majority that commission income received by a Hong Kong based 
portfolio management company from overseas stockbrokers arose in Hong Kong. 
The commissions were essentially a share of the overseas brokers' commissions on 
purchases and sales of securities held in portfolios managed by the taxpayer. The 
management agreement between the taxpayer and its customers permitted the 
taxpayer to keep any such commissions that the taxpayer was able to negotiate with 
stockbrokers. The taxpayer's operations were all in Hong Kong, and it apparently held 
the customers' funds, from which the commissions were paid, in Hong Kong bank 
accounts. 
The two-to-one majority of the Court of Appeal in Hong Kong held that these 
commissions were taxable in Hong Kong. And as Fuad V-P stated in delivering the 
269 
270 
At 728j /729a. 
At 730j /731a. 
271 See The Taxpayer, note 12, January 1999, p. 7. 
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principal judgment, the Privy Council decisions in Hang Seng Bank and HK-TVBI 
require the court to look at what the taxpayer did to earn the profit and where it did it. 
Since the taxpayer did nothing outside Hong Kong, its profits must have arisen from 
what it was doing in Hong Kong. Moreover, it was pointed out that the taxpayer's 
income was earned under a management contract made in Hong Kong. 
However, the dissenting judgment presented by Cons V-P offers a better view, where 
the judge stated that the commissions arose outside Hong Kong because the 
transactions that gave rise to the commissions were purchases and sales that were 
effected overseas. The management contract was not the source of these particular 
commissions because these commissions came from the overseas brokers rather than 
from the Hong Kong customers. 273 
In conclusion, the Wardley decision appears to be in line with Sino link and TVBI 
cases rather than with Hang Seng Bank. The Court of Appeal failed to recognise that 
the overseas brokers were acting on Wardley's behalf as its agent and dealing with 
property held by Wardley outside Hong Kong. Instead the majority looked at 
Wardley's operations at its Hong Kong base. Immediately after the Wardley case, the 
court took an important step forward in the development of the law, by confirming the 
decision of the Board of Review under which the acts of agents were treated as acts of 
the taxpayer, in the trading profits dispute of CIR v Magna Industrial Co Ltcf74 where 
the 'totality offacts' test was considered. 
The consideration of the taxpayer's overall business as the proper approach in 
application of the 'operations' test was reinforced in the source case of CIR v Orion 
Caribbean Limited,275 where the Privy Council has further confused the already 
uncertain law in this area, by looking at the taxpayer's business as a whole (business-
framework approach) rather than particular transaction giving rise to the profit in 
determining the source of interest. 
272 See CIR v Wardley Investment Services (Hong Kong) Limited (1992) 1 HKRC para 90-068; also 
commented by Vanderwolk, JP, "The Structure of Revenue Law in Hong Kong", Tax Notes 
International, November 1, 1993, p. 1126. 
273 See VanderWolk, JP, "Hong Kong Taxation: Where Do Profits Arise?" Tax Planning International 
Review, 1993, p. 12. 
274 (1996), 1 HKRC, para 90-082. 
275 (1997) 1 HKRC, para 90-089 (PC); also cited by VanderWolk and Brook, op cit, note 233; This 
case is also analysed in www.info.gov.hklird/ipn2l.htm. 
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In this case, Orion Caribbean Limited (the company taxpayer), earned interest income 
by lending to unrelated parties as a participant in syndicated loans. It was not a 
financial institution as designed in the Ordinance. It was wholly owned by a Hong 
Kong financial institution, Orion Royal Pacific Limited (ORPL), which provided 
various services to the taxpayer in Hong Kong for a fee . ORPL also entered into 
syndicated loan agreements in Hong Kong on behalf of the taxpayer from time to 
time. About 40 per cent of the taxpayer's loan agreements were concluded in Hong 
Kong in this way. 
The taxpayer's directors met in the Cayman Islands and approved all of its loans 
there. In all cases, the taxpayer, acting through ORPL, made the loan funds available 
to the borrower outside Hong Kong. The taxpayer relied on ORPL and another related 
bank in Singapore to lend it the funds with which it made its loans. ORPL handled 
virtually all aspects of the taxpayer's business except for the decision making by the 
directors. 
The Commissioner's assessment at profits tax was upheld by the Inland Revenue 
Board of Review on the ground that the taxpayer was a financial institution carrying 
on business in Hong Kong and so its interest income was sourced in Hong Kong 
under the expansive source test of section 15(1)(1) of the Ordinance. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal (the case did not pass through the High Court) 
reversed the Board's decision holding that the taxpayer did not take deposits in Hong 
Kong and therefore was not a financial institution within the meaning of the statutory 
definition. Thus, the expansive source test of section 15( 1 )(1) was not applicable; 
rather the 'provision of credit' test was applicable. Since the taxpayer had provided 
the credit to the borrowers outside Hong Kong, its interest did not arise in Hong Kong 
and was not taxable. 
In an appeal by the Commissioner to the Privy Council, the latter held, without 
considering whether or not the taxpayer was a financial institution, that the taxpayer 
was simply a vehicle or mechanism by which ORPL had avoided Hong Kong tax on 
interest from syndicated loans to borrowers outside Hong Kong. 
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In delivering the judgment, Lord Nolan listed three reasons why the taxpayer's 
interest was sourced in Hong Kong under the 'operations' test rather than outside 
Hong Kong under the 'provision of credit test': 
• A distinction must be drawn between the situation where the taxpayer lends out its 
own funds and where the taxpayer must borrow before it may lend . In the first 
situation the source of the interest will be the place the money was lent. However, 
the latter case is more akin to a trading transaction involving commodities and 
both the place of lending and the place of borrowing should be looked at. 
• The established authorities, including Lord Bridge's dictum in the Hang Seng 
case, do not stand for "the proposition that Lord Bridge was laying down a rule of 
law to the effect that, in the case of loan of money, the source of income was 
always located in the place that the money was lent." There is no simple single 
legal test - it is a practical hard matter of fact. 
• The present case was far removed from the simple type of loan transaction 
contemplated by Lord Bridge. The business of the taxpayer was the borrowing 
and on-lending of money with a view to profit. The taxpayer allowed itself to be 
interposed between its Hong Kong parent and the ultimate borrowers as a channel 
for the loans. In all ways the parent acted as an agent for the taxpayer. The loan 
agreements were negotiated, concluded (in some cases at least) and serviced by 
the parent from funds raised or provided by the parent in Hong Kong. 
Consequently, the implication of this case for the source of profits tax in Hong Kong 
is that the Hang Seng Bank case principle of determining the source of particular 
profits from particular transactions has been rejected in favour of the approach 
adopted in the TVBI case, which laid emphasis on the taxpayer's business as a whole 
in ascertaining the source of the taxpayer's profits. 
The Privy Council did not distinguish between the loans that were concluded outside 
Hong Kong and those concluded in Hong Kong. As Lord Nolan seems to establish as 
a principle in the Orion case, the place of borrowing and the place of lending (that is 
the main operations) should be taken into consideration as important factors in 
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ascertaining the source of interest. Unfortunately, this decision contributed to the 
ongoing uncertainty in the law. 
When comparing the TVE International and the Orion case to the Epstein's case276 in 
South Africa, It is observed that the courts in Hong Kong have rejected the majority 
judgment approach adopted in South Africa. Further, by looking at the entire business 
as one entity (the 'activities test', as known in the South African context), the Hong 
Kong courts seemed to agree with the dissenting judgment of Schreiner JA in the 
Epstein 's case, which is now implemented in section 24H(2) of the South African 
Income Tax Act dealing with partnership income. 
c) The 'business presence overseas' test 
In the judgment of the HE-TVEI case, the court made an interesting remark on the 
relationship between the carrying on of a business and the source of profits.277 As 
their lordships went on to say: 
'It can only be in rare cases that a taxpayer with a principal place of business 
in Hong Kong can earn profits which are not chargeable to profits tax under 
section 14 of the Ordinance. ,278 
Under the Hong Kong tax system, a business may maintain a presence overseas which 
earns profits outside Hong Kong, but the absence of a business presence overseas 
does not, of itself, mean that all the profits of a Hong Kong business invariably arise 
in or are derived from Hong Kong. 
However, as considered in the HE-TVEI case,279 in the vast majority of cases where 
the principal place of business is located in Hong Kong and there is no business 
presence overseas, profits earned by that business are likely to be chargeable to profits 
tax in Hong Kong. 
There have been over the years some decisive court decisions to illustrate the 
exceptional circumstances as analysed below: 
276 (1954) Taxpayer 147. See also Hollingsworth, R, "The Source of Income from Maritime 
Operations: A Comparison between South Africa and Namibian Legislations", 30 April 1994, vol. 1, 
Bcom Teclmical Reports (UCT). 
277 See Toh, op cit, p. 105. 
278 At 730a. 
279 See the Taxpayer, note 12, Op cit. 
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For instance, in the Hang Seng Bank case,280 the buying and selling of certificates of 
deposits by agents outside Hong Kong was not subject to profits tax in Hong Kong 
because the court emphasised on the particular transaction giving rise to the income. 
The similar situation was decided in some early cases where the circumstances were 
comparable to those in the Hang Seng bank case. 
In CIT, Bombay Presidency and Aden v Chunlilal B Mehta oj Bombay,281 a broker in 
Bombay entered into future delivery contracts for the purchase and sale of 
commodities in various foreign markets with parties outside British India, in which no 
delivery was ever given or taken, and the profits flowing from such contracts were not 
received in British India. The Privy Council held that in the particular circumstances 
(the contracts having been neither framed nor carried out in British India), the profits 
derived from the contracts did not accrue or arise there. As the Court stated: 
'They are not saying that the place of formation of the contract prevails 
against everything else. In some circumstances it may be so, but other matters 
- acts done under the contract, for example - cannot be ruled out a priori . In 
the case before the Board the contracts were neither framed nor carried out in 
British India; the High Court's conclusion that the profits accrued or arose 
outside British India is well-founded. ,282 
In CIR v The Hong Kong & Whampoa Dock Co Ltd,283 the appellants, in response to a 
request from the owners, sent a tug to salvage a vessel stranded on a foreign island. 
The tug refloated the vessel, towed her to a sheltered achorage where she was made fit 
for the tow to Hong Kong, and thereafter towed her for four days to docks in Hong 
Kong. 
The Supreme Court held that, the profits from the salvage operation were not 'profits 
arising in or derived from the Colony' within the meaning of section 14(1) of the 
Inland Revenue Ordinance. As Reece J stated: 
'Here the contract of salvage was entered into in the Paracels and all the work 
of refloating and putting the vessel into a condition to be towed to Hong Kong 
and nearly all the two, except for the last three miles, were completed beyond 
280 Op cit, note 250. 
281 (1938) 6 ITR 521; also analysed by Toh, D, "Source Principles: Recent Hong Kong Cases", (1990) 
3 Juta 's Tax Review 52. 
282 At533 . 
283 (1960) 1 HKTC 85. 
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the territorial limits of Hong Kong and consequently I take the view that the 
profits must be said to arise outside of Hong Kong rather than inside. ,284 
The principle adopted in the Whampoa Dock case was followed in the International 
Wood Products case,285 where the facts are quite analogous to those in TVBI case. In 
this case, the Hong Kong based taxpayer had entered into an agency agreement and 
then sub-contracted all of its duties to offshore sub-agents. The taxpayer's profits 
consisted of the spread between commissions received and commissions paid to the 
sub-agents. Similarly, TVB International's profits equalled the spread between 
royalties received and royalties paid. In both cases, the taxpayers were not actively 
involved in earning the money on a day-to-day basis. 
The Court in International Wood Products took the approach that, the 'real action' 
producing the profits was occurring outside Hong Kong. The fact that the taxpayer 
had no operation of its own outside Hong Kong was not thought to be relevant, 
though the Inland Revenue Department had argued otherwise. 
In conclusion, as stated in the various court decisions, the judicial tests in ascertaining 
the source of profits tax do not lay down a rule of law that will cover all cases where 
the locality of profits was in issue. 
In order to minimise the confusion and to provide certainty in the operation of the 
territorial source principle, the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) has established 
basic guiding principles286 to assist in locating the source of profits that can be 
summarised as follows: 
• The question of locality of profits is a hard, practical matter of fact. No universal 
rule will cover every case. Whether profits arise in or are derived from Hong 
Kong depends on the nature of the profits and the transaction giving rise to them. 
• The broad guiding principle is that, one looks to see what the taxpayer has done to 
earn the profits in question and where he has done it. In other words, the proper 
approach is to ascertain what were the operations which produced the relevant 
profits and where those operations took place. 
284 At 116. 
285 CIR v International Wood Products (1971) 1 KHTC 551. 
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• The distinction between Hong Kong profits and offshore profits IS made by 
reference to gross profits arising from individual transactions. 
• In certain situations, where gross profits from an individual transaction arise in 
different places, they can be apportioned as arising partly in and partly outside 
Hong Kong. 
• The place where the day-to-day investment business decisions are taken does not 
general I y determine the locality of profits. 
• The absence of an overseas permanent establishment of a Hong Kong business 
does not, of itself, mean all of the profits of that business arise in or are derived 
from Hong Kong. 
Because each case has to be considered in the light of its own particular circumstances 
and facts, it is easy to apply the above guidelines in cases where, for instance, 
everyone can agree which operations produced the profits and those operations all 
occurred in the same place. Due to the fact that it is difficult to set out a hard and fast 
rule in tax disputes concerning source, another approach in determining the source of 
profits will be to look at straightforward scenarios that give rise to particular types of 
Income. 
2.2 Source of particular kinds of income. 
As the above analysis demonstrates, conflicting court decisions suggest that it may 
not always be easy to determine with clarity the source of the profits of a business. 
Thus, in order to provide taxpayers with a higher degree of certainty in their taxation 
affairs, the Hong Kong's Inland Revenue Department (for a better interpretation and 
understanding of cases) has established Practice Notes and provides Advance Rulings 
(from 1 April 1998) of how the general rules for determining where profits arise apply 
to particular types of income. 
286 The guiding principles in the form of Practice Notes and Advance Ruling are not laws, but rather 
the view of the IRD as to how the law presently operates. See The Departmental Interpretation & 
Practice Notes No 21 (Revised 1998) on the Locality ofprofits. 
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2.2.1 Trading profits 
Determining the locality of profits derived from trading in commodities or goods has 
given rise to a lot of controversy. Generally, the determining factor as stated in the 
Privy Council decisions (the Hang Seng Bank and TVBI cases) is the place where the 
contracts for purchase and sale are effected. 
The Department's approach derives from the fact that, because the locality of profits 
is a hard, practical matter of fact, 'effected' cannot merely mean legally executed (as 
this would depend on formal legal rules of offer and acceptance) and thus must 
contemplate the actual steps leading to the existence of the contracts including the 
negotiation, an in substance, conclusion and execution of the contracts?87 
The Department's View here seems to contradict preViOUS court decisions. For 
instance, as stated by Lord Bridge in the Hang Seng Bank case to the effect that 
contracts for the purchase and sale of goods are effected, at least in part, where the 
taxpayer's contractual obligations are performed. In contrast, the department seems to 
indicate that a trading profit is earned in its entirety, when the taxpayer enters into a 
contract of sale for a price in excess of that paid or payable by the taxpayer for the 
goods being sold. This is inconsistent with the principle that as a matter of law and as 
a matter of fact, the seller does not have the right to receive payment under the 
contract until he/she has performed his or her obligations under the contract. 
Therefore, the reality is that trading profits are not earned merely through the making 
of contracts. 
Furthermore, the department's inclusion of negotiations as operations to be taken into 
account in determining where profits are earned is not in line with the principle that 
profits arise not from decision-making but from transactions. It is submitted that 
negotiations, per se, are mere preliminary activities and that the place where 
negotiations occurred could only be relevant in determining the locality of a profit 
(other than a fee for negotiation services) if the negotiations resulted in the making of 
a contract at that place. 
287 Contained in www.info.gov.hklird/brief-sg.htm. 
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2.2.1.1 'Totality of facts' test 
However, following the recent Court of Appeal decision in CIR v Magna Industrial 
Co Ltd,288 it is now clear that a wider approach is necessary. The proper approach is to 
look at the totality of facts in determining what the taxpayer did to earn the trading 
profits. All the relevant facts must be considered, not simply the purchase and sale of 
goods. 
The taxpayer, Magna, was a Hong Kong company whose sole office was located in 
Hong Kong. The company derived profits from selling goods in foreign markets 
through independent sale agents based overseas. It purchased the goods in Hong Kong 
from a wholly owned subsidiary, Company A. Company A purchased the goods on its 
own account from independent suppliers and stored them in Hong Kong warehouse 
pending the receipt of orders from Magna. Magna paid Company A a cost-plus price 
for the goods in addition to a service fee for its assistance in carrying out Company 
A's obligations under the contract with the buyer. 
The Board of Review held that Magna's profits for overseas sales had arisen outside 
of Hong Kong, on the grounds that the overseas agents had concluded the sales on 
Magna's behalf outside Hong Kong. 
The Commissioner appealed the board decision to the High Court arguing that the 
board had reached the wrong conclusion as to where the profits arose. The High Court 
surprisingly agreed with this, holding that 'the true and only reasonable conclusion 
would have been that the profit arose and was derived from Magna's activities in 
Hong Kong'. 289 
The Court of Appeal overturned the High court judgment stating that the judge 'was 
not entitled' to make such a finding. Litton V-P went on to confirm the principle that, 
only in 'rare cases' will no tax be due on the profits of Hong Kong-based taxpayers, 
noting that Magna's wide network of overseas agents and distributors was 'rare'. 
He also noted that the question of whether particular profits arose in Hong Kong or 
overseas is one in which reasonable people might differ. 
288 (1996) 1 HKRC para 90-082. 
289 Ibid, para 90-078. 
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As the Court of Appeal pointed out 
'Obviously the question where the goods were purchased and sold is 
important. But there are other questions: For example: How were the goods 
procured and stored? How were the sales solicited? How were the orders 
processed? How were the goods shipped? How was the financing arranged? 
How was payment effected?,29o 
This actually reflected the statement by the High Court in relation to how the relevant 
facts are considered: 
'More often than not, it would not be the quantity of activities but the nature 
and quality of them that matters more. The cause and effect of such activities 
on the profits is the determining factor. It is what role such activities played 
and the relative importance of them in the making of profits that would usually 
tilt the scale and not the number of activities carried out at a particular 
place. ,291 
As stated in the headnote to Case No D9/89 that 
'Generally, the employment of staff and the maintenance of an office in Hong 
Kong, with all necessary services and facilities including telephone and telex, 
are the essence of a trading company's activities. Where these are all in Hong 
Kong, it could be concluded that the resultant profits have a Hong Kong 
source. The fact that goods are located and delivered outside Hong Kong is not 
material for this purpose. ,292 
The development of the source of trading profits through cases has not helped to 
clarify this sensitive aspect of the source income. As correctly submitted by 
VanderWolk, confusion continues to reign as to where trading profits arise for tax 
purposes. As the cases reveal, we are told to look at where contracts are effected. 
Then we are told to look also at the totality of facts relevant to the earning of the 
profits. After that, we are told that merely having an office in Hong Kong with a 
working telephone is somehow the 'essence' of the business and will suffice for the 
profits to be properly treated as arising in Hong Kong. 293 
2.2.1.2 The Inland Revenue Department's views 
On the basis of the opinions expressed above and in the light of the various court 
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locality of profits derived from trading in commodities or goods by a business carried 
on in Hong Kong can be summarised as follows294 : 
• Where both the contract of purchase and contract of sale are effected in Hong 
Kong, the profits are fully taxable. 
• Where both the contract of purchase and contract of sale are effected outside 
Hong Kong, no part of the profits is taxable. 
• Where either the contract of purchase and contract of sale is effected in Hong 
Kong, the initial presumption will be that the profits are fully taxable . However, 
the totality of facts will have to be examined to determine the source of profits. 
• Where the sale is made to a Hong Kong customer, the sale contract will usually be 
taken as having been effected in Hong Kong. 
• Where the commodities or goods are purchased from either a Hong Kong supplier 
or manufacturer, the purchase contract will usually be taken as having been 
effected in Hong Kong. 
• Where the effecting of the purchase and sale contracts does not require travelling 
outside Hong Kong but is carried out in Hong Kong by use of telephone, fax or 
other electronic means including the internet, the contracts will be considered as 
having been effected in Hong Kong. 
• The purchase and sale contracts are important factors, but the totality of facts must 
be looked at to determine the locality of the profits. 
i) Irrelevant facts 
Facts not directly related to the trading activities are considered irrelevant in 
ascertaining the locality of profits. There may be cases where the activities of a Hong 
Kong trading business are limited to the following: 
• Issuing or accepting an invoice (not order) to or from an ex-Hong Kong customer 
or supplier (whether related or not) on the basis of contracts of sale or purchase 
already effected by an ex-Hong Kong associates; 
• arranging letters of credit; 
293 See VanderWolk, op cit , note 233, p. 102. 
294 See Departmentallnlerprelation and Practice Notes, no 21 (Revised 1998) in www.Ntaxhk4.htm 
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• operating a bank account, making and receiving payments, and 
• maintaining accounting records. 
This situation commonly arises when a Hong Kong business, as a member of a group 
and pursuant to group directives, carries out the above activities and 'books' the 
profits in Hong Kong. Provided the activities of the Hong Kong business do not 
include the acceptance or issue of sale or purchase orders in or from Hong Kong, the 
profits would not be taxable. 
Another situation that may anse is that a trading company, carryIng on business 
outside Hong Kong, may set up a branch in Hong Kong to act as a buying office. The 
activities of the branch are confined to the purchase of goods in Hong Kong and it is 
not involved in their sale, either in Hong Kong or elsewhere. In such a case, a liability 
to Hong Kong profits tax would not arise. The function of buying office may also be 
carried by a subsidiary company or by an accredited agent (either related or 
unrelated) . However, as for a branch, the subsidiary company or accredited agent 
must not be involved in the sale of goods. On the other hand, any commission or other 
remuneration earned by the subsidiary company or accredited agent for performing its 
services in Hong Kong will be fully taxable.295 
Cases may also arise where it is claimed that contracts of purchase and of sale have 
been effected outside Hong Kong by employees of the Hong Kong business travelling 
abroad or by fully accredited overseas agent. In this context, an agent is regarded as 
fully accredited if it has, and habitually exercises, a general authority to negotiate and 
conclude contracts on behalf of his principal. Normally, the activities of a fully 
accredited agent and an employee are accorded the same weight if it can be shown 
that the employee has fully authority to conclude contracts without reference to the 
business in Hong Kong. In considering claims that contracts have been effected 
outside Hong Kong by employees, assessors will require details of travelling, hotel 
and subsistence expenses in respect of each individual transaction. Where it is 
claimed that contracts are effected by overseas agents, it will be necessary to provide 
agency agreements or other documentary evidence to support the claim. 
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The department also states in its guiding principle that 'the question of apportionment 
does not arise in relation to trading profits', which will either wholly taxable or 
wholly non-taxable. No rationale is given in support of this position. This approach is 
difficult to reconcile with the fact that the department at the same time stresses the 
need to look at the totality of facts in determining the source of trading profits; it 
seems then strange that the commissioner is not willing to consider the possibility of 
apportionment of such profits in cases where the relevant activities occurred both 
inside and outside Hong Kong. 
2.2.1.3 Profits of manufacturing businesses. 
2.2.1.3.1 'The place of manufacture' test 
The Inland Revenue Department considers that the source of profits for a 
manufacturing business is the place where the goods are manufactured. The profits 
arising from the sale of goods manufactured in Hong Kong are fully taxable there. 
In the situation where goods are manufactured partly in Hong Kong and partly outside 
Hong Kong (say in the Mainland China), that part of the profits which relates to the 
manufacture of goods outside Hong Kong will not be regarded as arising in Hong 
Kong. 
The Department's views are illustrated through the following examples: 
i) Manufacturing under a processing or assembling arrangement with an 
entity in the Mainland China. 
It is common for a Hong Kong business, which may well have previously carried out 
all of its manufacturing operations in Hong Kong and does not have a licence to carry 
on a business in the Mainland, to enter into a co-operative agreement, sometimes 
referred to as a processing or assembling arrangement with an entity in China. 
Under this arrangement, the Hong Kong manufacturer normally provides the raw 
materials, technical know-how, management, production skills, design, skilled labour, 
295 Vanderwolk, JP, "Source Based Taxation: Hong Kong Inland Revenue Department Issues Long 
awaited Practice Note on Locality of Profits", December 1992, Tax Notes International, p. 1308. 
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training and supervision for the locally recruited labour and the manufacturing plant 
and machinery 
The Mainland entity is responsible for processing, manufacturing or assembling the 
goods by providing factory premises, land and labour that are required to be exported 
to places outside the Mainland . For this, it charges a processing fee and exports the 
completed goods to the Hong Kong manufacturing business. 
In this type of case, strictly speaking as a matter of law, the Mainland entity is a sub-
contractor separate and distinct from the Hong Kong manufacturing business and the 
question of apportionment in respect of the latter's profits should not arise. 
However, recognising that the Hong Kong manufacturing business is involved in the 
manufacturing activities in the Mainland (in particular in the supply of raw materials, 
training and supervision of the local labour), the Department is prepared to concede in 
cases of this nature to allow the profits on the sale of goods in question to be 
apportioned which is based generally on a 50:50 basis. In other words, only 50% of 
the profits are assessed as sourced in Hong Kong. 296 
ii) Manufacturing by an independent sub-contractor in the Mainland of 
China. 
It is recognised by the Department that in cases where the manufacturing in the 
Mainland has been contracted to a sub-contractor (whether a related party or not) and 
paid for on an arm's length basis, with minimal involvement of the Hong Kong 
business in the manufacturing work, the question of apportionment will not arise. For 
the Hong Kong business, this will not be a case of manufacturing profits but rather a 
case of trading profits. Its profits will be calculated by deducting from its sale the cost 
of goods sold, including any sub-contracting charges paid to the sub-contractor in the 
Mainland. Therefore, taxability of such profits will be determined on the same basis 
as for commodities trading business. 
The Department's views on the subject can be summarised as follows: 
296 Contained in www.info.gov.hkJird/brief-sg.htm 
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• A Hong Kong company manufactures goods in Hong Kong and sells them to an 
overseas customer. The fact that the company has sales staff overseas does not 
give a part the profits an overseas source. This is not a case for apportionment. 
The whole of the profits are liable to profits tax. On the other hand, where a 
company manufactures goods outside Hong Kong and sells them to Hong Kong 
customers, the manufacturing profits are not liable to profits tax. However, in the 
exceptional case where the sale activities in Hong Kong are so substantial as to 
constitute a retailing business, the profits attributable to the retailing activities are 
fully taxable. 
• A Hong Kong garment manufacturer has a factory in the Mainland where sweater 
panels are knitted. These panels are then transported to the manufacturer's factory 
in Hong Kong where there are sewn together into finished garments for sale. This 
would be a case where the manufacturing profit could be apportioned. 
2.2.1.4 Sale or purchase commission 
2.2.1.4.1 The place where service is performed 
This refers to situations where the commission income is earned both by securing 
buyers for a manufacturer's products and by securing suppliers to make products 
required by customers?97 In such cases, the Department considers that the activity 
which gives rise to the commission income is the arrangement of the business to be 
transacted between principals. The source of the income is the place where the 
activities of the commission agent are performed. Thus, if such activities are 
performed in Hong Kong, the income has a source in Hong Kong. 
Factors such as the place where the principals are located, how they are identified by 
the commission agent, and the place where incidental activities are performed prior or 
subsequent to the earning of the commission are not generally relevant in determining 
the source of the commission income. 
297 It should be noted that typically, the commission income is a percentage of the invoiced value of 
goods. 
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The Inland Revenue Practice was tested in court in the recent case of CIR v Indosuez 
WI Carr Securities Ltd (Carr).298 Carr was organised as a Hong Kong securities hub 
company with clients all over the world. The issue was whether brokerage 
commission income earned by Carr from transactions consummated for clients on 
various stock exchanges outside Hong Kong, such as Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, 
India, Korea and Taiwan, was derived outside Hong Kong and therefore not taxable in 
Hong Kong. 
In the first instance, the Board of Review concluded that the answer depended on 
where Carr's clients were located. Commissions from clients not based in Hong Kong 
were offshore in nature and thus not taxable, while commissions from Hong Kong-
based clients were onshore and taxable. In the case of clients not based in Hong Kong, 
the rationale adopted by the board was that the source of the commissions was the 
activity undertaken by the subsidiaries or office of Carr located outside Hong Kong in 
places like New York, London, and Singapore (collectively referred to as affiliates). 
The board reasoned that although Carr had not furnished any evidence that the 
affiliates were agents of Carr, it was reasonable for the board to infer that they acted 
as Carr's agents when they undertook activities such as company research, 
maintaining client relationships, and processing orders. Because the acts of an agent 
are attributed to the principal, the board concluded that Carr had performed the 
activities outside Hong Kong and the related commission was therefore offshore in 
nature. Curiously, the board ignored the acts of the brokers who actually 
consummated the trades, because they were considered to be independent contractors 
providing services to Carr. 
In the case of Hong Kong clients, the board concluded that activities performed by 
Carr both in and out of Hong Kong generated the commission income. The onshore 
and offshore activities carried a weighting of roughly 60 to 40. Although the board 
was tempted to apportion the income on a 60-40 basis, it concluded that the 
commission from Hong Kong clients was wholly onshore and therefore fully taxable 
because apportionment was not permissible, according to previously decided cases. 
298 Inland Revenue Appeal No 5 of 200 1. 
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In the appeal to the Court of First Instance, Deputy High Court Judge Longley 
concluded that the board erred in its conclusions on the agency of both the affiliates 
and brokers. Because the onus was on Carr to provide evidence that the affiliates were 
acting as its agents in law and Carr had not furnished the relevant evidence, the board 
erred in concluding that the affiliates were agents of Carr. On the other hand, even the 
counsel for the commissioner accepted that brokers who were responsible for 
executing orders were acting as agents; however, in the commissioner's view, they 
were agents of Carr's clients, not Carr. That was firmly rejected by the judge, who 
accepted that the brokers were acting on behalf of Carr. 
On the question of apportionment, the court concluded that the observation made by 
the Privy Council in the Hang Seng Bank case (namely the lack of statutory provision 
for apportionment did not preclude apportionment) was the right legal position in 
Hong Kong. 
Having arrived at the above conclusions, the judge remitted the case back to the board 
with the following instructions: 
• In the case of commissions from clients based outside Hong Kong, the board 
should reconsider the position on the basis that the acts of affiliates could not be 
attributed to Carr. The board also needed to consider whether non-Hong Kong 
clients could properly be considered clients of Carr or its affiliates. 
• In the case of commissions from clients in Hong Kong, it would be appropriate 
for the board to apportion the income. In arriving at the offshore portion, it will 
now be necessary for the board to ignore the activities of the affiliates but take 
into account the acts of the non- Hong Kong brokers. 
2.2.1.5 Interest 
2.2.1.5.1 Persons other than financial institutions 
Considering its policies of being an attractive financial center, Hong Kong repealed 
interest tax with effect from the year of assessment commencing on the 1 April 1989. 
Now in Hong Kong, the only interest chargeable to tax under the profits tax is the one 
296 
accrued or received by persons carrying on a business, trade, profession in Hong 
Kong. 299 
In Hong Kong, the source of interest income has been determined in practice by the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue and in law by the courts. 
Before studying the test generally applied for determining whether interest accrued or 
received by a business carried on in Hong Kong is assessable, it is important to 
analyse the extent to which the receipt of interest income can constitute a trade or 
business. 
a) Receipt of interest as trading activity 
The question whether the passive receipt of interest income by a company constitutes 
the carrying on of a business has arisen occasionally under the Hong Kong income tax 
law. The Department's view on this matter has derived from the court decisions in 
IRC v Korean Syndicate Ltd,300 CIR v The South Behar Railway Co Ltd,301 and 
American Leaf Blending Co Sdn Bhd v Director-General of Inland Revenue,302 where 
the current position was formulated as follows : 
• The mere receipt of interest by a company does not constitute the carrying on of a 
business; 
• actions that go beyond 'mere passive acquiescence' may constitute the carrying on 
of a business; 
• a period of inactivity does not rebut the fact that a company is still carrying on 
business. 
The application of the above principle was highlighted in the Supreme Court case of 
CIR v Bartica Investment Ltd,303 where a company placed deposits with financial 
institutions as security for back-to-back loans, and also held investments and 
purchased shares in a listed Hong Kong company. 
299 For instance, interest on bank deposits placed in Hong Kong's authorised banking institutions is 
exempt from profits tax. See www.deloitte.c .. ./newsiguidesitextlasilhk0698-2.htm 
300 12 TC 181. 
301 12 TC 657. 
302 (1978) STC 581 . 
303 Case cited in the Inland Revenue Department Interpretation and Practice Notes No 13 (Revised 
October 1996. July 1997). 
297 
Cheung J decided in favour of the Commissioner that, without having to rely on its 
investment holding and share purchasing activities, the company's principal on-going 
activity of placing deposits and furnishing securities was sufficient to constitute 
carrying on a business. As the court found it, the company's activities had gone 
beyond 'mere passive acquiescence ' , and therefore, considering the case on its own 
facts, it can be distinguished from situations involving the mere passive receipt of 
interest. 
Section 15( 1 )(g) of the Inland Revenue Ordinance, deems interest received in respect 
of the funds of a business carried on in Hong Kong by a person, other than a 
corporation, to be receipts arising in Hong Kong from a business carried on in Hong 
Kong and chargeable to profits tax. Interest is thus subject to profits tax on the same 
basis as all other income received by a business. 
Moreover, as decided in CIR v Lau, Wong & Chan,304 interest received in respect of 
monies held on trust, for instance, interest bearing clients' trust accounts which by 
agreement with the clients is retained by a business, trade or profession is also subject 
to profits tax. As it was stated in that case, such income is received as consideration 
for services rendered and consequently arises in or is derived from that business in 
Hong Kong. 
b) Test for interest tax liability 
i) The 'provision of credit' test 
In the case of interest income from loans made in the course of business (other than 
financial institution), the Inland Revenue Ordinance has over the years relied on a 
provision of credit test which holds that interest arises in the place where the credit 
was first made available to the borrower.305 
304 
305 
2 HKTC 470. 
See www.hk.orglguide.hk.html; also cited by Swanepoel, E, op cit, p. 50. 
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The Department's view on the provision of credit test derives from the court decisions 
in CIR (NZ) v N V Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken,306 and CIR v Lever Brothers & 
Unilever Ltd,307 where the courts held that for the purpose of determining the place 
where interest arises or is derived from, it is the location of the originating cause that 
almost invariably determines the source. 
In essence, the place of derivation of interest is the place where the funds from which 
the interest is derived were provided to the borrower. 
The correctness of the provision of credit test as a general matter was re-affirmed by a 
dictum of Lord Bridge in the Privy Council's decision in CIR v Hang Seng Bank 
Ltd,308 where it was stated that, profits from lending money would arise where the 
money was lent. 
Consequently, if the originating cause of the income is situated in Hong Kong, the 
source of interest is in Hong Kong, irrespective of the currency in which the loan is 
denominated, the place of residence of the debtor or the place where the debtor 
employs the capital. 
As it was decided in IRBRD 20175,309 and in Studebaker Corporation of Australasia 
Ltd v C of T,310 while the emphasis is generally placed on the provision of credit, in 
some instances, such as mortgages, the originating cause may well be the mortgage 
itself. In addition, interest has a Hong Kong source where it forms an integral part of a 
trading transaction carried out in Hong Kong, i.e, where a Hong Kong manufacturer 
sells his goods to an overseas buyer on extended credit terms. In such situations, the 







(1954) 10 AID 435. 
(1946) 14 SATC 1. 
Op cit, note 250. 
At 184. 
(1921) 29 CLR 225 . 
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ii) Departure from the 'provision of credit' test: The Orion case 
In the case of CIR v Orion Caribbean Ltd, the issue was whether the interest earned 
from lending money outside Hong Kong has its source in Hong Kong. 311 
The Privy Council refused to apply the provision of credit test in determining the 
source of interest, and thus departed from the principle that was thought to be settled. 
Lord Nolan in his judgment reiterated the Board of Review's finding that the taxpayer 
served as a vehicle for a tax avoidance scheme and established this as the foundation 
for the decision, without finding that the taxpayer was not a genuine company or that 
the arrangements could be disregarded under either general principles or anti-
avoidance legislation. 
In applying the 'operations' test to the case rather than the 'provision of credit' test, it 
was argued that the learned judge has altered the test to determine the source of 
interest for an entity which is not a financial institution as defined in the Ordinance. 
He consequently gave the impression that the 'provision of credit' test is limited to the 
situation where the money lent is the entity's own money and that if the taxpayer has 
had to borrow funds in order to lend, it appears that both the place where the 
borrowing took place and the place of lending should be looked at in determining the 
source of the interest.312 
This case has come to lay down the principle that the 'provision of credit' test is no 
longer the conclusive factor in ascertaining the source of interest. Even if the funds 
was provided outside Hong Kong and the relevant activity or operation leading to the 
earning of that interest was carried on in Hong Kong, it would thus be possible to 
apply the basic charging provision of section 14 of the Ordinance 
Accordingly, though the Orion case has set a precedent that has rendered the source 
of interest test in Hong Kong to be more problematic, this has not in practice changed 
the way the Department interprets and applies the law relating to the source of interest 
income accruing to a business (other than a financial institution). 
311 (1997) 1 HKRC para 90-089. 
312 See VanderWolk and Brook, op cit, note 233. 
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Thus, as a general rule, the source of interest is only considered to be in Hong Kong if 
the lender provides the funds there to the borrower.313 
2.2.1.5.2 Interest earned by financial institutions 
The 'provision of credit' test was apparently abused by Hong Kong financial 
institutions. In response, the Ordinance was amended in 1978 by the addition of 
section 15(1 )(1) which deems interest income received by financial institutions from 
their businesses in Hong Kong to arise in or be derived from a trade, profession or 
business carried on in Hong Kong, notwithstanding that the provision of credit may 
have been outside of Hong Kong. 314 
In other words, all sums accrued or received by a financial institution by way of 
interest or profits or the sale or the redemption of certificates of deposits, 
notwithstanding that the money in respect of which the interest is received or 
certificates acquired was made available outside Hong Kong, will be assessable to 
profits tax if such sums arise through or from the carrying on of the business of the 
financial institution in Hong Kong. 
The issue has been raised as to what extent interest can be said to have arisen from the 
carrying on of a business in Hong Kong by a financial institution. It is argued that this 
is a question of fact to be determined by the totality of circumstances in each case. 
Modern international banking is a highly complex business and circumstances will 
vary between different financial institutions. 
31 3 See the Department's guide on territorial source principle of taxation, February 1998, from 
www.info.gov.hklirdlbrief-sg.htrn. 
314 The term 'financial institution' is defined as : 
-an authorised institution within the meaning of section 2 of the Banking Ordinance (Cap 
155); and 
-an associated corporation of an authorised institution which would have been liable to be 
authorised as such an institution under the Banking Ordinance had it not been exempt under 
the relevant provisions (such as the deposit taking companies) under section 3(2) of the 
Banking Ordinance. 
Section 15(1)(1) only applies to interest income not otherwise chargeable to profits tax. Thus, the Board 
of Review has also held that, notwithstanding that the provision of credit was outside Hong Kong, 
interest derived by a financial institution may still be chargeable under section 14 if the interest arose 
from a financial institution's operations in Hong Kong. See 2 IRBRD 59. 
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If financial institutions carrying on business solely in Hong Kong accepted deposits 
there but use part of the proceeds to purchase foreign interest-bearing securities or 
advance loans to overseas borrowers, the whole of its profits will arise from its Hong 
Kong business. 
On the other hand, we may also have situations where the operations carried out in 
Hong Kong are confined merely to entering a transaction in the books of account, and 
it would be difficult to claim that the profits on such transactions arise from the 
carrying on of business in Hong Kong. Conversely, if the operation of substance 
relating to a transaction are carried out in Hong Kong, the profits tax liability cannot 
be escaped merely by entering the transaction in the books of an overseas branch of 
the Hong Kong financial institution. 315 
The complexity of finance operations shows that it is not possible to lay down one 
comprehensive formula to cover all situations. Thus, cases falling between the two 
extremes will arise where it can be said that the profits derived from business carried 
on in Hong Kong and partly from business carried on elsewhere. This will probably 
give rise to some difficult apportionment problems. 
In recognising the practical difficulty associated with determining the assessable 
profits of financial institutions, the Department has reached agreements (like in 
1986),316 with practitioners and their financial institution clients on the taxation 
treatment of certain interest and related fee income in order to reduce a large number 
of disputes resulting from the 1978 amendment to section 15(1 )(1) of the Ordinance. 
Accordingly, depending on the types of income, their tax treatment is settled as 
follows: 
i) interest from loans 
• Where the offshore loans are initiated, negotiated, approved and documented by 
an associated party outside Hong Kong and funded outside Hong Kong, or where 
the funds are raised and loaned directly to the borrower by a non-resident (such as 
315 See Mintz, 1M & Richardson, SR, "Taxation of Financial Intermediation Activities in Hong 
Kong", February 2002, 25 Tax Notes International, p. 771. 
316 Cited in the 1993,6 SA Tax Review 57. 
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a subsidiary) albeit through or in the name of the Hong Kong institution, the 
transaction is 100% non-taxable. 
• Where offshore loans are initiated for example, by the Hong Kong institution and 
funded by it in or from Hong Kong, the transaction is 100% taxable. 
• Where offshore loans are initiated, for instance, by an associated party outside 
Hong Kong, but funded by the Hong Kong institution, the transaction is 50% 
taxable. 
• Where offshore loans are initiated for example, by a Hong Kong institution but 
funded by offshore associates (particularly applying to start up position where the 
Hong Kong institution has yet to establish a market presence), the transaction is 
50% taxable. 
ii) Interest on certificates of deposit (CDs) 
The acquisition of CDs is treated in the same way as deposit placements (as 
distinguished from loans) . The treatment is predicated on the fact that the Hong Kong 
institution operates within previously approved parameters as to credit limits and 
prime banks with whom it may operate. Such transaction is 100% taxable. 
iii) Interest from securities other than CDs 
The tax treatment in this case follows the same approach as adopted in the case of 
interest from loans. If there is to be any attribution of interest to offshore intervention, 
the role of the Hong Kong institution must be that of a mere intermediary in the 
purchase and sale of securities with no discretion in the matter. It is unlikely that any 
claim for exemption will be entertained in instance where the Hong Kong institution 
possesses its own security dealing capability and is active in this capacity. 
iv) Guarantee/underwriting fees 
In this case, a principal consideration of source is related to whether or not the risk 
under the guarantee or underwriting commitment is evaluated and is to be borne by 
the Hong Kong institution. In instance, where the Hong Kong institution has no 
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discretion on the acceptance or rejection of offshore instruction, and undertakes no 
risk, such fees will be accepted as merely 'booked' and not assessable. 
2.2.1.6 Royalties 
The tax treatment of royalties falls under provisions for ascertaining liability to profits 
tax in Hong Kong. Thus, as stated in section 15(1)(a) of the Ordinance, income 
received from the exhibition or use in Hong Kong of cinematography or TV film or 
tape, any sound recording or any advertising materials connected with such film, tape, 
or recording, is deemed to be from a Hong Kong source. 
In the same manner, section 15(1 )(b) of the same Ordinance states that sums received 
for the use or right to use in Hong Kong, a patent, design, trademark, copyright 
material or secret process or formula or other of a similar nature will also be from a 
Hong Kong source. 
As a general principle, the source of royalties in Hong Kong is determined by where 
the relevant intellectual property rights are located. This is the result of the first 
decision of the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on the source 
of profits in Emerson Radio Corporation v CIR?17 In this case, the court recognised 
the territorial limitation in section 15(1 )(b) which turns on the exploitation in Hong 
Kong of intangible property as being the originating cause of the royalty income. 
The taxpayer, Emerson US, had granted a license to its wholly owned Hong Kong 
subsidiary, Emerson HK, to use the 'Emerson' trademark in the manufacture and sale 
of goods to US customers. In exchange for the right to use the trademark, Emerson 
HK agreed to pay Emerson US a percentage of its income from sales to US 
customers. Emerson HK engaged contract manufacturers both in and outside Hong 
Kong to produce goods bearing the 'Emerson' brand, and sold such goods to 
customers located outside Hong Kong. The activities of Emerson HK in Hong Kong 
consisted only of paperwork relating to the manufacturing, sale, shipment of and 
payment for the goods, all of which were done elsewhere (apart from some of the 
manufacturing and shipping). 
317 (1998) Inland Revenue Appeal No.2, 1997, Court of First Instance, 30 June 1998. 
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The Commissioner assessed tax on Emerson US under section 15 (1 )(b) and therefore 
all of the royalties paid to Emerson US were included as taxable amounts. 
Emerson US objected arguing that, first, the trademark was used only in the US where 
the relevant sales were made, and second that if the trademark was also used where 
the manufacturing occurred, then only a portion of the royalties could be said to be 
within the scope of section 15(1 )(b). 
The Board of Review held in favour of the Commissioner, saying that the trademark 
was used both in and outside Hong Kong but for the purposes of section 15(1 )(b), the 
royalty was an indivisible sum that arose from a business carried on in Hong Kong by 
Emerson HK which produced Hong Kong-sourced profits. Thus, the royalty was 
subject to tax in Hong Kong in its entirety. 
In the Court of First Instance, Ribeiro R agreed with the Board of Review that the 
trademark was used both in the place where sales were made and the place where the 
manufacturing of the branded goods occurred, but he disagreed with the notion that 
the royalty was an indivisible sum that had to be either wholly within or wholly 
outside the scope of section lS(l)(b). As he went on to say: 
'The foreign proprietor [of the trademark] is taxed only in respect of royalties 
earned from use of the trademark in Hong Kong in a manner essential to the 
generation of that royalty. It is the Hong Kong profit-generating activity that 
triggers the charge .... [The] taxpayer's royalty receipts in respect of goods 
which were manufactured, marketed and sold wholly outside Hong Kong, do 
not activate section lS(l)(b) ... .I cannot accept the suggestion that each royalty 
payment was "a single indivisible sum". Under the Royalty Agreement, 
royalty payments represented a percentage of US sales achieved. It seems 
clear that such payments are in principle divisible, and that it is possible to 
relate particular sums of royalty to the sale of particular goods deriving from 
the use of the trademark in Hong Kong. ,318 
However, the general rule on the source of royalties IS subject to certain 
qualifications: 
First, when the royalties on intellectual property used in Hong Kong are paid to a non-
resident (like an overseas company not carrying on business in Hong Kong), only 
10% of the gross payments (sum receivable) is taxable, and therefore, the effective 
318 At 28, 32, 34. 
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rate of tax is 1.65% of the total sums due, as a deemed Hong Kong sourced business 
receipt 
The Hong Kong party must withhold such taxable amount at the time of payment, 
which the foreign party is statutorily obliged to indemnify. 
This first qualification is the result of the amendment of section 21 A of the Ordinance 
which by virtue of section 21(A)(3) expressly prevents the exploitation of the 
royalties provision by Hong Kong companies which enter into arrangements with 
overseas associates. The usual approach in order to circumvent section 21 A was for 
the Hong Kong company to enter into sale and licence back arrangement with a 
subsidiary incorporated offshore. By such agreement, the Hong Kong company would 
transfer ownership of property of a kind referred to in section 15(l)(a) or (b) to the 
offshore subsidiary which would then grant back to the Hong Kong company. 
The objective for tax purposes was for the Hong Kong business to obtain a deduction 
under section 16( 1) of the Ordinance, for the full amount of the royalty or fee paid 
while the offshore subsidiary was taxed under section 21 A on only 10% of the sums it 
received. Funds remained within the group but a 90% deduction was created in 
respect of the royalties or fees involved. 
With the new provision following the amendment to section 21 A, if the patent or 
know-how was utilised in a trade, profession or business in Hong Kong and the 
royalties are received from an associate, then the royalty payments are determined on 
the same basis as trading profits. 
This leads to the second qualification as to the source of royalty in Hong Kong, by 
which royalties received by a business are taxable in Hong Kong if the relevant 
activities (operations test) are carried out in Hong Kong, though the intellectual 
property might have been used outside Hong Kong. 
This rule was reaffirmed from the leading case of CIR v TVB International Ltd,319 
where it was held that the royalties received by the taxpayer was from a source in 
Hong Kong. In this case, the taxpayer exercised rights to grant sub-licences for the 
exhibition outside Hong Kong of Chinese dialect films made or acquired by its parent 
319 This principle was early adopted in D 9/88 (1988,3 IRBRD 166); and continued in D 39/89 (1989, 
1 HKRC para 80-004). 
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company, and the court based its decision on the point that because the main activity 
giving rise to the royalties were exercised in Hong Kong, the profits had a Hong Kong 
source. 
This decision was highly criticised for failing to appreciate that such income arises 
from property rather than from activities of the licensor. It is argued that this approach 
was not satisfactory, and not supported by any reasoning because it was inconsistent 
with general principle that royalties arise where the licensed intellectual property 
rights are registered or otherwise 10cated.320 
The above case reconciles with the determination of actual source of royalties as 
decided in the South African case of Millin v CIR,321 to the effect that the source of 
royalties is the place where the royalty producing activities of the taxpayer takes 
place. This results in a similar decision to that arrived at by the Hong Kong court in 
the TVBI case. 
2.2.1. 7 Source of other profits 
In dealing with the locality of other types of profits which have generally not given 
rise to disputes in the past, the Department considers their tax liability to be as 
follows322 : 
i) Rental income 
Rental receipt from real property is taxable in Hong Kong if the property is located in 
Hong Kong. 
It is important in the Hong Kong context to draw the inter-relation between profits tax 
based on rent and property tax. Though property tax in Hong Kong is levied on the 
consideration (in the form of rent) received by the taxpayer for the use of his land, 
buildings, or other structures in Hong Kong, any person who sublets premises IS 
considered to be carrying on business, and the corresponding rental income IS 
chargeable to profits tax rather than property tax. 
320 See VanderWolk, op cit, note 233, p. 119. 
321 (1928) AD 207. 
322 See 1993,6 SA Tax Review 56. 
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Consequently, any company which carries on trade, profession or business in Hong 
Kong can on agreement with the Commissioner be exempt from property tax provided 
that any income earned in respect of any property is brought into charge for profits tax 
purposes or the corporation occupies the property for the purpose of producing profits 
assessable to profits tax. 
ii) Profits from the sale of real property are taxable in Hong Kong if the property 
is located in Hong Kong. 
iii) Profits from the purchase and sale of listed shares are taxable if the stock 
exchange where the shares are bought and sold is located in Hong Kong. 
iv) Profits accruing to a business from the sale of securities issued outside Hong 
Kong and not listed on an exchange are taxable if the contracts of purchase 
and sale are effected in Hong Kong (except financial institutions in instances 
where section 15 (1)(I) applies) . 
v) Service fee 
This type of income is taxable if the services which give rise to the payment of 
the fees are performed in Hong Kong. In the case of an investment adviser 
whose organisation and operations are located only in Hong Kong, profits 
derived in respect of the management of the clients' funds are considered to 
have a Hong Kong source. Included in chargeable sums are not only 
management fees and performance fees but also rebates, commissions and 
discounts received by the adviser from brokers located in Hong Kong or 
elsewhere in respect of securities transactions executed on behalf of clients. 
vi) Cross-border land transportation income 
It is normally taxable if the place of uplift of the passengers or goods is in 
Hong Kong. However, where the contract of carriage does not distinguish 
between outward and inward transportation, apportionment will not be 
permissible. 
2.3 Apportionment of profits 
The courts in various decisions have enunciated the issue of apportionment of profits 
under the Hong Kong tax law. 
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Early in the Whampoa Dock case,323 Reece J analysed the treatment of profits arising 
or derived from different sources by recognising that one must make a judgment 
concerning the relative importance of the different parts of the source of an indivisible 
profit, and then concludes that the profit arose in the jurisdiction where the most 
important part or parts of the source of the profits were located?24 
Later in the Hang Seng Bank case,325 Lord Bridge favourably considered the 
possibility of apportioning profits arising from different sources when he held that: 
, ... [T]he structure of the section [14] presupposes that the profits of a business 
carried on in Hong Kong may accrue from different sources, some located 
within Hong Kong, others overseas. The former are taxable, the latter are 
not ... ,326 
The effect of the above cases is that if it is determined that a given profit arose partly 
in Hong Kong and partly elsewhere, a determination of how much of the profit arose 
in Hong Kong must be made if it is possible to do so on a rational basis in light of all 
of the facts and circumstances of the case. 
This principle was highlighted in the landmark case of CIR v Emerson Radio 
Corporation,327 where the court made it clear that, the profits in issue must be 
apportioned into those arising in Hong Kong and those arising elsewhere. 
As Ribeiro R went on to say in applying the doctrine of apportionment: 
'[I]n my view, an apportionment of the taxpayer's receipt is required ... [T]he 
royalties received or accrued in relation to the sale of goods manufactured in 
Hong Kong must be segregated from other royalties. Only the former class of 
royalties attracts the charge to profits tax. ,328 
The concept of apportionment has been clearly endorsed in the Carr Securities329 case 
where the court concluded that source is not necessarily an 'all or nothing' question, 
and thus in appropriate cases, income may have to be apportioned between onshore 
and offshore components. 
323 Op cit, note 247. 
324 Op cit, at 116. 
325 Op cit, note 250. 
326 At 318. 
327 23 June 1998; final appeal no 3 of 1999 (Civil). Case analysed under the source of royalty's 
section. 
328 At 35. 
329 Inland Revenue Appeal no 5 of 200 1. 
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The Department now accepts that notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision 
for apportioning profits in the Ordinance, there are certain situations in which an 
apportionment of the chargeable profits is appropriate, though it does not consider it 
will have a wide application. 33o 
The Department believes that where apportionment IS appropriate, a pragmatic 
arrangement with apportionment on a 50:50 basis will be generally adopted across-
the-board, unless compelling reasons dictate otherwise. 
For instances, it has been recognised that for manufacturing profits or service fee 
income involving substantial activities, both inside and outside Hong Kong, 
apportionment of profits is appropriate. 
Moreover, when apportionment is applied, it may lead to the question of how indirect 
expenses are to be allocated. It will be necessary to scale down claims for general 
expenses of the business, which contribute indirectly to earning both the Hong Kong 
and offshore profits. 
3. Concluding remarks 
The analysis of the application of source rules in the South Mrican context has 
revealed that the concept of source although very crucial for the taxation of non-
residents is still subject to inconsistent judicial decisions. 
With the application of a fully-fledged residence tax system, the deletion of most of 
the deeming source provisions in section 9 that were criticised for being formalistic, 
unclear, rigid in their application and did not give substance to the real cause of 
income, is welcome because they became obsolete and were easily manipulated. 
A major issue in the South African source rules is that although the courts have in 
many occasions recognised the possibility that a given commercial event giving rise 
to the income may have multiple sources, they have continued to follow an 'all-or-
330 In Hong Kong, it is only in the specific situation of profits resulting from commodities trading 
transaction that the Department expressly considers that no question of apportionment can arise. Thus, 
as the Department views it, such profits will either be wholly taxable or wholly non-taxable. See 
Departmental Interpretation and Practice Notes No 21 (revised 1998) at 
www.info.gov.hklird/ipn21.htm 
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nothing' approach to the determination of the dominant source?3l Following the Katz 
Commission recommendations, the principle of apportionment with respect to the 
source of income should be incorporated into the tax law in such a manner that the 
South African courts would be obliged to apportion income between its various 
sources. 
The rigid structure and lack of clarity in the application of source rules might pose a 
serious concern to offshore investors. For instance, South Africa has repealed the 
application of deemed source of royalties (in which royalties were considered sourced 
in the country where the intellectual property was used), but is still imposed a 
withholding tax on royalty payment made to non-residents based on the repealed 
deemed source rules. Further, the South African definition of royalties is much 
broader than the OECD Model definition, by including the show-how payments 
which normally should be taxed under active business income. 
In addition, the term 'carrying on business' for the purposes of interest exemption in 
section 10(1 )(hA) should refer mainly to situations where the non-resident company 
carries on business through a permanent place of business suitably equipped for 
carrying on such a business (the permanent establishment concept), rather than merely 
for instance setting up a local branch. This would establish a true taxable presence for 
the non-resident in South Africa and avoid confusion as to the determination of 
'carrying on business' as applicable to companies. Thus, as the Katz Commission 
recommended, in terms of section 10( 1 )(hA) application, interest which is attributable 
to such permanent establishment should then not qualify for the exemption. 
The imposition of a higher rate of tax (35%) on non-resident companies carrying on 
business in South Africa through a branch, as compared to the 30% imposed on South 
African companies (assuming they do not distribute dividends), might be seen as 
331 It is somehow surprising that the concept of apportionment as indicated in the Lever Brothers case, 
has been given a favourable treatment for other fiscal purposes. For instance, in Tuck v CIR (1988, 3 
SA 819, 50 SA TC 98), dealing with capital and revenue income issues in which there were two or 
more originating causes of a lumpsum receipt by a taxpayer and the court applied an apportionment. 
The apportionment has also been applied in the capital and revenue expenditure situations such as the 
recent case of CIR v VRD Investments (Ply) Ltd (1993, 4 SA 330, 55 SATC 368, 1993 Taxpayer 231). 
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discriminatory and might jeopardise South African relationship with its trading 
partners, particularly in the negotiation of double tax agreements.332 
Hong Kong's taxation system on the other hand, works on the territorial source 
principle whereby only earnings derived in Hong Kong are taxable. 
Yet, for years, international businesses have had to accept that there is an element of 
uncertainty about Hong Kong taxation. As far as the determination of source of profits 
is concerned, Hong Kong tax law has been attacked as being in a state of confusion, 
because the courts have not analysed the question of 'source' and interpreted the 
'operations' test with any consistency. The Inland Revenue Department has also 
failed to adopt a practice that is clear or acceptable. 333 
It has been argued that because there is no legislation on the issue of source, this has 
given rise to a string of ambiguous court decisions. For instance, on the source of 
trading profits following the Magna Industrial case, it has been difficult for a 
potential taxpayer to know when he is conducting a business in Hong Kong and 
whether the related profits are Hong Kong source, and therefore taxable. Furthermore, 
the court decision in the Orion Caribbean case has rendered the test for determining 
the source of interest income to be more problematic. 
Following the international practice, it is suggested that as applied in the South 
African context on source of profits, rather than giving a general definition, it may be 
more helpful to ascertain the source of income by considering particular types of 
income on a case-by-case basis. 
In order to render the tax law more predictable when determining the source of 
profits, the Department in Hong Kong is much more active in reducing the possibility 
and the areas of disputes with the taxpayers, by consistently providing Advance 
Rulings and Practice Notes on the locality of profits to businesses. For instance, 
unlike in South African, the Department in Hong Kong in most cases where profits 
332 See Harrison, P, "Non-discrimination of Tax Treaties", Accountancy SA, February 2002, p. 8-11. 
333 See The Taxpayer, January 1999, p. 8. It was stipulated by VanderWolk, op cit, Tax Notes 
International, 7 December 1992, p. 1307, that the department's practice note has raised more questions 
than it answered. It suffers from both internal inconsistencies and from departures from authoritative 
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are earned from different sources has recognised that apportionment is permissible 
under the Ordinance, and is in favour of a pragmatic arrangement with apportionment 
of profits on a 50:50 basis. 
Finally, the comparison of the source of particular incomes in Hong Kong and South 
Africa as adopted by the Inland Revenue practice in both countries can be 
summarised as follows: 
Types of income Hong Kong 
Rental income from Taxable if the property 
real property Hong Kong 
Profits from the sale Taxable if the property 






Taxable if the property is located in 
South Africa. 
Taxable if the capital is employed or the 
taxpayer's activities exercised in South 
Africa. 
Profits from the sale Taxable in principle, if the contract is Taxable is the capital is employed or the 
of goods effected in Hong Kong, but following activities carried out in South Africa. 
the Magna Industrial case, 
consideration also of the totality of 
facts. 
Profits from the Taxable if the stock exchange where Taxable depending on the facts, if the 
purchase and sale of the shares are bought and sold is independent share dealing business is 
listed shares 
Service fees 
located in Hong Kong. However, carried on in South Africa. 
profits accruing to a business (other 
than fmancial institution) from the sale 
of securities issued outside Hong Kong 
and not listed on an exchange are 
taxable if the contract of purchase and 
sale is effected in Hong Kong. 
Taxable if the services are performed Taxable if the service is performed in 
in the Republic. However, employment South Africa. 
income is taxable if it is located in 
Hong Kong. 
Royalties on Taxable if the intellectual property is Sourced in South Africa if intellectual 
Intellectual property used in Hong Kong (when received by property is created or developed in the 
legal sources such as the Hang Seng Bank decision. Moreover, certain areas where the law is currently 
uncertain are simply not addressed. 
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a non-resident). Otherwise, if received 
by a business, taxable on the same 
basis as trading profits. 
Republic irrespective of where the asset 
is used to generate royalties. However, it 
is subject to a withholding tax on 
payment to non-residents for the use of 
intellectual property in South Africa. 
Interest accruing to a Taxable in principle, if the lender All types of interest income taxable in 
business (other than provides the funds in Hong Kong to the South Africa if either the provision of 
financial institution) borrower. However, following the credit was made in the Republic or if the 
Orion case, can be subject to tax in debtor uses the money in South Africa. 
Hong Kong if the main business of the 
lender which gave rise to the interest is 
located there. 
In the case of financial institution, 
taxable if the business is carried on in 
Hong Kong irrespective of the location 
of the provision of credit. 
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Part V: General conclusion and recommendations 
This research analyses the concept of fiscal jurisdiction using a comparative approach. In 
doing so, it attempts to show that it is still difficult, irrespective of the jurisdiction 
considered, to find a comprehensive and uniform test for determining the factors for tax 
liability. 
In analysing the concept of fiscal jurisdiction in the countries considered, one of the main 
findings is that one of the problems of international taxation today concerns the divergent 
interpretation of similar or identical issues by the tax authorities and the courts in 
different countries. Even for countries adopting the same system of taxation, it is 
common that a single criterion could be interpreted differently. The main solution 
suggested is for countries to enter into agreements in order to counter the problem of 
multiple taxation of the same income and to facilitate international trade. 
However, the issue remains in relation to the harmonisation and proper understanding of 
rules on how to decide which one of the contracting states shall have the right to tax. Tax 
treaty language can sometimes be quite vague, and necessarily so, given that it is 
designed to operate in what may be two very different revenue systems. The legal effect 
of treaties may be different in the two treaty countries, and the manner in which a treaty 
is interpreted may vary in different court systems without necessarily harmonious 
results.l 
From the fiscal analysis of the jurisdictions considered (South Africa and Hong Kong), 
the concept of source has appeared to be an enigmatic principle in terms of its definition 
and application. The first argument that has been raised in this study is that there is no 
statutory definition of 'source' principle in South Africa and Hong Kong and the courts 
have not analysed the issue of ascertaining the source of particular incomes in these two 
I See Sandler, Part III, op cit, p. 39. 
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countries with any consistency.2 Moreover, in the application of the source concept, the 
South African tax system, in taxing according to a dominant cause of income, could learn 
from the Hong Kong system where the principle of apportionment of income is expressly 
implemented in the tax legislation. 
In addition, it has been argued that apart from the similarity of approach adopted by the 
courts in these two countries, taking into consideration that the case law development in 
one generates a great deal of interest in the other, every jurisdiction still provides in its 
tax law different criteria for the determination of their domestic source of income. 
Given the level of cross-border activities undertaken, it remains important to clarify and 
harmonise the rules relating to the determination of the source of income in any 
jurisdiction. It is also necessary to explain the taxation of particular types of income in 
order to provide certainty to taxpayers and to minimise the effect of international double 
taxation. It is to this effect that in the implementation of the residence tax system in South 
Africa from 01 January 2001, most of the deeming source provisions, criticised for being 
formalistic and subject to abuse, have been repealed in the legislation. 
In the complex world of international trade, no single tax principle can be applied in a 
pure form. Various principles have been modified in the direction of some common 
middle ground. As a result, jurisdictions exclusively based on source (Hong Kong) have 
also imported an element of a residence basis, while others like South Africa have shifted 
their tax system from a hybrid source based to a pre-dominantly residence tax system. 
In the jurisdictions considered, that is, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, various factors are adopted to ascertain the meaning of 'residence'. This 
determination varies from the 'physical presence' test to the factual approach in the case 
of individuals. With regard to legal entities, the main tests are the place of incorporation 
2 The Hong Kong source system has been criticized for being in a state of confusion, while South African 
tax legislator has reacted in the past by the adoption of various deeming provisions to circumvent this 
problem. 
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and the subjective factor of central management and control or the place of effective 
management. 
In the United Kingdom, for instance, the scope of residence in tax law applicable to 
individuals is extremely wide, and as a result, the different forms of residence create their 
own problems by relying, to a considerable extent, on calculation of length of stay and 
the taxpayer's intent. The tax legislation in South Africa appears to be more 
comprehensive in comparison although it still contains a number of uncertain areas. For 
example, the interpretation in the legislation of the term 'ordinarily resident' is still 
vague, although guidelines have now been provided on its interpretation by SARS.3 
Furthermore, the United States rules on individual residence, based on the green card and 
substantial presence tests, differ from those of both South Africa and the United Kingdom 
in some interesting respects. 
With regard to legal entities, South Africa has implemented in its tax law, in addition to 
the 'place of incorporation' test, the DEeD tie-breaker rule of 'place of effective 
management' in its tests of residence. In terms of SARS' Interpretation Note,4 the place 
of effective management is viewed as the place where the highest level of day-to-day 
management is located, which is very distinct from the 'central management and control' 
applicable in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Revenue authorities considered 
the place of central management and control to be where the board of directors meets to 
make the key decisions. 
In contrast, the United States tax law is based only on the 'place of incorporation' as the 
unique test for determining the residence of corporations. With the globalisation of the 
world's economies and the desire to attract foreign direct investment in most countries, 
the registration of a company has become easy and inexpensive and it is therefore 
surprising that such a formality should have such significant tax consequences. The effect 
3 See SARS' Interpretation Note no 3, 4 February 2002. 
4 No 6, dated 26 March 2002. 
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is that adopting the place of incorporation as the sole factor for determining the corporate 
residence may reach a result that is purely formal and devoid of any substance. 
Furthermore, even countries which adhere strictly in their bilateral treaties to the OECD 
Model Tax Convention do not adopt the same interpretation of the definitional provision 
of this Convention, although the Commentary5 of the Model now provides an 
interpretation of the 'place of effective management', which is very similar to the United 
Kingdom application. Thus, for the purposes of fiscal jurisdiction, this could explain why 
OECD measures have had limited success in resolving the more serious problems of 
international tax avoidance. One of the ideal solutions for a more homogeneous 
interpretation of the provisions of the treaty is for different jurisdictions to co-operate by 
agreeing to a common tax base. 
1. The evaluation of the reasons for the radical change to the residence basis of 
taxation in South Africa 
For major net capital exporting countries, the residence tax system is preferred. It is 
argued that with the international economic integration, where capital has become highly 
mobile and businesses increasingly becoming transnational, adopting a residence tax 
system would protect the tax base from possible erosion when exchange controls are 
lifted . 
South Africa's main reasons for shifting from a source system to a residence tax system 
were as follows: 
• To place the income tax system on a sounder footing thereby protecting the South 
Mrican tax base from exploitation; 
• To bring the South African tax system more in line with international practice; 
• To relax exchange control regulations and facilitate greater involvement of South 
African companies offshore; 
5 See The OECD Commentary updated as of 29 April 2000, on the definition of 'place of effective 
management', in article 4, para 24. 
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• To more effectively cater for the taxation of e-commerce. 
From the perspective of a developing country like South Africa, the more important tax 
problem in respect of the residence principle concerns the gradual relaxation of exchange 
controls and the resultant capital flight. With the application of the residence tax system, 
many residents, especially those with the greatest wealth, will seek to send their wealth 
abroad and those sophisticated may wish to ensure that no tax liability arises in respect of 
the wealth, by using various stratagems. The main problem is one of detection and tax 
administration. 
South Africa has tried to protect its tax system from this kind of exploitation by widening 
its tax base. Thus, under the current 'residence-minus' system, South Mrica imposes 
taxes on a worldwide basis. South Mrica has therefore followed the international practice 
(as applicable in the United Kingdom and the United States), by implementing legislation 
in the forms of controlled foreign entity and foreign dividend application rules, which 
provide for South African taxation either of certain foreign sourced income generated by 
South African controlled foreign entities, or when the foreign income is finally 
repatriated in South Africa in the form of foreign dividend. 
For instance, in relation to South African controlled foreign entity (CFE) rules, South 
Africa tax applies where failure to tax foreign controlled entity income will likely lead to 
an artificial flow of funds offshore, not where taxation will likely damage South Mrica 
international competitiveness. In addition, countries studied in this research attribute 
income of a CFE only to resident taxpayers that have a minimum interest (which may be 
variable) in the CFE. The rationale for a minimum ownership requirement is fairness. 
Although all shareholders of a CFE benefit from the deferral of residence country tax on 
the income of the CFE, shareholders with small interests in CFEs, may not have any 
influence over the affairs of the CFE and may not even be able to obtain the necessary 
information to report their share of the CFE's undistributed income. 
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Similarly, for the purposes of encouraging investment in South Mrica, the legislation 
introducing the residence based system of taxation in South Africa has provided some 
specific concessions, including incentives and exemptions to motivate the establishment 
in the country of foreign international company's headquarters,6 the exemption of foreign 
employment income of contract workers, and the temporary exemption on foreign 
pensions received by South African residents. In addition, the legislation provides in 
section 9E(8A), a kind of ministerial exemption by which the Minister of Finance may 
grant, if the taxpayer meets certain requirements, exemption from the application of 
foreign dividend rules of section 9E. The effect of this tax sparing concession is that the 
taxpayer will be able to repatriate the benefits of the tax incentives enjoyed in the foreign 
country. Previously, such benefits would have been lost when the dividends were brought 
in South Mrica. 
However, it can be argued that the previous tax regime (source system) helped to attract 
and retain companies in South Africa. Thus, the shift in tax policy (with the 
implementation of the residence tax system) has made it less attractive to run businesses 
from South Africa, not only because companies have to pay South African taxes on local 
and foreign earnings, but mainly because the tax system has become enormously 
complex, contrary to the intention of the Katz Commission in its 5th Report, which 
advocated a system that is as simple as possible. Judge Davis 7 contended on this matter 
that there is an information overload in the new tax system, and because the tax system 
through its foreign income taxation rules is ever changing, this has left tax advisers at a 
loss as to how to advise their clients. 
It is known that CFE and foreign dividend application rules are legitimate actions against 
tax avoidance. This is because under a worldwide system of taxation, it is unacceptable 
that the mere incorporation of a subsidiary in a tax haven would lead to an exemption or 
deferral of tax. Thus, for countries using a residence tax system, the decision to introduce 
6 This is the main concession in the South African tax law whereby headquarter companies are 
pracctically out of the tax system, though certain items of income generated by them will still be taxed in 
South Africa, probably because they represent South African source income. See section 1 (b) of the Act. 
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for example, CFE legislation is based on the consideration of capital export neutrality. 
This requires that all residents of a country should face the same effective rate whether 
they invest in that country or abroad. The fairness issue is magnified when the domestic 
market is important and taxpayers with foreign activities would be favoured over 
domestic operations. 
Although the implementation of the CFE legislation in South Africa reflects strong 
adherence to this doctrine, it has been proven in its application to be notoriously complex 
and difficult to administer. Thus, generally, a strong dissent has been expressed by the 
proponents of deferral against the implementation of CFE rules by countries on the 
following grounds: 
• They infringe upon tax sovereignty; 
• They destroy capital import neutrality; 
• They prevent fair tax competition; and 
• They confuse deferral of tax and abuse. 
With regard to whether the South African residence tax system is more suitable for the 
taxation of e-commerce, it may be argued that in the digital economy, the jurisdictional 
rules of residence may be more dependable and less subject to manipulation than those 
governing source-based taxation, although this does not mean that they are without 
difficulty. Thus, there seems to be a trend that residence-based tax systems assume 
greater importance and are more suited and effective in an e-commerce environment. On 
the other hand, to the extent that reliance is still placed on the physical presence or 
location in a particular territory in determining the residence tests, the communication 
technology will also affect the test for residence. 
2. Summary of recommendations 
For the purposes of analysing the concept of fiscal jurisdiction, the following emerges: 
7 See Davis, D, "Tax Refonn Not Complete, But Pause Needed", January 2002, no 11 , Tax Update, 
Deneys Reitz Attorneys Publication. 
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(i) The justification for the imposition of tax depends on the theory of fiscal 
jurisdiction chosen. There are a variety of models, and this research has 
considered two essential concepts: source and residence. It is appropriate for a 
jurisdiction to consider a connecting factor for tax liability that is suitable for the 
circumstances of its economy. A country should adopt the basis for tax liability 
that prevents the abuse of the tax system, while taking into consideration its 
administrative efficacy in enforcing the legislation. 
ii) Developing countries with policies to attract foreign direct investment and strict 
exchange control regulations which result in insignificant outward investment 
should tend more to adopt the source principle of taxation, while developed 
countries which are more capital exporters would in many cases apply the 
residence tax system. It might seem surprising in the case of South Africa that as a 
developing country, it has decided to adopt the residence principle of taxation. 
However, the South African shift to a mainly dominant residence system is 
justifiable in consideration of the continuous relaxation of its exchange control 
regulations which has triggered a large volume of outbound investment as well as 
the compatibility of the residence system with the practice of its trading partners. 
In addition, the residence tax system is considered to be suitable in an e-
commerce environment. 
iii) The main challenge for any country is to be able to develop certainty in domestic 
rules of fiscal jurisdiction. This is not easy in the South African context because 
of the necessity for the tax system to borrow extensively rules from other 
countries which are initially alien to South African application. Thus, it is 
important to harmonise the key tax concepts in the application of double tax 
treaties. With regard to the source system for instance, the rule relating to the 
determination of the source of income should be more consistent or the taxation 
of particular types of income should be explained to provide certainty to 
taxpayers. On the other hand, with regard to the residence concept, though it is the 
favourable tax system in international practice, it remains important for a 
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jurisdiction to adopt III its national tax laws, residence criteria that are not 
extremely wide and fragmented into classes and application. Although the 
combination of various residence rules may minimise the abuse of the tax system, 
it follows that they may nevertheless become impractical, especially in light of 
growth of multinational companies and cross-border movement. 
iv) As already mentioned, the decision for a residence country to introduce specific 
anti-avoidance measures such as CFE and foreign dividend application rules is 
based on the policy consideration of capital export neutrality. Many technical 
issues are involved in determining the appropriate portion of the income of a CFE 
or foreign dividend to be attributed to resident shareholders. Countries limit the 
application of CFE rules to foreign entities that are controlled by residents or in 
which residents own a substantial interest. For South African tax purposes, the tax 
system is very complex and several factors have contributed to this state of 
affairs, such as : the increasing complexity of modern business; the greater 
sophistication of tax planning techniques; the effect of globalisation with 
taxpayers investing and doing more business offshore. It is recommended that 
SARS should provide detailed interpretation notes on the understanding of the 
relevant legislation, and should avoid constant change of the legislation in order 
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